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– ABSTRACT – 
 
This thesis offers an account of how European human rights law – the law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘the ECHR’) – imagines the human 
condition. It argues that the ECHR legal order is an order that is constituted upon, 
and structured by, a vision of ‘the individual’, and that to understand European 
human rights law we need to understand the mode of being – the vision of life – 
that underpins this order. The argument I make is that a series of assumptions 
about the human condition structure European human rights law, in that they 
underpin the six things that European human rights law relies on for its 
significance: its interpretive vision; its modes of reasoning; its integration of values; 
its expression of a vision of emancipation; its therapeutic potential; and its form 
of accountability. Assumptions are made about the way in which ‘the individual’ 
develops an identity in European human rights law, about her need for a sense of 
continuity across time, about her need for recognition by others, about her agency 
in managing reality and her capacity to detach from reality, and about the way in 
which she is attached to material circumstances and is also able to extend herself 
beyond material circumstances. I argue that these assumptions are broadly oriented 
towards a notion of individual continuity through time and that they are 
underpinned by a vision of the human condition in which the fundamental 
question to be negotiated is a question of coming to terms – a question of coming 
into the terms of European human rights law and of coming to terms with all that 
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– INTRODUCTION – 
 
“[T]he object and purpose of the [European Convention on Human Rights] as an instrument for 
the protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied 
so as to make its safeguards practical and effective…” (Soering v UK (1989), para.87) 
“The very essence of the [European Convention on Human Rights] is respect for human dignity 
and human freedom.” (Pretty v UK (2002), para.65) 
 
Giving an account of European human rights law 
This is a thesis about the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the ECHR’): 
a Convention that is described as having as its “object and purpose…the 
protection of individual human beings”1 and as its “very essence…respect for 
human dignity and human freedom”.2 The former claim, expressing the object and 
purpose of the Convention, is one about the style of interpretation implied and 
indeed necessitated here; the latter claim, stipulating the ‘essence’ of the 
Convention, is one about its form and structure. Taken together, the two claims 
offer a profound insight into the constitution and structure of the legal order that 
is founded by the ECHR. For through these claims, we are introduced to the idea 
that what we have here, in European human rights law, is a form of law that is 
based on and exists for ‘the individual’. More specifically, we are introduced to the 
idea that European human rights law is underpinned by an account of what it 
means to be an ‘individual human being’ who is the subject of the protection of 
the ECHR – and, therefore, to the idea that European human rights law 
presupposes and produces a vision of being. 
 On the one hand, the idea that European human rights law expresses a 
vision of being is unsurprising. After all, the centrality that European human rights 
law appears to grant to ‘the individual’ would tend to imply the articulation of an 
                                                          
1 14038/88, Soering v UK (1989), para.87. 
2 2346/02, Pretty v UK (2002), para.65. 
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account of this ‘individual being’. Furthermore, the ECHR legal order must in any 
case, and by virtue of its nature as a legal order, set out a vision of being. This is 
because, as a legal order, the ECHR order is a lived order, which is to say that it 
necessarily presupposes and expresses a mode of being – a vision of life – such 
that the order is itself lived. We might further fairly presume that this vision of 
being would be fundamental to European human rights law’s whole operation, 
since to be at all effective European human rights law must be able to relate to the 
lives and experiences of those within its jurisdiction, so that they can rely on, appeal 
to, and fundamentally assume the existence of the rights and freedoms set out in 
the ECHR. European human rights law must, in other words, be able to engage 
with the self-understanding of its individual subjects and objects so that they can 
understand themselves as such: as subjects and objects of European human rights 
law. 
 And yet while there may therefore be something unsurprising about the 
idea that European human rights law articulates a vision of being, the implications 
of this are nevertheless far-reaching in what they suggest. This is that to understand 
European human rights law – as a legal order, and as a lived order – we need to 
understand the mode of being that underpins its conception of order. We need to 
understand, in other words, its vision of life.  
 This thesis offers an account of that vision; and, as such, it suggests a way 
of thinking about and understanding European human rights law. The principal 
argument that I make is that a series of assumptions about the human condition 
are made in European human rights law. I argue that these assumptions are ordering 
assumptions. They underpin the terms of European human rights law and they 
therefore underpin the six things that European human rights law relies on for its 
significance: its interpretive vision; its modes of reasoning; its integration of values; 
its expression of a vision of emancipation; its therapeutic potential; and its form 
of accountability.  
1. The ordering assumptions about the human condition underpin the 
interpretive vision of European human rights law, in that they structure the 
ECtHR’s interpretation of the ECHR. Ordering assumptions inform 
13 
 
specific assumptions. Specific assumptions are the assumptions that 
structure the interpretation of specific provisions of the ECHR. For 
example, the assumption that “an individual’s interest in discovering his 
parentage does not disappear with age, quite the reverse” is one of the 
assumptions that structures the Court’s construction of “the right to know 
one’s parentage” (which is included within the right to respect for private 
life),3 and the assumption that the destruction of a natural swamp in the 
vicinity of an individual’s home would have a lesser effect on their well-
being than the destruction of a forest is one of the assumptions that 
structures the Court’s interpretation of what constitutes “environmental 
deterioration” capable of directly affecting the rights to respect for private 
and family life.4 Such specific assumptions are products of the more general 
ordering assumptions that cut across European human rights law – 
assumptions about the meaning of identity and about the form that 
attachment takes, for example, and assumptions about what constitutes an 
individual’s sense of place and what ‘well-being’ means and entails.5   
 
2. European human rights law’s ordering assumptions underpin the modes of 
reasoning of the ECtHR – the modes by way of which interferences with 
rights are tested and conflicting interests are brought into terms with each 
other. For example, in recent years, the ECtHR has accepted that the 
principle of “living together” (which is essentially about a State’s 
conception of “the minimum requirements of life in society”) “can be 
linked” to ‘the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’, which is 
specified as one of the legitimate aims for possible interferences with 
qualified rights like the rights to freedom of religion and to respect for 
private life.6 This acceptance – like the principle of ‘living together’ itself – 
is, in turn, underpinned by assumptions not only about what it means to 
                                                          
3 58757/00, Jäggi v Switzerland (2006), paras.40, 37. See further Ch.4, part 4.4.2. 
4 41666/98, Kyrtatos v Greece (2003), para.53. See further Ch.6, part 6.3.2. 
5 See further Chs.2, 4, and 6. 
6 43835/11, S.A.S. v France (2014), para.121. See further Ch.4, part 4.3.  
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‘live together’ in society but about the way in which individuals relate to 
each other and, more fundamentally, about the construction of the self in 
relation to the other.7  
 
3. The ordering assumptions underpin the integration of values in European 
human rights law. This integration is reflected in the way in which the 
provisions of the ECHR are related to each other:8 a relation that is enabled 
– or so I argue in this thesis – by a vision of the human condition that runs 
across these provisions. For example, significant weight is attached in 
European human rights law to the capacity to hope. The assumptions that 
are made about the importance of “the experience of hope” and about what 
hope itself entails run across the interpretation of the ECHR provisions 
and underpin the notion of ‘human dignity’ that is the more explicit 
expression of the integration of values in European human rights law.9  
 
4. European human rights law’s ordering assumptions underpin its expression 
of a vision of emancipation. This is not only in the sense that being in the terms 
of European human rights law and making claims through the language of 
these terms is deemed emancipatory in itself, but in that European human 
rights law sets out its own vision of what constitutes emancipation. For 
example, in Leyla Şahin v Turkey (2005) the ECtHR accepted that one of the 
grounds on which a prohibition on wearing the Islamic headscarf in a 
Turkish university was based was the ground of ‘gender equality’, such that, 
as Judge Tulkens pointed out in her Dissenting Opinion, “the principle of 
sexual equality” was conceived of as a justification for a “[prohibition on] 
a woman from following a practice which, in the absence of proof to the 
                                                          
7 See further Ch.4. 
8 On this notion of integration see S. Baer, ‘Dignity, Liberty, Equality: A Fundamental Rights 
Triangle of Constitutionalism’ (2009) University of Toronto Law Journal 59(4), 417-468.   
9 22662/13 et al., Matiošaitis and Others v Lithuania (2017), para.180. See further Ch.3, part 3.2.3. 
The notion of ‘dignity’ is an explicit expression of the integration of values in European human 
rights law in that as we saw above, “[t]he very essence of the Convention is respect for human 
dignity and human freedom” (2346/02, Pretty v UK (2002), para.65). See further Ch.3, part 3.2. 
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contrary, she must be taken to have freely adopted”.10 The Court 
subsequently conceded in S.A.S. v France (2014) that “a State party cannot 
invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice that is defended by 
women…in the context of the exercise of the rights enshrined in [Articles 
8 and 9 of the Convention]”.11 But the dropping of the argument is not 
itself the point, which is rather that the ECtHR conceives of itself as having 
this function of setting out a vision of what constitutes emancipation at all, 
and that certain assumptions (such as about the meaning of equality) 
underpin the exercise of this function. 
 
5. The ordering assumptions underpin European human rights law’s 
expression of its therapeutic potential, which is about the way in which 
European human rights law is conceived of as supplying a language and a 
means for recounting and containing experiences. For example, European 
human rights law is conceived of as being able to pull traumatic experiences 
– which would otherwise be usually taken to resist meaning and 
interpretation12 – within a narrative form and to thereby impose some order 
upon these experiences.13 This move is in itself a reflection of a broader 
assumption that is made in European human rights law about the need for 
a sense of continuity and, more specifically, about the role of narrativisation 
in the construction of this continuity.14 
 
6. European human rights law’s ordering assumptions underpin the 
expression of its form of accountability, which is about the way in which the 
ECHR places a constraint on State power that involves bringing power to 
its terms. The ordering assumptions underpin, for example, the account 
that is constructed of what would be required, in a context of alleged 
                                                          
10 44774/98, Leyla Şahin v Turkey (2005), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tulkens, para.12. 
11 43835/11, S.A.S. v France (2014), para.119. 
12 See, e.g., M. S. Roth, Memory, Trauma, and History: Essays on Living with the Past (2012, Columbia 
University Press), p77 et seq.  
13 See further Ch.3, parts 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. 
14 See further Ch.3. 
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medical negligence, to “call a Contracting State to account from the 
standpoint of its positive obligations under Article 2 of the Convention to 
protect life”.15 This is because they underpin European human rights law’s 
vision of what roles like ‘health professional’ mean and entail; and they also 
underpin a vision of the relationship between these roles and the State.16     
 
Over the course of Chapters 2-6 of this thesis, we will see that we can classify the 
ordering assumptions that structure European human rights law in this way into 
five main categories that are all broadly oriented towards the persistence of (a 
conception of) ‘the individual’ through time. Assumptions are made about the way 
in which ‘the individual’ develops an identity in European human rights law 
(Chapter 2), about her need for a sense of continuity across time (Chapter 3), about 
her need for recognition by others (Chapter 4), about her agency in managing 
reality and her capacity to detach from reality (Chapter 5), and about the way in 
which she is attached to material circumstances and is also able to extend herself 
beyond these (Chapter 6). The thesis offers an account of the vision of the human 
condition that underpins and emerges from the notion of individual continuity that 
these assumptions give rise to. This vision, I argue, is one of the human condition 
as a condition in which the fundamental question to be negotiated is a question of 
coming to terms – a question of coming into the terms of European human rights law 
and of coming to terms with all that which must be brought to terms according to 
European human rights law.  
 In giving an account of how European human rights law imagines the 
human condition in this way, an account of the lived order of European human 
rights law necessarily also emerges in my thesis. This is because European human 
rights law’s vision of the human condition (its vision of a mode of being) is 
inseparable from its mode of order of individuation – an inseparability that is a 
consequence of the nature of the ECHR legal order as a lived order. The mode of 
being that is in question in this thesis is, in other words, one that is presupposed 
                                                          
15 See, e.g., 56080/13, Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v Portugal (2017), para.187 et seq. 
16 See further Ch.2, part 2.3; Ch.5, part 5.4.1; Ch.6, part 6.3.1. 
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and expressed by European human rights law’s mode of order of individuation, 
such that this order is itself lived. And so my account of how European human 
rights law imagines the human condition is also an account of how this vision is 
lived; and the underpinning question of this thesis – the question of ‘how does 
European human rights law imagine the human condition?’ – emerges as being inseparable 
from the further questions of ‘how is life lived when this vision is lived?’ and ‘what does it 
mean for life to be lived in this way?’  
Methodology 
(i) The practice-dependent approach 
Methodologically, the guiding questions of my thesis imply a practice-dependent 
approach. More specifically, they demand a reconstruction of the practice of 
European human rights law, and one that is organised around the way in which 
European human rights law imagines the human condition.17 Kai Möller 
distinguishes such a “reconstructive theory” from “a ‘philosophical’ 
theory…which is insensitive to practice” and which “will aim at providing the 
morally best account…while ignoring the question of the extent to which this 
account fits the practice”.18 A reconstructive theory, like a philosophical theory, 
“aims at providing a theory which…is morally coherent, but unlike it, need not be 
the morally best (‘the one right’) theory, where ‘morally best’ is understood as 
morally best independently of practice”.19  
 As the question here is one of how European human rights law imagines 
the human condition, the object of the reconstruction must be European human 
rights law’s vision of the human condition. The aim must be to account for this 
aspect of the practice of European human rights law. But since this vision has 
already been identified as being inseparable from European human rights law’s 
mode of order of individuation (an inseparability that derives from the constitution 
of the ECHR legal order as a lived order), the account must also have explanatory 
                                                          
17 This is how Kai Möller defines a “reconstructive” approach in The Global Model of Constitutional 
Rights (2012, Oxford University Press), p20.  
18 Ibid., p20. 
19 Ibid., p20. 
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value as such. In other words, there is a methodological consequence to the 
inseparability of the questions of being (‘how does European human rights law 
imagine the human condition?’) and meaning (‘how is life lived when this vision is 
lived?’ and ‘what does it mean for life to be lived in this way?’) and this consists in 
the way in which the reconstructive account must be able to speak to both aspects.  
This is where the insights of philosophical anthropology can be usefully 
brought in. Philosophical anthropology is a discipline that deals specifically in 
questions of meaning. It forefronts “conceptual life”, and particularly, the question 
of “the concepts with which we understand ourselves and the world we inhabit”.20 
It deals, in other words, with how concepts “are part of a certain way of being”;21 
it addresses our frameworks of understanding – the frameworks of “intelligibility” 
that we use and rely on to make sense of our lives.22 Here, it suggests a framing 
for the reconstructive inquiry, because it implies that the vision of being in 
question cannot be considered in abstraction from the lived order within which it 
is grounded.  
This conceptualisation of the ECHR legal order as a lived order is 
elaborated in Chapter 1, which unpacks the concept of ‘lived order’ and as such 
establishes the conceptual framework that underpins the thesis entirely. It suggests 
that a lived order has three features: it is governed by an ethos, which functions to 
support the mode of being of the order; it is internalised by those within it; and it 
sets out a vision of five sites of life and order (which are, accordingly, five sites of 
inquiry): space, time, body, wisdom, and things. Any lived order, I suggest, must 
be able to account for these five sites; and critically, it must be able to account for 
the subject from their perspective, so that it can sustain its claim of a capacity to 
                                                          
20 J. Lear, The Idea of a Philosophical Anthropology (Spinoza Lectures) (2017, Koninklijke Van Gorcum), 
p15, p13.  
21 Nigel DeSouza, in an interview with Charles Taylor: ‘Philosophy as Philosophical 
Anthropology: An Interview with Charles Taylor’, in A. Waldow and N. DeSouza (eds.), Herder: 
Philosophy and Anthropology (2017, Oxford University Press), 13-29, p23. 
22 Thus in a “loss of intelligibility…the concepts and categories by which the inhabitants of a form 
of life have understood themselves…cease to make sense as ways to live”: J. Lear, ‘What Is a 
Crisis of Intelligibility?’, in Wisdom Won from Illness: Essays in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (2017, 
Harvard University Press), 50-62, p50-51. See also J. Lear, Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural 
Devastation (2006, Harvard University Press).  
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relate to the self-understanding of its subjects. It must, therefore, have some 
conception of the space (and spatial boundaries) of its order and of the place of 
the subject within it. It must have some notion of time within the order – a notion 
of the temporality of being within the order. It must have some conception of the 
body within the order, so that it can produce a vision of embodiment within the 
order. It must have some conception of the reflexive capacity of the subject and 
of the interaction of this capacity with the normativity of the order. And finally, it 
must have a material dimension – a dimension which treats, at the very least, how 
material things are related to within it.  
The coupling of the conceptualisation of the ECHR legal order as a lived 
order with the reconstructive approach that is demanded by my research question 
suggests that what is necessitated here is an account that reconstructs European 
human rights law’s vision of the human condition in the light of – and with a view 
to accounting for – the constitution of the ECHR legal order as a lived order. What 
is called for is a reconstruction that takes place through the lens of the concept of 
lived order. The demand is not, therefore, for a “moral reconstruction” that “aims 
at finding moral value in a practice”23 or a normative reconstruction that seeks to 
find purpose in the practice.24 Rather, the demand is for a reconstruction that is 
aimed at the questions of being and meaning within the practice: a reconstruction 
that has as its object the vision of the human condition that is articulated within 
the context of European human rights law’s lived order.  
The question, then, is of the value of such an account. This is a question 
that we can assess by reference to its utility, and there are two measures that we 
may wish to employ to this end: (i) the degree to which the account enables us to 
better understand European human rights law; and (ii) the degree to which the 
account can serve as groundwork for future research. Whether or not the account 
offered in this thesis fulfils these measures (and whether, indeed, these measures 
                                                          
23 Ibid., p21. 
24 This does not mean that question of the morality or purpose of the practice of European human 
rights law can be eliminated from the inquiry entirely; the thesis after all opened with reference to 
the ECtHR’s conception of the purpose of the ECHR. The point is rather that the question does 
not demand a moral or purposive reconstruction. 
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are the correct ones to use in assessing the utility of the account) is ultimately a 
matter to be determined by the reader. But I would offer two reasons in support 
of the claim that an account of how European human rights law imagines the 
human condition could be useful.  
Firstly, an engagement with European human rights law’s vision of the 
human condition is an engagement with the very basis of European human rights 
law. This is in two senses: in the sense that it is an engagement with the underlying 
vision of European human rights law (a vision that is often only captured in 
references to the way in which the ECtHR conceives of the “very essence” of the 
ECHR as being “respect for human dignity and human freedom”25) and in the 
sense that it is an engagement with the nature of the ECHR legal order as such (an 
order that is a lived order, in which the vision of being is inseparable from the 
order itself). And to the extent that what is in question here is, in this way, the basis 
of European human rights law – in terms of the essence of European human rights 
law, and the constitution of its order as such – an account of European human 
rights law’s vision of the human condition could conceivably enable us to better 
understand European human rights law. The underpinning claim in this regard 
would be that to understand a system, we need to understand its basis. Its 
employment here would rest on three further empirical assumptions: that we have 
not hitherto engaged sufficiently with European human rights law’s underlying 
vision; that engagement with this vision would enable us to better understand 
European human rights law’s basis; and that understanding this basis would enable 
us to better understand European human rights law.26 
 Secondly, an account that is focused on how European human rights 
imagines the human condition could usefully serve as a basis for future research. 
There is currently a relative lack of literature in the field of European human rights 
law that tackles the question of the construction of the subject, let alone the 
question of the construction of a vision of the human condition.27 This is despite 
                                                          
25 2346/02, Pretty v UK (2002), para.65. 
26 All three assumptions are, of course, open to contestation.  
27 For notable exceptions on the construction of the subject in European human rights law (albeit 
ones that focus on particular dimensions of the subject), see P. Johnson, Homosexuality and the 
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the fact that the ECHR legal order constructs a vision of ‘the individual’ that it 
posits as central to its order and despite the fact that it also sets out a vision of 
being – a vision of life – such that it can engage with the self-understanding of its 
subjects and objects and be lived as a legal order at all. An account of how 
European human rights law imagines the human condition could usefully serve in 
this context as the starting point for work that engages with the institutional, social, 
political, economic, and cultural context in which this vision is produced; work 
that critiques the way in which European human rights law imagines the human 
condition (or the way in which it has been recounted as doing so); work that 
engages in questions of the morality and/or normativity of European human rights 
law’s vision of the human condition; and work that puts this vision into 
comparative perspective.28 Any of these projects would require an account with 
which to begin, and a reconstruction such as that offered here could provide this 
starting point.  
 As indicated above, these questions of utility must, in the end, be 
determined by the reader. My point here is merely that it is possible to imagine that 
a reconstruction of the sort that is offered in this thesis – a reconstruction of the 
practice of European human rights law that accounts for how European human 
rights law imagines the human condition within the context of the constitution of 
the ECHR legal order as a lived order – could be a useful contribution.  
(ii) The focus on European human rights law 
But why reconstruct the practice of European human rights law at all? Why is the 
question here one of how European human rights law imagines the human 
condition and not one of international human rights law, or domestic human rights 
law, or some other system of regional human rights law? And why consider the 
                                                          
European Court of Human Rights (2013, Routledge) and D. A. Gonzalez-Salzberg, Sexuality and 
Transsexuality under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Queer Reading of Human Rights Law 
(2019, Hart Publishing). See further Ch.1, part 1.2.2. Notably more has been written on this 
subject in the context of international human rights law. See esp. J. R. Slaughter, Human Rights, 
Inc.: The World Novel, Narrative Form, and International Law (2007, Fordham University Press).  
28 An interesting starting point for such a comparative inquiry would be Floris de Witte’s work 
on the way in which different regional organisations construct the subject: ‘Integrating the 




ECHR legal order in isolation, and not in relation to these other legal systems? 
These questions emerge as particularly acute when we consider the interaction that 
occurs between the ECtHR and national legal systems,29 between the ECtHR and 
the Court of Justice of the EU (‘the CJEU’),30 and between the ECtHR and other 
international instruments.31 Why, then, focus on the ECHR legal order? 
 The reason is that the ECHR legal order is a wholly distinctive legal order. 
This is not only in the sense that its court, the ECtHR, is “the single most active 
and important rights-protecting body in the world”32 and that it has a notably 
enormous span, covering 47 member states with a population of 820 million 
people. Rather, the form of the legal order presented here is unique in the way in 
which it is oriented entirely around ‘the individual’. Of course, all legal orders 
presuppose and express some conception of their subject. But what is notable 
about the ECHR legal order is the way in which it forefronts a process of 
individuation in this respect: a process of the delineation (and simultaneous 
articulation) of ‘the individual’, and one which here involves the elevation of ‘the 
individual’ out of the order of the state33 and the instatement of this same 
‘individual’ as the organising principle of a new form of order: the ECHR legal 
order. 
 The constitution of the process of individuation in European human rights 
law presents a challenge to the idea of individuation itself, which would usually be 
taken (and was always so taken in histories of the idea of ‘the individual’ in 
                                                          
29 See esp. H. Keller and A. Stone Sweet, A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National 
Legal Systems (2008, Oxford University Press); P. Popelier, C. Van De Heyning and P. Van Nuffel 
(eds.), Human rights protection in the European legal order: the interaction between the European and the national 
courts (2011, Intersentia). 
30 This is partly a consequence of the interpretive obligation laid down by Article 52(3) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. For a useful overview of the relationship between the 
ECtHR and the CJEU, and one addressing this specifically in the context of the question of EU 
accession to the ECHR, see F. Fabbrini and J. Larik, ‘The Past, Present and Future of the Relation 
between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2016) 
Yearbook of European Law 35(1), 145-179. 
31 The ECtHR regularly draws on other international instruments in interpreting ECHR rights. 
See, e.g., 23459/03, Bayatyan v Armenia (2011), para.102 et seq. 
32 A. Stone Sweet and C. Ryan, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Kant, Constitutional Justice, and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2018, Oxford University Press), p2. 
33 A. W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European 
Convention (2001, Oxford University Press), p157.   
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European thought34) to involve the delineation of ‘the individual’ from all forms 
of order. But what European human rights law’s conception of individuation 
claims to secure is the protection of ‘the individual’ within and beyond the state: a 
process that was consolidated by Protocol No. 11 of the ECHR (1998), which 
created a right of individual petition to the (then newly-permanent) ECtHR, once 
domestic remedies had been exhausted. 
 In fact the combination of the effects of Protocol No. 11 and the 
incorporation of the ECHR into national legal systems led, according to Alec Stone 
Sweet and Clare Ryan, to the emergence of the ECHR legal order as a “cosmopolitan 
legal order”, defined as “a multi-level, transnational legal system in which (i) 
justiciable rights are held by individuals; (ii) all public officials bear the obligation 
to fulfil the fundamental rights of every person within their jurisdiction, without 
respect to nationality or citizenship; and (iii) both domestic and transnational 
judges supervise how officials do so”.35 What is recognised in this depiction – and 
this is the vital point that we need to consider here – is that what we are presented 
with in European human rights law is a legal order that is intensely focused on – 
and owes its existence and purpose to – a conception of ‘the individual’. The 
ECHR legal order exists, as I will elaborate in Chapter 1, as an order of individuation.36 
It is based entirely around a vision of ‘the individual’. 
 Such an order, with “the oldest and most important international tribunal 
in the world dealing with human rights issues and cases”37 at its helm, offers the 
potential to tell us a great deal about human rights law and about the idea of human 
rights. In particular, it has the potential to tell us about the construction of ‘the 
individual’ as the subject and object of the ECHR legal order, as well as about the 
meaning of the concepts of ‘human dignity’ and ‘human freedom’ that motivate 
the practice of European human rights law.38 From the perspective of an inquiry 
into the idea of human rights, then, as well one into questions of legal culture, a 
                                                          
34 See further Ch.1, part 1.2. 
35 Stone Sweet and Ryan (2018), above n32, p1. 
36 See Ch.1, part 1.2.  
37 J.-P. Costa, ‘Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, in 
C. McCrudden (eds.), Understanding Human Dignity (2013, Oxford University Press), 393-402, p393. 
38 2346/02, Pretty v UK (2002), para.65, discussed above. 
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focus on how European human rights law imagines the human condition appears 
to be both an important and valuable exercise.  
 In addition to offering us insights about the idea of human rights and 
questions of legal culture, the ECHR legal order also promises to tell us something 
about the idea of Europe. This stems, not least, from the way in which the ECHR 
is interpreted by the ECtHR as calling for direct engagement with ‘modes of being’ 
in Europe. A central doctrine of interpretation in European human rights law is, 
therefore, that the ECHR be interpreted dynamically, as “a living instrument” and 
“in the light of present-day conditions”.39 As Guido Raimondi, the then President 
of the ECtHR, put it, in explaining this doctrine in a speech in January 2019: 
“Europe in the 1950s and the world we now live in are very different places. Our 
ways of life and moral standards are no longer the same.”40 This statement points 
to two important ideas. The first is that European human rights law necessarily 
engages with the question of ‘being’ in Europe.41 The second is the notion of the 
‘our’: “our ways of life and moral standards are no longer the same”. This ‘our’ 
performs an identifying (and therefore exclusionary) function. It signals to a shared 
framework of understanding that enables the “ways of life” and “moral standards” 
in question to be understood not just as belonging but as making sense at all.42 It 
signals, in other words, to a vision of the human condition through which meaning 
is generated and life is understood. That vision – which we can now understand as 
containing within it an idea of Europe – is the object of my research question.  
 
                                                          
39 5856/72, Tyrer v UK (1978), para.31. 
40 Guido Raimondi (President), Opening speech at the solemn hearing for the opening of the judicial year of 
the European Court of Human Rights (25 January 2019, Strasbourg) (available at: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20190125_Raimondi_JY_ENG.pdf) (last 
accessed 19 July 2019). 
41 Incidentally, this notion of ‘being’ in Europe – and law’s engagement with it – is gradually 
acquiring increased attention in the European law literature more broadly. See esp. Editorial 
comments, ‘EU law as a way of life’ (2017) Common Market Law Review 54(2), 357-367; L. Azoulai, 
S. Barbou des Places, and E. Pataut, ‘Being a Person in the European Union’, in L. Azoulai, S. 
Barbou des Places, and E. Pataut (eds.), Constructing the Person in EU Law: Rights, Roles, Identities 
(2016, Hart Publishing), 3-11. 
42 On such questions of “the concepts with which we understand ourselves and the world we 
inhabit” see further Lear (2017), above n20, p13.  
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(iii) The delineation of the scope of the inquiry  
The nature of the vision that is in question in this thesis – a vision of the human 
condition – is not one that is explicit in European human rights law. That much 
has already been made clear in the discussion of the way in which the question 
here is one of the underlying vision of European human rights law and one that 
calls for a reconstructive approach. But what we therefore need to give special 
consideration to is the question of the material that is to fall within the scope of 
the inquiry here.43 We need, in other words, to consider what will be constructed 
as the ‘practice’ of European human rights law in this context.  
 The starting point in this respect must surely be the ECtHR. This is the 
court that rules on applications alleging violations of the ECHR and is responsible 
for authoritatively interpreting the ECHR. If a vision of the human condition 
exists in European human rights law at all, we would presumably expect to find it 
in the work of this body – that is, in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
 The corpus of European human rights law is enormous, however, for since 
the ECtHR was set up, it has decided on hundreds of thousands of applications 
and it has handed down judgments in thousands of cases.44 I accordingly decided, 
and early on in my research, to specify the scope of the inquiry in terms of the 
range of jurisprudence that would fall within it. Given that the question of this 
thesis is one of the underlying vision of European human rights law, the obvious 
point of focus seemed to be the jurisprudence pertaining to the provisions of the 
ECHR that the ECtHR itself identifies as being closest to its claims about the 
“essence” of European human rights law. After all, if this ‘underlying vision’ does 
not appear in reference to the most fundamental, most vital, most essential aspects 
of European human rights law, then where would it appear? 
                                                          
43 This would always be a question but its urgency is arguably heightened when it concerns a 
vision that needs to be identified as such.   
44 See European Court of Human Rights, Overview: 1959-2018, ECHR (2019, European Court of 
Human Rights) (available at: https://echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592018_ENG.pdf) 
(last accessed 19 July 2019).  
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Articles 2, 3, and 4 have, in particular, been identified by the Court as 
“[enshrining] one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the 
Council of Europe”,45 and the idea that “the very essence of the Convention is 
respect for human dignity and human freedom” has been articulated most 
commonly in the context of Articles 3 and 8 (and especially 346).47 Such claims are 
significant, for they reveal what the Court itself conceives of as the underlying 
vision of European human rights law. And since the objective of this thesis is to 
uncover and dig down into this vision, much of the analysis presented in the 
following chapters is focused on Articles 2, 3, 4, and 8 (although reference is at 
times also made to jurisprudence under the other provisions, for reasons that are 
explained below). 
 Within this focus on Articles 2, 3, 4, and 8, my analysis further concentrates 
on those aspects that the ECtHR has deemed most fundamental to these 
provisions. These are the ‘general principles’: principles that the ECtHR has 
identified and developed in relation to each of the Convention provisions. They 
involve fundamental statements about the provision in question, such as about its 
scope and meaning. For instance, in relation to Article 3 (which prohibits torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), the general principles 
elaborate the meaning and implications of each of these terms. An example is the 
well-established principle that “[i]ll-treatment must attain a minimum level of 
severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3” and that “[t]he assessment of 
this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as 
the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, 
the sex, age and state of health of the victim”.48 
 When the Court assesses purported breaches of ECHR provisions in any 
given case, the relevant general principles are typically set out in a passage on the 
provision in question prior to the Court’s assessment of the case in their light. As 
such, the general principles are easily identifiable and traceable within the 
                                                          
45 73316/01, Siliadin v France (2005), para.82. 
46 Costa (2013), above n37. 
47 2346/02, Pretty v UK (2002), para.65.  
48 7334/13, Muršić v Croatia (2016), para.97. 
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jurisprudence of the ECtHR, as they are embedded in, and developed within, that 
jurisprudence. That does not negate the need to begin somewhere in analysing 
these principles, of course; and my first sweep of the case law involved tracing the 
chronological development of each provision’s principles through the 
jurisprudence of the Grand Chamber and also through the cases categorised as 
importance level ‘1’ in the database of the ECtHR. Importance level ‘1’ cases are 
described in the database as “[a]ll judgments, decisions and advisory opinions not 
included in the Case Reports which make a significant contribution to the 
development, clarification or modification of its case-law, either generally or in 
relation to a particular State”.49 They are judgments where fundamental questions 
of principle are at stake. I supplemented my analysis of these cases with analysis of 
the cases featured in the Case Reports50 and in the wider case law. Cases falling 
into the latter category included cases that were referred to in the judgments that 
featured in the Case Reports or in the level ‘1’ list. They also included cases that I 
encountered in searching for specific lines of case law or concepts that had 
emerged from my first sweep of the case law – such as the case law on the ‘right 
to hope’, which is discussed in Chapter 3. 
(iv) The reading of European human rights law 
The practice-dependent approach called for by the research question – an 
approach involving, as discussed, an examination of how European human rights 
law imagines the human condition through the lens of the concept of lived order 
– suggests a way of reading and interpreting the ECHR jurisprudence. This centres 
on reading it with a view to ascertaining how the five sites of lived order – space, 
time, body, wisdom, and things – are constructed in European human rights law. 
It is to the method of this that I now turn. 
The specified cases51 were read chronologically (in terms of the 
development of the general principles in question) and in relation to each other 
(which enabled comparisons to be drawn across provisions, such as about how the 
                                                          
49 See https://hudoc.echr.coe.int (last accessed 19 July 2019). 
50 These are described in the HUDOC database as ‘key’ cases. 
51 See part (iii) above. 
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ECtHR conceives of ‘hope’ in and across different contexts). My initial reading 
focused on the interpretation and construction of concepts that have been 
articulated by reference to the terms of – and in the light of – the ECHR. For 
example, Article 8 provides for a right to respect for one’s ‘private life’, ‘family life’, 
‘home’, and ‘correspondence’; and I began by looking at how these notions have 
been interpreted by the ECtHR. I then examined the concepts that have been 
constructed by the Court in articulating the meaning of these provisions. So, for 
example, the Court has elaborated the right to respect for ‘private life’ as follows:   
“[T]he concept of ‘private life’ is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive 
definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person… It can 
sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity… 
Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation 
and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8… Article 8 
also protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish and 
develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world… Although 
no previous case has established as such any right to self-determination as being 
contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that the notion of 
personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its 
guarantees.”52  
We can see from this passage that a number of questions arise and have to be 
addressed by reference to the Court’s jurisprudence. What is meant by ‘physical 
and psychological integrity’, for instance? What about the notions of ‘physical and 
social identity’, ‘a right to personal development’, ‘the right to establish and 
develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world’, ‘self-
determination’, and ‘personal autonomy’? How and why do these notions come to 
be constructed and included here? What does this process of construction mean 
and indeed tell us about European human rights law? And, to draw these questions 
together: what assumptions underpin this construction of ‘private life’?  
 Over the course of my research, the initial focus of my reading of the cases 
– a focus on the interpretation and construction of concepts of European human 
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rights law (such as those noted above in relation to Article 8) – gradually developed 
into a deeper focus on the assumptions that underpin these concepts. Of course, 
to posit such a point of focus presupposes an empirical claim, which is that such 
assumptions are made in European human rights law at all. This is, in fact, the 
argument that is pursued and drawn out across the thesis, and it takes the form 
that European human rights law makes a series of assumptions about the human 
condition. It poses a prior methodological question that requires engagement here, 
however. This is the question of how to read for assumptions. 
 To read for assumptions in European human rights law is to bring to the 
fore and to analyse the assumptions that underpin the interpretation and 
construction of the concepts that have been articulated by reference to the terms 
of – and in the light of – the ECHR. As noted above in relation to Article 8, these 
include concepts that appear in the terms of the ECHR, such as ‘private life’, but 
also those that have been articulated in elaborating that idea, such as ‘physical and 
psychological integrity’, ‘physical and social identity’, ‘personal development’, ‘self-
determination’, and ‘personal autonomy’. Two types of assumptions can be found 
in the case law: explicit assumptions and implicit assumptions. An example of an explicit 
assumption would be the assumption that access to information about one’s 
genetic origins or childhood has “formative implications for [one’s] personality” 
(the consequence of which is that “an individual’s entitlement to such information 
is of importance” from the perspective of the ECHR).53 The notion of an implicit 
assumption meanwhile points to the assumptive work that underpins the claim of 
a connection between information about one’s origins or childhood and the 
formation of personality itself. 
 The reconstruction of European human rights law that is presented in this 
thesis involves the identification and systematisation of a series of (explicit and 
implicit) assumptions that are made in European human rights law about the 
human condition. Drawing on Colin Murray Parkes’ seminal theory of the psycho-
social ‘assumptive world’ that we each individually create and carry – a world 
                                                          
53 53176/99, Mikulić v Croatia (2002), para.54. 
30 
 
formed “[o]ut of the ‘total set of assumptions which we build up on the basis of 
past experience in carrying out our purposes’”54 – I examine how the assumptions 
that are made in European human rights law about the human condition relate to 
each other and generate an imaginary ‘assumptive world’ that is internal to 
European human rights law. The argument that I ultimately make in this respect 
is – and as I noted earlier – that the assumptions that are made about the human 
condition in European human rights law underpin and give rise to a notion of 
individual continuity that is focused on the persistence of ‘the individual’ through 
time.  
 This argument is one that emerges from an exercise of identifying, 
analysing, and systematising assumptions – an exercise that involves the ascription 
of meaning to these assumptions. But such an exercise poses a stark question of 
positionality: what of my own assumptions in reading and seeking to interpret the 
assumptions that I am claiming to identify in European human rights law? This is 
an inevitable and intractable problem. It is inevitable because assumptions are 
inevitable, and it is intractable because assumptions, by their nature, are not 
straightforwardly malleable. We build up assumptions and rely on these in going 
about our lives; and their totality forms a framework of beliefs – an outlook on life 
– which is what is captured by the concept of the “assumptive world”.55 This is 
not to say that these assumptions cannot be reflexively engaged with, but rather 
that the starting point for any such engagement must involve an acknowledgement 
of the inevitability of assumptions and their effects. For if we form an ‘assumptive 
world’, then in an important way, our assumptions shape our world and our 
interpretation of the world. And in another way, too, assumptions are a necessary 
part of the process of interpreting in the first place. As Ronald Dworkin argues, 
interpretation not only presupposes but requires assumptions of a certain kind: 
one “needs assumptions or convictions about what counts as part of the practice 
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in order to define the raw data of his [or her] interpretation at the preinterpretive 
stage”.56 
 If our assumptions are an inevitable and potentially necessary part of any 
act of interpretation, then no interpretive account can ever be fully divorced from 
the interpreter’s own assumptions and situation. Interpreters may acknowledge 
and be alive to their assumptions and situations; and they may try to isolate their 
assumptions from that which they are interpreting. But ultimately, an act of 
interpretation – as an act of ascribing meaning – cannot be separated from the 
interpreter, which means that accounts are always only ever possible accounts. 
Thus this thesis offers only an account – my account – of European human rights 
law: an account based on my reading and interpretation of the assumptions that 
are made in European human rights law about the human condition.  
(v) The nature of the account   
What then, and finally, is the nature of the account that is generated in this thesis? 
The account offered is one that is borne of a combination of a practice-dependent 
reconstructive approach and a philosophical anthropology that is guided by the 
concept of ‘lived order’. It can be described as a practice-dependent account of 
how European human rights law imagines the human condition. 
It is important to add to this description that whilst the account offered 
here aims at being a coherent account of the practice of European human rights 
law, it can only be a general account. This is because it engages in a general inquiry 
of European human rights law’s vision of the human condition and generates an 
account that is grounded in that which is deemed most fundamental and essential 
to European human rights law on the ECtHR’s own terms. The reasoning behind 
the grounding of the account in this way derives, as we have seen, from the sense 
that if an ‘underlying vision’ exists in European human rights law at all, then it 
must surely be reflected in references to the ECHR’s ‘essence’. But its consequence 
is that the account produced here necessarily has a certain generality about it: it has 
general applicability as an account of how European human rights law imagines 
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the human condition, but it is also at its most intense in the areas that are most 
integral to the ECHR legal order (and that are identified by the ECtHR as such).  
This qualifies our definition of the nature of the account that is set out in 
this thesis as follows: it is a general and practice-dependent account of how 
European human rights law imagines the human condition. Furthermore, whilst 
the thesis offers a comprehensive engagement with the question of how European 
human rights law imagines the human condition, it does not offer (and nor does it 
claim to offer) a comprehensive account of the practice of European human rights 
law entirely. In particular, it addresses the practice of European human rights law 
by reference to a specified range of case law only. It does not treat the institutional 
context within which European human rights law’s vision of the human condition 
is produced, and nor does it address its social, economic, political, and cultural 
context. And even in terms of the engagement with the case law, the focus is not 
on the legal concepts that are the more frequent target of the European human 
rights law scholarship (such as the concepts of ‘proportionality’, ‘European 
consensus’, ‘living instrument’, and ‘margin of appreciation’). This is because this 
is a project about the concepts with which being is understood and articulated in 
European human rights law. These are not the legal concepts – which operate on 
the surface of European human rights law’s vision of the human condition and 
come into play in the context of operationalising the vision in specific instances – 
but rather the concepts with which European human rights law appeals to the self-
understanding of its subjects and objects: the appeal that it must make for its legal 
order to be lived. The project here is one that is concerned with questions of how 
European human rights law imagines the human condition and the meaning of 
this vision as such. It is, accordingly, an account of this vision – and one that is 
framed by a conception of the ECHR legal order as a lived order – that emerges 






The structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis is as follows:  
Chapter 1 develops the conceptualisation that has been presented in this 
Introduction: the conceptualisation of European human rights law as a lived order 
of individuation. It begins with an analysis of how and why the ECHR legal order 
can be thought of as an order of individuation. It argues that the ECHR legal order 
is notable in the way in which it forefronts a process of individuation: a process of 
the delineation (and simultaneous articulation) of ‘the individual’, and one which 
here involves the elevation of ‘the individual’ out of the order of the state and the 
instatement of this same ‘individual’ as the organising principle of the ECHR legal 
order. This is the vision, I suggest, that underpins the claim of the ECHR legal 
order to protect ‘the individual’ within and beyond the state; and it is the 
constitution of the ECHR legal order around ‘the individual’ in this way that brings 
us to a conceptualisation of the ECHR legal order as an order of individuation. 
The chapter then moves on to consider what it means to think of the 
ECHR legal order in these terms. It does so by examining the concept of ‘order’; 
and I argue, through an analysis of two ‘ideal types’ of order,57 that the question 
here must be one of the mode of being that underpins a conception of order that 
has, as its basis, ‘the individual’. This is a question of the ECHR legal order as a 
lived order – as an order that presupposes and expresses a mode of being, such 
that the order is itself lived – and in the final part of the chapter I examine what it 
means to think of European human rights law in these terms. I suggest that a lived 
order has three main features: it is governed by an ethos, which functions to 
support the mode of being of the order; it is internalised by those within it; and it 
sets out a vision of space, time, body, wisdom, and things. It is in these terms that 
the subsequent chapters of the thesis analyse European human rights law. Each 
chapter is structured around a different sphere of lived order: space (Chapter 2), 
time (Chapter 3), body (Chapter 4), wisdom (Chapter 5), and things (Chapter 6).  
                                                          
57 I further argue that the order of individuation sits alongside and draws on these types of order.  
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Chapter 2 examines the idea of space that structures European human 
rights law.  I argue that space is conceptualised here by reference to two visions: a 
phenomenological vision of the sense of place of the individual, which I describe 
as an idea of individual presence, and a more functional or instrumental vision of the 
position of the individual – of the representation of the individual through the lens 
of some social role or status – which I describe as an idea of individual presentation. 
The main question addressed in this chapter is of how these two visions are 
mediated. Together, they supply the terms through which the individual is 
articulated and presented in European human rights law; but the visions that they 
each set out are at odds with one another. For whereas the notion of presence 
originates in an account of the sense of place and sense of orientation of the 
individual, the notion of presentation focuses on the social function that she is 
performing or the activity that she is engaged in. I argue that although the splitting 
of the individual between the terms of presence and presentation in this way gives 
rise to the possibility for presentation to submerge presence, there is also a 
productive quality to this tension. This consists in the way in which it opens up a 
space for the negotiation of individual identity in European human rights law. I 
suggest that what this means, from the perspective of our consideration of 
European human rights law as an order of individuation, is that the individual is 
not only granted a sense of place and a position in this order, but that she is given 
an identity in it too.   
Chapter 3 argues that the idea of individual identity that emerges in this 
way is structured by a notion of individual continuity across time. I locate the 
origins of this notion in European human rights law’s conception of human dignity 
– a conception which, I argue, is about the protection of potentiality: a latent 
capacity to become and therefore ‘be’ within the meaning of European human 
rights law. Two forms of potentiality are articulated: vital potentiality, which marks 
the beginning of time and being in European human rights law and is about the 
potential (of an embryo, for example) to develop into a human being; and ethical 
potentiality, which is about the continuous development and realisation of the self. 
Taken together, vital potentiality and ethical potentiality make for an account in 
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which being is about becoming. They articulate a vision of self-continuity: a 
continuity that is cast as being promised by the fact of being in a continuous 
process of development. 
The notion of ‘self-continuity’ is, however, quite abstract; and the chapter 
goes on to argue that it is substantiated by two conditions: habituation (which is 
about what the individual is habituated to) and narrativisation (which is about the 
construction of narrative as a means through which to organise life and to accord 
it a sense of coherence and continuity). Whilst these conditions appear to be about 
a ‘sense of feeling habituated’ and a ‘sense of continuity’, however, I argue that 
they carry a normative hue that problematises this appearance entirely. The 
condition of habituation contains an account of what it means to be habituated – 
of what it means to be situated – which is articulated by reference to such notions 
as of the ‘roots’ of the individual and of the ‘degree’ of her ‘integration’ and thereby 
enables a pinning down of the individual. The condition of narrativisation 
meanwhile involves a series of choices that shape the construction of the narrative 
itself and therefore the experience of continuity that is grounded upon it, with the 
effect that the notion of ‘becoming’ in European human rights law is about 
becoming in a particular way. The consequence of this, I argue, is that the idea of 
individual continuity in European human rights law acquires a double function: it 
is at once about the individual’s sense of continuity and at the same time a means 
of pinning down this individual in the terms of European human rights law. This, 
I suggest, is enabled by a vision of the human condition in which we are assumed 
to have a need to assume our self-continuity across time. 
Chapter 4 argues that the assumption that we have a need to assume our 
self-continuity is bound up in the way in which European human rights law 
conceives of us as having a need to be recognised by others: a need that is 
concretised in European human rights law’s vision of the body. This is a vision 
that hinges on two ideas: the idea that our fundamental assumptions about the 
world and about our place in the world are bound up in our sense of our body; 
and the idea that the right to respect for bodily integrity (which is the fundamental 
underpinning of relations between living bodies in European human rights law) is 
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about recognition, so that respect for the bodily integrity of another is a matter of 
recognition of that other. The chapter maintains that a theory of recognition is 
articulated in this context, and one that conceives of a mutual dependence of self 
on other, such that we are conceived of as being dependent on the other to see 
and be seen. I argue that this vision finds two principal expressions in the case law. 
Firstly, the need for recognition is cast as exposing us to our vulnerabilities and 
insecurities, since these are portrayed as being managed and confronted with and 
through the other. Thus the projection of insecurities onto the body of the other 
is cast as involving the use of that other to gain access to those feelings (a possibility 
indicated, I argue, in the case law concerning the exposure of the body). Secondly, 
the need for recognition is conceived of as being essential not only to self-
knowledge but also to the sustenance of the self. This is such that in the face of 
the loss of specific others, the focus is on renegotiating the specificity of that lost 
recognition, in order to reconstitute its effects. European human rights law’s 
account of loss and mourning is accordingly structured by a vision of what this 
reconstitution consists in; and this vision is a restatement of the centrality that is 
attached in European human rights law to the notion of a need to sustain individual 
continuity. 
Chapter 5 builds on this account of the assumptions that European human 
rights law conceives of us as making (such as about our self-continuity and our 
capacity to be recognised) by examining how an interaction is envisaged between 
our fundamental assumptions and our experiences. I argue that a normative 
account of the management of reality is elaborated in European human rights law, 
and that this account forefronts a particular manner of integrating experience, 
understanding, and knowledge that constitutes European human rights law’s 
conception of wisdom.  
At the basis of this account is, I suggest, a conception of us as having two 
needs: a need to preserve our fundamental assumptions, the object of which is the 
preservation of our sense of identity, and a need to integrate experiences into our 
frameworks of assumptions, including those experiences that are at odds with our 
fundamental assumptions. In the course of the struggle that takes place between 
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these needs, two conclusions are drawn in European human rights law about the 
nature of the integration of experience. The first is that the act of striving to 
preserve assumptions that run counter to reality can sometimes be taken to signal 
a need to adapt to that reality. The second is that we are portrayed as taking a while 
to integrate experiences that require an adaptation in our fundamental 
assumptions. A vision of what it means to integrate experience (and therefore to 
adapt our assumptive frameworks) is in this context articulated; and the integration 
of experience is presented as having three stages: a stage of understanding the 
experience in question by reference to the reasons for it and its causes; a stage of 
ascribing meaning to the happening; and a stage of locating the self in relation to 
the experience, which involves tolerating the experience and coming to live with 
it. I argue that this vision presupposes a conception of what it means to be capable 
of integrating experience. In particular, it presupposes a capacity on the part of the 
individual to accept responsibility, to overcome emotion, and to withstand 
influence. The development of these capacities – and the development, therefore, 
of the ability to integrate experience in the manner depicted – is, at the same time, 
I suggest, the development of an outlook on life in which these capacities are 
forefronted and towards which the individual is oriented. This outlook supplies a 
moral orientation to the notion of individual continuity specified in Chapter 3. But 
it also implies that this notion of individual continuity has to accommodate a sense 
of detachment, and this is because the outlook articulated here involves a degree 
of detachment from reality.  
Chapter 6 picks up this last point about detachment and examines the 
vision of the present that is bound up in the conception of the capacity of the 
individual to stand at a certain distance from life itself. It argues that the individual 
is envisaged as being attached to the present and as extending beyond the present, 
and that this comes to light when we examine how the individual is conceived of 
as relating to material things in European human rights law. 
The first part of the chapter argues that things are cast in European human 
rights law as standing for something in time. This is partly a function of the way in 
which things are treated as being embedded in narratives (for example, the things 
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that go to make up an individual’s home are envisaged as containing the memories 
of the past, the familiarity of the present, and the hopes of the future); but it is also 
about the way in which things are cast as pointing to some conception of time that 
lies beyond the thing and is materialised in it (as when, for example, a thing is taken 
to represent a forthcoming risk). I argue that in materialising time in this way – in 
pointing to that which is to come – things also materialise that which has already 
happened (a present that has come to be in a particular way), such that the account 
of things in European human rights law is also an account of the condition of the 
present: an account in which the present is conceived of as being about containing 
the future.  
The chapter then examines how the individual is located in this vision. It 
suggests that the conceptualisation of the present as containing the future makes 
for an account in which the individual is located between present and future. On 
the one hand, she is conceived of as being attached to material things. On the other 
hand, these material things are taken to reveal that which is to come as well as that 
which has already happened; and so in being attached to material things, the 
individual is also pushed beyond them. This account, I argue, is underpinned by a 
way of seeing which emphasises foresight, a way of relating to material things 
which is based on a notion of the material extent of the individual (of how far she 
extends in her material environment), and a way of representing the individual in 
her relations with material things which involves an abstraction from life itself to 
deal in the language of forms (a form being the image of the relationship that links 
the individual to the thing).  
The final part of the chapter addresses the implications of this vision. I 
argue that the form’s logic of abstraction has a reflexive quality, such that the 
possibility arises for the form itself to become a thing, with the relationship 
between the individual and the thing then being rendered material and pursued for 
its own sake. This entails a shift from the practice of the thing (a practice originally 
represented in the form, in that the form is an image of the relationship between 
the individual and the thing) to the practice of the form (a practice of a 
representation). I argue that the overall effect of this is that stability in European 
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human rights law comes to be located beyond the present, with the individual 
conceived of in terms of that which is to come. This means that the notion of 
individual continuity in European human rights law has to accommodate a notion 
of alienation, because in the moment that stability is located beyond the present, 
individual continuity is relocated at the level of the representation of the individual, 
and a mode of being emerges that is located between present and future and in 
terms of that which is to come. 
*** 
Taken together, the six chapters of my thesis develop an account of how European 
human rights law imagines the human condition. The account is one of how this 
vision of the human condition – which is expressed in, and underpinned by, a 
series of ordering assumptions – structures European human rights law; and it is 
an account, also, of the construction of European human rights law as a lived order 
of individuation. In the Conclusion, I outline the overall vision of the lived order 
of individuation that is articulated here and consider its implications. I argue that 
what binds the ordering assumptions of European human rights law together – 
that what constitutes the vision of the human condition that underpins and 
emerges from the notion of individual continuity that these assumptions give rise 
to – is a vision of the human condition as a condition in which the fundamental 
question to be negotiated is a question of coming to terms. This is a question of 
coming into the terms of European human rights law and of coming to terms with 
all that which must be brought to terms according to European human rights law.  
 The vision of the human condition as a condition of coming to terms makes 
for a mode of being that is about becoming. This, I suggest, is the mode of being 
that structures European human rights law as a lived order of individuation: an 
order that has an ethos of individual continuity that structures and supports this 
mode of being as becoming; that is internalised insofar as those within the 
jurisdiction of ECHR law rely on, appeal to, and fundamentally assume the 
existence of the rights and freedoms set out in the ECHR; and that structures life 
within it by reference to a series of assumptions that underpin (and are articulated 
in terms of) its vision of space, time, body, wisdom, and things. 
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– CHAPTER 1 – 
European human rights law as a lived order of 
individuation 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter develops the conceptualisation of European human rights law that 
was presented in the Introduction: the idea of European human rights law as a 
lived order of individuation. The ECHR legal order presents us, I suggest, with an 
order of individuation because it is constituted upon and structured by a vision of ‘the 
individual’. And as a legal order, it is a lived order, because it necessarily presupposes 
and expresses a mode of being – a vision of life – such that the order is itself lived. 
These are the two principal ideas that are addressed in this chapter. 
To begin, I examine the way in which ‘the individual’ is forefronted in the 
ECHR legal order such that we can think of this order as an order of individuation 
at all (1.2). The chapter then moves on to consider what it means to think about 
European human rights law in this way. It does so by examining the notion of 
order; and I argue, through this analysis, that the fundamental question must be 
one of the mode of being that underpins a conception of order that has, as its 
basis, ‘the individual’ (1.3). This is a question of the nature of European human 
rights law as a lived order of individuation – as an order that presupposes and 
expresses a mode of being such that the order is itself lived – and the final part of 
the chapter sets out a way of accounting for European human rights law in these 
terms. I argue, in particular, that a lived order has three main features: it is governed 
by an ethos, which functions to support and structure the mode of being of the 
order; it is internalised by those within it; and it structures life by setting out a 
vision of space, time, body, wisdom, and things (1.4). These are the features, I 
suggest, that we need to examine in European human rights law in order to account 




1.2 The ECHR legal order as an order of individuation 
To speak of a form of law that is based around ‘the individual’ is to beg many 
questions: what – and who – is ‘the individual’? What does it mean for a form of 
law to be based around this figure? How does this come about, and what are its 
implications? These are some of the questions that are invited by the depiction of 
‘the individual’ as the central figure of the European project today. This depiction 
takes the following form: in the case of the European Union (‘the EU’), ‘the 
individual’ is cast as being “at the heart of its activities”,58 whilst in the case of the 
Council of Europe (‘the COE’), “[t]he object and purpose” of its principal 
Convention – the ECHR – is described as being “as an instrument for the 
protection of individual human beings”.59  
 In order to think about what it means to speak of ‘the individual’ in this 
way, this section begins with the idea of ‘the individual’ itself. It offers a brief 
account of the three strands of the idea of ‘the individual’ that have shaped the 
trajectory of this idea in European thought (1.2.1). These strands are individuality 
(envisaging ‘the individual’ as a bearer of distinct qualities), individualism (involving 
an assertion of individual liberty and entitlement), and identity (focusing on the 
identification of each individual); and what they reveal is a narrative of the 
individuation of ‘the individual’ – of the delineation (and simultaneous articulation) 
of ‘the individual’ – from all kinds of orders and institutions. When we turn to 
consider the scholarship on ‘the individual’ in the European project in this light, 
we see that it too addresses questions of the claims about individuality, 
individualism, and identity that are made in this context. However, the more 
notable feature about ‘the individual’ in the European project is the way in which 
it exemplifies and problematises the narrative of individuation that underpins these 
                                                          
58 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Preamble para.2. As Azoulai et al. note, 
the precise term used in this statement depends on the language of the version being read 
(individual, person, human being...); but the point, they suggest, is the same one: a reference “to 
an individual endowed with moral significance and legal protection” (L. Azoulai, S. Barbou des 
Places, and E. Pataut, ‘Being a Person in the European Union’, in L. Azoulai, S. Barbou des Places, 
and E. Pataut (eds.), Constructing the Person in EU Law: Rights, Roles, Identities (2016, Hart Publishing), 
3-11, p3). 
59 E.g., 32541/08 and 43441/08, Svinarenko and Slyadnev v Russia (2014), para.118.  
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strands (1.2.2). I suggest that European human rights law, as the form of law 
headed by the ECHR, in particular pushes us beyond tracing the elements of the 
idea of ‘the individual’ or seeing how the narrative of individuation pans out; 
rather, it constitutes a legal order that is generated around ‘the individual’. It 
constitutes, I suggest, an order of individuation: an order that is constituted upon 
and structured by ‘the individual’ (1.2.3). 
1.2.1 The idea of ‘the individual’ in European thought  
If we are to think in any detail about ‘the individual’, we ought really to have some 
sense of that which we are thinking about – whilst being wary of presupposing that 
which we then go to look for – and one way of coming to this is to draw on the 
three strands of the idea of ‘the individual’ that have structured the history of this 
idea in European thought: individuality, individualism, and identity. A good place 
to focus on in unpicking these is European humanist thought, which is accredited 
with having made a significant contribution to the idea of ‘the individual’ in 
Europe. Humanist thinkers articulated a vision involving the individuation of ‘the 
individual’ from socio-political ordering, the instatement of ‘the individual’ as a site 
of value distinct from such ordering, the elaboration of values such as ‘dignity’ and 
‘potentiality’, and a passion for the active civic life as the prime mode of being. 
This informed the development of the three strands of the idea of ‘the individual’ 
that are noted below. To be clear, my point in this respect is not to imply that these 
strands were articulated in a linear fashion; and nor is it to claim that the account 
below is anything approaching a comprehensive account. Rather, the purpose is to 
highlight some formative dimensions of the idea of ‘the individual’ – my suggestion 
being that in each strand of humanist thought, we see one or the other of these 
dimensions prevailing – as a starting point towards thinking about the idea of ‘the 
individual’ in the European project today.   
(i) Individuality  
The first strand of the idea of ‘the individual’ that we can discern is that of 
individuality. This envisages the individual as a bearer of distinctive qualities, and 
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its origins have been dated to the twelfth century,60 during which period an idea of 
the ‘self’ emerged and came to flourish.61 Colin Morris, in The Discovery of the 
Individual 1050-1200, describes, in particular, how ideals of self-knowledge and self-
cultivation (in terms of the Delphic ‘Know thyself’) and practices of self-
expression and self-examination developed during this period.62 The latter were 
especially influenced by – and expressed in – cultural and religious turns such as 
to the practice of annual confession for Church members, a notion of individual 
intentionality,63 the practice of autobiographical writing, and the practice of 
depicting individuality (as opposed to office) in portraiture.64 
 The notion of individuality that emerged in this way depicted a process of 
individuation from office and emphasised the distinctive qualities of the individual. 
It was subsequently taken up during the fourteenth-century Italian Renaissance;65 
and the humanist writings of this period reflected a passion for the active civic life 
as the prime mode of being, found self-cultivation to lie in literature and education, 
emphasised the power of human intellect as being no longer determined by 
religious or divine edict, accorded primacy to the earthly search for self and 
identity, and articulated a vision of the ontological condition of the individual.66 In 
addition, much emphasis was placed on the status and innate potentiality of the 
individual, and this was exemplified by the conception of dignity that came to the 
                                                          
60 For a long time, the origins of the notion of ‘the individual’ (in terms of individuality) were 
located – namely by Burckhardt – in the fourteenth-century Italian Renaissance (J. Burckhardt, 
The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy: An Essay (2010 [1860], Dover Publications, p81-87). 
Burckhardt’s thesis was later superseded by a body of work which dated the appearance of ‘the 
individual’ to the High Middle Ages. 
61 C. Morris, The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200 (1972, SPCK), p52-54, 121-138. 
62 Ibid., p65-79.  
63 See esp. P. Abelard, Peter Abelard’s Ethics (ed. D. E. Luscombe) (1971 [c.late.1130s], Oxford 
University Press).  
64 Morris (1972), above n4, p65-120. This movement from representations of typology has also 
been described by Ullmann, who further argued that this form of individuality underlay the 
ecclesiological and cosmological ordering all along, such that it was less the emergence of 
individuality that occurred, and more its re-emergence. See W. Ullmann, Medieval Foundations of 
Renaissance Humanism (1977, Elek Books), p68-88. 
65 See n3 above. 
66 D. Hay, The Italian Renaissance in its Historical Background (Second Edition) (1977, Cambridge 
University Press), Chs.4, 5; E. Garin, Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance 
(transl. P. Munz) (1975 [1947], Greenwood Press), Chs.1, 2.  
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fore at this time: a conception of dignity as being about the realisation of innate 
potentiality67 and the consequent acquisition of (dignified) status.68 
(ii) Individualism 
The second strand of the idea of ‘the individual’ is that of individualism, which 
involves an assertion of individual liberty and entitlement. This can be traced to 
the political theology of the Reformers, many of whom identified as humanists or 
were at least schooled in humanism.69 Predominant among the methodological and 
thematic affinities of the two movements was an emphasis on the status of the 
individual. This was partly fuelled by the humanists’ longstanding critique of 
Church corruption,70 but its cause was furthered by Martin Luther’s political 
theology and, in particular, by his attack, in To the Christian Nobility, on the papacy.71 
Underpinning Luther’s message were the Reformation doctrines of the primacy of 
the authority of Scripture, justification by faith, and the priesthood of all 
believers.72 In particular, a claim of (the equality of) individual entitlement was 
articulated through the concept of the ‘common man’,73 through the elevation of 
the individual above institutions,74 through the attribution of fault to individuals 
as opposed to divinely-ordained institutions,75 and through the reasoning which 
underpinned the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers: that the only difference 
between the laity and the clergy was the office of the latter; their status was equal.76 
Within this vision, individual entitlement was founded as latent and therefore 
                                                          
67 See esp. G. Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man (transl. A. R. Caponigri) (1956 
[1486], Henry Regnery Company). 
68 See, e.g., E. F. Rice, The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom (1958, Harvard University Press), Ch.4.   
69 Notably Luther. See L. W. Spitz, The Religious Renaissance of the German Humanists (1963, Harvard 
University Press), Ch.10; V. H. H. Green, Luther and the Reformation (1964, B. T. Batsford), p29; R. 
W. Scribner, The German Reformation (1986, MacMillan Publishers), p49-50.  
70 Spitz (1963), above n12, p238.   
71 M. Luther, ‘To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the Reform of the 
Christian Estate’ (1520) (transl. C. M. Jacobs), in M. Luther, Luther: Selected Political Writings (ed. J. 
M. Porter) (1974, Fortress Press), 37-49, p39.  
72 J. M. Porter, ‘Introduction: The Political Thought of Martin Luther’, in Luther (ed. J. M. Porter) 
(1974), above n15, 1-21, p4.  
73 Scribner (1986), above n12, p18-19, 49-50. 
74 Porter (1974), above n15, p6-7. 
75 See W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, The Political Thought of Martin Luther (ed. P. Broadhead) (1984, 
The Harvester Press), p6.  
76 Luther (1520), above n14, p41.  
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always present. In an argument which strikingly parallels Carl Schmitt’s later 
thinking on the exception as revealing the truth of the norm,77 Luther reasoned 
that the truth of all believers being priests was revealed by the exceptional force of 
necessity (“in cases of necessity anyone can baptize and give absolution”78). This 
conception of the realisation of (latent) individual entitlement later went on to be 
asserted in the modern scientific method, having been adopted by the scientific 
revolution which marked the beginning of the Enlightenment.79   
In many ways, the Reformers’ ideals continued into the Enlightenment; it 
too promoted scholarship and rationalism. It was characterised, or so Immanuel 
Kant argued, by “man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage”,80 and the idea of 
‘the individual’ articulated here emphasised rationality and individuation from 
forms of traditional authority, such as Church doctrine. This vision was developed 
with the aid of two ideas which were advanced during the French Revolution: 
individualism and the abstract man of rights.81 The political philosophy that 
underpinned these ideas was significantly at odds with the conception of 
individuality that had been expressed by Renaissance humanists. For example, the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen conceived of an 
abstract individual – an individual stripped of the scope for individuality that had 
characterised the trajectory of the idea of ‘the individual’ from the twelfth century 
onwards.82 It set out a representation of a form, a type – a ‘what’ as distinct from 
the singular ‘who’, to use the distinction later drawn out by Hannah Arendt and 
Adriana Cavarero and that casts the ‘what’ as a quest for the universal, the 
                                                          
77 C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (transl. G. Schwab) (1985 
[1922, 1934], MIT Press), Ch.1.  
78 Luther (1520), above n14, p40.  
79 Cf. and for discussion, T. K. Rabb, ‘Religion and the Rise of Modern Science’ (1965) Past & 
Present 31, 111-126.    
80 I. Kant, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, (1784) in I. Kant, On History (ed. and transl. L. W. Beck) 
(1963, Macmillan), 3-10, p3.  
81 Whilst the term ‘individualism’ derives from the nineteenth century, its doctrines (deemed by 
Swart to be political liberalism, economic liberalism, and Romantic individualism: K. W. Swart, 
‘“Individualism” in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (1826-1860)’ (1962) Journal of the History of Ideas 
23(1), 77-90, p77) have earlier roots. See R. R. Palmer, ‘Man and Citizen: Applications of 
Individualism in the French Revolution’, in M. R. Konvitz and A. E. Murphy (eds.), Essays in 
Political Theory presented to George H. Sabine (1972 [1948], Kennikat Press), 130-152.  
82 See also C. Douzinas, ‘Human Rights, Humanism, and Desire’ (2001) Angelaki: Journal of the 
Theoretical Humanities 6(3), 183-206, p188.  
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anonymity of which poses a threat to the ‘who’.83 The paradox underlying the 
concept of the rights of the abstract man was, then, that the structure established 
for his articulation had inherent in it the seeds of his alienation.  
(iii) Identity 
The third strand of the idea of ‘the individual’ is that of identity, and this is about 
the identification of each individual (as opposed to the individual). Its origins can be 
traced to the Romantic thought of the late-eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, 
where it was born of a tension between the notions of individualism and 
individuality. The Romantics, reacting to the “‘quantitative,’ ‘rationalistic,’ 
‘optimistic,’ and ‘democratic’” elements of Enlightenment individualism, 
articulated a conception of individualism which was “‘qualitative,’ ‘irrationalistic,’ 
‘pessimistic,’ and ‘aristocratic’” in form.84 It praised the distinctive qualities of each 
individual; Georg Simmel, describing it in terms of “the new individualism”, “the 
individualism of uniqueness”,85 saw it as consisting in the quest of the individual, 
in the aftermath of “thorough liberation” from “the rusty chains of guild, birth 
right, and church”, to “distinguish himself from other individuals”.86 Thus whereas 
Enlightenment humanists had articulated individuation in terms of the liberation 
of the individual (qua abstract man) from traditional authority, focusing on the 
innate equality and universality of each (recognised) individual, Romantic 
humanists articulated individuation in terms of an ideal of identity, emphasising 
the unique potentiality and particularity of each individual.87  
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1.2.2 Thinking about ‘the individual’ in the European project 
From this brief account of the three strands that underpinned the articulation of 
the idea of ‘the individual’ in European thought, we can draw out three stances 
that we might want to consider in thinking about ‘the individual’ in the European 
project. And indeed, when we turn to the literature to consider how ‘the individual’ 
has been thought about in this context, we find accounts dealing with questions of 
the notions of individuality, individualism, and identity that emerge in the terms of 
the CoE and the EU. For example, Catherine Dupré’s analysis of the place of 
human dignity in the EU and in the ECHR highlights the question of individuality 
(a question of what is distinctive about the individual), insofar as dignity is 
conceived of in the context of European constitutionalism as being a distinctive 
human quality that is shared by all.88 Alexander Somek’s analysis of the way in 
which the EU legal order presupposes an individualistic citizen is an argument 
about the way in which EU regulatory authority appeals to a type of individualism 
(involving the assertion of individual liberty and entitlement).89 And Jill Marshall’s 
analysis of how human rights law relates to personal identity brings to the fore the 
way in which ECHR law works to create and protect personal identity (involving 
the identification and self-identification of each individual).90 
 The focus of this literature is on the way in which EU law and ECHR law 
engage with and articulate notions of individuality, individualism, and identity, and 
on what this tells us about these legal orders and their representation of ‘the 
individual’. Critically, this representation is only ever that: it is about ‘the individual’ 
as distinct from ‘each’ ‘individual’. This makes for a space between ‘the individual’ 
and subjectivity itself; and the effect of this space, whether conceived of in terms 
of the construction of ‘the individual’ or in terms of the effects of legal 
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constructions of subjectivity on individual subjectivity itself has also been explored 
in literature on the EU and the ECHR.91 
 Alongside these questions of the formation (and effects) of ‘the individual’, 
there is also a question of the origins of ‘the individual’ to consider. One of the 
most notable things about the historiography of the idea of ‘the individual’ in this 
respect is the extent to which the trajectory of ‘the individual’ in European thought 
is cast as being borne of a narrative of the individuation of ‘the individual’ – of the 
delineation (and simultaneous articulation) of ‘the individual’ – from all kinds of 
normative orders and institutions.92 This process of individuation is coupled with 
a problematisation of these structures of order and authority, and this is 
represented in the three strands of the idea of ‘the individual’ that were noted 
above. The notion of individuality (envisaging ‘the individual’ as a bearer of distinct 
qualities) emphasises individuation from office; the notion of individualism 
(involving an assertion of individual liberty and entitlement) emphasises 
individuation from structures of traditional authority; and the notion of identity 
(focusing on the identification of each individual) emphasises individuation in 
terms of self-definition. 
 The European project, in both its EU and CoE instantiations, in many ways 
exemplifies this narrative of individuation, insofar as it seeks to lift ‘the individual’ 
out of the order of the state. Two of the most interesting concepts that have come 
to the fore in recent literature as tools to think about this are the concepts of 
emancipation and justification. Floris De Witte has theorised EU law in terms of 
the former. He argues that EU law can be understood, albeit not 
unproblematically, “as an instrument for emancipation”93 (with ‘emancipation’ 
understood here as being about creating “a negative space for freedom – a space in 
                                                          
91 On EU law, see esp. the essays in Azoulai et al. (eds.) (2016), above n1; P. Neuvonen, Equal 
Citizenship and its Limits in EU Law: We the Burden? (2016, Hart Publishing). On ECHR law, see 
esp. P. Johnson, Homosexuality and the European Court of Human Rights (2013, Routledge) and Going 
to Strasbourg: An Oral History of Sexual Orientation Discrimination and the European Convention on Human 
Rights (2016, Oxford University Press). 
92 See, e.g., L. Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism (2015, Penguin); 
W. Ullmann, The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages (1967 [1966], Methuen & Co Ltd.). 
93 F. de Witte, ‘Emancipation Through Law?’, in Azoulai et al. (eds.) (2016), above n1, 15-33, p21. 
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which choices can be internalised privately and freely expressed or acted upon 
publically without the risk of domination”94). There are three reasons, he suggests, 
for this. Firstly, EU law “amplifies the capacity of individual citizens to publically 
realise their private aspirations and ambitions”.95 Through the free movement 
provisions, in particular, EU law “[makes] available to citizens not only choices 
that exist on the territory of her own State, but also those available in 27 other 
States”;96 and it accordingly “allows citizens to vault over normative, 
administrative, economic or cultural values imposed within their own State”.97 
Secondly, it “[includes] more citizens in the conditions that allow for 
emancipation”98 by “[guaranteeing] the availability of positive rights…to an 
increasing number of individuals”.99 In particular, “the obligation of non-
discrimination based on nationality can be understood as a process of gradual 
inclusion of non-nationals within domestic structures of positive rights”.100 
Thirdly, it “problematises the domination that results from a source that the nation 
State cannot tackle: the nation State itself”.101 More specifically, it problematises 
the nation state’s limited “conception of the individual as being first and foremost 
a national”.102  
 None of this is without problem, as De Witte goes on to show. He argues 
that the norms and dynamics that can be taken as an expression of emancipation 
at the EU level also carry the potential to destabilise emancipatory projects and 
institutions at the national level, and that the account of the emancipatory potential 
and project of EU law does not sufficiently engage with (and in fact “glosses over”) 
“the structures of domination that the EU itself perpetuates”.103 But setting aside 
the critique of this account, and focusing instead on the vision that is elaborated 
in its terms, what is highlighted is the way in which EU law enables the individual 
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to conceive of herself as apart from her ‘home’ state: something which enables a 
form of self-realisation (the realisation of “innermost and private aspirations and 
desires”104) and a form of self-articulation (the articulation of ‘this is who I am’). 
EU law, on this account, presupposes that the individual may not find and realise 
herself within her state, and it enables her to look elsewhere. In so doing it “aims 
to allow the individual to live a life that more closely realizes his or her idea of 
‘self’”.105 And to the extent that the dialogical processes of self-realisation and self-
articulation that are implied here occur in relation to and against the backdrop of 
the individual’s ‘home’ state, we can read De Witte’s reconstruction of EU law as 
an account of EU law’s vision of individuation: as an account of the way in which 
EU law envisages itself as lifting the individual up and out of her state.  
 Turning next to the ECHR, as “the cornerstone” of the CoE,106 we see that 
this, too, involves a problematisation of the relationship between ‘the individual’ 
and the state, being produced as it was of a theory which located “future salvation 
in restoring the primacy of the individual against the over powerful state, in 
establishing civil and political freedom, and in restoring and safeguarding 
democracy”.107 The way in which individuation has been most notably theorised 
in this context is in terms of justification, with the ECHR being taken to be a part 
of a “culture of justification”. That term was coined by Etienne Mureinik108 and it 
is now claimed by Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat to depict an “emerging 
global legal culture”109 in which the state must justify its action to the individual. 
Kai Möller defines it more precisely: “in a culture of justification it is the role of the 
courts to ensure that every act of the state that affects a person is substantively justifiable to him 
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or her”.110 The related right to justification “expresses the same idea in moral terms; 
it insists that every citizen has a moral and, ideally, constitutional right to the kind of 
justification envisaged by the culture of justification”.111 
 Cohen-Eliya and Porat argue that a culture of justification is fostered by the 
following principal characteristics of post-War “Western constitutional systems”: 
“a broad conception of rights; a constitutional interpretation approach that 
emphasizes fundamental principles and values rather than text; few barriers to 
substantive review; and no legal ‘black holes’ (areas and actions with respect to 
which the government is not required to provide justification)”.112 The most 
critical feature of a culture of justification, however – the one that springs from it 
and “epitomizes” it113 – is its doctrine of proportionality, which “basically 
[requires] that any interference with rights be justified by not being 
disproportionate”.114  
 The ECtHR relies heavily on the doctrine of proportionality in its 
reasoning;115 and it forms part of the culture of justification in this sense. The 
position that is accorded to the individual in this regard has been brought out most 
clearly by Möller in his analysis of the moral basis of the culture of justification. 
Drawing on Rainer Forst’s analysis of human beings as justificatory beings (as 
beings with a basic right to justification), and Mattias Kumm’s analysis of 
reasonable disagreement, Möller argues that the moral basis of the culture of 
justification lies in the fundamental status of every person as “a justificatory agent” 
(“as an agent who has a right to justification”).116 Möller argues that it follows from 
this status that any act on the part of the state that burdens the individual must be 
substantively justifiable to him or her as a “reasonable” act.117 This right to 
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justification is, furthermore, judicially protected: “every person has the right to 
challenge any act or policy that imposes a burden on [him or her]”.118   
Möller’s analysis of the conception of the person that underlies the culture 
of justification in this way (and that, Möller argues, supplies its moral basis) points 
towards something significant about individuation in European human rights law. 
For it cannot only be that the relationship between the conception of the person 
at issue here and the right to justification works in one direction, such that the 
conception of the person as a justificatory agent is what gives rise to the right to 
justification at all. The relationship must be more reflexive and fluid than this.119 
This is not least because the act of addressing someone as having a right to 
justification – an act of addressing which precedes but is not wholly separable from 
the act of justifying itself – involves an assumption that the addressee is capable of 
challenging what is being done or said. The act of addressing is, in this way, an act 
of seeing, and an act of constituting the addressee as such: as a singular individual 
to whom justification is owed by the state. Justification is not only, then, about 
accounting for the exercise of state power in terms of the individual. It also implies 
the delineation and articulation of the individual as against and in relation to state 
power. In other words, it is also about individuation. We accordingly arrive at a 
way of understanding its apparent significance in European human rights law from 
the perspective of the ECHR itself – a Convention which, it will be recalled, is in 
part about “restoring the primacy of the individual against the over powerful 
state”.120 
1.2.3 From the idea of ‘the individual’ to an order of individuation  
The European project has not only been taken to set out a vision of individuation 
(involving the delineation – and simultaneous articulation – of ‘the individual’ from 
structures of order) in this way. It also challenges the notion of individuation by 
instating the individual that it elevates out of the order of the state as the organising 
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principle of a new vision of order: the European order. The EU and the CoE form 
two sides of the same post-War ‘European order’ in this sense, but the way in 
which ‘the individual’ is presented as the organising principle in each case is 
different. 
 In the case of the ECHR, ‘the individual’ is conceived of as the end source 
of value and as the objective of its vision. As the ECtHR now emphasises, 
therefore, “[t]he object and purpose of the Convention” is “as an instrument for 
the protection of individual human beings”,121 and its “very essence…is respect 
for human dignity and human freedom”.122 In the case of the EU, by contrast, ‘the 
individual’ is envisaged in terms wholly delineated by and consonant with the 
vision of EU integration articulated through EU law.123 Thus ‘the individual’ in the 
EU legal order is an individual placed into the terms of the EU; or, to put it 
differently, EU law’s way of envisaging and representing ‘the individual’ is formed 
by, and extends only as far as, the vision of the activities with which it engages. 
This makes for an episodic representation of ‘the individual’ – a vision that cuts 
across and invokes only particular life stages, at particular times, under particular 
conditions, and in particular contexts – which explains why much of the 
scholarship on ‘the individual’ in EU law takes as its starting point specific 
categories (such as of the citizen and the worker).124 And if this episodic 
representation nevertheless derives a coherence from a distinctive “EU legal 
persona” that underpins it – a normative and normalising vision “used to make 
sense of EU law”125 – then the fact that this is a ‘persona’ at all (a term which has 
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its origins in the ‘mask’126) serves as a reminder of the difficulty in ascertaining the 
nature of the vision of ‘the individual’ now relocated beneath it. 
 This conceptualisation of ‘the individual’ as placed into the terms of the 
EU has been most recently affirmed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU (EUCFR), which stipulates, in its Preamble, that ‘the Union…places the 
individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union 
and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice’.127 It is worth noting in 
this respect that there is a degree of interaction between the ways in which the EU 
legal order and the ECHR legal order conceive of ‘the individual’ expressed here, 
because the idea of ‘the individual’ that emerges from the EUCFR to guide EU 
law is shared and primarily shaped by the ECHR.128 At the same time, however, 
EU fundamental rights law has a very different scope and nature to ECHR law. It 
is limited to the EU legal order,129 and so even if it takes on certain qualities of 
ECHR law, it can only be fully understood in reference to the vision of EU law 
around which it is constituted.130 This makes for a difference between the idea of 
‘the individual’ that is articulated in EU law and that which is articulated in the 
context of ECHR law that can be quite simply put. In the case of the EU, ‘the 
individual’ is conceived of as being placed into the terms of the EU and as forming 
part of a legal order that is oriented towards integration. The EU legal order is, in 
this way, an order of integration. In the case of the CoE, the ECHR is conceived of as 
existing for ‘the individual’. The form of legal order constructed here is an order 
that is built around ‘the individual’ and the problematisation of the relationship 
between the state and ‘the individual’. It is an order of individuation: an order that is 
constituted upon and structured by ‘the individual’.  
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 Although both sides of the post-War European order conceive of ‘the 
individual’ as an organising principle then, they do so in quite different ways. The 
ECHR legal order presents itself as an order that is based on and exists for ‘the 
individual’. This renders its interaction with and conception of ‘the individual’ 
different from projects of regional integration, like the EU, which necessarily imply 
some conception of their subject (and one that is inseparable from the project of 
regional integration itself).131 It also renders its notion of ‘the individual’ different 
from those of the post-War national constitutional orders that have forefronted a 
conception of ‘the individual’ in their specific national contexts.132 And not only is 
the ECHR legal order distinctive among legal orders in this way. It is also 
distinctive from the perspective of the history of the idea of ‘the individual’. For 
whereas that history is underpinned by a narrative of individuation from order, the 
ECHR legal order is generated upon a vision of individuation. It constitutes an 
order of individuation: an order that is constituted upon and structured by ‘the 
individual’. 
1.3 Order  
The question that we need to think about, then, is the question of what it means 
to think about the ECHR legal order as an order of individuation. To do this, we 
need to think about the concept of order itself; and to this end, this section 
examines two types of order that have been central in European thought and 
history and that developed alongside the idea of ‘the individual’. These are the 
orders of incorporation and association. The order of incorporation is based on a 
form of enclosure (a term which alludes to the articulation of the boundaries that 
any form of order requires) and it is governed by an ethos of stability (which is 
often taken to entail permanence of place – the stability for the individual of 
remaining in a place, and the stability, for the order, of the individual’s so 
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remaining) (1.3.1). The order of association is based on a practice of cooperation 
(which is about acting together to some end) and it is governed by an ethos of 
sociality (which is about the norms of relating between members) (1.3.2). My 
suggestion is going to be that the order of individuation represented in European 
human rights law constitutes a third type of order that draws on the traditions of 
the orders of incorporation and association. The focus of this section, however, is 
on the way in which each order is inseparable from the mode of being that it 
presupposes and expresses: an inseparability, I suggest, that leads us to a 
conception of order as lived (1.3.3). 
1.3.1 Orders of incorporation 
Our first form of order is the order of incorporation, the defining feature of which 
is that it intertwines a form of enclosure with an ethos of stability. The terms 
‘enclosure’ and ‘stability’ require immediate specification. The term ‘enclosure’ 
alludes to the articulation of the boundaries that any form of order requires. These 
boundaries are not only spatial; as Hans Lindahl has emphasised, in his analysis of 
legal orders, the boundaries of an order are also temporal, material, and 
subjective.133 What is distinctive about enclosure in an order of incorporation is 
both its extent and its coincidence with the notion of incorporation. We see this 
most strikingly where enclosure emerges in the process of the formation of some 
body and represents the moment of incorporation itself. In ancient Rome and 
Greece, for example, the enclosure of the hearth, which contained a sacred fire, 
was at the same time the constitution of the family.134 This was because the sacred 
fire “represented the ancestors; it was the providence of a family, and had nothing 
in common with the fire of a neighbouring family, which was another 
providence”.135 Those around it were bound, by its existence, to their ancestors; 
and at the same time, the fire constituted all those outside this realm as strangers.136 
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The enclosed sacred hearth was accordingly not only an expression of the single 
body of the family, but it was also the moment, the reason, and the ethic of its 
incorporation.  
 The second term, ‘stability’, is about the ethos of stability that the enclosure 
in an order of incorporation is bound up with. This is often taken to entail 
permanence of place – the stability for the individual of remaining in a place, and 
the stability, for the order, of the individual’s so remaining. This interpretation of 
stability and of its relationship with enclosure dates back to and is typified by the 
form of monasticism that was established under the Rule of St. Benedict (‘the 
Rule’) in the sixth century and that went on to become the most significant 
monastic Rule in European history.137 We will examine this model of monasticism 
here in order to further understand the incorporation that it exemplifies and to 
focus our discussion of the notion of the order of incorporation itself. 
 At the core of the Benedictine model of monasticism is a particularly 
stringent vision of enclosure, involving a “completely self-contained and self-
sufficient” monastery.138 The monastery envisaged in the Rule is one in which 
“everything necessary – in other words, water, the mill, the garden and the various 
crafts practised” is to be, “[i]f possible”, contained within it, “so that the monks 
do not need to go wandering outside for that is not at all good for their souls”.139 
Any form of exit from the monastery is thoroughly discouraged, and if the monks 
have to go outside their monastery, they are to keep quiet about what they have 
seen upon their return.140 
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  This makes for a strict division between life within the monastery and the 
world outside the monastery. The gate of the monastery symbolises this division. 
It represents not only a threshold that leads to a physical and mental “relocation”141 
and a change in status142 but it is also taken to convey an unimaginable distance 
“between two modes of being” – between “two worlds”.143 The world that lies 
beyond the gate is cast as a potential pollutant of the monastic order itself; and the 
constitution of the outside world as such further reinforces the internal 
organisation of order.144 Even visitors to the monastery, welcome as they may 
be,145 are kept at some distance to minimise disruption.146 The Benedictine 
enclosure depends, in this way, on the exclusion of the outside world. 
This vision of enclosure is coupled with an ethos of stability, the origins of 
which lie in the vow of stability (stabilitas), which commands a series of 
commitments to the way of life of the monastic community, to remain within the 
monastery until death, to the maintenance of the stability of the community, and 
to the authority of the monastery as established by the abbot. The extent of this 
commitment is reflected in the sense that stability itself is a way of life; “[t]he 
workshop” in which the monk is to perform his life and task is “the enclosure of 
the monastery and stability in the community”.147 Stabilitas thus supplies the ethos 
of the Benedictine life, in that it functions to support and structure the mode of 
being of its order. This mode of being is a mode of common being: a mode of 
being that is characterised by homogeneity and simultaneity. All activities – such 
as eating, working, praying, and sleeping – are to occur in this way; and they derive 
the dignity granted to them in the Rule from the fact of being done in common. 
More than this, the Benedictine idea of order implies that it ought to be possible 
                                                          
141 A. Sennis, ‘Narrating Places: Memory and Space in Medieval Monasteries’, in W. Davies, G. 
Halsall, and A. Reynolds (eds.), People and Space in the Middle Ages, 300-1300 (2006, Brepols 
Publishers), 275-294, p278. 
142 This ultimately underlies the vow of conversion of life.  
143 See, on this notion of ‘threshold’, M. Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion 
(transl. W.R. Trask) (1950, Harcourt, Brace & World Inc.), p25. 
144 This is the nature of the concept of pollution: see M. Douglas, Purity and Danger: An analysis of 
concepts of pollution and taboo (1966, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.). 
145 RSB, Ch.53. 
146 RSB, Chs.53, 61. 
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to look at the monastery and see everything moving in common.148 To realise this, 
the monks are not to be distinguishable from each other. They shed their identity 
and individuality upon admission to the monastery;149 thereafter, each holds only 
the status of monk.150 The ethos of stability that lies at the origin of this form of 
uniformity functions, in this way, to secure common being, which is the mode of 
being of the order of incorporation. 
1.3.2 Orders of association  
Whereas an order of incorporation is based on a form of enclosure and is governed 
by an ethos of stability, an order of association is based on a practice of 
cooperation and is governed by an ethos of sociality. An order of association will, 
of course, have its own notions of enclosure and stability too; as was noted above, 
any form of order requires an articulation of boundaries and it must also be 
stabilised as an order. The critical difference between an order of incorporation 
and an order of association is, then, this: whereas an order of incorporation is 
defined by the way in which it constructs and relates its visions of enclosure and 
stability, an order of association is defined by the way in which it constructs and 
relates its visions of cooperation and sociality.  
 In an order of association, the notion of a practice of cooperation alludes 
to three things: to the teleological nature of cooperation (the way in which a 
practice of cooperation has an objective); to those who are doing the cooperating 
(and who have, apparently, an interest in cooperating); and to interpersonal ties 
                                                          
148 On how this is furthered by the architecture of the monastery, see W. Braunels, Monasteries of 
Western Europe: The Architecture of the Orders (transl. A. Lang) (1972, Thames and Hudson Ltd.), 
p10-11. 
149 This renunciation of individuality and total alienation of difference is a unique feature of the 
order of incorporation. Cf., e.g., structures of assimilation (where the individual comes to 
resemble, or becomes a part of, a corporation, such as the Hegelian corporation) or identification 
(where the individual is to fully adopt and identify with some form, such as the Soviet kollektiv). 
Such structures involve an action upon an individual, consisting in the eclipsing or changing of 
individuality. See further (and respectively on assimilation and identification), G. W. F. Hegel, 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right (ed. A. W. Wood; transl. H. B. Nisbet) (1991 [1820], Cambridge 
University Press), p270-271; O. Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of 
Practices (1999, University of California Press), p75-88. 
150 This equal formal status is supported by a vision of humility that is itself cast as leading to a 
substantive equality. See esp. RSB, Ch.34 on “distribution according to need” (and more generally 
Chs.35-37 on helping the weak). 
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(which are expressed in the practice of cooperation itself). These three elements – 
teleology, interest, and ties – underpin the practical quality of cooperation that 
Richard Sennett has elsewhere labelled “a craft”.151 As a craft, cooperation 
“requires skill”,152 and it especially requires “the skill of understanding and 
responding to one another in order to act together”.153 It is this notion of action 
together that is key here. For whereas ‘action together’ in the context of an order 
of incorporation is about homogeneous and simultaneous action (the same action 
at the same time), ‘action together’ in an order of association means action to which 
each member contributes a distinctive part, the sum of which parts make for a 
greater whole. 
 One way of thinking about this is in relation to the modern political 
community, which necessarily presupposes a capacity for action together, sets out 
an account of what this action looks like, and values the action itself. In fact, we 
can go further than this and suggest that the order of association – an order based 
on a practice of cooperation – is exemplified by the modern political community, 
and, more specifically, by imaginaries of that community. This is not only insofar 
as the community of citizens (civitas) was originally understood as a practice of 
association;154 but insofar as the tasks that a political community must perform can 
be understood through its lens. Damian Chalmers has suggested that these tasks 
are fourfold. He argues that the concept of political community serves to secure 
citizen trust in a political system, that it secures sacrifice on the part of citizens in 
the name of the system, that it generates a type of mutual commitment (expressed 
in the institution of citizenship), and that it supplies a language of public reason.155  
The notion of cooperation clearly underlies all four qualities. In relation to 
trust in the political system, Chalmers argues that political community establishes 
“terms of recognition”, sets out a space for resolving collective disputes, and offers 
                                                          
151 R. Sennett, Together: The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation (2013 [2012], Penguin Books), 
px. 
152 Ibid., p6. 
153 Ibid., px. 
154 De Coulanges (1854), above n77, p177. 
155 D. Chalmers, ‘Political Community and EU Law’ (manuscript on file), p7-10. 
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an account of the political system that encompasses its subjects.156 In relation to 
sacrifice for the political system, costs are distributed within the community in a 
manner that is “determined by the content and quality of the mutual commitments 
[that] members owe each other” as well as by the “affective ties” that exist within 
the system (between members and between subjects and the system).157 In relation 
to mutual commitment (which identifies members and their identical 
entitlements), citizenship works in a way that “citizens are…presumed to have 
equal access to the public sphere, public health system and public education”.158 
And in relation to public reason, political community offers a language of 
membership which unites its members.159   
The form of association that is depicted in this way is based on a practice 
of cooperation, involving the capacity for action together and action together itself. 
Chalmers argues that the vision of political community that emerges from this 
involves “the interlocking of two forms of association between strangers” – one 
which is about “co-existing together (communities of co-presence)” (and in which 
there is a commitment to living together), and another which is about “doing 
things of value together (communities of shared activity)” (and in which the 
community is established on the basis of “participation in a shared activity”).160 He 
argues that it is the interaction between these two forms of association that marks 
out a political community as such. But from our perspective here, we can also see 
in this the distinction between an order of incorporation and an order of 
association. Whereas in the case of the former, co-presence and action are about 
common being – about doing things in the same way and at the same time – in the 
case of the latter, co-presence and action are about being-in-common – about doing 
things together. The mode of common being in an order of incorporation is 
oriented towards the activity in question. The mode of being-in-common in an 
order of association is, meanwhile, oriented towards being together and relating to 
one another. It therefore requires bonds to be formed between members of the 
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community; and such bonds will be commonly expressed in the language of 
solidarity. In an order of incorporation, by contrast, such bonds will be thin, if not 
absent. Primacy is, instead, attached to the activity of the order. Hence, for 
example, the emphasis that is placed in the Benedictine Rule on the dignity of the 
activity and its stipulation that “measures should be taken [in the monastery] to 
prevent there being an opportunity for one monk to defend another or to try to 
protect him, even if they are related”.161 
The ethos that functions to support the mode of being-in-common of an 
order of association is an ethos of sociality, which is about the norms of relating 
between members. It is about the manner of relating to others and of being aware 
of others that is prescribed as being a part of – and a means to – the practice of 
cooperation itself. In this sense, ‘sociality’ here denotes something that is at once 
thinner and thicker than prevailing conceptualisations in the literature. It is thinner 
in the sense that it is about ‘relating to others’ (as compared, for example, with 
Marilyn Strathern’s conception of sociality “as the relational matrix which 
constitutes the life of persons”162) and it is thicker in the sense that it has a 
normative hue (it is about a prescribed manner of being with others, as opposed, 
for example, to being about the propensity for being with others as such163). 
The norms that comprise and are expressed in an ethos of sociality in this 
sense may develop between members of the community as they go about their 
pursuit of a project of acting together. They may also be imposed on these 
members ‘in the name of’ (which is to say for the sake of some conception of) the 
community. The critical point is that the project of acting together is deemed to 
rely for its sustenance on the maintenance of these norms. Contemporary 
expressions of an ethos of sociality (as a manner of relating to others) in the 
context of the modern political community include, for example, notions of 
                                                          
161 RSB, Ch.59. 
162 M. Strathern, Presentation in the 1989 debate of the Group for Debates in Anthropological 
Theory (on the motion: ‘The concept of society is theoretically obsolete’), in T. Ingold (ed.), Key 
Debates in Anthropology (1996, Routledge), 50-55, p53. 
163 On which see N. J. Long and H. L. Moore, ‘Introduction: Sociality’s New Directions’, in N. J. 
Long and H. L. Moore (eds.), Sociality: New Directions (2013, Bergahn Books), 1-24, 9-11. 
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‘civility’ (which has its roots in the classical ideal of good citizenship164), ‘social 
integration’ (which whilst not necessarily appealing directly to the political 
community is increasingly inseparable in its contemporary European usage from a 
vision of what it means to be a part of, or at least to relate to, this community165), 
and ‘social behaviour’ (of the sort that we see being articulated in the context of 
the regulation of ‘anti-social’ behaviour, for example166). The norms of relating that 
are articulated in this way – norms that, I am suggesting, set out a manner of 
cooperating – are intertwined in the practice of cooperation itself; and the effect 
of this is that the ethos of sociality underpins and conditions the mode of being-
in-common that is the mode of being of the order of association.  
1.3.3 Order and being 
What emerges most notably from this analysis of the orders of incorporation and 
association is the way in which each form of order presupposes and constructs a 
mode of being that is supported and structured by the ethos of the order. The 
mode of being in an order of incorporation is a mode of common being, the ethos 
of which is an ethos of stability; the mode of being in an order of association is a 
mode of being-in-common, the ethos of which is an ethos of sociality. The 
inseparability of being and order that is depicted in each case points towards the 
way in which each order is lived. This notion, of lived order, implies the possibility 
of the order itself as a mode of being.167 It points towards the way in which the 
                                                          
164 B. Davetian, Civility: A Cultural History (2009, University of Toronto Press), p9.  
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order itself structures – and accounts for – the life within it. If we go back and 
think about our two forms of order in this sense, we can see more closely how 
each one is lived in this way.  
 In the case of the order of incorporation, the demand exerted by the mode 
of common being entails an abandonment of individual identity: a process of self-
surrender and incorporation under a Rule.168 This process – of a giving over of 
identity – is instigated by the conditions that must be observed by an individual 
seeking admission to the order. In the case of the Benedictine monastery, for 
example, the aim of the conditions stipulated in this regard is to ensure that the 
individual demonstrates perseverance and endurance: he “should not be granted 
easy entry” and must be tested.169 The process of admission is accordingly a 
lengthy one. Only if “the newcomer persists in knocking and seems to endure 
patiently the harsh treatment and the difficulty of entry” should he be granted entry 
in the first instance, and then only to stay in the guest-house “for a few days”.170 
Following this, he initially dwells in “the novices’ centre”, where he is supervised 
by a senior and “told about all the difficult and harsh things that he will experience 
along the road to God”; and if he nevertheless perseveres, then after two months, 
he is read the Rule.171 If he can observe it, he returns to live among the novices; if 
not, he departs at this point. The process is repeated again after six months (“so 
that he knows what he is letting himself in for”) and again, “[i]f he still stands 
firm”, after another four months.172 After that, he is “received into the 
community” if “he promises to observe all the rules and to obey all the commands 
given to him”.173 But that admission occurs “in full awareness of the fact that the 
law of the rule lays down that from that day on he is not allowed to leave the 
                                                          
Bare Life (transl. D. Heller-Roazen) (1998 [1995], Stanford University Press); G. Agamben, The 
Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life (transl. A. Kotsko) (2013, Stanford University Press)). 
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monastery or to withdraw his neck from the yoke of the rule, which he had been 
allowed to accept or reject during the extended period of reflection”.174 He 
proceeds to take the vows of stability, conversion of life, and obedience. From 
now on, obedience will always denote that early liberty; and the Benedictine 
scheme is consequently taken to be one of “ordered liberty”.175  
Running alongside this process is a gradual elimination of individual will. 
This is cast as stemming from the choice to be admitted as a monk,176 which means 
that what we have here is an act of will which, at the moment of its expression, 
entails its renunciation; hereafter, the monk “will not even have jurisdiction over 
his own body”.177 The monk is to “renounce” his own will,178 to “hate” his own 
will,179 to “give up” his own will,180 to “guard” himself against his own will and to 
avoid “loving” his own will…;181 simply put, “monks should not…count their own 
bodies and wills as their own”.182 Only in one sense does any form of individual 
will hold, and this comes to light if, exceptionally, the monk has to be disciplined 
and order in the monastery has to be restored.183 The idea of individual will re-
emerges here in that while all good is attributed to God and to the common 
stability of the monastery, any bad or disobedience is attributed to the individual.184 
The underpinning theory seems to be that instances of disobedience reveal that 
the monk had never renounced his will in the first place. And so the monk is 
disciplined and punished; and the aim is to bring this renunciation about. 
The order of incorporation thus subsumes the individual within the status 
of subject of its order. It creates a bounded individual, by drawing a literal and 
metaphorical boundary around individual will and revoking this only in exceptional 
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conditions. This enables the mode of common being, because in eliminating the 
notion of the individual, the possibility of deviation is also eliminated.185 The focus 
then comes to be on the activity of the order. 
The order of association is lived differently. There is no renunciation of 
individual will comparable to that seen in an order of incorporation. Rather, the 
individual is cast as committing herself to the practice of cooperation in the 
community and as bearing a series of rights and duties that are associated with the 
collective interest. More specifically, she is conceived of as identifying and relating 
as a member of the community; and the focus of the mode of being-in-common 
is on the ties that are formed between these members. Critically, from the 
perspective of each individual member, the status of membership of a given order 
of association is but one status. An individual may be a member of or identify with 
other forms of community, status, and organisation. The idea of ‘the individual’ 
supplies a coherence and identity across these different statuses, which means that 
unlike in an order of incorporation, where the status of the individual therein is a 
total status, the status of membership in an order of association is but one face of 
the individual. The different faces of the individual furthermore interact.  
The practice of cooperation in an order of association accordingly relies 
largely on the negotiation of difference, because although the status of member 
itself entails that members are identifiable as sharing some sameness, this 
identification occurs from the perspective of individual difference. Differences are 
emphasised as being of equal worth and the politics is one of the recognition of 
this individual worth.186 Members are required to recognise each other and their 
own position in relation to these others and to the collective; and the conception 
of identity that emerges is one that is about sharing. It involves shared vulnerability, 
shared difference, and shared community; and this secures the mode of being-in-
common that is the mode of the order of association. 
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This is not to say, however, that the individual is necessarily read on her 
own terms in an order of association. For although the order of association 
presupposes a negotiation of difference as occurring within it, it primarily reads 
the individual in terms of her membership of it. And so whilst the individual is 
conceived of as being expressed in and as uniting all the multiple statuses that she 
holds, she is typically only presented and read through the lens of her roles and 
ties of membership.187 The focus comes to be on the individual as member, and as 
part of this, she is oriented towards the form of the ideal member. This means that 
whilst the community of the order of association appears to preserve the status of 
the individual as such, it also poses a risk of suppressing her singularity. It 
emphasises individual participation, but it reads the individual as embedded for 
this purpose in roles and ties of membership, to which can be attributed an ideal 
form, and towards which the individual can be oriented and bound. 
In both the orders of incorporation and association, then, the fate of the 
individual188 is one of a comparable complexity. The mode of common being of 
the order of incorporation involves a renunciation of the individual will that brings 
about incorporation in the first place. It creates a bounded individual, by drawing 
a literal and metaphorical boundary around individual will and revoking this only 
in exceptional conditions. The mode of being-in-common of the order of 
association requires the commitment of the individual to its practice of 
cooperation, but at the same time it primarily presents her in the terms of her roles 
and memberships. It creates a bonded individual, by binding the individual to her 
roles and statuses, to which can be attributed an ideal form, and towards which 
form the individual then comes to be oriented.  
The inseparability of being and order that is depicted in this way points to 
the notion of order as lived. What we have seen with the orders of incorporation 
                                                          
187 The embedding of the individual in this way is a problem of communitarian philosophies like 
MacIntyre’s in which such primacy is attached to the particular role that is inhabited that “what 
is good for me has to be good for one who inhabits those roles” (A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A 
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incorporation presupposes an individual who seeks admission to it; the order of association 
presupposes an individual capable of continuing commitment to cooperation in this order.  
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and association is not only that they set out a mode of being but that they do so in 
a manner that renders this mode of being inseparable from the mode of order. The 
order thus structures the life within it; and it conceives of an individual that befits 
it. And what we come to, then, is this: an illustration of what it means for an order 
to be lived.  
1.4 Lived order 
When we take the insights gained from this study of order back to our question of 
European human rights law, we see the beginnings of something very interesting. 
For if we start to think about the order of individuation that is constituted by the 
ECHR legal order as a lived order – and as a legal order, it is, by definition, a lived 
order189 – we come to a way of analysing it and accounting for it that forefronts 
the question of the mode of being that underpins a conception of order that has, 
as its basis, ‘the individual’. To prepare us for such a study of European human 
rights law as a lived order of individuation, this section examines in further detail 
the concept of lived order itself. It does so by drawing out the main features of a 
lived order as these were illustrated by our examples of incorporation and 
association. I suggest that a lived order has three principal features: it is governed 
by an ethos, which functions to support and structure its mode of being (1.4.1); it 
is internalised by those within it (1.4.2); and it structures life by setting out a vision 
of five spheres: space, time, body, wisdom, and things (1.4.3). 
1.4.1 The ethos of lived order  
A lived order is governed by an ethos, which functions to support and structure 
the mode of being of the order. We know this from our analysis of the orders of 
incorporation and association; but what these forms of order also show us is that 
this ethos must have three dimensions: a local dimension (involving the place of 
the order); a common dimension (involving the body of the order); and an 
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system of human rights law would be the way in which to be at all effective it must be able to 
relate to the lives and experiences of those within its jurisdiction, so that they can rely on, appeal 
to, and fundamentally assume the existence of the rights set out. 
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individual dimension (involving the subject of the order). To think about these 
dimensions, and to see how they interact, we need to go back to our models of 
incorporation and association.  
 The ethos that supports and structures the mode of common being of an 
order of incorporation is, as was discussed above, an ethos of stability. If we return 
to our example of Benedictine monasticism in this respect, we can see the way in 
which three strands of stability – local, common, and individual – feature in the 
Rule of St. Benedict itself and in subsequent interpretations of it. Local stability is 
the strand of stability that we focused on earlier; and it emphasises permanence of 
place and connotes the attachment to territory that underlies the Benedictine 
enclosure more generally. But local stability does not offer a comprehensive 
account of stability, as is revealed by the reality of monastic history, and, in 
particular, by instances in which monastic communities have had to move or flee. 
This notably occurred at the Benedictine monastery at Monte Cassino, when, forty 
years after the death of St. Benedict, the Lombards destroyed his monastery and 
the monks who were based there fled to Rome.190 Evidently, this movement and 
subsequent reconstitution in Rome could not have been easily harmonised with a 
reading of stability as local stability; and so a conception of common stability emerged, 
which secures the continuity that local stability cannot guarantee. It does so by 
grounding stability within the permanence and strength of the monastic 
community or congregation itself.191  
 Local stability and common stability interact; thus Jean Leclercq argues that 
common stability has its roots in local stability, such that “[s]tability of place was 
the expression of, and means towards, permanence in the brotherhood, in that 
daily cheek-by-jowl contact in which all virtues are simultaneously forged within 
the soul of the cenobite”.192 Common stability is consequently not merely the 
                                                          
190 J. McCann, Saint Benedict (1937, Sheed and Ward), p225. 
191 Thus Butler, whilst offering a reading of stabilitas as stabilitas loci, reconciles this vision with 
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70 
 
expression of (and means of) the common mode of being, but also “a means of 
moving towards perfection” and of bringing closer the relationship between monk, 
neighbour, and God.193 It rests upon a model of common life that is characterised 
by the fact that everything is done in common: the monks are occupied by the 
same tasks, simultaneously, and common stability reflects and derives from this 
homogeneity and from the rhythm of the Rule that guides it. 
The individual monk is incorporated into this common by the strand of 
individual stability. Columba Cary-Elwes supplies the principal reading of the vow 
of stability in these terms. He argues that interpretations of stabilitas as local stability 
overemphasise the ‘local’; rather, the vow of stability is one of stability of 
obedience, based upon individual “perseverance in the monastic state”.194 This 
reading, which centres upon the vow of obedience, derives from the weight that is 
attached to motive and to ‘Godward’ will throughout the Rule more generally;195 
what St. Benedict was seeking to do, Cary-Elwes argues, was to ensure that self-
will was fully suppressed by stabilitas, so that stabilitas “blocks up the holes by which 
the fox, self-will, might escape”.196 And indeed, as we have seen already, within the 
Rule itself it is made clear that individual will is renounced upon admission to the 
monastery. Whether this truly represents the influence of Stoicism on monasticism 
– and the attainment of the Stoic ideal of apatheia (“the perfect domination over all 
inclinations of nature”) – as Herbert Workman suggests,197 is more questionable, 
since on many occasions in the Rule natural inclinations are suppressed only with 
external assistance. The bulk of the emphasis on monks not finding things too 
difficult or distressing is thus oriented towards ensuring that they have no cause to 
grumble in the first place: a subtle shift, but one which does away with a Stoic 
presupposition that they would not feel difficulty or distress, and replaces it with 
an external protection against such feelings.198 The strand of individual stability is, 
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in this way, underwritten by a fairly weak vision of human psychology. It is, after 
all, a “little rule for beginners”.199 
When we turn to consider the order of association, we see that the ethos 
that structures its mode of being-in-common – the ethos of sociality – is similarly 
composed. This ethos, as we know, is about the norms of relating between 
members that are prescribed as being a part of the practice of cooperation itself. 
Like the ethos of an order of incorporation, the ethos of an order of association 
has three dimensions: local, common, and individual. These strands operate to 
secure each other. Local sociality is about the strand of sociality that pertains to the 
site of the order of association. It is about the particularity of the norms of relating 
– a particularity that renders these norms ones that are bound to a specific order 
of association. For example, contemporary European expressions of ‘social 
integration’ – either as a point of assessment in examining an individual’s degree 
of association (and therefore ‘belonging’ and connection) in a society, or as an 
explicit injunction200 – reflect an ethos of local sociality in this sense. They 
presuppose and express a vision of what it means to be ‘socially integrated’ in a 
certain place – of what it means to relate in a specific context. And so if, for 
example, “proximity to a society” is what is being assessed when the degree of an 
individual’s ‘social integration’ is being examined,201 then a vision of what it means 
to be proximal to a society is necessarily also being articulated too.  
Local sociality is connected to common sociality in that while local sociality is 
about the particularity of the norms of a given order of association,202 common 
sociality is about the manner of relating to each other (and therefore living together 
and acting together) that these norms stipulate and give rise to. Appeals to civility 
draw this strand of the ethos of sociality out particularly clearly,203 for the notion 
                                                          
199 RSB, Ch.73. 
200 See, e.g., in the context of EU law Barbou des Places (2016), above n108. 
201 As is apparently increasingly so in EU free movement law: ibid., p185. 
202 It is in this sense that I include EU law’s notion of ‘social integration’ – a notion which points 
to association in the host society. The fact that this then feeds into a broader conception of the 
EU legal order (an order of integration) is a separate point. 
203 It also, of course, has a local dimension (on which see L. Cahoone, ‘Civic Meetings, Cultural 
Meanings’, L. S. Rouner (ed.), Civility (2000, University of Notre Dame Press), 40-64). 
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of civility denotes a ‘civil’ manner of behaving, relating, and conversing (and one 
that derives its normative hue from the articulation of what being ‘civil’ means).204 
This is what is forefronted in the French legal conception of the “minimum 
requirements of life in society”, for instance – a notion that has also been specified 
in terms of the “minimum requirement of social interaction that is necessary for 
civility”.205 It is in these terms, for example, that the prohibition on the covering 
of the face in public has been primarily justified by the French Government, which 
conceives of the covering of the face in public as being contrary to the principle 
of “living together” in society.206  
 The final strand of the ethos of sociality is individual sociality. If this appears 
to be a contradiction in terms, it is simply meant to denote the way in which 
individual responsibility is conceived of in relation to the ethos of sociality. This is 
about the way in which the individual is conceived of as having an obligation to 
contribute to the maintenance of this ethos: an obligation expressed, for example, 
in the language of duties in relation to social integration,207 and in terms of notions 
such as of individual social and/or civic responsibility and ‘social behaviour’. 
Individual sociality locates sociality in the individual’s demonstration of an 
awareness of others and in so doing it further secures the mode of being-in-
common that forefronts the bonds between members in an order of association. 
 The first feature of a lived order is, therefore, that it has an ethos, which 
functions to support and structure the mode of being of the order. The ethos has 
three dimensions: local, common, and individual. These interact to secure each 
other and to govern the order. 
 
                                                          
204 See esp.  T. M. Bejan, Mere Civility: Disagreement and the Limits of Toleration (2017, Harvard 
University Press); Sennett (2013), above n94, p116-127; Davetian (2009), above n107; A. Bryson, 
From Courtesy to Civility: Changing Codes of Conduct in Early Modern England (1998, Clarendon Press); 
P. Smith, T. L. Phillips, and R. D. King, Incivility: The Rude Stranger in Everyday Life (2010, Cambridge 
University Press). 
205 43835/11, S.A.S. v France (2014), paras.82, 25. See further Ch.4, part 4.3. 
206 Ibid., para.82. See further Ch.4, part 4.3. 
207 On which see, e.g., Barbou des Places, above n108, p196. 
73 
 
1.4.2 The internalisation of lived order  
The second feature of a lived order is that the order is internalised by those within 
it, by which I mean that it is taken in by its subjects. To return to our example of 
the order of incorporation, the first sentence of the Prologue to the Rule of St. 
Benedict is: “[l]isten, my son, to the master’s instructions and take them to 
heart”.208 A few pages later, in the chapter describing the “kind of man the abbot 
should be”, we read that he “should work into the minds of his disciples the Lord’s 
commands and his teaching”.209 This language – of taking the instructions to heart 
and having these instructions worked into the mind – is the language of 
internalisation. More specifically, it is the language of instructions to internalise – 
of instructions to take in the Rule of the order. This culminates in the expression 
of the demand that the individual renounce his will210 – a demand which paves the 
way for a total internalisation of the Rule and therefore an internal alignment of 
life and the order. 
 The Rule specifies different ways of attaining this internal alignment: 
specific rules are to be read aloud regularly, for example,211 and habits are to be 
formed out of things that once entailed fear and required effort.212 But the most 
profound expression of the instruction of internalisation consists in the notion that 
there is to be a closing of the gap between instruction and action – a closing which 
eliminates the possibility of thought itself. This has its origins in the idea of 
obedience that is articulated here. Obedience is to be “unhesitating”, such that 
“[t]he master’s order and the disciple’s perfect fulfilment of it occur more or less 
simultaneously”.213 This requires more than proximate simultaneity between 
instruction and action, however. Rather, it affects motive too. Thus the order must 
be “carried out without hesitation, without delay, without apathy, without 
complaint and without any answering back from the one who is unwilling”; and 
                                                          
208 RSB, Prologue. 
209 RSB, Ch.2. 
210 See part 1.3.3 above. 
211 RSB, Ch.66. 
212 RSB, Ch.7. 
213 RSB, Ch.5. 
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the monk has to obey both in his action and “in his heart”.214 The same instruction 
is repeated elsewhere in the Rule too; in the ‘Regulations regarding the singing of 
psalms’, for example, it is said: “let us stand to sing in such a way that there is no 
discrepancy between our thoughts and the words we are singing”.215 
 Such an instruction to close the gap between actions and instructions and 
between words and thoughts is a somewhat extreme example of an instruction to 
internalise an order; and the norms of an order can, of course, be internalised in 
the absence of an explicit instruction to do so. The normative and normalising 
conceptions of roles articulated within the context of an order of association may 
be internalised in this sense by way of a process of ‘socialisation’, for example. This 
would suppose that the orientation of the individual towards a particular 
conception of a given role could, over time, bring about its internalisation, such 
that the norm would be experienced from within. In Freudian thought, this is the 
mechanism of the Super-ego – a voice of authority and prohibition216 – and what 
it essentially denotes is the idea of the internalisation of a form which then sets to 
work on the ego of the individual, by “setting up an internal authority to watch 
over him, like a garrison in a conquered town”.217 This enables the norms of the 
order to be experienced from within and without.218  
 What the notion of the internalisation of lived order points to is the way in 
which the order is inhabited and assumed by those within it. This is what Jonathan 
Lear elsewhere describes in terms of the intelligibility that is bound up in a form 
of life219 – the notion of ‘intelligibility’ here pointing to the way in which we are 
                                                          
214 RSB, Ch.5. 
215 RSB, Ch.19. 
216 S. Freud, The Ego and the Id (1949 [1927], The Hogarth Press), Ch.3. 
217 S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (transl. D. McLintock) (2004 [1930], Penguin), p77. 
218 This example of internalisation is, evidently, of a different degree to that which we saw in the 
case of the Benedictine instruction to internalise; the existence of the Super-ego as a voice of 
authority arguably serves only to indicate that there remains a gap between life and the rule in this 
case. But the example nevertheless points to the way in which the norms of a lived order can be 
taken in, such that they are experienced from within and without. 
219 Lear’s argument is made about ‘forms of life’ but I think we draw on it in thinking about lived 
order. On the comparison between the notions of ‘lived order’ and ‘form of life’ see above n110. 
The two notions are structurally similar (both are lived); the difference is in what is being lived 
(an order/a form).   
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located within a form of life and our life makes sense in relation to it.220 The focus 
of Lear’s analysis in this respect is on crises of intelligibility – on what happens 
when intelligibility breaks down.221 He suggests that in a “loss of intelligibility…the 
concepts and categories by which the inhabitants of a form of life have understood 
themselves…cease to make sense as ways to live”.222 Where there is a breakdown 
in intelligibility, things no longer make practical sense (things “cease to 
happen”223); moreover, the intelligibility of the self is thrown into question, for 
“the possibility of constituting oneself as a certain sort of subject suddenly 
becomes problematic”.224 What such breakdowns in intelligibility in a form of life 
reveal is the extent to which one has “[inhabited] a way of life” in the first place.225 
They reflect the way in which the form of life has been an assumed part of one’s 
existence to the extent that one’s self-understanding arises in it and is shaped by it.  
If we draw these notions together – these notions of internal alignment 
with an order, of socialisation and orientation to norms in an order, and of the 
intelligibility that is bound up in a form of life (and, by extension, a lived order226) 
– we come to a way of understanding the internalisation of lived order that marks 
it out as being about the way in which the order itself is assumed and so also is life 
(and self-understanding) in relation to it. This, in turn, forefronts the structuring 
function of a lived order – the way in which it structures life within it – and this 
brings us to the final feature of a lived order: the structure of its vision of life.  
1.4.3 The five spheres of lived order  
The final insight that can be drawn from the orders of incorporation and 
association is that a lived order sets out an account of space, time, body, wisdom, 
and things. A lived order claims to structure these spheres; an account of these 
                                                          
220 J. Lear, Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation (2006, Harvard University Press); J. 
Lear, ‘What Is a Crisis of Intelligibility?’, in Wisdom Won from Illness: Essays in Philosophy and 
Psychoanalysis (2017, Harvard University Press), 50-62. 
221 This is not necessarily consonant with a breakdown in the form of life itself: Lear (2017), ibid., 
p51. 
222 Ibid., p50-51. 
223 Lear (2006), above n163, p6. 
224 Ibid., p44. 
225 Ibid., p6. 
226 See n162. 
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spheres – which is at the same time an account of how the subject of the order 
experiences these – is what structures a lived order’s vision of life. The five spheres 
are necessarily intertwined; but an account of each sphere is also separately set out. 
We can consider the broad contours of the ways in which these spheres are 
imagined and accounted for in the orders of incorporation and association as 
follows. 
(i) Space 
The order of incorporation conceives of space primarily in terms of the enclosure 
that lies at its basis. As we saw earlier, it is this enclosure that enables the 
constitution of the order of incorporation as such; and it makes for a focus on 
delineating that which falls within and without the order. Once this enclosure is 
secured, a form of ‘transitional space’227 emerges within it. This space is transitional 
because it is a space of living that is oriented towards the objective of the order. In 
the case of the Benedictine monastery, for example, life is conceived of as being 
lived in the transitional space between the monk and God, with the monastery 
being “a temporary point for the transition of the individual from earth to 
heaven”.228 Transitional space is a space (and temporal stage) of passage: a space 
that points to a liminal stage involving the feeling of being “betwixt and between” 
that is experienced as one passes from one realm to the next.229  
 An order of association relies on a notion of enclosure too, in the sense 
that this order (like any order) must have boundaries.230 But space is primarily 
conceived of in an order of association in terms of spatial bonds (rather than spatial 
boundaries), for attention is drawn in the first instance to the relations between 
                                                          
227 The term comes from Winnicott, who introduced it to denote the space at the border between 
the infant’s body and her external reality and the space of creativity: D. W. Winnicott, ‘Transitional 
Objects and Transitional Phenomena’ (1953), in Playing and Reality (2005 [1971], Routledge), 1-34. 
228 G. Melville, ‘The Innovational Power of Monastic Life in the Middle Ages’, in L. Bisgaard, S. 
Engsbro, K. V. Jensen, and T. Nyberg (eds.), Monastic Culture: The Long Thirteenth Century – Essays 
in Honor of Brian Patrick McGuire (2014, University Press of Southern Denmark), 13-31, p16. 
229 V. Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (1969, Aldine de Gruyter), p95 (note 
also his argument at p107 that this “passage quality of the religious life” represents an 
“institutionalization of liminality”). See also A. Van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (transl. M. B. 
Vizedom and G. L. Caffee) (1960 [1908], The University of Chicago Press). 
230 On which see Lindahl (2013), above n76. 
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members of the order – to the habits of the community of cooperation and the 
bonds of custom and culture that characterise it (and then only distinguish it).231 
In an order of association, the practice of cooperation is conceived of as making 
the place (and so defining the space) of the order.232 
(ii) Time 
An order of incorporation is oriented towards the future and towards that which 
is to come. The monks under the Rule of St. Benedict are accordingly conceived 
of as being on a “journey to God”.233 This temporal orientation is underpinned by 
the mode of common being (of doing things in the same way at the same time) 
that transcends each monk;234 and this mode of being hinges on the demand of 
simultaneity. In the Rule of St. Benedict, a rigid schedule enables this. The order 
of the hour, of the day, of the night, of the week, of the month, of the season, and 
of the year is accounted for; in fact, it has been argued that the Benedictine way of 
‘accounting for’ “almost every moment of a monk’s life” underpinned the 
establishment of modern scheduling and daily “temporal regularity” more 
generally.235 The overriding sense is that there is a proper time for everything; and 
anything that falls outside this constitutes, by definition, a point of disturbance and 
a source of distress.236 The time of the order is, moreover, to supersede all other 
categories of time. Thus in the Benedictine monastery, “the brothers should keep 
                                                          
231 In the context of the political community in this respect see J. Tussman, Obligation and the Body 
Politic (1960, Oxford University Press), p5 et seq. 
232 See, e.g., De Coulanges (1854), above n77, p177, who draws this point out in relation to the 
ancient meaning of ‘civitas’ (community of citizens) as a practice of association (as distinct from 
the urbs, which was the enclosure within which this practice occurred).  
233 McCann (1937), above n133, p108. 
234 If this appears to carry a paradox, as Riesenberg argues – in that individual perfection demands 
“corporate acts of prayer and mutual regulation” instead of individual action (P. Riesenberg, 
Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau (1992, The University of North Carolina Press), 
p96) – then that view has to be qualified to take account of the fact that the idea here is that 
without common being there is no perfection (qua common monk) at all. 
235 E. Zerubavel, ‘The Benedictine Ethic and the Modern Spirit of Scheduling: on Schedules and 
Social Organization’, (1980) Sociological Inquiry 50(2), 157-169, p158. 
236 See esp. RSB, Ch.31, in relation to the carrying out of the duties of the cellarer: “Necessary 
items should be requested and given at the proper times, so that no one is disturbed or distressed 
in the house of God.” 
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the rank they were assigned at the time of their entry to the monastic life” and it is 
this time of entry that matters, not, for example, their age.237  
 In an order of association, time is conceived of more in terms of temporal 
attachment between members, by which I mean that whereas the mode of 
common being in an order of incorporation is focused on the activity itself (and 
simultaneity in relation to it), the mode of being-in-common in an order of 
association is focused on the fact that the activity is engaged in together (through 
a practice of cooperation). The sort of notions that we accordingly see being 
articulated are notions of belonging and solidarity. The focus is on temporal 
continuity, not least because to set up some sense of community there needs to be 
a sense of narrative continuity; and the literature points to the importance of forms 
of ritual and tradition in this regard.238  
(iii) Body 
The order of incorporation produces a vision of a body that has been submitted 
to its order. In the Rule of St. Benedict, for example, it is said that from the 
moment of his admission to the monastery the monk “will [have nothing], not 
even have jurisdiction over his own body”.239 This submitted body becomes a 
habituated body – a body that takes on certain habits240 and is bound up in a 
habitual way of being. In the Benedictine monastery, humility is accordingly to be 
shown by the body; thus in greeting guests, “the brothers should bow the head or 
prostrate the whole body”.241 Submission and habituation are conceived of as 
                                                          
237 RSB, Ch.63. 
238 See e.g., Sennett (2013), above n94, p86-95; E. Hobsbawm, ‘Introduction: Inventing 
Traditions’ in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (1983, Cambridge 
University Press), 1-14. See also B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and 
Spread of Nationalism (2006 [1983, Verso).   
239 RSB, Ch.58. See also Ch.33: “monks should not even count their own bodies and wills as their 
own…”; and Ch.7 on rejecting bodily desire 
240 See Agamben (2013), above n110, p13-16.  
241 RSB, Ch53. See also Ch.7. 
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enabling the incorporation of the individual body into the common (monastic) 
body.242  
 In an order of association, a vision of what Nancy Scheper-Hughes and 
Margaret Lock describe as “the three bodies” – the individual body (“understood 
in the phenomenological sense of the lived experience of the body-self”), the social 
body (which “[refers] to the representational uses of the body as a natural symbol 
with which to think about nature, society, and culture”), and the body politic 
(which “[refers] to the regulation, surveillance, and control of bodies”) – is similarly 
produced.243 An order of association has, unlike an order of incorporation, a 
conception of difference, and the focus is on the contribution of each individual 
to the order itself. This makes for an organological account, in which each 
individual is conceived of as playing his or her part in relation to the whole.244 
Bound up in this will necessarily be an account of what it means to be socialised 
within the order, however; and a vision of ways of using the body will inevitably 
be articulated as a part of that.245 
(iv) Wisdom 
In an order of incorporation, wisdom is conceived of as being located in the Rule 
of the order, such that wisdom on the part of those within the order involves an 
alignment of their understanding and behaviour with the Rule itself. In the case of 
the Benedictine order, the abbot is the principal figure of wisdom in this regard. 
Thus a criterion for his appointment is “the wisdom of his teaching”; and his “wise 
management” of the monastery is cast as consisting in his observation of “[the] 
rule in all things”.246  Wisdom features as a criterion in the appointment of other 
authoritative figures in the monastery too: deans should be selected “for their 
                                                          
242 And so in relation to “[t]hose who refuse to amend despite frequent rebuke”, the abbot must 
ultimately “use the knife of amputation” by banishing the monk, “to prevent a single diseased 
sheep infecting the whole flock” (RSB, Ch.28). 
243 N. Scheper-Hughes and M. M. Lock, ‘The Mindful Body: A Prolegomenon to Future Work in 
Medical Anthropology’ (1987) Medical Anthropology Quarterly 1(1), 6-41, p7. 
244 See R. Sennett, Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization (1994, Faber and 
Faber), p23-24. 
245 See M. Mauss, ‘Techniques of the Body (1935)’ (1973) Economy and Society 2(1), 70-88.  
246 RSB, Ch.64. 
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virtuous behaviour, their learning and wisdom”;247 the cellarer should be “a man 
who is wise, mature and sensible”;248 and the porter should be “[a] wise old 
man”.249 For everyone else, wisdom is something to strive for250 and to acquire 
through the development of wise habits.251 
 There are three levels to the notion of wisdom that is articulated in this way: 
it involves a holistic integration of understanding and behaviour that pushes it 
beyond ‘intelligence’, ‘expertise’, or ‘specialisation’;252 it constitutes a guide to the 
conduct of life; and it is an evaluative concept in the sense that actions and motives 
are assessed against the normative standard of good judgment that it articulates. In 
an order of association, wisdom in this sense is located in the practice of 
cooperation itself – and, more specifically, in the terms of its traditions and norms 
– and it is conceived of as being oriented towards the wellbeing of the association. 
In the same way that normative conceptions of particular roles within the order 
are constructed, wisdom will also be cast as an individual virtue; but critically, its 
meaning as such will be determined collectively and specifically, in accordance with 
the values of the association that are represented in the ethos of sociality.253 
(v) Things  
A lived order sets out a vision of how material things are related to within it. In an 
order of incorporation, things are incorporated into the order, just like the 
individual is. As we saw earlier, the moment of incorporation involves a 
renunciation of individual will; and at the same time, there is a renunciation of the 
notion of possession. Thus in the case of the Benedictine order, there is to be no 
private ownership, and this is because there is no concept of individual possession; 
                                                          
247 RSB, Ch.21. 
248 RSB, Ch.31. 
249 RSB, Ch.97. 
250 RSB, Ch.73. 
251 E.g., the monks are to speak few words, as is deemed befitting of the wise: RSB, Ch.7. 
252 See e.g., G. Labouvie-Vief, ‘Wisdom as integrated thought: historical and developmental 
perspectives’, in R. J. Sternberg (ed.), Wisdom: Its Nature, Origins, and Development (1990, Cambridge 
University Press), 52-83, p77-78. 
253 On the specificity of the substantive content of ‘wisdom’ in this regard, see J. E. Birren and C. 
M. Svensson, ‘Wisdom in History’, in R. J. Sternberg and J. Jordan (eds.), A Handbook of Wisdom: 
Psychological Perspectives (2005, Cambridge University Press), 3-31. 
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the monks are, rather, dependent on the abbot for everything.254 The monks are 
cast as relating to material things by way of their relationship with the abbot, 
therefore; and need for things as independent of this relationship is conceived of 
as being eradicated.255 The governing principle is then that all material things are 
the property of the monastery; and the Rule specifies rules for care of this 
property.256  
 In an order of association, there is no comparable renunciation of 
individual will or individual property. The retention of the individual in this sense 
means that there is also a retention of a notion of individual need; and the 
satisfaction of this need may be conceived of as being a part of the function of the 
order of association (as where the order is conceived of as having a welfare-based 
function, for example). The focus, in addition, is on the contribution of the 
member to the practice of cooperation and to the collective goods generated 
through this practice, which makes for a way of relating to material things from 
the perspective of the practice of cooperation itself.  
*** 
To summarise, a lived order has three principal features:  
1. A lived order is governed by an ethos. This ethos functions to support and 
structure the mode of being of the order, and it has three dimensions: a 
local dimension (involving the place of the order); a common dimension 
(involving the body of the order); and an individual dimension (involving 
the subject of the order). These dimensions interact to secure each other 
and to govern the order. 
 
2. A lived order is internalised by those within it. This is to say that the order is taken 
in by those within it. The effect of this is that the order is assumed by its 
inhabitants, and so also is life and self-understanding in relation to it.  
                                                          
254 RSB, Chs.33, 54, 55, 58, 59. 
255 RSB, Ch.55: to eradicate the “vice of “personal property”, the abbot is to “hand out everything 
that is needed…then no one can pretend that they have need of something…” 




3. A lived order structures life within it. The structure of its vision of life consists 
in the way in which it delineates and sets out an account of five spheres: 
space, time, body, wisdom, and things.  
 
A study of European human rights law as a lived order of individuation must 
account for these three features.  
1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out a way of thinking about European human rights law as a 
lived order of individuation: as an order that is constituted upon and structured by 
a vision of ‘the individual’ and that presupposes and expresses a mode of being 
such that the order is itself lived. More specifically, this chapter has shown us three 
things. It has, firstly, elaborated the idea of the ECHR legal order as an order of 
individuation; and in so doing, it has shown us why we might do well to think of 
European human rights law in such terms. It has, secondly, shown us what it 
means to think about European human rights law as an order of individuation, 
which is to say that it has shown us – through an analysis of the orders of 
incorporation and association – that the fundamental question must be of the 
mode of being that underpins a conception of order that has, as its basis, ‘the 
individual’. It has, thirdly, shown us how we might analyse European human rights 
law as a lived order of individuation. A lived order, I have argued, has three main 
features: it is governed by an ethos; it is internalised by those within it; and it 
structures life within it by setting out a vision of space, time, body, wisdom, and 
things. The next five chapters take up the challenge of analysing European human 
rights law in these terms. 
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With this chapter, we embark on an analysis of the ECHR legal order as a lived 
order. This is an analysis of the mode of being that underpins a conception of 
order that has, as its basis, ‘the individual’, and it takes up the rest of my thesis. In 
the preceding chapter, in which I elaborated the conceptualisation of the ECHR 
legal order as a lived order of individuation, we saw how a lived order sets out an 
account of space, time, body, wisdom, and things. In this chapter, we will examine 
the conception of space that is set out in European human rights law. 
 The chapter argues that space is conceived of in European human rights 
law by reference to two visions: a vision of the sense of place of the individual, 
which I describe as an idea of individual presence (2.2), and a vision of the position 
of the individual – of the representation of the individual through the terms of 
some role or status – which I describe as an idea of individual presentation (2.3). The 
fundamental question is of how these two visions are mediated; and the argument 
that I make is that although the notion of presentation carries within it the 
possibility of suppressing presence, the mediation of presence and presentation 
also carries a more productive potential, as it opens a space for the negotiation of 
individual identity in European human rights law (2.4). 
2.2 Presence 
In Chapter 1, we saw much about the place that the individual holds in European 
human rights law. We saw, for example, how the ECHR legal order is structured 
around ‘the individual’, and we saw how the delineation of the place that is 
occupied by the individual in this way has been theorised in terms of justification 
of state action to the individual. But the place of the individual in European human 
rights law is portrayed in the case law not only in these terms of a position within 
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the ECHR legal order, but also in phenomenological terms – in terms of the sense 
of place of the individual. This is captured by a vision that can best be described 
as a vision of individual presence and is about the individual’s feeling of – and 
articulation of – being here and at home in the world. It originates in the 
individual’s sense of place, which is itself largely inseparable from the sense of 
orientation (a sense which is about the individual’s ability to orient herself in the 
world) (2.2.1). There are three elements to this notion of presence: self-image 
(which is about the individual’s establishment and communication of an image of 
herself), self-recognition (which is about her capacity to recognise herself), and 
attachment (which is about her ability and need to attach and create meaning) 
(2.2.2). These elements inform the category of the self in European human rights 
law. More specifically, they are cast as enabling the individual’s articulation of her 
self (2.2.3).  
2.2.1 The origins of presence: the sense of place and the sense of 
orientation 
The vision of presence that, as we will soon come to see, emerges in European 
human rights law as being about the individual’s feeling of – and articulation of – 
being here and at home in the world, originates in a notion of the individual’s sense 
of place. This has been elaborated most fully in cases concerning the home. The 
home is cast in European human rights law as being a place that is borne of and 
ought to denote feelings of security, stability, attachment, and familiarity.1 It is 
conceived of as grounding and framing a life, such that what is at issue when the 
Article 8 right to respect for the home is at issue is not only the home that has 
been built up but also the “personal security and wellbeing” that is associated with 
it2 and the life that has been built up in conjunction with it.3 The right to respect 
for the home is not only then about physical shelter but also about the sense of 
being at home: it “touches upon issues of central importance to the individual’s 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., 1870/05, Irina Smirnova v Ukraine (2016), para.93. 
2 9063/80, Gillow v UK (1986), para.55. 
3 See, e.g., 13216/05, Chiragov and Others v Armenia (2015), para.206. 
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physical and moral integrity, maintenance of relationships with others and a settled 
and secure place in the community”.4  
 The need that is conveyed in this way – the need of the individual for a 
sense of place that is here bound up in the meaning of ‘home’5 – is inextricably 
bound up in another need too: the individual’s need to orient herself in the world. 
In the literature, the development of a sense of orientation is often conceived of 
as being contingent on the establishment of a sense of place;6 but the two senses 
thereafter work together, for just as it is necessary to have some sense of place in 
order to be able to orient oneself, so it is also necessary to be able to orient oneself 
in order to develop a sense of place.7 This is reflected in the case law concerning 
the loss or destruction of the home, in which much emphasis is placed on the 
disorienting effects of losing a form of life,8 of being uprooted from a form of 
life,9 and of having to build another life elsewhere.10 The challenge in the aftermath 
of such experiences – as in the aftermath of any disorienting experience11 – is the 
challenge of reorientation; and here again the sense of place and the sense of 
orientation go together, the process of reorientation being not only one of 
                                                          
4 46577/15, Ivanova and Cherkezov v Bulgaria (2016), para.54. 
5 This does not mean, however, that there is “a right to be provided with a home” under the 
ECHR (27238/95, Chapman v UK (2001), para.99). 
6 See, e.g., Y.-F. Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (1977, University of Minnesota 
Press), Ch.3. 
7 This is captured by the idea that the development of the sense of orientation is dependent on 
experiences of disorientation and reorientation. See, e.g., B. Jager, ‘Theorizing, Journeying, 
Dwelling’, in A. Giorgi, C. T. Fischer, and E. L. Murray (eds.), Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological 
Psychology: Volume II (1975, Duquesne University Press), 235-260; A. Buttimer, ‘Home, Reach, and 
the Sense of Place’, in A. Buttimer and D. Seamon (eds.), The Human Experience of Space and Place 
(1980, Croom Helm Ltd.), 166-187, p170-174; Y.-F. Tuan, Landscapes of Fear (1980, Basil 
Blackwell), Ch.15; R. Solnit, A Field Guide to Getting Lost (2006, Canongate Books), p14-24.  
8 See, e.g., 23656/94, Ayder and Others v Turkey (2004), paras.109-110 (concerning the burning of 
the applicants’ homes and possessions). 
9 See, e.g., 46346/99, Noack and Others v Germany (2000, admissibility decision), para.1 (concerning 
the transfer of the inhabitants of a village to a town twenty kilometres away due to an expansion 
of lignite-mining operations in the area). 
10 23656/94, Ayder and Others v Turkey (2004), para.109 (see n8 above). 
11 By ‘disorienting experience’ I mean any experience that involves a feeling of expansion or 




reorienting oneself in the world but also of rebuilding a sense of place in the 
world.12 
The significance that is ascribed to the sense of orientation in European 
human rights law in this way can be further seen by considering the case of Slyusarev 
v Russia (2010). This concerned the complaint of Mr Slyusarev about his treatment 
by the police following his arrest for an assault. In particular, he complained that 
the police had removed his glasses (which he needed greatly) and had failed to 
return them to him for five months. He argued that this had debased his dignity 
and had seriously impaired his eyesight, contrary to the prohibition on torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment set out in Article 3 ECHR. 
In assessing the case, the ECtHR considered that had the glasses been 
returned to Mr Slyusarev quickly, no Article 3 issue would have arisen, because the 
minimum threshold of severity of ill-treatment required to bring an issue within 
the scope of Article 3 would not have been met. But here, Mr Slyusarev had been 
without glasses for several months; and “even if having no glasses had no 
permanent effect on [his] health, he must have suffered because of it”.13 Although 
Mr Slyusarev had still been able to “attend to himself, orient himself and move 
around indoors”, “he could not read or write normally, and, besides that, it must 
have created a lot of distress in his everyday life, and given rise to a feeling of 
insecurity and helplessness”.14 The Court thus appealed to two kinds of 
orientation: a notion of topographical orientation (about the capacity of Mr 
Slyusarev to orient himself in physical space and to navigate his environment) and 
a more ontological notion of the sense of orientation (about Mr Slyusarev’s 
capacity to situate himself in the world). It was this latter notion that, the Court 
implied, had been disrupted by the feelings of distress, insecurity, and helplessness 
that Mr Slyusarev had experienced here. The combination of the harm that he had 
experienced to his sense of place, coupled with the lack of explanation on the part 
of the State – as to why Mr Slyusarev’s glasses had been taken in the first place, as 
                                                          
12 The challenges of reorientation in this regard are well-captured by theories of grief, e.g. T. Attig, 
How We Grieve: Relearning the World (Revised Edition) (2011, Oxford University Press), Ch.4. 
13 60333/00, Slyusarev v Russia (2010), para.36. 
14 Ibid., para.36. 
87 
 
to why there had been a delay in medically examining him, and as to why there had 
been a delay in providing him with new glasses – led the Court to conclude that 
Mr Slyusarev had been subjected to degrading treatment in violation of Article 3. 
In thinking about the two kinds of orientation elaborated here, two 
questions arise. The first is as to the relation between topographical orientation 
and ontological orientation. Topographical orientation emphasises physicality of 
being (being in physical space) and ontological orientation emphasises security of 
being (sense of place), and the question that we are left with is of how these relate 
to one another. If we look to other case law in this respect, what we see is that 
where physical space is a concern in European human rights law, this is because 
(and insofar as) it affects the individual’s sense of place. This is well-illustrated by 
case law concerning physical conditions of detention, wherein the ECtHR’s central 
concern is with the effect of these conditions on the detainee’s sense of place. For 
example, a lack of physical space in a prison cell is conceived of as being a problem 
of a lack of personal space and a problem of the effect of this on the individual’s 
sense of place.15  
The second question that Slyusarev v Russia provokes is the question of the 
extent of the sense of orientation – a question of how this sense is delineated. After 
all, a sense of orientation is evidently something that is necessarily individually 
constituted. We can think of all sorts of things that may well partly or wholly 
constitute such a sense: relations with significant others; a state of health and bodily 
integrity; relations to significant activities, work, and interests; memories and the 
ability to maintain a continuous self-narrative; and the ability to delineate and 
preserve a sphere of personal space would perhaps be some examples. But such 
thinking only serves to reinforce the point about how unique a sense this is – and 
about how potentially far-reaching it is too; and the challenge for European human 
rights law lies in specifying its scope. In the following pages, we will see how it 
does this. 
                                                          
15 On which see, e.g., 14097/12 et al., Varga and Others v Hungary (2015). 
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2.2.2 Elements of presence 
There are three elements to the vision of individual presence articulated in 
European human rights law: self-image, self-recognition, and attachment. These 
elements are cast as enabling the sense of place and orientation of the individual, 
and they also tell us something about the category of the self in European human 
rights law. 
(i) Self-image 
The first element of individual presence in European human rights law is that of 
self-image. This is about the projective and introjective needs of the individual in 
establishing and communicating an image of herself. Jacques Lacan was among the 
first to theorise self-image in these terms; and in his account, the first occasion of 
seeing the self is integral to the process of ego-formation.16 He argued that this 
occasion consists in the first time that a child sees her own image in a mirror: a 
moment of identification, whereupon the child “assumes an image”.17 The 
identification of the ego with its own image inaugurates the ‘mirror-phase’ and 
instigates both an anticipation of future unity of self and body and a process of 
realisation that one possesses the capacity to project a self-image – the culmination 
of which marks the end of the ‘mirror I’ and the birth of the ‘social I’.18  
It is at this point of projection – the moment of the ‘social I’ – that 
European human rights law becomes interested. Its paramount concern here is 
with securing the capacity of the individual to project her own image. This is most 
evident in instances in which there is an appropriation and a controlling of the 
projected image of self of a subject. An example is Erdoğan Yağiz v Turkey (2007), 
which concerned the complaint of Mr Yağiz, a police doctor, that he had been 
intentionally humiliated and degraded by police officers during his arrest and 
subsequent detention. He had been arrested and handcuffed in public, taken in 
handcuffs to his workplace and to his home, and made to sit on a chair in custody 
                                                          
16 J. Lacan, ‘The Mirror-phase as formative of the Function of the I’ (1968) New Left Review 1(51) 
(Sept.-Oct.), 71-77.  
17 Ibid., p72. 
18 Ibid., p75.  
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for three days, blindfolded and handcuffed; and he argued that the humiliation that 
he had been made to endure in this regard in front of his colleagues, neighbours, 
family, and members of the public had affected him to such an extent that he had 
been unable to cope and had lost his job. 
In assessing this case, the ECtHR emphasised the way in which Mr Yağiz 
had been “affected mentally by the treatment to which he was subjected”.19 It 
considered that being made to wear the the handcuffs in public, at his workplace, 
and in front of his family had “aroused in him a strong feeling of humiliation and 
shame, especially in view of his professional duties” and that “[his] mental state 
suffered irreversible damage as a result of the incident, and he was incapable of 
coming to terms with his ordeal”.20 The humiliation that Mr Yağiz had experienced 
in his own eyes had been aggravated by its public nature, and, moreover, the 
Government had not provided any justification as to why the handcuffs were 
needed or as to why there was a need for Mr Yağiz to be seen wearing them. The 
ECtHR concluded that “in the particular context of the case, exposing [Mr Yağiz] 
to public view wearing handcuffs was intended to arouse in him feelings of fear, 
anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him and possibly 
breaking his moral resistance”,21 and that this had constituted degrading treatment 
in breach of Article 3.  
What this case highlights is the way in which self-image, both in terms of 
the control over it, and in terms of the need to be able to project it, serves a 
relational and communicative purpose, not least because it operates at the 
boundary between ‘concealment’ and ‘exposure’ – “between what we reveal and 
what we do not”.22 Self-image serves to signify a social identity; and more than 
this, it represents a vital “transaction” with the world,23 involving a setting out of 
self which is understood to be up for a sort of mutual engagement with the world 
that is only facilitated once the stage in emotional development has been reached 
                                                          
19 27473/02, Erdoğan Yağiz v Turkey (2007), para.45.  
20 Ibid., para.45. 
21 Ibid., para.47. 
22 T. Nagel, ‘Concealment and Exposure’ (1998) Philosophy and Public Affairs 27(1), 3-30, p4. 
23 This term comes from Nussbaum’s discussion in M. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The 
Intelligence of Emotions (2001, Cambridge University Press), p78. 
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in which it is realised that the world is not there to respond to one’s needs. The 
fact of this interaction means that self-image involves not only the projective 
qualities of the ego but also the introjective needs of the ego ideal (the vision of 
the ideal self) and the Super-ego (conscience).24 The taking in from the 
surrounding environment that is involved in this process of introjection could be 
thought of as involving the basic form of the Lacanian ‘social I’, but it also goes 
further than this. This is because its findings take the normative form of the 
idealised and authoritative self-image and become the point to which the 
(presently) formed self-image either aspires or from which it feels alienated. 
The concern of European human rights law in cases of humiliation is that 
these channels of projection and introjection are fundamentally abused in such 
instances. A striking illustration of this is to be found in Bouyid v Belgium (2015), in 
which the Grand Chamber held that there had been a violation of the Article 3 
rights of the applicants on account of the fact that they had been slapped on their 
faces by law-enforcement officers. In its reasoning, the Court elaborated the link 
between Article 3 and the concept of dignity, describing “a slap inflicted by a law-
enforcement officer on an individual who is entirely under his control” as 
“[constituting] a serious attack on the individual’s dignity”.25 The Court 
emphasised, in particular, the effects of a slap to the face: “A slap has a 
considerable impact on the person receiving it. A slap to the face affects the part 
of the person’s body which expresses his individuality, manifests his social identity 
and constitutes the centre of his senses – sight, speech and hearing – which are 
used for communication with others.”26 What was especially significant in this 
case, therefore, was that a channel for the expression of self-image, along with 
individual control of that image, was taken over; one of the key means through 
which the demand for recognition can be made – by way of communication – was 
violated. The sense emerging from the case law in this regard is that what is most 
pernicious about the infliction of humiliation is the way in which it sets in train a 
                                                          
24 For a restatement of the original distinction between these, see J. Mitchell, Siblings: Sex and 
Violence (2003, Polity Press), p16-17. 
25 23380/09, Bouyid v Belgium (2015), para.103. 
26 Ibid., para.104. 
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process of reducing the individual. The point has been put most starkly in cases 
involving violations of Article 3 on account of humiliating strip-searches in 
detention27 and the display of defendants in ‘courtroom cages’;28 and it is this: there 
comes a point where the individual is reduced to such an extent that not only does 
she lack control over her self-image, but her position as a subject with a self-image 
is thrown into question.29  
(ii) Self-recognition 
To have a self-image presupposes that one can recognise oneself in the first place; 
and this brings us to the second element of individual presence: self-recognition. 
This is conceived of as presupposing a certain organisation of the self, involving 
the recognition of a marginal yet fundamental state which is necessary to the 
constitution of the psyche but only insofar as it is kept in check. This is the realm 
of the abject – the realm theorised by Julia Kristeva in terms of that which is 
expelled from the body and is subsequently experienced as alien. The expulsion is 
necessary for the constitution of the body of the subject as such; but the abject 
then remains at the border, as a looming and potentially revolting threat to the 
subject’s identity.30 It constitutes an abyss: “the locus of the subject’s generation 
and the place of its potential obliteration”.31 
The capacity to recognise one’s self as such depends on an organisation of 
self in which the abject is maintained at the margin. The experience of abjection, 
by contrast, involves a breakdown in this organisation, and the realisation of the 
possible “relation to death, to animality, and to materiality”.32 This is experienced 
                                                          
27 E.g., 52750/99, Lorsé and others v The Netherlands (2003); 70204/01, Frérot v France (2007). 
28 E.g., 5829/04, Khodorkovskiy v Russia (2011); 33376/07, Piruzyan v Armenia (2012). 
29 See, e.g., 70204/01, Frérot v France (2007), in which Mr Frérot argued that the strip-searches in 
detention made the prisoners look “like slaves or animals for sale” (para.31), and 5829/04, 
Khodorkovskiy v Russia (2011), in which the ECtHR noted that Mr Khodorkovskiy’s display in a 
metal cage in the courtroom “aroused in him feelings of inferiority”, and “such a harsh appearance 
of judicial proceedings could lead an average observer to believe that an extremely dangerous 
criminal was on trial” (para.125). 
30 J. Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (transl. L. S. Roudiez) (1982 [1980], Columbia 
University Press). 
31 E. Gross, ‘The Body of Signification’, in J. Fletcher and A. Benjamin (eds.), Abjection, Melancholia 
and Love: The Work of Julia Kristeva (1990, Routledge), 80-103, p89. 
32 Ibid., p89. 
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as “if an Other has settled in place and stead of what will be ‘me’”,33 and it is 
recounted in European human rights law in terms of the elimination of the sense 
of place and sense of orientation of the individual. Such total estrangement is, in 
its interpretation, the experience of the “deliberate inhuman treatment causing very 
serious and cruel suffering” that is torture,34 whereby the mind is driven into 
submission by the dominance of the experience of the body.35 The self, in this way, 
is possessed by pain and terror; the “fragile states” of abjection,36 and the 
experience of the body as alien,37 become fixed. 
As Elaine Scarry describes it, the experience of torture involves the 
obliteration of the realm of experience that the individual had beyond the body; 
and all that remains is the experiencing and subjected body, in relation to which 
everything becomes “an agent of pain”.38 In European human rights law, this 
includes even the passage of time, due not only, and immediately, to the fear and 
uncertainty induced as to what is coming next, but, in some instances, to the deep 
and persisting psychological scars impressed on the victim.39 And reflected also, as 
an agent of torture in the jurisprudence, has even been life itself. In Mikheyev v 
Russia (2006), for example, the ill-treatment to which Mr Mikheyev was subjected 
by police was of such severity that he was driven to attempt suicide: an act to which 
he was not, the Court said, predisposed, and, in fact, “may require a certain 
personal resolve”.40 
In these cases, which address instances in which the possibility of the sense 
of place and sense of orientation has been eliminated, the necessity of self-
recognition – and its underpinning self-organisation – is implied. Its breakdown 
not only reveals the way in which it is necessary to be able to recognise oneself as 
                                                          
33 Kristeva (1982), above n30, p10. 
34 5310/71, Ireland v UK (1978), para.167; 25803/94, Selmouni v France (1999), para.96.  
35 E.g., 42310/04, Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v Ukraine (2011), para.157. 
36 Kristeva (1982), above n30, p12. 
37 See J. Mitchell, ‘Trauma, Recognition, and the Place of Language’ (1998) Diacritics 28(4), 121-
133, p125. 
38 E. Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (1985, Oxford University Press), 
p40. 
39 23178/94, Aydin v Turkey (1997), para.83. 
40 77617/01, Mikheyev v Russia (2006), para.132. 
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such in order to be able to create and project a self-image. It also suggests that self-
recognition – and the underlying self-organisation – is a prerequisite for the 
possibility of experiencing familiarity at all.41  
(iii) Attachment  
The element of individual presence that is about attachment is about the ability 
(and need) of the individual to attach and create meaning. This has been 
elaborated, for instance, in the course of the development of a series of analytical 
categories of isolation in detention and solitary confinement cases: ‘sensory 
isolation’; total, relative, and partial ‘social isolation’; ‘removal from association’; 
and ‘solitary confinement’.42 The focus of the ECtHR in relation to these 
categories is on the effect of the conditions that they depict on the individual’s 
sense of place and, in particular, on the way in which these forms of isolation – 
which may entail such consequences as a cutting of contact with relatives, or 
restricted access to information – may disable the capacity of the individual to seek 
and create meaning. The ECtHR considers, in particular, that the combination of 
total sensory isolation and total social isolation is so potentially destructive of the 
personality that it is unjustifiable.43 In relation to the other categories (which may 
also be found to violate the ECHR), it has developed general principles which are 
aimed at securing conditions conducive to the fulfilment of the individual’s need 
to attach and create meaning. These principles pertain, for example, to the need 
for contact with friends and family:44 a need which is often cast not so much in 
terms of securing its realisation in practice, but in terms of the existence of its 
possibility (“the opportunity to write and to receive letters”, for example45) or, 
                                                          
41 This implies a connection between breakdowns in self-recognition and experience of the 
uncanny (theorised by Freud as involving a specific and frightening kind of estrangement from 
the familiar [S. Freud, The Uncanny (transl. D. McLintock) (2003 [1919], Penguin Books), 123-
162]). Kristeva distinguishes abjection from the uncanny, arguing that abjection more violently 
rejects familiarity itself (Kristeva (1982), above n30, p5). 
42 E.g., 52750/99, Lorsé and others v The Netherlands (2003); 46221/99, Öcalan v Turkey (2005); 
24626/09, X v Turkey (2012); 24069/03 et al, Öcalan v Turkey (No. 2) (2014). 
43 See 50901/99, Van der Ven v The Netherlands (2003), para.51. 
44 E.g. 41418/04, Khoroshenko v Russia (2015). 
45 See, e.g., 13590/88, Campbell v UK (1992), para.45. 
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more strikingly, in terms of the individual’s responsibility to minimise the isolation 
imposed on her.46 
The role that is played by attachments within the vision of individual 
presence comes to the fore more strongly still in the case law pertaining to the 
anguish of relatives in the face of indifferent and incompetent authorities following 
the disappearance of family members.47 While European human rights law loses 
the full extent of its bite in relation to an individual once that individual has died 
(the prohibition on ill-treatment is not applicable to corpses, for example48), it 
recognises a relational ambit of the rights in question, and remains concerned with 
surviving relatives.49 Varnava and Others v Turkey (2009) is an example. The 
applicants here alleged that there had been multiple violations of the ECHR, on 
account of the (still-unaccounted for) disappearance of their relatives following 
their detention by Turkish military forces during the Turkish military operations in 
Northern Cyprus in July and August 1974. One of their complaints was that Article 
3 had been violated on the ground of the anguish and distress that they had 
suffered as a result of being without news of their relatives for thirty-four years – 
anguish and distress which had only been exacerbated by news reports that missing 
persons had been used as guinea pigs in biochemical laboratories in Turkey.  
The ECtHR began its assessment of this complaint by recounting the 
applicable principles, recognising, in particular, that “[t]he phenomenon of 
disappearances imposes a particular burden on the relatives of missing persons 
who are kept in ignorance of the fate of their loved ones and suffer the anguish of 
uncertainty”.50 It emphasised that where it had previously found the situation of 
relatives to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment, this was due to the 
                                                          
46 E.g., 24027/07 et al., Babar Ahmad and Others v UK (2012), para.222. 
47 E.g., 3013/04, Khadzhialiyev and Others v Russia (2008). 
48 56760/00, Akpinar and Altun v Turkey (2007), para.82. 
49 E.g., although the exercise of Article 8 ECHR rights “pertains predominantly to relationships 
between living human beings, it is not excluded that these notions may extend to certain situations 
after death” (40167/06, Sargsyan v Azerbaijan (2015), para.255). A restriction on an individual’s 
Article 10 right to freedom of expression may also be necessitated by “[t]he need to protect the 
rights to honour of the murdered and the piety rights of their relatives” (40721/08, Fáber v Hungary 
(2012), para.58). See further Ch.4, part 4.4. 
50 16064/90 et al., Varnava and Others v Turkey (2009), para.200. 
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attitudes and reactions of the authorities when the situation had been brought to 
their attention. Objective factors relevant in this include: “the proximity of the 
family tie, the particular circumstances of the relationship, the extent to which the 
family member witnessed the events in question, and the involvement of the family 
member in the attempts to obtain information about the disappeared person”.51 
Here, and applying the findings of the Grand Chamber in Cyprus v Turkey (2001),52 
the Court found that Article 3 had been violated, reasoning that “[t]he length of 
time over which the ordeal of the relatives has been dragged out and the attitude 
of official indifference in face of their acute anxiety to know the fate of their close 
family members discloses a situation attaining the requisite level of severity”.53  
Whilst the essence of the violation in the disappearance cases thus lies in 
the indifferent attitudes of the authorities, the essence of the concern with respect 
to the surviving relatives lies in the ‘anguish of uncertainty’ under which they are 
made to labour. This concern derives from the recognition that their sense of 
orientation and sense of place may be disrupted by uncertainty and fear as to the 
fate of their relatives, the security and wellbeing of whom is, in which case, at least 
partly constitutive of their own capacity to situate themselves in the world. The 
focus, therefore, is on what the attachments, or the objects of those attachments, 
mean to the individual before the Court, and the emphasis of European human 
rights law is on setting in place means to aid the individual in managing the 
disorientation that she has experienced.54  
2.2.3 The ethos of articulation  
The three elements of European human rights law’s vision of individual presence 
tell us not only how this notion of presence is specified. They also point us towards 
an outline of the category of the self in European human rights law. More 
specifically, they point us towards European human rights law’s vision of what it 
means to have a sense of self, the central idea of which seems to be that the three 
                                                          
51 Ibid. 
52 25781/94, Cyprus v Turkey (2001). 
53 16064/90 et al., Varnava and Others v Turkey (2009), para.202. 
54 See further Ch.4, part 4.4. 
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elements enable the individual’s articulation of her self. This notion of articulation 
– described here as an ‘ethos’ to capture the way in which it binds the vision of 
individual presence set out in European human rights law – is not only about the 
articulation of one’s place in the world but also about the meaning that this holds 
in relation to close others.  
 The articulation of one’s place in the world is in many ways a claim to 
recognition – a claim to be seen. It comes to light clearly in the case law concerning 
the right to vote, which is one of the “subjective rights of participation” enshrined 
in Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR.55 At the core of this right is the opportunity 
to vote;56 and the jurisprudence here draws out its meaning. In Scoppola v Italy (No. 
3) (2012), for example, in which the applicant challenged the fact that he had been 
disenfranchised following a criminal conviction, the Grand Chamber highlighted 
the relevance of the fact that, under Italian law, it was possible for a convicted 
person who had been disenfranchised to recover the right to vote. This meant, it 
said, that the Italian system was not “excessively rigid”.57 But it also meant that the 
opportunity to vote remained, albeit that it was latent and needed to be restored 
to be exercised. This same reasoning underpinned Shindler v UK (2013). Mr 
Shindler was a British national living in Italy. He had retained a right to vote in UK 
elections for fifteen years following his emigration, but he now fell outside this and 
complained that he was no longer permitted to vote. The Court, in finding that 
there had been no violation of the right to vote, focused on the proportionality of 
the restriction; but it also noted that if Mr Shindler returned to live in the UK, his 
vote would be restored. It could not be said, therefore, that the restriction impaired 
the very essence of the right.58 He retained the opportunity to vote; it was simply 
latent. A final example is Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v Greece (2012). The 
applicants here were Greek nationals who were based in Strasbourg. They were 
unable to vote from France in the Greek parliamentary elections, as the Greek 
legislature had not arranged for this. They argued that this disproportionately 
                                                          
55 9267/81, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium (1987), para.51.  
56 See 24833/94, Matthews v UK (1999), paras.64-65. 
57 126/05, Scoppola v Italy (No. 3) (2012), para.109. 
58 19840/09, Shindler v UK (2013), para.108. 
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interfered with the exercise of their right to vote, as it meant that they would have 
to travel to Greece to vote. The Grand Chamber considered, however, that Article 
3 of Protocol 1 did not require States to implement measures to allow expatriates 
to vote from abroad, and, moreover, that the disruption that would have been 
caused to the applicants’ lives by the need to travel to Greece would not have been 
“disproportionate to the point of impairing the very essence of the voting rights 
in question”.59 Ultimately, the applicants could have travelled; their opportunity to 
vote was intact.  
The essence of the significance of the opportunity to vote in these cases 
lies in the notion of having a political presence expressive of one’s opinions and 
beliefs.60 The opportunity to vote is the opportunity to express oneself in this 
regard. It involves the articulation of one’s place in the world and a corresponding 
claim to have this recognised. It is an opportunity to affirm one’s presence and 
ability to “orient [oneself] in political matters”: something which Mr Kiss, in Alajos 
Kiss v Hungary (2010), argued that he could still very much do, in a context in which 
he had automatically lost his right to vote upon being placed under partial 
guardianship.61 And it is an opportunity, too, to affirm one’s place and identity as 
a participant in the political life of a society: something which Mr Aziz, in Aziz v 
Cyprus (2004), argued that he had lost entirely when his registration on the electoral 
roll was refused on account of his being a member of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community.62  
The articulation of one’s place in the world in this way is not entirely 
separable from the articulation of one’s capacity; and the significance of the latter 
is reflected in cases in which the individual has been rendered powerless and unable 
to articulate her presence. We have already seen something of this in the cases 
discussed in relation to self-image, self-recognition, and attachment; but there is 
an added dimension to it that we have not fully drawn out yet and that pertains to 
                                                          
59 42202/07, Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v Greece (2012), para.80. 
60 See 24833/94, Matthews v UK (1999), in which “the applicant…was completely denied any 
opportunity to express her opinion in the choice of the members of the European Parliament” 
(para.64). 
61 38832/06, Alajos Kiss v Hungary (2010), para.30.  
62 69949/01, Aziz v Cyprus (2004), para.17. 
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the implications for close others (namely family members) of the articulation of an 
individual’s presence. Gutsanovi v Bulgaria (2013) is an example. The case concerned 
a police operation at the home of the Gustanovi family to arrest Mr Gutsanov and 
to search the family home in conjunction with a criminal investigation into 
misappropriation of public funds. The issue before the Court was the conduct of 
this operation: masked and heavily armed police had burst into the house early one 
morning, while Mr Gutsanov and his wife and their two young daughters were still 
asleep. The Court found that the psychological ordeal that this had involved had 
constituted degrading treatment of Mrs Gutsanova and the two children, who had 
been left “severely affected by the events”.63 It had constituted degrading 
treatment of Mr Gutsanov too, and this was bound up in the effect of his treatment 
on his family: the manner of his arrest “very early in the morning, by several armed 
and masked officers who forced their way in through the door of the house, and 
under the frightened gaze of Mr Gutsanov’s wife and two young daughters” had 
aroused in him “strong feelings of fear, anguish and powerlessness…capable of 
humiliating and debasing him in his own eyes and in the eyes of his close 
relatives”.64 The essence of the degradation in Mr Gutsanov’s case was, therefore, 
the harm to his sense of self in regards to his sense of his capacity to protect his 
family. And this same point – about the articulation of presence that is bound up 
in the meaning of that presence for loved ones – has been set out elsewhere too, 
such as in terms of the effect on a parent of being powerless to protect her child 
and in terms of the effect on a child of the consequent “degradation of the parental 
image”.65 The two effects are cast as going together; and the articulation of 
presence is, therefore, not only about the articulation of one’s place and capacity 
in the world, but also about the articulation of a presence that in some respects 
derives its meaning for the individual from the meaning that it carries for others. 
The vision of presence has a reflexive quality in this sense, because it 
accommodates, within its conception of one’s sense of place, not only the effect 
                                                          
63 34529/10, Gutsanovi v Bulgaria (2013), para.134. 
64 Ibid., para.136. 
65 39472/07 and 39474/07, Popov v France (2012), para.101. See further Ch.5, part 5.2.1. 
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of this sense of place on close others, but the effect of this effect on the individual 
herself. 
2.3 Presentation 
Sitting alongside the vision of individual presence articulated in European human 
rights law is a vision of individual presentation. This is about the position that is 
ascribed to the individual in the terms of European human rights law – about the 
way in which the individual is read through the lens of some social role or status 
and is accordingly presented in the terms of a persona. Towards the end of the 
discussion of presence above, we began to see something of European human 
rights law’s account of certain roles and positions in this respect. For example, 
there was a clear sense in the final cases discussed of the meaning and implications 
of the ‘parental image’ for the child (something which, in turn, tells us something 
about how the meaning of being a parent is constructed in European human rights 
law). The following section examines in greater detail how European human rights 
law envisages particular statuses and roles and how it presents the individual in the 
terms of these. I suggest that the individual is always presented in European human 
rights law in the terms of a persona (2.3.1). The persona has three qualities: it is 
ascribed a master image; it is read in relation to a notion of collective agency; and 
it is transient in nature (2.3.2). These elements are bound together by an ethos of 
replaceability (2.3.3). 
2.3.1 The formation of the persona 
The idea of presentation originates in the persona, which, in turn, derives from the 
mask: the face that is presented socially; the roles and statuses that the individual 
plays.66 Human rights law selects among representations and ascriptions to 
interpret and present a picture of the individual in this way. It establishes an 
account through the lens of some role, categorised life stage, or status (‘worker’, 
                                                          
66 See further M. Mauss, ‘A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person, the Notion of 
‘Self’” (1938), in Sociology and Psychology: Essays (transl. B. Brewster) (1979 [1950], Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd.), 57-94, p78-82; V. Turner, ‘Acting in Everyday Life and Everyday Life in Acting’, 
in From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play (1982, PAJ Publications), 102-123. 
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‘infant’, or ‘marriage’, for example); and to each of these categories comes to 
correspond a normative and normalising vision of what it stands to represent and 
entail. The account always revolves around some central activity or task, be it the 
pursuit of a principle (such as the best interests of the child), a way of life (such as 
a religious way of life), or an objective that has been decreed and in relation to 
which all other matters in the case are construed (such as a commitment to the 
protection of health). This determines the nature of the roles and statuses in 
question, and, therefore, the terms of the case itself.  
Each form of presentation contains a representation of associational ties: a 
referential or relational element which points either to the central activity or to 
some other co-participant in it. A case about a ‘parent’ is necessarily a case about 
a ‘child’, a case about an ‘employer’ one about an ‘employee’, and so on. It follows 
that forms of presentation only make sense in the context of their broader set and 
the activity in question. The focus is on participation in a shared activity; and a 
body membership is formed around this. Critically, there is no agreement on how 
to frame the activity, since it necessarily means something different to each 
participant; what to one person is a question of the freedom of the press and of 
the publishers to publish is to another a matter of the freedom of the audience to 
receive the information. Such framing ultimately becomes an exercise in legal 
interpretation, and this determines the roles and statuses to be invoked and 
applied. Only then does attention shift to the matter of admission to the structure 
of membership thereby established – to whether there is a ‘fit’ between the persona 
being invoked and that laid out by the activity itself.  
What becomes highly significant, then, is the interpretive choice and 
manner of framing the case: the choice to interpret someone through the lenses of 
‘illegal immigrant’ and ‘criminal’ instead of through the lens of their family life 
which is being interfered with by a deportation order;67 the choice to interpret 
sadomasochism as the (public) criminal activity of assault and wounding instead 
of as the (private) consensual sexual activity that those involved in it experience it 
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to be;68 the choice to interpret a case presented as pertaining to a hierarchical child-
parent relationship in terms of two equally autonomous and legally unrelated 
adults.69 The latter case (Odièvre v France (2003)) is in fact particularly interesting in 
this regard, for it illustrates the extent and effect of different framings. 
The case was brought by Ms Odièvre, who was born anonymously in 
France under the domestic law on accouchement sous X. This grants women a right 
to give birth anonymously, and it has existed as a legal possibility in one form or 
another since 1793. Ms Odièvre complained that her Article 8 ECHR rights had 
been violated by the fact that her birth had been kept secret with the result that 
she had been unable to obtain information (other than non-identifying) about her 
origins. Although she submitted that establishing her “basic identity” was integral 
to both her private life and her family life,70 the Court only approached the case in 
terms of her private life, on the ground that she was seeking information about the 
circumstances of her birth, and not intending to “call into question her relationship 
with her adoptive parents”.71 By positing private life and family life as mutually 
exclusive alternatives in this way, the Court was able to sidestep the possibility that 
the information could be relevant to Ms Odièvre’s relationship with her adoptive 
parents.72 Instead, it framed the case as being one of competing private life rights: 
Ms Odièvre’s right to knowledge of origins against her birthmother’s interest in 
anonymity. 
More significant, however, in terms of the formation of the persona in law, 
is that the Court then proceeded to fluctuate between two positions: a framing of 
the case as concerning two adults and a framing of the case as concerning a 
biological parent and child. It began its analysis in terms of “the child and the 
mother”, noting, for instance, the indifference that had been displayed by Ms 
Odièvre’s birthmother towards her,73 but it then moved on to consider that the 
                                                          
68 E.g., 21627/93 et al., Laskey and Others v UK (1997). 
69 E.g., 42326/98, Odièvre v France (2003).  
70 Ibid., para.25. 
71 Ibid., para.28. 
72 On which see J. Carsten, ‘Constitutive Knowledge: Tracing Trajectories of Information in New 
Contexts of Relatedness’ (2007) Anthropological Quarterly 80(2), 403-426, p416.  
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private interests at stake did “not concern an adult and a child, but two adults, each 
concerned with her own free will”,74 before shifting, a few paragraphs later, to 
address the point that most Contracting States did not have comparable legislation 
“at least as regards the child’s permanent inability to establish parental ties with the 
natural mother if she continues to keep her identity from the child she has brought 
into the world”.75 Whilst the child-parent framing enabled the Court to grasp the 
issue here as being a matter of relational statuses, the two-adult framing did not; 
moreover, the latter equated two unequal instances of free will, and overlooked 
that Ms Odièvre’s position resulted from the birthmother’s actions. Nevertheless, 
it was the two-adult framing that shaped the remainder of the judgment, which 
ultimately found that the interference with Ms Odièvre’s right was justified in the 
name of the balance that the French legislation had sought to strike between the 
competing interests. 
As this case demonstrates, the formation of the persona in European 
human rights law involves a selection among memberships, as determined by the 
construction of the activity or matter in question. This choice is, at the same time, 
the legal constitution of the subject in terms of some persona; and it is in this way 
that the vision of presentation here differs most greatly from other frameworks of 
social presentation, the most notable of which is that set out by Erving Goffman 
in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. While Goffman emphasises the interest of 
the presenting individual in having control over the impression she gives, and, 
therefore, in indirectly controlling the conduct of others in their “responsive 
treatment” of her,76 there is no such individual control in the case of presentation 
in European human rights law. The persona is, rather, formed in and by law, and 
the individual is read in these terms. The choice and formation of this persona, 
moreover, detracts from the reality of the multiple memberships from which to 
select. And so although each account may in itself have an aura of cohesion (a 
definitive activity and a definitive vision of a set of participants), that in turn belies 
the extent to which the account of the individual in general is fragmented. The 
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articulation of a role or status only reflects placement in relation to one activity, 
and consequently, the account of the individual supplied here is only ever partial. 
It is limited by the form through which it is expressed. 
2.3.2 Elements of presentation 
The notion of individual presentation in European human rights law is accordingly 
about the way in which the individual is read and represented in the terms of a 
persona. It involves the representation of the individual through the lens of some 
role, categorised life stage, or status, with the choice as to the framing of the case 
being the most significant of all. The form that the persona then goes on to take 
has three qualities: it sets out a vision of a master image; it relates this to a form of 
collective agency; and it is transient in nature.  
(i) The master image  
The account of the formation of the persona already implies that expectations are 
attached to the roles and statuses in question; and indeed each form of persona is 
imbued with an ideal status form: a master image.77 This means that the individual 
comes to be oriented, in her capacity qua whichever role or status, towards a 
normative and normalising conception of this. Reference is accordingly made in 
the case law to stylised conceptions of categories – to what a ‘child’ needs,78 or to 
the ‘appropriate’ appearance of a ‘teacher’,79 for example – with European human 
rights law revealing itself here to be labouring under a certain vision of various 
relationships and their accompanying statuses. 
                                                          
77 The term ‘master image’ here is inspired by Spanish constitutional law, where institutions are 
conceived of as having their own ‘master image’ (see, e.g., Judgment 198/2012 of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court, discussed below). A comparable notion of ‘master ideals’ is theorised by 
Philip Selznick, who argues, in ‘Sociology and Natural Law’ (1961) Natural Law Forum 61, 84-108, 
that “normative systems” (such as friendship and democracy) are systems that are governed by a 
certain “master ideal”, towards the realisation of which the system is oriented. Winfried Brugger 
draws on Selznick’s analysis in ‘The Image of the Person in the Human Rights Concept’ (1996) 
Human Rights Quarterly 18, 595-611, noting that every culture has its own “‘images’ of the human 
person”, and that “these images represent ‘master ideals’ of the culture in question” (p596). 
78 E.g., in visions of a child’s ‘best interests’: 41615/07, Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (2010).  
79 E.g., concerning religious dress: 42393/98, Dahlab v Switzerland (2001, admissibility decision). 
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 Roles and relationships pertaining to family life are, as ever, a hotspot for 
this normative orientation; and in the case law of the ECtHR concerning the 
Article 8 right to respect for family life a clear vision of what ‘family life’ consists 
in has been articulated. Meeting the standard of ‘family life’ is necessary to fall 
within the protection of this provision. For example, between a genetic father and 
his child, “mere biological kinship, without any further legal or factual elements 
indicating the existence of a close personal relationship”, will not suffice to evince 
a relationship of ‘family life’.80 The genetic father has rather to demonstrate his 
commitment to the child; and the case law fleshes out what this looks like. For 
example, in L v The Netherlands (2004), although the genetic father had never 
cohabited with his daughter and her mother, it sufficed for ‘family life’ purposes 
that he had been present at her birth, and that until his relationship with the mother 
had ended (sixteen months later), he had visited them “at unspecified regular 
intervals, that he changed A’s nappy a few times and babysat her once or twice, 
and that on several occasions he had contact with Ms. B about A.’s impaired 
hearing”.81 In Schneider v Germany (2011), meanwhile, the Court did “not exclude” 
the applicability of the Article 8 ‘family life’ protection to an “intended 
relationship” between a potential genetic father and child.82 The child in this case 
– a boy named F – had been conceived thirteen months into a sixteen-month 
relationship between Mrs H and Mr Schneider which had occurred while Mrs H’s 
husband was away working in the UK. Mr and Mrs H were now raising F together 
with their daughter, and they refused to allow Mr Schneider to see F. They 
acknowledged that Mr Schneider could be F’s genetic father, but they claimed that 
it was also possible that it was Mr H. Mr Schneider meanwhile argued that he and 
Mrs H had planned F’s birth, and that this intended family life should suffice for 
Article 8 protection. The Court agreed: Mr Schneider and Mrs H had not had a 
“merely haphazard” relationship, and Mr Schneider had demonstrated “interest in 
and commitment...to F both before and after his birth”,83 by accompanying Mrs 
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81 Ibid., para.39. 
82 17080/07, Schneider v Germany (2011), para.90. 
83 Ibid., para.89. 
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H to two antenatal appointments, acknowledging paternity prior to the birth, 
asking for some photos of F, and trying to have contact with F.  
In these cases, the genetic fathers succeeded in establishing that their 
situations fell within the ambit of ‘family life’ because they reached something 
which resembles what is taken, in European human rights law, to be the ideal form 
– the master image – of ‘normal’ family life.84 The idea of presentation is, in this 
way, teleological in nature. It involves the construction of norms of behaviour, 
relationships, and states of being. An account is articulated, for example, of the 
behaviour that befits particular categories (and against which the conduct of 
individuals performing these categories is assessed),85 of what – as we have already 
seen – ‘normal’ relationships of various sorts consist in, and of what being 
dependent means.86 The norms that are elaborated in this way are, furthermore, 
institutionalised, in the sense that socio-legal institutions, like marriage, are cast as 
having their own ‘master images’ too. This has been developed most fully in 
Spanish constitutional law, where an ‘institutional guarantee’ exists to protect 
“certain constitutionally recognised institutions against any legislative action that 
intends to remove or denaturalize them”, the point being “to ensure that the 
legislator does not remove or empty the institution of its master image”.87 But the 
basic idea expressed in the idea of the institutional master image is articulated more 
widely too; it is only with some conception of what a particular socio-legal 
institution is – of what its master image consists in – that the ECtHR can, for 
example, assess what is accommodated by it or whether it has changed over time.88 
 
 
                                                          
84 On which see, e.g., 6833/74, Marckx v Belgium (1979). 
85 See, e.g., in relation to professional statuses, 33677/10 and 52340/10, Fürst-Pfeifer v Austria 
(2016). 
86 E.g., 25960/13, I.A.A. and Others v UK (2016, admissibility decision). 
87 Judgment 198/2012 (Spanish Constitutional Court), para.7 (concerning the master image of the 
institution of marriage).  
88 See, e.g., 30141/04, Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2010), para.58 (“Although…the institution of 
marriage has undergone major social changes since the adoption of the Convention, the Court 
notes that there is no European consensus regarding same-sex marriage…”). 
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(ii) Collective agency 
The master image that is carried by each persona is related to a vision of collective 
agency, which is about the way in which the individual, in some capacity or role, is 
related to the collective and charged with upholding it. This underpins, for 
example, the conceptualisation of secularism in European human rights law: a 
conceptualisation that has enabled the possibility of a ruling (in the context of 
States which have secularism as a constitutional principle) that the religious dress 
of an individual contravenes this principle.89 The basis of this is the notion that 
“[a]n attitude which fails to respect that principle [of secularism] will not 
necessarily be accepted as being covered by the freedom to manifest one’s 
religion”;90 in other words, it is the assumption that the wearing of religious dress 
(the case in question concerned a student’s wearing of the Islamic headscarf) 
denotes an attitude and that this attitude is one of a lack of respect for the principle 
of secularism.91 In relation to States that accord secularism a constitutional status, 
the principle of secularism is accordingly conceived of by the ECtHR as a 
collective principle that demands a particular presentation on the part of the 
individual and, moreover, a particular way of demonstrating commitment to that 
principle. 
 We see a similar phenomenon in relation to Article 4 of the ECHR, into 
which an idea of collective agency – in terms of social solidarity – has been read. 
Article 4 sets out the freedoms from slavery and forced labour, and it also 
delineates (in paragraph (3)) what is not included in this latter category, namely 
work done in legitimate detention, military service (or its equivalent), ‘service 
exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of 
the community’, or work forming ‘part of normal civic obligations’ (such as 
compulsory jury service92 or fire service93). In Van der Mussele v Belgium (1983) – a 
case involving the complaint of a lawyer that the requirement on him to provide 
                                                          
89 E.g., 44774/98, Leyla Şahin v Turkey (2005). 
90 Ibid., para.114. 
91 On which see esp. the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tulkens in Leyla Şahin v Turkey (ibid.).  
92 E.g., 17209/02, Zarb Adami v Malta (2006), para.47. 
93 E.g., 13580/88, Karlheinz Schmidt v Germany (1994), para.23. 
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pro bono legal representation constituted ‘forced or compulsory labour’ in 
violation of Article 4 – the ECtHR described the subparagraphs of Article 4(3) as 
being “grounded on the governing ideas of the general interest, social solidarity 
and what is in the normal or ordinary course of affairs”.94 What was of relevance 
in Mr Van der Mussele’s case was the ‘normal civil obligations’ exclusion. The 
Court emphasised that the obligation on Mr Van der Mussele to perform pro bono 
work had enabled Mr Ebrima (the man whom he had been required to defend) to 
have his Article 6(3) ECHR rights95 secured, to which extent the pro bono duty 
“was founded on a conception of social solidarity and [could not] be regarded as 
unreasonable”96 let alone as forced or compulsory labour. This conception of 
social solidarity, understood here in terms of Mr Van der Mussele acting to help 
Mr Ebrima to secure his ECHR rights, has underpinned subsequent cases too. For 
example, it underpinned the finding in Graziani-Weiss v Austria (2011) that a lawyer 
who had been appointed as a legal guardian for someone who was suffering from 
mental illness had not been required to perform services which constituted forced 
or compulsory labour.97 It has also been cast as underpinning obligations on 
doctors to contribute to the provision of an emergency service. The issue arose in 
Steindel v Germany (2010), in which Mr Steindel, a private doctor, complained that 
the requirement on him to participate in the medical emergency service constituted 
forced or compulsory labour. The ECtHR, in finding that it did not, followed 
much of its Van der Mussele v Belgium reasoning; and it added that the scheme in 
question was “devised to unburden all practising physicians from the obligation to 
be available during night-time and at weekends and to ensure the availability of 
medical services during these times”, to which extent it was “founded on a concept 
of professional and civil solidarity” and was “aimed at averting emergencies”.98 
Participation in and contribution to the emergency service was accordingly a 
demand and a reflection of professional and civil solidarity.  
                                                          
94 8319/80, Van der Mussele v Belgium (1983), para.38. 
95 Article 6 sets out the right to a fair trial, and paragraph 3 sets out the ‘minimum rights’ that 
everyone charged with a criminal offence has. 
96 Ibid., para.39. 
97 31950/06, Graziani-Weiss v Austria (2011). 
98 29878/07, Steindel v Germany (2010, admissibility decision). 
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 Collective agency in European human rights law seems to be then about 
the form of social interaction and contribution that is demanded by each form of 
role or status. It is here that it is related most closely to the notion of the master 
image, for if the master image is about the normative and normalising vision 
attached to each role or status, collective agency is about the form of interaction 
and contribution that is part of this vision. And so, for example, being a student 
in a secular institution seemingly entails not wearing religious dress in that 
institution (in the name of the collective principle of secularism); and being a 
doctor entails contributing to an emergency service programme (in the name of 
the collective principles of professional and civil solidarity).  
In the sense in which it is concerned with norms which we might loosely 
call norms of the ‘common good’ in this way – and in the sense in which it 
accordingly articulates a vision of acting together and ‘living together’99 – collective 
agency in European human rights law appears to echo the ethos of sociality 
discussed in relation to the order of association in Chapter 1.100 And yet what is 
challenging about European human rights law’s vision here, from the perspective 
of the idea of ‘collective agency’ itself, is that the focus is primarily on the 
appearance of things – on what things look like.101 This is reflected in the 
distinction that is drawn between the principles of collective agency and the 
reasons for action underpinning the articulation of these. This can be better 
understood by considering the cases above in which work-related obligations of 
doctors and lawyers – obligations that the individuals in those cases claimed to 
constitute forced or compulsory labour – are deemed reflective of social, civil, or 
professional solidarity. The consequence of this reasoning is that the work 
subsequently performed looks like an expression of solidarity; and moreover, this 
is what counts, with the reasons that motivate the action (essentially, compulsion) 
                                                          
99 This latter notion (of ‘living together’) has acquired a life of its own in the ECHR jurisprudence 
as a possible justification for limitations on the rights to freedom of religion and to respect for 
private life, and we will return to it in Ch.4 (part 4.3).  
100 See Ch.1, parts 1.3.2 and 1.4.1. 
101 See e.g., 37452/02, Stummer v Austria (2011), concerning the question of the full incorporation 
of prisoners within national social security systems, which indicates that the principle of social 
solidarity that underlies Article 4(3) does not run so deeply as to disrupt collective national 
structures and is rather focused on the maintenance of the appearance of pre-existing structures. 
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being overshadowed by this. Solidarity is conceived of, therefore, not as requiring 
a certain motivation on the part of the individual, nor as requiring a collectively-
oriented perspective per se. It is not about agency, as such, then; rather, it is about 
the action itself that is taken as expressing solidarity. The focus is on a 
representation (such as of solidarity or secularism) that is cast as being a mode of 
collective agency. It is this representation that the individual is to uphold. 
(iii) Transience 
Talk of appearances leads us to the final feature of any persona in European human 
rights law, and this is its transient quality. This is not about the transience of the 
role per se, for as long as the associated activity continues to exist, the role in 
question will exist too. Rather, transience here is about the transience of the figure 
filling the role (from law’s perspective) and about the individual experience of 
transience in relation to these roles. The point  about the transience of the figure 
filling the role supports the way in which European human rights law constructs a 
normative and normalising master image for each role and constructs concepts of 
value and collective activity more generally. For example, in relation to the activity 
of school education, pupils come and go, and so in an instance in which the 
domestic authorities objected to a teacher wearing an Islamic headscarf while 
teaching, it was less relevant in the eyes of the Court that there had been no 
complaints whatsoever from any of the parents or pupils at the time (who were 
individually transient figures) and more important that the headscarf was deemed 
to be at odds with the domestic authorities’ conception of schooling.102 
 The point about the individual experience of transience in relation to roles 
is about the way in which the experience of roles is conceived of as being 
potentially transient and about the way in which a distinction is drawn between 
not becoming something (which is cast as being a transient experience) and 
becoming something (which is not). This is well-illustrated by Evans v UK (2007), 
which concerned the competing interests of Ms Evans and her former partner, J. 
They had frozen six embryos together, prior to an operation that Ms Evans had to 
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have to remove her ovaries. At the time of the treatment, Ms Evans and J. each 
signed a form which stated that under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act, it would be possible for either of them to withdraw their consent to the use 
of the embryos at any time prior to implantation (‘the joint consent rules’). Not 
long after, they broke up, and J. told the clinic that he wanted the embryos to be 
destroyed. Ms Evans objected, and ultimately argued before the Grand Chamber 
of the ECtHR that the domestic provisions enabling J. to withdraw his consent in 
this way violated her Article 8 ECHR rights. In particular, she complained that the 
effect of the joint consent rules was that she was denied her only chance of having 
a genetically-related child. The conflict was therefore between her decision to 
become a parent, and J.’s decision not to; and both decisions were protected by 
the Article 8 concept of ‘private life’, the Court said.103 
Ultimately, J.’s right to respect for his decision not to become a genetic 
parent trumped in this case, and no violation of Article 8 was found. Whilst there 
is a broader question to be asked as to why J.’s right trumped in this way,104 what 
is notable for our purposes is the way in which the Court tried to find a way around 
the fact that, with this decision, Ms Evans would not have the chance to realise 
herself as a genetic parent: the terms in which she conceptualised motherhood.105 
The Court suggested alternative routes to parenthood; she was thus not prevented 
“from becoming a mother in a social, legal, or even physical sense”; ‘only’ genetic 
parenthood was in issue.106 In other words, Ms Evans could still realise her 
potential as a mother, just in different senses.  
In trying to veil Ms Evans’s loss in this way, the Court conceptualised the 
loss itself as transient; and this can be seen by considering the different ways in 
which the positions of Ms Evans and J. were framed. Whereas Ms Evans’s position 
was analysed in terms of ‘genetic parenthood’ (and in terms of not becoming a 
genetic mother), J.’s position was mostly analysed in terms of the effect that 
                                                          
103 6339/05, Evans v UK (2007), para.71. 
104 See also 46470/11, Parrillo v Italy (2015), in which Ms Parrillo’s deceased partner similarly 
acquired something of a final say in relation to the fate of their frozen IVF embryos (which Ms 
Parrillo wanted to donate to scientific research). On this case, see Ch.3, part 3.2.1. 
105 6339/05, Evans v UK (2007, para.90. 
106 Ibid, para.72. 
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becoming a ‘father’ would have on him. And so, as the Court put it, permitting Ms 
Evans to use the embryos would mean that “J. [would] be forced to become a 
father”, whereas refusing this permission would mean that Ms Evans would be 
“denied the opportunity of becoming a genetic parent”.107 Evidently, and even on the 
Court’s own conceptualisation of parenthood as involving ‘social’, ‘legal’, and 
‘physical’, as well as ‘genetic’ dimensions, J. would not have been forced to become 
a father in all these senses. What he would have become would have been a genetic 
father. By the end of the judgment, this was somewhat recognised, insofar as the 
framing came to be one of Ms Evans as genetic parent versus J. as having “a 
genetically related child with her”.108 But throughout the reasoning leading up to 
this, the presentation was of Ms Evans as genetic parent and J. as father. The 
‘genetic’ in Ms Evans’s case was cast as having been a mere possibility; 
furthermore, there were other ways in which she could become a parent, and these 
forms of parenthood were mutually exchangeable. In J.’s case, by contrast, the 
genetic was cast in permanent terms; use of the embryos would mean that he 
would become a (genetic) father.  
It was not, therefore, the genetic role itself that was cast in transient terms 
in this case. Rather, the case implies a distinction between becoming something 
and not. The experience of not becoming something is conceived of as being 
transient, whereas the experience of becoming something is conceived of as being 
more far-reaching in effect. This tells us two things about presentation in 
European human rights law. First, it confirms that the focus is on the activity to 
which the role is attached, as opposed to the meaning of the role for the individual 
performing it (a perspective which would have to accommodate the possibility that 
becoming something and not becoming something might have comparable 
effects109). Second, it points to the way in which the experience of transience is 
cast as being inseparable from the experience of the exchangeability of roles. And 
this brings us to the ethos of replaceability in European human rights law.  
                                                          
107 Ibid., para.73 (emphases added). 
108 Ibid., para.90. 
109 On which see S. Scott, ‘A Sociology of the Nothing: Understanding the Unmarked’ (2018) 
Sociology 52(1), 3-19. 
112 
 
2.3.3 The ethos of replaceability  
The ethos of replaceability seals the structure of the vision of presentation.110 Its 
logic is simple: presentation hinges on some activity, and the roles and statuses 
invoked pertain solely to this activity; therefore, the activity could be carried out 
by whoever qualifies as presenting in the terms of the role or status in the necessary 
(or better) way. This is particularly familiar in the realm of employment and in 
areas in which roles are primarily assumed as opposed to being assigned. For 
example, employees who present in ways that are deemed incompatible with their 
roles may find themselves being dismissed and replaced111 or else they may be cast 
as being ‘free to leave’ and able to go elsewhere.112 But elsewhere, the way in which 
this ethos manifests itself is not always clear at first glance. We see this in the 
‘replicability’ cases, in which the individuals in question are deemed free to leave 
and able to replicate elsewhere whichever possibility or form of life is said to 
conflict with the trumping ‘general’ interest. This approach has been applied in a 
range of cases, including in instances in which individuals or their family members 
are refused leave to enter or remain in a country, with consequences for their family 
life (where it might well be concluded that this in itself is no bar, as there are no 
strict obstacles to replicating this family life in another country113), in cases 
concerning local schooling provision (where parents might be told that in the 
absence of some public provision – for example, of teaching through the medium 
of a particular language – they are ‘free’ to move their child114), and in cases 
concerning noise pollution (where, in the face of a purportedly greater general 
economic interest in its source – an airport, for example – families might be told 
that they are free to move and able to replicate their current lives elsewhere115).  
                                                          
110 This part draws on my paper on ‘The ethos of replaceability in European human rights law’ in 
J. Owen and N. Segal (eds.), On Replacement: Cultural, Social and Psychological Representations (2018, 
Palgrave Macmillan), Ch.13. 
111 E.g., 56030/07, Fernández Martínez v Spain (2014). 
112 E.g., 29107/95, Stedman v UK (1997, admissibility decision). Cf. the balancing approach 
preferred in 48420/10 et al., Eweida and Others v UK (2013), para.83.  
113 E.g., 9214/80 et al., Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK (1985), para.68. 
114 E.g., 1474/62 et al., Case “Relating to Certain Aspects on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” 
v Belgium (1968), para.7.  
115 E.g., 36022/97, Hatton and Others v UK (2003), para.127 et seq. 
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The refrain of ‘free to leave’ in such cases is mostly cast in terms of the 
capacity of the individuals to replicate the activity in question, and its environment, 
elsewhere. That, at least, is how it is presented in the case law, notwithstanding the 
reality that the moves in these cases are not as straightforward as they are made 
out to be.116 But this articulation of the possibility of replication, of reproduction, 
which is cast in terms of the choice of the individuals, also, at the same time, 
communicates the redundancy of these same individuals. Someone else will fill the 
place that they are ‘free’ to relinquish; and only in rare cases of high specificity, 
where there is a drive towards rebuilding some unit with the same members as 
before, is this any different. Such cases involve, for example, situations in which 
the maintenance of a child’s ties and contact with her family is at stake; and in such 
instances, “everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, if and 
when appropriate, to ‘rebuild’ the family”.117 But with the exception of such cases, 
replicability is related to replaceabilty.  
The focus of the ethos of replaceability is on the role or status that the 
individual represents and on the function that is being performed; and the question 
posed is of whether the (alienable) performances of the individual are living up to 
the normative vision articulated by European human rights law. This approach, by 
definition, excludes recognition of the singularity of the individual. It overlooks 
the need to be recognised (a need identified by the vision of presence); and 
moreover, it demands a reconceptualisation of relations, and their imbuing with a 
sense of detachment. Such a reconceptualisation has elsewhere been described by 
Georg Simmel as being an instance of the money economy: an economy which, 
he argues, depends on an endless role-playing of individuals that poses a threat to 
individual being itself. He conceives of this economy as instigating a change in our 
relations of dependency: a shift from us as having a small number of irreplaceable 
relations to having a larger number of replaceable relations to whom we are 
                                                          
116 It is only in exceptional cases of this kind, where, e.g., “radical upheaval” for children would 
be entailed, that the ‘free to leave’ narrative is not applied (e.g., 25017/94, Mehemi v France (1997), 
para.36).  
117 40031/98, Gnahoré v France (2000), para.59. The obligation on the State here is one of means, 
not one of result; see, e.g., 805/09, Pascal v Romania (2012), para.69 and the cases cited therein. 
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indifferent.118 Thus, Simmel writes, “we are remarkably independent of every 
specific member of this society, because his significance for us has been transferred 
to the one-sided objectivity of his contribution, which can just as easily be 
produced by any number of other people with different personalities with whom 
we are connected only by an interest that can be completely expressed in money 
terms.”119 
This is precisely the vision of political economy that is reflected in the ethos 
of replaceability. And European human rights law carries this vision further too, 
for it culminates in its application to those claiming to be family members. There 
are therefore examples of cases of paternity challenges in which the ECtHR has 
focused on securing and preserving the stability of the ‘existing’ family unit in the 
face of the ‘threat’ of disruption posed by the man claiming to be the legal father 
of the child in question.120 To reach this conclusion, the ECtHR has to focus on 
the performance of the role of ‘fathering’, and since this is being presently 
performed by the social father, he is experienced by the potential biological father 
– the man contesting his legal paternity – as having replaced him in this role. It is 
irrelevant, in this respect, whether the man claiming paternity has ever ‘done’ any 
‘fathering’ in the first place, which, in any case, is not merely a matter of his display 
of commitment but also of whether the mother has enabled him to be involved.121 
What is at issue in these cases is, rather, the sense of loss: something that can be 
experienced even if its object has not been ‘held’ in the first place. The experience 
of the ethos of replaceability, and the sense of having been replaced, may be felt 
where the chance to perform the role or status was not even had – where the 
opportunity did not even arise, therefore, to be in a position to be properly 
replaced. 
                                                          
118 G. Simmel, The Philosophy of Money (ed. D. Frisby; transl. T. Bottomore and D. Frisby) (Second 
Edition) (1990 [1900], Routledge), p297-298.  
119 Ibid., p298.  
120 E.g., 45071/09, Ahrens v Germany (2012); 23338/09, Kautzor v Germany (2012). See further Ch.3, 
part 3.4.3. 
121 In Ahrens and Kautzor, ibid., for instance, the ECtHR emphasised what it perceived as being the 
men’s lack of demonstrable commitment towards the children in question. But the men argued 
that the mothers had obstructed their ability to demonstrate their commitment to the children. 
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What the ethos of replaceability seems to generate, then, is a sense of 
insecurity and non-recognition. It generates a sense of insecurity by imbuing every 
role and status with a fragility and by attributing to every performer of every role 
and status a capacity to be replaced. It generates a sense of non-recognition 
through the anonymity of the language of roles and statuses that is used to express 
it: the addressor and the addressed could just as well be other and someplace 
else.122 This is the essence of the distinction between the visions of presence and 
presentation set out in European human rights law. For whereas presence is about 
the articulation of the distinctive individual, presentation leans towards her non-
recognition.  
2.4 The mediation of presence and presentation  
We therefore arrive at a position in which we have two very different visions to 
think about: a phenomenological vision of presence, which is about the sense of 
place of the individual, and a more functional or instrumental vision of 
presentation, which is about the representation of the individual through the terms 
of some role or status. The question that arises is of how these two visions are 
mediated, for they are clearly at odds with one another. Whereas the notion of 
presence originates in an account of the sense of place and sense of orientation of 
the individual, the notion of presentation focuses on the social function that she is 
performing or the activity that she is engaged in. 
 In this section, we will consider more closely the tension between presence 
and presentation and we will see how the two notions are mediated. The way in 
which the individual is split when cast in terms of presence and presentation – 
split, that is, between her self and her role (2.4.1) – gives rise to a possibility for 
presentation to submerge presence (2.4.2). But the mediation of presence and 
presentation also carries a productive potential too, for it opens a space for the 
negotiation of questions of individual identity in European human rights law 
(2.4.3). 
                                                          
122 On which see esp. J. Butler, ‘Response: Performative Reflections on Love and Commitment’ 
(2011) Women’s Studies Quarterly 39(1/2), 236-239. 
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2.4.1 The tension between presence and presentation 
A tension quite evidently exists between the visions of presence and presentation 
articulated in European human rights law. We have seen, for example, how the 
ethos of replaceability that structures the vision of presentation is at odds with the 
ethos of articulation that structures the vision of presence; and we have seen 
something too of the alienating effects of being formed and represented through 
the lens of some role, categorised life stage, or status. What this tension points to 
is the way in which the individual in European human rights law is split between 
her sense of place and her position. She is split, that is, between her self and her 
role – between her constitution and her representation.  
The effects of this split have been articulated most starkly in case law 
concerning questions of the recognition (and lack thereof) of an individual’s 
gender identity. In Goodwin v UK (2002), for example – a case concerning the lack 
of legal recognition of the applicant’s gender following reassignment surgery – the 
ECtHR acknowledged, for the first time in this context, the “stress and alienation” 
that a discord between an individual’s sense of self and legal status could 
generate.123 It noted, in particular, the international trend towards the social and 
legal recognition of transsexuality, and it described the illogicality of an 
administrative and legal practice that provided for reassignment surgery but then 
failed to legally recognise its effects – something especially pertinent given the 
significance of legal recognition for personal development.124 Failure to legally 
recognise the gender of the individuals in question would entail the continuation 
of a situation in which “post-operative transsexuals live in an intermediate zone as 
not quite one gender or the other”.125  
The alienating effects of a discord between presence and presentation point 
towards the way in which a form of presentation can come to have a hold on an 
individual, and the nature of this hold was exemplified in Axel Springer AG v 
Germany (2012). The applicant here, Axel Springer AG, was the publisher of Bild, a 
                                                          
123 28957/95, Goodwin v UK (2002), para.77. 
124 Ibid., paras.78, 85, 90. 
125 Ibid., para.90. 
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German tabloid newspaper. It had been subjected to an injunction prohibiting it 
from reporting on the arrest and conviction of a well-known actor (‘X’) – 
something which, it argued, breached its Article 10 right to freedom of expression. 
The question for the ECtHR was of the necessity of the interference with Axel 
Springer AG’s rights in the name of protecting X’s reputation. It was a question, 
therefore, of whether a fair balance had been struck between the freedom of 
expression and the right to respect for private life; and the relevant criteria in 
assessing this were: the contribution made by the articles to a debate of general 
interest; X’s notoriety and the nature of the subject of the report; X’s prior 
conduct; the “method of obtaining the information and its veracity”; the “content, 
form, and consequences of the publication”; and “the nature and severity of the 
sanctions imposed”.126 
 The Court found all the criteria to be satisfied: the articles concerned 
“public judicial facts that may be considered to present a degree of general interest” 
(albeit one that would “vary in degree…during the course of the proceedings”);127 
X was a well-known figure and was arrested in public; he had in the past “actively 
sought the limelight, so that, having regard to the degree to which he was known 
to the public, his ‘legitimate expectation’ that his private life would be effectively 
protected was henceforth reduced”;128 Axel Springer AG had not “acted in bad 
faith when publishing the articles”;129 “[t]he articles did not…reveal details about 
X’s private life, but mainly concerned the circumstances of and events following 
his arrest”;130 and the sanctions imposed, though “lenient”, were still “capable of 
having a chilling effect on the applicant company”.131 The Court accordingly 
concluded that the restrictions imposed on Axel Springer AG’s right to freedom 
of expression were disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (of protecting 
the reputation or rights of others). 
                                                          
126 39954/08, Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012), paras.89-95. 
127 Ibid., para.96. 
128 Ibid., para.101. 
129 Ibid., para.107. 
130 Ibid., para.108. 
131 Ibid., para.109. 
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 It was in the Court’s analysis of these criteria – and specifically in its analysis 
of the criterion concerning X’s notoriety and the subject of the report – that a 
broader point about the tension between presence and presentation in European 
human rights law came to the fore. This came about through the significance that 
was attached to X’s acting role. At the material time, X played the main character 
of a police superintendent in “a very popular detective series”.132 The Court noted 
in this respect a point that had been made by the domestic Court of Appeal as to 
the existence of X’s fan clubs and the way in which “his admirers could have been 
encouraged to imitate him by taking drugs, if the offence had not been committed 
out of public view”.133 It went on to consider that “whilst…the public does 
generally make a distinction between an actor and the character he or she plays, 
there may nonetheless be a close link between the popularity of the actor in 
question and his or her character where, as in the instant case, the actor is mainly 
known for that particular role”.134 Here, X’s role was that of “a police 
superintendent, whose mission was law enforcement and crime prevention”: a fact 
that “was such as to increase the public’s interest in being informed of X’s arrest 
for a criminal offence”.135 In other words, the public interest in being informed 
about X’s arrest was heightened by the fact that at the material time, he was playing 
the role of a police superintendent in a popular detective series. This led the Court 
to conclude that “he was sufficiently well known to qualify as a public figure”: 
something that “[reinforced] the public’s interest in being informed of X’s arrest 
and of the criminal proceedings against him”.136 
 The Court accordingly attached a significance not only to X’s role as an 
actor, but to the character that X played as an actor. The fact that he played the 
role of a police superintendent and therefore held himself out in this role as law-
abiding and law-enforcing somehow made it more interesting for the public that 
he had been arrested for a criminal offence. There are two troubling things about 
this. The first is the blurring of the distinction between actor and character – a 
                                                          
132 Ibid., para.98. 
133 Ibid., para.98. 
134 Ibid., para.99. 
135 Ibid., para.99. 
136 Ibid., para.99. 
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blurring that took place just as the distinction was purportedly being drawn. X’s 
persona as an actor and the persona that he was acting as an actor (the persona of 
his persona) were blurred into one. The second point is the blurring of the 
distinction between X himself and the persona of his persona: the fact that he was 
playing the role of a police superintendent somehow made it interesting that in real 
life he did not behave in accordance with that role.  
 What we have in this case, then, is a clear example of the tension between 
presence and presentation in the form of the hold that presentation can come to 
carry. This notion – of the hold of presentation – involves a problematisation of 
the idea of the ‘persona’ itself. As we have seen it, the idea of the ‘persona’ in 
European human rights law is about appearance; it is about the face that is 
presented socially – about the roles and statuses that the individual plays. Hannah 
Arendt, writing about social roles and statuses more generally, argues that the 
derivation of ‘persona’ (mask) from the Latin ‘per-sonare’ (to sound-through) 
means that although we always appear in terms of our roles, “[i]t is through this 
role, sounding through it, as it were, that something else manifests itself, something 
entirely idiosyncratic and undefinable and still unmistakably identifiable, so that we 
are not confused by a sudden change of roles…”.137 We are still recognisable in 
spite of and throughout the different roles in which we present, in other words; 
our masks and roles are “not a permanent fixture annexed to our inner self in the 
sense in which the voice of conscience…is something the human soul constantly 
bears within itself”.138 However, if in European human rights law this is already 
only a theoretical possibility (the focus of presentation is on the role itself, as 
opposed to on the one beneath the role), then the reasoning in Axel Springer AG v 
Germany regarding the notoriety of X flips this possibility on its head. For what is 
cast as sounding through in that case is not X himself but the character being 
performed by X. X came to be read in terms of the persona of his role; he was 
                                                          
137 H. Arendt, ‘Prologue (speech delivered upon receiving Denmark’s Sonning Prize in 1975)’, in 
Responsibility and Judgment (ed. J. Kohn) (2003, Schocken Books), 3-14, p13. 
138 Ibid., p13. 
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brought to the terms of his role and assessed in their light. He was read, in other 
words, as if the expectation was that he would personify his role.  
2.4.2 Personification  
The problem of personification – a problem of the bearing down of presentation 
on presence – pushes us beyond the experience of alienation that the discord 
between presence and presentation gives rise to. There are ways of responding to 
this discord which mitigate the alienation experienced: for example, the cases on 
gender identity noted above involve a closing of the gap between presence and 
presentation. There are also ways of rethinking this discord entirely: for example, 
Rahel Jaeggi suggests that the experience of alienation in relation to a role is not 
an experience of alienation by that role but an experience of alienation from the 
self within it, such that the problem is one of a failure to appropriate the role and 
to identify with it.139 The problem of personification – in which the individual is 
conceived of as personifying the role that she is performing – is quite different, 
because it both obliterates and simultaneously uses the discord between presence 
and presentation.  
 An example of the way in which personification works in this regard is the 
notion of “the risk personified by unreformed and potentially recidivist prisoners”: 
a phrase that was expressed in a Joint Dissenting Opinion in a case concerning the 
Article 6 rights of two applicants who had been denied legal representation and 
legal aid for their disciplinary hearings before a prison governor.140 In this phrase, 
the persona in question is that of the prisoner. More specifically, it is that of 
“unreformed and potentially recidivist prisoners”. This persona already sits within 
a narrative of risk: the language of “unreformed and potentially recidivist 
prisoners” is, evidently, a language that expresses an assessment of risk. But then 
the persona itself comes to be cast as being a personification of risk (“the risk 
personified by unreformed and potentially recidivist prisoners”). The ‘sounding 
                                                          
139 R. Jaeggi, Alienation (transl. F. Neuhouser and A. E. Smith; ed. F. Neuhouser) (2014, Columbia 
University Press), Ch.6. 
140 39665/98 and 40086/98, Ezeh and Connors v UK (2003), Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges 
Zupančič and Maruste, para.3. 
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through’ here, to take Arendt’s term, is the sounding through of a narrative of risk; 
and it is this that becomes the focus. The individual underlying the persona, and 
furthermore underlying the personification of this persona, is objectified and lost 
in the process.  
 The possibility of personification that emerges in European human rights 
law in this way is not only then about the discord between the visions of 
presentation and presence. It is rather about the possibility that this discord gives 
rise to: the possibility that presentation might submerge presence. This has long 
been identified as one of the most troubling qualities (if not the most troubling 
quality) of the concept of human rights itself. It was on this ground, for example, 
that the late nineteenth-century philosopher Vladimir Solovyov offered a scathing 
critique of the placement of the principles of ‘human’ and ‘citizen’ alongside each 
other in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. He argued 
that had there been “one determining principle – human rights”, then “the 
inviolable rights of everyone” could have been guaranteed; instead, the placement 
of the ‘human’ and the ‘citizen’ alongside each other rendered the former 
subordinate to the latter.141 Thus, Solovyov wrote: “As is natural, the lower, being 
more concrete and graphic, turned out to be the more powerful, and soon pushed 
itself into the superior position. It then swallowed up the first without a trace, for the 
execution of the citizen of necessity killed the man.”142 The French revolutionary 
terror consequently found “its principal support” in the French Declaration itself, 
Solovyov argued;143 and there was nothing contradictory, therefore, about the 
“declaration of human rights at the beginning, and then the unheard-of systematic 
obliteration of all such rights by the revolutionary powers”.144 
                                                          
141 V. Solovyov, ‘The Idea of Humanity in Auguste Comte’ (1898), in J. D. Kornblatt, Divine 
Sophia: The Wisdom Writings of Vladimir Solovyov (2009, Cornell University Press), 213-229, p216-
217. (See for comparable critiques H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1976 [1951], Harcourt), 
p290-302; and G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (transl. D. Heller-Roazen) 
(1998 [1995], Stanford University Press), p126-135.) 
142 Ibid., p217. 
143 Ibid., p217. 
144 Ibid., p215. 
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 In the context of the ECHR legal order, the possibility that presentation 
might submerge presence is a product of the way in which the vision of space 
articulated in European human rights law – a vision comprised of the individual’s 
sense of place, on the one hand, and the individual’s position in the terms of an 
ascribed role or status, on the other – splits the individual between constitution 
and representation. This creates the possibility of personification, in which the 
individual is conceived of as personifying the role that she is performing. The 
existence of the possibility of the submergence of presence by presentation in this 
way is an expression of the tension between presence and presentation in 
European human rights law. But it also institutes a potential crisis in European 
human rights law. For the possibility that presentation might suppress presence is 
the possibility of the suppression of the recognition of the singular individual by 
the norms of replaceability and non-recognition, which in other words means the 
possibility for the individual to be sacrificed within the terms of an order founded 
upon the idea of ‘the individual’. This leaves the order of individuation set out in 
European human rights law as constituted upon the potential sacrifice of its 
foundational principle.   
2.4.3 Individual identity in European human rights law 
Conceived of like this, the tension between presence and presentation gives rise to 
a fragmented vision of the individual. It splits the individual between constitution 
and representation – between her sense of place and her ascribed position – and 
in so doing it opens a number of spaces that are configured around a sense of 
possible absence. We have seen how, therefore, it opens up the possibility of a 
feeling of alienation (and therefore of a feeling of absence), the possibility of being 
submerged by the terms of presentation (and therefore of being rendered absent), 
and the possibility of a gap between reality and the terms of the role or status 
through which one is being read (and therefore a space of absence which the role 
in question requires to be breached). More than that, however, the possibility of 
the suppression of presence by presentation means that the vision of individual 
presence articulated in European human rights law is itself configured around this 
sense of absence. This means that the terms for articulating the individual in 
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European human rights law are also the source of the loss of the individual – the 
source of her rendering absent. 
At the same time, however, the spaces of absence that emerge in this way 
carry a more productive force too. For in the tension that arises between presence 
and presentation a space is also articulated for the negotiation of individual 
identity. We can see this more clearly if we think back to the way in which the 
visions of presence and presentation each set out an account of identity. The vision 
of presence involves a conception of identity as self-identity, which is about the way 
in which the individual conceives of herself and articulates herself. The notions of 
an individual’s sense of place and sense of orientation in the world are 
inconceivable without her being able to conceive of herself in some way at all; and 
it is this self-conception that is specified in, and indeed supported and generated 
by, the three elements of individual presence: self-image, self-recognition, and 
attachment. We can think of individual presence in European human rights law as 
therefore being about that which is truly distinctive about the individual. It 
involves the specification and articulation of ‘who I am’. 
The vision of individual presentation meanwhile involves a conception of 
identity as ascribed identity, which is about the identity that is ascribed to the 
individual in the terms of the role or status through which she is presented in 
European human rights law at any one time. Each role or status involves a 
normative and normalising vision of what it represents, and the individual is 
assessed in relation to this, so that there is also a normative assessment bound up 
in the conception of identity that is set out in these terms. On the one hand, then, 
individual presentation makes for an account of ‘what I am’. On the other hand, 
this is bound up in an account that originates in a notion of ‘what I am said to be’. 
This sets up a challenge between the individual’s own conception of her roles and 
statuses in the world and the way in which she is conceived of in the terms of the 
roles and statuses articulated in European human rights law; and it is in this context 
that an interplay between self-identity and ascribed identity emerges.  
This interplay occurs in three ways. There is firstly the possibility of a 
reconciliation of self-identity and ascribed identity, involving an identification with 
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the roles ascribed – an appropriation of these roles, in Jaeggi’s terms.145 If we think 
back to the visions of presence and presentation, we can see how the roles in which 
we are presented in European human rights law may indeed play a part in our sense 
of presence. For example, we may fully identify with the vision of parenthood 
articulated in European human rights law, such that being a parent in the way 
specified forms a part of our sense of self. Likewise, our capacity to present 
ourselves in the terms of some role or status envisaged in European human rights 
law – and our reputation acquired in relation to this role or status – may form a 
part of our self-identity.  
The second way in which an interplay occurs between self-identity and 
ascribed identity in the context of the question of roles and statuses here is about 
the way in which self-identity is articulated in the context of (and sometimes 
directly against the backdrop of) ascribed forms of identity. This is reflected in the 
case law in which individuals challenge legal conceptions of various roles, statuses, 
or institutions: challenges which reflect, by definition, a sense that the legal 
conception in question is at odds with the individual’s self-conception (often put 
in terms of her “social reality”146). Sometimes, a challenge is direct, as in X, Y, and 
Z v UK (1997), in which the applicants complained of the lack of legal recognition 
of the father-child relationship between X (who had transitioned from female to 
male) and Z (the child, who had been conceived by donor insemination and carried 
by Y, X’s partner).147 At other times, there may be more of an interaction between 
the notions of identity in question, as in Muñoz Díaz v Spain (2009), in which the 
applicant complained that, following the death of her partner (to whom she had 
been married under Roma rites and traditions), the authorities had refused her a 
survivor’s pension on the ground that their marriage did not have civil effects in 
Spanish law, even though those same authorities had treated the couple as a 
married couple for years.148 On still other occasions, the interaction between the 
notions of identity may occur at a more general level, as when we are confronted 
                                                          
145 Jaeggi (2014), above n139, Ch.6. 
146 On which see Ch.3, part 3.4.3. 
147 21830/93, X, Y and Z v UK (1997). 
148 49151/07, Muñoz Díaz v Spain (2009). 
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with assumptions and stereotypes about roles or statuses in judgments that in 
themselves challenge us to think about how we relate to the vision being 
articulated.149 
The third way in which an interplay between self-identity and ascribed 
identity occurs in European human rights law comes to light when we think about 
how our identities are shaped, in part, by things which we did not become and 
things we are not.150 It was this that emerged in the context of the discussion of 
Evans v UK above; and what it suggests is not only that the spaces of possible 
absence opened up in the tension between presence and presentation are 
productive spaces but that the notions of presence and presentation must in 
themselves already be underpinned by a sense of how things could have been 
different.  
What these three levels of interplay between ascribed identity and self-
identity point to is the way in which the mediation of presence and presentation 
produces a space for the negotiation of individual identity in European human 
rights law. This, in turn, indicates that space is not only conceived of in European 
human rights law in terms of the place of the individual and the position of the 
individual, but that the mediation of these two notions generates a third space, 
which is the space of individual identity.  
2.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has shown how space is conceptualised in European human rights 
law by reference to two visions: a phenomenological vision of presence, which is 
about the sense of place of the individual, and a more functional or instrumental 
vision of presentation, which is about the position of the individual and her 
representation through the terms of some role or status. These visions supply the 
terms through which the individual is articulated and presented in European 
human rights law, and we will return to them time and again in this thesis. The 
question that this chapter has focused on, however, is the question of how the 
                                                          
149 E.g. 60367/08 and 961/11, Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v Russia (2017). 
150 See Scott (2018), above n109. 
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notions of presence and presentation are mediated. The argument that I have made 
in this respect is that although the splitting of the individual between the terms of 
presence and presentation carries a possibility that presentation might submerge 
presence, there is also a more productive quality to the tension between presence 
and presentation. This consists in the way in which it opens a space for the 
negotiation of questions of individual identity: questions originating in the 
interplay that occurs between the form of self-identity articulated by the vision of 
presence and the form of ascribed identity articulated by the vision of presentation. 
The effect of this, from the perspective of our consideration of the ECHR legal 
order as a lived order of individuation, is that the individual is conceived of as not 
only having a sense of place and a position in this order, but as developing an 
identity in it too.  
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In Chapter 2, we saw how the mediation of presence and presentation generates a 
space for the negotiation of individual identity in European human rights law. In 
this chapter, I argue that the idea of individual identity that emerges in this way is 
structured by a notion of individual continuity across time. I locate the origins of 
this notion in European human rights law’s conception of human dignity – a 
conception which, I argue, is about the protection of potentiality: a latent capacity 
to become and therefore ‘be’ within the meaning of European human rights law 
(3.2). Two forms of potentiality are articulated: vital potentiality, which marks the 
beginning of individual being in European human rights law and is about the 
potential (of an embryo, for example) to develop into a human being, and ethical 
potentiality, which is about the continuous development and realisation of the self. 
Taken together, vital potentiality and ethical potentiality make for an account in 
which being is about becoming and the focus is on the future. I argue that the idea 
of continuity that emerges from this is substantiated by two conditions: habituation 
(which is about what the individual is habituated to, and is conceived of as 
stabilising the individual) (3.3) and narrativisation (which is about the construction 
of narrative as a means through which to organise life and to accord it a sense of 
coherence and continuity) (3.4). These conditions contain a way of pinning down 
the individual within the terms of European human rights law; and this, I argue, is 
enabled by a vision of the human condition in which we are assumed to have a 






3.2 Potentiality and dignity  
The meaning and process of coming into the terms of European human rights law 
is articulated through a language of “human dignity and human freedom”;1 and in 
this section I suggest that it is in this notion of dignity that we can locate the origins 
of time in European human rights law too. I argue that this is because the 
conception of dignity articulated in European human rights law is about the 
protection of potentiality: a latent capacity to become and therefore begin to ‘be’ 
within the meaning of European human rights law. The principle of dignity 
protects, in the first place, vital potentiality: the capacity, represented in the 
embryo, for example, to develop into a human being (3.2.1). Individual being, 
within the meaning of European human rights law, begins in this notion of 
becoming; vital potentiality in other words secures entrance into the language of 
dignity and marks the beginning of time in European human rights law. Once this 
vital potentiality has been realised, a second form of potentiality emerges: ethical 
potentiality (3.2.2). This is geared towards the continuous development and 
realisation of the self. It derives its ethical orientation from the need to continually 
negotiate the question of living a life that is good for the self; and the attitude of 
anticipation that is a part of this is also cast as entailing a certain degree of faith, 
expressed in terms of hope (3.2.3). I suggest that taken together, vital potentiality 
and ethical potentiality make for an account in which being is always about 
becoming and the objective is one of self-continuity. 
3.2.1 Vital potentiality 
European human rights law grounds itself in a principle of human dignity: a quality 
that is unspecified in the case law beyond the twofold stipulation that it is inherent 
to the individual and to the vision of life that is constructed in European human 
rights law and that it is to be recognised and respected as such.2 That the principle 
of dignity is unspecified is largely because of its fluidity, for what dignity seems to 
be protecting is a form of potentiality: a latent capacity to become and therefore 
                                                          
1 As the ECtHR emphasises: “[t]he very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity 
and human freedom” (e.g., 2346/02, Pretty v UK (2002), para.65). 
2 Ibid.  
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begin to ‘be’ within the meaning of European human rights law. If this association 
between potentiality and dignity has a long history in Renaissance humanism and 
in Catholic social thought,3 it is carried across into European human rights law in 
the notion that it is in terms of potentiality that individual being begins in law. In 
the case of the embryo, for example, the Grand Chamber has stated that “there is 
no European consensus on the nature and status of the embryo and/or foetus” 
and that (“at best”) “it may be regarded as common ground between States that 
the embryo/foetus belongs to the human race. The potentiality of that being and 
its capacity to become a person...require protection in the name of human dignity, 
without making it a ‘person’ with the ‘right to life’ for the purposes of Article 2.”4 
The issue of when the right to life begins has thereby been enabled to fall within 
the margin of appreciation of the Contracting States.5 And so vital potentiality – the 
potential to develop into a human being – seems to pull the embryo into the 
language of human dignity,6 but it does not secure legal status as such. 
 The effects of this casting of vital potentiality as a point of beginning were 
drawn out in Parrillo v Italy (2015). The applicant in this case, Ms Parrillo, had frozen 
five embryos during IVF treatment with her partner. He was subsequently killed 
in Iraq (where he was reporting on the war), and she decided not to proceed with 
the implantation of the embryos but to donate them to scientific research instead. 
This, however, was banned under an Italian law that came into force a few months 
after her partner’s death. Before the ECtHR, Ms Parrillo argued that this ban 
violated her Article 8 right to respect for her private life.  
                                                          
3 This is both in terms of potential to become human (here described as vital potentiality), which 
is a matter of what I am, and in terms of potential to become ‘me’ (here described as ethical 
potentiality), which is a matter of who I am. See esp. on the connection between potentiality and 
dignity, G. Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man (transl. A. R. Caponigri) (1956 [1486], 
Henry Regnery Company), p6-8 (also discussed in Ch.1, part 1.2.1(i)). The connection between 
potentiality and dignity is notably drawn in German constitutional law, where constitutional 
protection extends to “all developing human life”: ‘First Abortion Decision’, 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975, 
German Constitutional Court), Part C., I., paras.1(b)-2. In this Decision, the German 
Constitutional Court stated that “[t]he potential capabilities lying in human existence from its 
inception on are sufficient to justify human dignity” (Part C., I., para.2).   
4 53924/00, VO v France (2004), para.84. 
5 Ibid., para.82.  
6 Cf. C. McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) The 
European Journal of International Law 19(4), 655-724, p709. 
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The ECtHR considered that Ms Parrillo’s “ability to exercise a conscious 
and considered choice regarding the fate of her embryos [concerned] an intimate 
aspect of her personal life and accordingly [related] to her right to self-
determination”, which meant that Article 8 was applicable here.7 In framing the 
case in this way, the Court focused on Ms Parrillo’s “freedom of choice”8 as 
regards the fate of the embryos; but the connection between Ms Parrillo and the 
embryos was also relevant: the embryos “[contained her] genetic material…and 
accordingly [represented] a constituent part of [her] genetic material and biological 
identity”.9 The ban on donating the embryos to scientific research was accordingly 
considered to constitute an interference with Ms Parrillo’s right to respect for her 
private life.  
The focus of the initial framing of the case was, in this way, on the 
connection between the embryos and Ms Parrillo and the sense that they were a 
part of her (they represented a part of her, they contained part of her genetic 
material, and they were in fact hers). But when it came to the question of the 
objective of the ban, there was a departure from this vision that was enabled by 
the fact that the embryos were outside Ms Parrillo’s body.10 The ECtHR accepted 
that the Italian Government was pursuing the protection of the “embryo’s 
potential for life”,11 on the basis that this “may be linked to the aim of protecting 
morals and the rights and freedoms of others, in the terms in which this concept 
is meant by the Government”.12 In the same breath, the Court added that this did 
not represent an assessment on its part of “whether the word ‘others’ extends to 
human embryos”.13 And yet it is hard to get past the sense that the embryos here 
appeared to be conceptualised as carrying a potentiality independent of Ms Parrillo 
                                                          
7 46470/11, Parrillo v Italy (2015), para.159. 
8 Ibid., para.159; see also paras.154, 157. 
9 Ibid., para.158. 
10 Cf. the case law where the embryo/foetus is (or was) inside the woman, in which the ECtHR 
has tended to focus on the tight connection between the life of the embryo/foetus and that of 
the woman: 53924/00, VO v France (2004), paras.86-87; 13423/09, Mehmet Şentürk and Bekír 
Şentürk v Turkey (2013), para.109; 5410/03, Tyisąc v Poland (2007), para.106; 25579/05, A, B and C 
v Ireland (2010), paras.213, 237.  
11 46470/11, Parrillo v Italy (2015), para.162. 
12 Ibid., para.167. 
13 Ibid., para.167.  
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and one to be accorded legal recognition in these terms. They went from being 
deemed a part of Ms Parrillo (and seen in her image) to having their own 
potentiality and status as ‘others’ (and seen in the human image more generally). 
The ECtHR proceeded to consider that since the right to donate embryos 
to scientific research did not pertain to “a particularly important aspect of the 
applicant’s existence and identity” (it was not “one of the core rights” of Article 8, 
unlike matters concerning “prospective parenthood”),14 Italy could be afforded a 
wide margin of appreciation, in an area lacking European consensus. It set out 
three reasons as to why the Government had not overstepped this margin (and 
why, therefore, there had been no violation of Article 8). Firstly, the legislature had 
balanced the interests at stake. Secondly, any inconsistencies as there were in the 
legislation were not capable of directly affecting Ms Parrillo. Thirdly, there was no 
evidence that Ms Parrillo’s partner, “who had the same interest in the embryos in 
question as the applicant at the time of fertilisation, would have made the same 
choice” as she was seeking to make; and there were “no regulations governing this 
situation at domestic level”.15  
This final reason is incoherent, and it is particularly problematic when 
considered in the light of Evans v UK (2007), discussed in Chapter 2, in which Ms 
Evans’s former partner similarly acquired something of a final say in relation to 
the fate of their IVF embryos.16 But looked at in the context of the conceptual 
transformation that we see in Ms Parrillo’s case, it makes sense. The embryos go 
from being a part of Ms Parrillo – a “constituent part” of her identity – to 
occupying an intermediate space between being a part of her and being ‘others’ 
(not ‘mere’ possessions’17) with their own vital potentiality and divergent interests.  
                                                          
14 Ibid., para.174. This hints at the distinction between becoming something and not becoming 
something, discussed in Ch.2, part 2.3.2(iii). 
15 Ibid., para.196. 
16 See Ch.2, part 2.3.2(iii). 
17 The Court dismissed Ms Parrillo’s complaint that there had also been breach of her right to 
peaceful enjoyment of her possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No.1: “[having] regard to the 
economic and pecuniary scope of that Article, human embryos cannot be reduced to ‘possessions’ 
within the meaning of that provision” (ibid., para.215). See further Ch.6, part 6.4.3. 
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And so a relationship between potentiality and dignity is established in that 
vital potentiality – the potential to become human – warrants admission into the 
realm of European human rights law. Notably, this does not tell us how a conflict 
between an embryo and a woman is to be resolved; it merely says that a potentiality 
in the embryo is recognised (as in the granting of a status of ‘other’ to it). And it 
does not tell us when life begins in the terms of the ECHR (or, indeed, whether 
the embryo is granted a right to life); rather, it says that potentiality is recognised 
within the vision of European human rights law (which is not the same as saying 
that potentiality is the source of rights). The claim is, therefore, this: that vital 
potentiality marks the point of beginning in European human rights law – that 
individual being, within the meaning of European human rights law, begins in this 
notion of becoming. 
3.2.2 Ethical potentiality   
If vital potentiality secures entrance into the language of dignity and marks the 
beginning of time and being in European human rights law, then once this 
potentiality has been realised, a second form of potentiality emerges: ethical 
potentiality. This is geared towards the continuous development and realisation of 
the self; and it derives its ethical orientation from the need to continually negotiate, 
within the context of the processes of self-development and self-realisation, the 
question of living a life that is good for the self. Self-development is conceived of 
here as being about the development of the self through time, and self-realisation 
is about the realisation of one’s potential and/or conception of self. The two 
processes are not entirely separable; and part of the vision of ethical potentiality is 
about the way in which they are brought together.  
The origins of European human rights law’s account of self-development 
lie in Article 8 of the ECHR, which includes, within the ambit of its right to respect 
for private life, “a right to personal development”.18 This has been variously 
                                                          
18 This can be traced back to 44599/98, Bensaid v UK (2001), para.47. That case does not cite any 
case law in support of this proposition; the subsequent citation of 16213/90, Burghartz and Schnyder 
Burghartz v Switzerland (1992) and 15225/89, Friedl v Austria (1995) is in reference to the other right 
mentioned (“to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside 
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conceived of from perspectives of personal identity,19 personality,20 and personal 
autonomy,21 but the essence of the issue in all three framings lies in the 
development of the self through time, and, moreover, in the conduct of one’s 
development and life in a manner of one’s own choosing.22 This demands, on the 
part of the individual, a capacity to see and foresee her self through time and to 
develop and realise her potential; and it demands, on the part of European human 
rights law, the provision of guarantees that enable and protect this process. Hence, 
for example, the emphasis placed by the ECtHR on the importance of 
safeguarding the “mental stability” of the individual (this being “an indispensable 
precondition” for the enjoyment of the right to respect for one’s private life, and, 
therefore, for the pursuit of self-development at all),23 and, separately, the 
significance attached in the case law to the child’s personal development24 and 
“ability to reach [his or her] maximum potential”.25 In fact on this latter point, it is 
                                                          
world”). In subsequent cases, Bensaid v UK is cited in support of the ‘right to personal 
development’ (e.g., 36515/97, Fretté v France (2002), para.1 of the Joint Dissenting Opinion). 
19 Details of one’s personal identity (such as the details of one’s birth parents: 42326/98, Odièvre 
v France (2003), para.29) are, thus, deemed relevant and/or necessary to personal development 
(e.g., 552/10, I.B. v Greece (2013), para.67 and 6339/05, Evans v UK (2007), para.71, in which the 
right to personal development is included as a part of “physical and social identity”), such that an 
interference with an individual’s identity is deemed to constitute an interference with her personal 
development (e.g., 25680/94, I v UK (2002), para.70). In a few other cases, “the right to identity” 
has been distinguished from “the right to personal development”, with the latter being cast as 
something that can be expressed either in terms of personality or in terms of personal autonomy. 
This was apparent in 35968/97, Van Kück v Germany (2003), para.75, insofar as the consideration 
was of the relationship between matters of identity and personal development. But it became 
more apparent in 30562/04 and 30566/04, S and Marper v UK (2008), in which the elements of 
Article 8 pertaining to identity were described and then it was added that “Article 8 protects, in 
addition, a right to personal development...” (para.66).  
20 This occurs principally where the protection of the individual’s own image and her control over 
this is cast in terms of personal development (e.g., 1234/05, Reklos and Davourlis v Greece (2009), 
para.40). This association of personal development and the right to protect and control one’s own 
image has roots in the Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Spielmann and Jebens in 68354/01, 
Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v Austria (2007), para.14. It is now a well-established principle and 
was subsequently articulated in, e.g., 40660/08 and 60641/08, Von Hannover v Germany (No. 2) 
(2012), para.96. 
21 In the case of adults, the right to personal autonomy means “the right to make choices as to 
how to lead one’s own life, provided that this does not unjustifiably interfere with the rights and 
freedoms of others” (10161/13, M. and M. v Croatia (2015), para.171). Children have a 
“circumscribed autonomy” (ibid.). 
22 E.g., 56030/07, Fernández Martínez v Spain (2014), para.126. 
23 E.g., 31827/02, Laduna v Slovakia (2011), para.53. 
24 E.g., 33677/10 and 52340/10, Fürst-Pfeifer v Austria (2016), para.45. See further parts 3.3.1 and 
3.3.2 below. 
25 23682/13, Guberina v Croatia (2016), para.82. 
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possible to see, through the category of ‘the child’ alone, a broader vision of 
individual development being articulated in European human rights law. This is 
not only in the sense of the extent to which childhood is cast as being a time for 
“the fundamental programming of personality”26 but also in the sense that 
childhood is cast as supplying the framework through which life is subsequently 
structured and interpreted – an idea that we will return to in due course.27  
A close connection exists in all this between the processes of self-
development (as being about the development of the self through time) and self-
realisation (as being about the realisation of one’s potential and/or conception of 
self). The two processes have a reflective and reflexive quality which means that 
they advance with each other and are a means and an end for each other. For 
example, the end of self-development may be the attainment of self-realisation (‘I 
have reached my aim…’), but that self-realisation is, in turn, the means towards 
further self-development (‘I have reached my aim; what next?’). Moreover, self-
development and self-realisation are also conceptualised as being related to a 
feeling of fulfilment; and “the right to self-fulfilment” (“whether in the form of 
personal development…or from the point of view of the right to establish and 
develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world”) has been 
included within Article 8 in this sense.28 The ECtHR has specified dimensions of 
this, which include sexuality (which has “physical and psychological relevance” for 
self-fulfilment),29 freedom of expression (which is deemed a condition of 
individual self-fulfilment),30 and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (the 
rights to which are treated as being important “in guaranteeing the individual’s self-
fulfilment”).31  
Taken together, these strands of self-development, self-realisation, and self-
fulfilment generate a vision in which the focus is on the individual moving forward 
                                                          
26 39388/05, Maumousseau and Washington v France (2007), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Zupančič, 
joined by Judge Gyulumyan. 
27 See parts 3.3 and 3.4 below. 
28 56030/07, Fernández Martínez v Spain (2014), para.126. 
29 17484/15, Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v Portugal (2017), para.52. 
30 This goes back to 9815/82, Lingens v Austria (1986), para.41. 
31 29617/07, Vojnity v Hungary (2013), para.36. 
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in her life. This brings it close to the ideal of authenticity – the “project of 
becoming who you are”32 – except, as it is expressed in European human rights 
law, it carries a greater urgency, supplying a direction and a purpose: the right and 
need to develop one’s own potential, and thereby one’s own self. The self is 
rendered a kind of “ethical telos”, the orientation towards which is one of 
“[devotion]…to its continuous realization”, to borrow a phrasing from Crispin 
Sartwell;33 and this way of conceiving of the self implies a certain capacity to 
abstract from oneself too. This notion, of a form of abstract self-relation, has been 
theorised by Barbara Johnson, who offers a reading of the Lacanian mirror stage 
(which we touched on in Chapter 234) in which she focuses on the effect, in that 
stage, of the identification “with a form…that interests the subject precisely 
because it anticipates stages of this development where he will be superior to what 
he is now”.35 The subject, she suggests, “assumes an identity derived from the 
discrepancy between a present and an ideal self – and that is what is recognized with 
such jubiliation. Henceforth the real self for the subject is the one in the mirror: 
…An idealization. A fiction. An object…”.36 She goes on to argue that the “image 
of this idealization will haunt the subject his whole life”; for “[n]o matter what he 
does, he can neither catch up with it nor equal it”,37 such that, ultimately, “the 
subject comes into being in the gap of inferiority between a flawed viewer and the 
anticipated wholeness of an armor of fiction”, with “the definition of a ‘person’ 
[then being]: the repeated experience of failing to become a thing”.38  
Johnson’s analysis gives us cause to reflect on the form of abstraction that 
the notion of ethical potentiality articulated in European human rights law entails. 
For what it brings to the fore is the way in which the construction of – and 
identification with – an idealised self, such as that which is presupposed by the 
notions of self-development, self-realisation, and self-fulfilment, entails the 
                                                          
32 C. Guignon, On Being Authentic (2004, Routledge), p3. 
33 C. Sartwell, End of Story: Toward and Annihilation of Language and History (2000, State University of 
New York Press), p26.  
34 See Ch.2, part 2.2.2(i). 
35 B. Johnson, Persons and Things (2008, Harvard University Press), p56. 
36 Ibid., p57. 
37 Ibid., p57. 
38 Ibid., p59. 
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locating of the individual in a rather ambiguous position. She is positioned as being 
in transition (as always engaged in the process of striving towards and realising her 
self) and as bearing the capacity to transcend her (current) self and to take the long 
view of this. This comes close to a liminal stage: a stage of passage, in which the 
feeling of being “betwixt and between” is experienced as one passes from one 
realm to the next.39 As this is conceptualised in European human rights law, 
however, liminality is fixed as a more generalised state of readiness and openness 
to possibility: a state in which the essential pursuit is one of becoming.  
3.2.3 Hope 
The focus of the vision of ethical potentiality articulated here is on the promise of 
the future and on the imagination of one’s self in that future. The ethical quality 
of this vision derives in the first instance from the need to continually negotiate 
the question of living a life that is good for the self; but the attitude of anticipation 
that is demanded in this is also cast as involving a certain degree of faith, expressed 
in European human rights law in terms of hope. Significant weight is increasingly 
placed in the case law on the importance of hope itself; the ECtHR has, in 
particular, stated that it is not possible, insofar as it is incompatible with human 
rights law, to either allow someone to labour on under false or misplaced hope40 
or to eliminate entirely the capacity of the human to hope at all. The latter point 
has been expressed most clearly in the jurisprudence on sentencing. Life sentences, 
for instance, must be reducible de jure and de facto; they must carry the prospect of 
release and the possibility of review of the sentence, “with a view to its 
commutation, remission, termination or the conditional release of the prisoner”.41 
                                                          
39 V. Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (1969, Aldine de Gruyter), p95.  
40 E.g., 26713/05, Bigaeva v Greece (2009), in which the Greek authorities had allowed Mrs Bigaeva 
to carry out her pupillage (to which she had been mistakenly admitted), even though, because of 
her Russian nationality, there was no way she was going to be able to sit the examinations that 
she would need to sit in order to be admitted to the Athens Bar. The ECtHR considered that the 
authorities had left Mrs Bigaeva with a false hope, since there was no chance of her proceeding 
to the Bar (see para.32 et seq.). 
41 21906/04, Kafkaris v Cyprus (2008), para.78. 
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The basis of this was elaborated in Vinter and Others v UK (2013), which 
concerned the compatibility of the whole life orders42 given to the applicants, who 
were each serving sentences of life imprisonment for murder, with Article 3 of the 
ECHR. The Grand Chamber set out four reasons as to why there needs to be 
“both a prospect of release and a possibility of review” for a life sentence to be 
compatible with Article 3.43 Firstly, there must always be a legitimate rationale 
underpinning the detention, and that involves also a review of this justification, 
and an examination of whether it has changed in any way.44 Secondly, without any 
possibility of release or review of the life sentence, “there is a risk that [the 
prisoner] can never atone for his offence”, since “whatever the prisoner does in 
prison, however exceptional his progress towards rehabilitation, his punishment 
remains fixed and unreviewable”.45 Thirdly, the ECtHR was influenced by German 
constitutional law and its recognition that “it would be incompatible with the 
provision on human dignity in the Basic Law for the State forcefully to deprive a 
person of his freedom without at least providing him with the chance to someday 
regain that freedom”.46 This consideration, it stated, was to be also applied in 
ECHR law. And fourthly, the context of contemporary European penal policy 
more generally was one of an emphasis on rehabilitation.47  
For these reasons, the Court said, life sentences must be reducible. They 
must involve a review which takes into account any changes in the life of the 
prisoner and the progress of that prisoner towards rehabilitation, and which 
checks, in the light of this, whether continued detention remains justifiable “on 
legitimate penological grounds”.48 Moreover, there is to be no uncertainty in the 
prisoner’s mind as to any of this: the prisoner “is entitled to know, at the outset of 
his sentence, what he must do to be considered for release and under what 
                                                          
42 A whole life order may be exceptionally imposed instead of a minimum term, with the effect 
that the offender cannot be released from prison other than by way of the Secretary of State’s 
exceptional exercise of discretion. 
43 66069/09 et al., Vinter and Others v UK (2013), para.110. 
44 Ibid., para.111. 
45 Ibid., para.112. 
46 Ibid., para.113. 
47 Ibid., para.115 et seq. 
48 Ibid., para.119. 
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conditions, including when a review of his sentence will take place or may be 
sought.”49  
In the case under consideration, the life sentences could not be regarded as 
reducible in this sense, and there had, accordingly, been a violation of Article 3. 
Yet whilst the Court emphasised that this finding did not give the applicants “the 
prospect of imminent release”,50 what it did do, according to Judge Power-Forde 
in her Concurring Opinion, was secure the place of the ‘the right to hope’ in Article 
3. The Court had implicitly recognised, she suggested, “that hope is an important 
and constitutive aspect of the human person”.51 She continued: “[t]hose who 
commit the most abhorrent and egregious of acts…nevertheless retain their 
fundamental humanity and carry within themselves the capacity to change…they 
retain the right to hope that, someday, they may have atoned for the wrongs which 
they have committed. They ought not to be deprived entirely of such hope. To 
deny them the experience of hope would be to deny a fundamental aspect of their 
humanity and, to do that, would be degrading”.52 These same words were 
subsequently expressed in the majority’s judgment in Matiošaitis and Others v 
Lithuania (2017), in which it was similarly found that the life sentences that had 
been served on the applicants were not reducible within the meaning of Article 3.53  
Hope functions, in this way, as a kernel of faith: as a carrier of a vision of a 
different future. It is directly linked to an innate potentiality (“the capacity to 
change”, in Judge Power-Forde’s words), and, consequently, to something that is 
already present and needs only to be developed. Indeed, this applies to the object 
of hope more broadly, since, as Paul Tillich has theorised, “[w]here there is genuine 
hope, there that for which we hope has already some presence”.54 Hope is a type 
of power, which can drive its object into realisation.55 And at the same time as it 
                                                          
49 Ibid., para.122. 
50 Ibid., para.131. 
51 Ibid., Concurring Opinion of Judge Power-Forde. 
52 Ibid. 
53 22662/13 et al., Matiošaitis and Others v Lithuania (2017), para.180. 
54 P. Tillich, ‘The Right to Hope’ (1965) Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und 
Religionsphilosophie 7(3), 371-377, p373. 
55 Ibid., p373. 
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enables the promise and imagination of the future,56 hope involves the projection 
of one’s self into that future.57 It is a source of transformation and motivation.   
The loss of hope has, by contrast, been associated in the literature with 
experiences of helplessness,58 despair,59 unquestioning compliance,60 passive 
subjection to the uncertainties of fortune and fate, and the end of life itself.61 We 
may not be surprised to find any of these featuring, in some form, in the experience 
of a person sentenced for life with no prospect of release. For such a sentence 
presents, in effect, what Jonathan Lear elsewhere describes as a breakdown in a 
way of life, its temporal structure, and its framework of intelligibility.62 The lack of 
prospect of release generates a sense of finality; and it imposes a loss of the sense 
of possibility that things could be otherwise. Crucially, this demands a total 
resignation, which runs entirely against European human rights law’s vision of 
continuous self-development and self-realisation. For if ethical potentiality 
supposes a form of temporal continuity in European human rights law – the 
continuity of the individual, the constitutive principle of its order – the devastation 
of the future-orientated attitude that it demands, and which is expressed in the 
principle of hope, brings about non-being. It entails the loss of the framework in 
which being is and makes sense.63  
In the terms of European human rights law, this is what a loss of dignity 
appears to involve: the trampling on possibility, on potentiality – on the capacity 
to imagine and anticipate at all. Without this, the framework of meaning by which 
the order of European human rights law is lived and perpetuated is lacking. The 
principle of dignity, in which this notion of ethical potentiality has its source, 
                                                          
56 See on this same point C. Dupré, The Age of Dignity: Human Rights and Constitutionalism in Europe 
(2015, Hart Publishing), p163-165.  
57 See, e.g., R. Solnit, Hope in the Dark: Untold Histories, Wild Possibilities (2016 [2004], Nation Books). 
58 A. Kellehear, The Inner Life of the Dying Person (2014, Columbia University Press), p71. 
59 W. I. Miller, The Mystery of Courage (2000, Harvard University Press), p212. 
60 D. W. Winnicott, The Family and the Individual Development (2006 [1965], Routledge), p103. 
61 Tillich (1965), above n54, p371. 
62 J. Lear, Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation (2006, Harvard University Press), 
Ch.1. On this, see the discussion in my own Ch.1, part 1.4.2. 
63 See further on this idea: Lear (2006), above n62.  
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serves, in this way, to preserve and affirm the framework of understanding that it 
subsequently generates: a framework which hinges on potentiality.  
3.3 Habituation 
The temporality of European human rights law – the form of time that structures 
the mode of being of its order64 – emerges as being one of individual becoming. 
This is comprised of two steps: vital potentiality (the potential to become human), 
which pulls an entity within the realm of human dignity, and ethical potentiality, 
which is about the continuous process of self-development and self-realisation and 
the accompanying attitude of anticipation. Being, in European human rights law, 
is accordingly always about becoming; and individual continuity is cast as being 
promised by the fact of being in a continuous process of development.  
 The notion of self-continuity that is articulated in this way is, however, quite 
abstract. How is the individual to know where to go? And what form does this 
self-continuity take? European human rights law does not leave these questions as 
open. It substantiates its notion of self-continuity by grounding its vision of self-
development and self-realisation in two conditions: habituation (which is about 
what the individual is habituated to, and is conceived of as stabilising the 
individual) and narrativisation (which is about the construction of narrative as a 
means through which to organise life and to accord it a sense of coherence and 
continuity).  
This section considers the condition of habituation. Habituation is cast as 
stabilising the individual, and the importance that is ascribed to this stabilisation 
originates in European human rights law’s vision of child development, wherein 
the role of stability in relation to individual development more generally is set out 
especially clearly (3.3.1). The idea is that habituation frees up energy that can be 
directed towards a longer view of self-development and self-realisation (3.3.2). At 
the same time, the account of what it means to feel habituated is underpinned in 
the case law by an account of what it means to be habituated – of what it means 
                                                          
64 This is to take Lear’s definition of ‘temporality’ (“a name for time as it is experienced within a 
way of life”): ibid., p40. 
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to be situated. This is articulated by reference to notions such as of the ‘roots’ of 
the individual, of the ‘degree’ of her ‘integration’, and of her ‘original environment’; 
and habituation thus contains within itself a mode of pinning down the individual 
(3.3.3).  
3.3.1 The origins of habituation  
The notion of habituation articulated in European human rights law – a notion 
which is about actions and elements of being that are so habitual that they are an 
unconscious and an engrained part of one’s character – originates in European 
human rights law’s account of child development, and in particular in its emphasis 
on stability in childhood.65 This account is largely articulated in the jurisprudence 
pertaining to family law decisions concerning children. In these cases, the primary, 
or paramount, consideration is the ‘best interests’ of the child,66 of which a 
“personal development perspective” is taken.67 In cases involving parent-child 
relations, the vision of what a child’s ‘best interests’ actually consist in hinges on 
two things: “that the child’s ties with its family must be maintained, except in cases 
where the family has proved particularly unfit” and that “it is in the child’s interest 
to ensure its development in a sound environment, and a parent cannot be entitled 
under Article 8 to have such measures taken as would harm the child’s health and 
development”.68 It is in the course of elaborating what these two points mean that 
the ECtHR has set out a more general and normative account of child 
development; and it is in this that we can locate the origins of the notion of 
habituation in European human rights law. 
The first element of this account – the point about family ties – is a 
reflection of the most basic principle of the Article 8 ‘family life’ jurisprudence, 
which is that “[t]he mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company 
                                                          
65 The following pages draw on my paper on ‘The Child in European Human Rights Law’ (2018) 
Modern Law Review 81(3), 452-479. 
66 See esp. 41615/07, Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (2010), paras.134-135. The distinction 
between a consideration of the child’s best interests as ‘primary’ and as ‘paramount’ is a significant 
and much-debated one, but I do not have space to discuss it in this chapter.  
67 Ibid., para.138. 




constitutes a fundamental element of family life”.69 This translates into a series of 
obligations on the part of domestic authorities in relation to the maintenance of 
the parent-child relationship. These are both positive obligations (for instance, 
obligations to enable an established family tie with a child to be developed,70 to 
ensure the continuation of family life between parents and children in the event of 
parental separation,71 or “to rehabilitate the child and parent, where possible”, in 
public care cases72) and negative obligations (“to refrain from measures which 
cause family ties to rupture”73). The sense is that disruption to an established 
parent-child relationship is to be kept to a minimum,74 because even a temporary 
measure can have a long-lasting effect on a child, as it can indeed also on a parent.75 
And so in cases in which a child has been taken into care, for instance, although 
the domestic authorities are granted a margin of appreciation in assessing the need 
for a care order in the first place (particularly if it is an emergency order76), any 
further limitations imposed on the parent-child relationship, such as to contact, 
will be more strictly scrutinised.77 This is because, particularly in cases involving 
young children, restrictions beyond the care order “entail the danger that the family 
relations between the parents and a young child are effectively curtailed”78 and that 
the children experience “alienation” from their parents;79 and authorities, 
accordingly, have to take steps to ensure that the chances of re-establishing a 
disrupted relationship are not “definitively compromised”.80 Where children have 
                                                          
69 E.g., 9749/82, W. v UK (1987), para.59. 
70 E.g., 16969/90, Keegan v Ireland (1994), para.50. 
71 E.g., 29192/95, Ciliz v The Netherlands (2000), para.62. 
72 28945/95, T.P. and K.M. v UK (2001), para.78. 
73 29192/95, Ciliz v The Netherlands (2000), para.62. 
74 The objective of reunion (e.g., in public care cases) does not, however, entitle a parent “to have 
such measures taken as would harm the child’s health and development”: 17383/90, Johansen v 
Norway (1996), para.78. 
75 E.g., 56547/00, P, C, and S v UK (2002); 11057/02, Haase v Germany (2005), paras.101-103; 
31127/96, E.P. v Italy (1999), para.68. On the effect on the child of separation from biological 
parents, as compared with the effect of separation from foster parents, see 74969/01, Görgülü v 
Germany (2004), paras.44-46. 
76 25702/94, K and T v Finland (2001), para.165 et seq. 
77 17383/90, Johansen v Norway (1996), para.64. 
78 Ibid. Any “total severance of contact” will be justified only in exceptional circumstances: 
39221/98 and 41963/98, Scozzari and Giunta v Italy (2000), para.170. 
79 46544/99, Kutzner v Germany (2002), para.79. 
80 E.g., 31127/96, E.P. v Italy (1999), para.69. 
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spent time in care, the authorities are obliged to ensure that the children and 
parents are prepared for their reunion.81 
The second component of the child’s ‘best interests’ in European human 
rights law is as to the development of the child in a ‘sound environment’. This is 
not a first-order principle. It does not mean, for example, that the removal of a 
child from her parents would be justified on the sole ground that there exists, 
somewhere else, a potentially “more beneficial environment” for her.82 A ‘good 
enough’ environment, to paraphrase Donald Winnicott,83 is all that matters, 
although everything hinges, of course, on what ‘good enough’ means. Rather, what 
this element of the child’s ‘best interests’ does ultimately establish is that the 
emotional interest of the child is generally conceived of as being bound in her own 
stability, not in the emotional wellbeing of her parents. And so if, for example, a 
child, over time, becomes settled in a ‘new’ environment, or with ‘new’ living 
arrangements, however temporary or contrary to a court order these were intended 
to be, it may be in her best interests – as distinct from those of her parent(s) – to 
leave her there and not to enforce any original order to the contrary.84 Thus in 
child custody cases, “the passage of time...can, in the end, determine what is in the 
best interests of the child”;85 and that in itself underpins a host of obligations that 
domestic authorities have in relation to the enforcement of orders (pertaining to 
contact or custody with the other parent, or ordering the child to be removed or 
returned to live with the other parent, for example86) and in relation to decision-
making processes and the determination of issues before courts.87 
Through the lens of the ‘best interests’ principle, the child is, in this way, 
presented as being an individual actor, with distinctive interests. At the same time, 
                                                          
81 E.g., 13441/87, Olsson v Sweden (No. 2) (1992), para.90. 
82 25702/94, K and T v Finland (2001), para.173. 
83 D. W. Winnicott, ‘Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena’ (1953), in Playing and 
Reality (2005 [1971], Routledge), 1-34, p13-14. 
84 E.g., 40031/98, Gnahoré v France (2000), para.60. 
85 32842/96, Nuutinen v Finland (2000), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Zupančič, joined by Judges 
Panţîru and Türmen, para.O-I30.  
86 The ECtHR has become increasingly strict about the enforcement of orders and about the use 
of sanctions to secure such enforcement (e.g., 48206/99, Maire v Portugal (2003), para.76). 
87 E.g., 32346/96, Glaser v UK (2000), para.66. 
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however, and underpinning this presentation, a normative account of the nature 
of the child’s interests is constructed – an account in which a “secure and 
emotionally stable” environment is cast as being a defining interest.88 This stability 
is conceived of as deriving either from the parent-child relationship and its 
maintenance, or from a ‘new’ relational environment (which might also involve 
living and establishing a relationship with the ‘other’ parent). The key point is that 
it is cast as being a foundation for individual development. Any uncertainty or 
disruption that is experienced by the child in relation to her family relationships is 
deemed damaging and destabilising for the child’s development.89 Stability, by 
contrast, is conceived of as serving as a basis from which to handle the ethical 
question of self-development: the question of ‘who am I to become?’.  
3.3.2 The work of habituation 
It is in terms of habituation – and, especially, in terms of the importance of the 
environment to which a child has become habituated – that the child’s stability has 
been most notably specified and valued in European human rights law. An 
example is Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (2010), which concerned proceedings 
regarding the order for return of a little boy, Noam, who had been wrongfully 
removed (within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction) by his mother from Israel to Switzerland. Noam 
and his mother argued that the order for Noam’s return to Israel breached their 
Article 8 ECHR rights; and the Grand Chamber agreed. In particular, it considered 
that Noam’s best interests would be better served by his staying in Switzerland 
than by his moving back to Israel, where there would be serious questions as to 
the capacity of his father to look after him. Noam was by now so well-settled in 
Switzerland that despite the fact that he was “at an age where he still [had] a certain 
                                                          
88 17383/90, Johansen v Norway (1996), para.80. See also, e.g., 35991/04, Kearns v France (2008), 
para.80. 
89 E.g., lengthy proceedings, in which a child is left in uncertainty as to where she will end up 
living, have a notable potential effect on “the child’s mental equilibrium”: 22430/93, Bronda v Italy 
(2001), para.61. And in 39472/07 and 39474/07, Popov v France (2012), the ECtHR considered 
that the fact that the children were detained, along with their parents, in profoundly unsuitable 
conditions, effectively destabilised their worldview. The situation “created anxiety, psychological 
disturbance and degradation of the parental image in the eyes of the children” (para.101). (On 
this case see further Ch.5, part 5.2.1.) 
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capacity for adaptation”, uprooting him and returning him to Israel would likely 
carry “serious consequences for him”, which would outweigh any potential benefit 
of his return to Israel.90 The Court described this in terms of the “habitual 
environment”, from which it would be problematic to uproot Noam.91  
This notion of the ‘habitual environment’ of a child has its source in the 
Hague Convention, which deals with the wrongful retention or removal of 
children and has, as one of its objectives, ‘to establish procedures to ensure their 
prompt return to the State of their habitual residence...’.92 In the Hague 
Convention, however, ‘habitual residence’ alludes to the State in which the child 
was living prior to her wrongful removal or retention,93 whereas in Neulinger and 
Shuruk the Court used ‘habitual environment’ not in reference to the place that 
Noam had been ordered to return to (Tel Aviv), but rather in reference to the 
environment that had since been established with his mother in Switzerland – the 
environment that had been generated through the act that was ‘wrongful’ in the 
sense of the Hague Convention.  
In constructing its notion of ‘habitual’ in this context, the ECtHR sets out 
an account of what it means to settle. This account hints at an assessment of the 
degree of social, cultural, and familial ties in question – an assessment which 
derives from its case law on expulsion measures,94 and is comparable to the 
principle of integration most favoured by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union in this context (a principle which, in turn, derives from its jurisprudence on 
free movement).95 Such an analysis, whether it is cast in terms of ties or integration, 
is looking not just at whether the child has settled, but at how she has settled, and 
her contribution to this settling; and this is what underpins the subtle distinction 
between the conceptualisation of habitual environment, which entails this latter 
                                                          
90 41615/07, Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (2010), para.147. 
91 Ibid., para.147. 
92 Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 
Preamble para.3. 
93 Ibid., Articles 3 and 4. This is also how ‘habitual environment’ has mostly been used by the 
ECtHR (e.g., 39388/05, Maumousseau and Washington v France (2007), para.75). 
94 E.g., 41615/07, Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (2010), para.146. 
95 Case 497/10 PPU, Barbara Mercredi v Richard Chaffe [2010] ECR I-14358, para.56. 
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fuller assessment of ties or integration, and the second element of the best interests 
test, as to the development of the child in a ‘sound environment’. The sense is that 
habitual environment is not merely alluding to an environment with which one is 
familiar. Its articulation in terms of individual stability rather renders it more a 
matter of individual orientation.96 The allusion is to an environment that is 
inhabited – to a habitual way of being. Christopher Gosden has suggested that 
such habituation – which, on his account, would derive from our socialisation 
within a material setting – is to be distinguished from the realm of consciousness.97 
Whilst “[l]ife is an intermingling of habitual and conscious elements”,98 it is mostly 
habitual actions, he suggests – unconscious actions – that link all our actions 
together and establish a “referential structure...which carries the main burden of 
our lives, giving them shape and direction”.99 Habitual being is, in this way, deemed 
to enable continuity, and this is the case whether we are looking at social forms, as 
Gosden is, or at individual continuity through time.  
The idea in European human rights law that disrupting the habitual 
environment of a child would disturb her development reflects this sense that the 
habitual aspect of our being is doing a lot of work. The existence of the habitual 
mode of being anchors the individual and enables energy to be directed elsewhere. 
In the case of a child, this might immediately be, for example, to school life or 
peers (as in Noam’s case); later on, as parental authority withers, attention might 
be directed towards the role of the child as a member of society.100 The crucial idea 
is that habituation, as a stabilising process that originates in childhood, is a 
precondition for the child’s development; put more generally, the point is that it 
frees up a space for individual development. It grounds ethical potentiality by 
                                                          
96 See e.g., 13178/03, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium (2006), para.51 on the 
dependency of a five-year-old child on its parents, such that “when separated from its parents 
and left to its own devices, it will be totally disoriented”.  
97 C. Gosden, Social Being and Time (1994, Blackwell Publishers), p11. 
98 Ibid., p35. 
99 Ibid., p16. 
100 See the discussion of 29086/12, Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v Switzerland (2017) in part 3.3.3 below. 
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constructing and expressing a notion of our historical being: of “the past’s 
repetition in the present”;101 of how, psychically, we are “historical persons”.102  
3.3.3 From feeling habituated to being situated  
Conceived of in this way, habituation is cast as stabilising the individual and as 
grounding the processes of self-development and self-realisation that reflect 
European human rights law’s vision of individual continuity. But if we dig a little 
deeper in the case law, we find that the construction of this habitual, historical self 
– and the construction of an account of what it means to feel habituated – has also 
entailed a parallel construction of what it means to be habituated – of what it means 
to be situated.103 It is in this context that we find notions of the “roots” of the 
individual,104 of the “degree” of her “integration”,105 and of her “original 
environment”106 being articulated.  
An example of the way in which the ECtHR links habituation to situation 
in this sense is Noack and Others v Germany (2000). This case concerned the proposed 
transfer of the 350 inhabitants of the village of Horno – a third of whom were 
members of the Sorbian minority – to a town twenty kilometres away. The 
objective of the move was to enable the expansion of local lignite-mining 
operations. The inhabitants of the village were strongly opposed to this; and before 
the Court, the fourteen applicants (the majority of whom were members of the 
Sorbian minority) argued that the decisions of the authorities to pursue lignite 
mining in the area and the legal provisions enabling this and providing for their 
transfer breached their right to respect for their private life. In particular, they 
complained that their rights as members of the Sorbian minority had been 
infringed, arguing that “the destruction of the village of Horno would deprive 
                                                          
101 C. Carlisle, On Habit (2014, Routledge), p25. 
102 J. Mitchell, ‘The Law of the Mother: Sibling Trauma and the Brotherhood of War’ (2013) 
Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis 21(1), 145-159, p146. 
103 We have already touched on the way in which the ECtHR has drawn out a notion of situated 
selfhood with respect to the home, which is cast as being a place that grounds and frames a life. 
See Ch.2, part 2.2.1. 
104 E.g., 52502/07, Aune v Norway (2010), para.78. 
105 E.g., 46410/99, Üner v The Netherlands (2006), para.56 et seq. 
106 E.g., the notion of the ‘original criminal environment’ with which an individual in detention is 
to have limited contact: 25498/94, Messina v Italy (No. 2) (2000), para.66. 
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them of the chance to perpetuate their customs and speak their language” and that 
“[t]he dissolution of the original community and the obligation to become 
integrated into a new community would ultimately entail the destruction of Sorbian 
culture”.107 They also alleged “psychological damage, interference with their right 
to carry on their occupations and an infringement of their right to respect for their 
family lives and homes”.108 
 The ECtHR framed the case largely in terms of the “private lives and 
homes of the people concerned”.109 It considered that the essential question was 
one of balancing “the interests of the community” (by which it seemingly meant 
the interest in the economic well-being of the country – the legitimate aim pursued 
by the interference) against “the applicants’ right to respect for their private lives 
and homes, bearing in mind that the vast majority of the applicants are members 
of the Sorbian community of Horno”.110 In this regard, it noted “the seriousness 
of the interference”: that “[q]uite apart from the fact that it is an upheaval for 
anyone to be uprooted from the life to which they are accustomed, transferring a 
village population can have dramatic consequences, especially for the elderly, who 
find it more difficult to adapt to a new environment” – something that was 
exacerbated by the fact that “the persons concerned in the present case were 
members of the Sorbian minority”.111 However, this was treated as being mitigated 
by two factors: that the decision-making process had been a lengthy and inclusive 
one and that the site of the proposed transfer was “within the area where the Sorbs 
originally settled” and had been chosen by the majority of the inhabitants when 
they were “consulted on their choice of destination”.112 Thus “[e]ven though the 
transfer means a move and reorganising life in the resettlement area, the 
inhabitants will continue to live in the same region and the same cultural 
environment, where the protection of the rights of the Sorbs is guaranteed…, 
where their language is taught in the schools and used by the administrative 
                                                          
107 46346/99, Noack and Others v Germany (2000, admissibility decision), para.1. 
108 Ibid., para.1. 
109 Ibid., para.1. 
110 Ibid., para.1. 
111 Ibid., para.1. 
112 Ibid., para.1. 
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authorities, and where they will be able to carry on their customs and in particular 
to attend religious services in the Sorbian language”.113 In addition, “the measures 
regulating the transfer of the inhabitants of Horno are intended to make the 
transfer as painless as possible for the persons concerned”.114 Given these factors, 
the interference here, “though indisputably painful for the inhabitants of Horno”, 
was not disproportionate to the aim pursued in the light of the State’s margin of 
appreciation;115 and the complaint was dismissed. 
 In acknowledging the effect that being uprooted from the village would 
have on the inhabitants, the Court recognised that what was at issue was their 
feeling of habituation – their habitual way of being. At the same time, whereas the 
applicants were claiming that this way of being was bound up in the place of the 
village itself, the Court located it in the community constituted by the inhabitants 
of the village. Their habitual way of being was, accordingly, cast as being situated 
in the culture, rights, language, and customs of their community; and since this was 
deemed separable from the village itself, it would consequently move with the 
community. This focus on what would stay the same for the community enabled 
the Court to reconcile the uprooting of the community from their village with the 
way of life from which the inhabitants felt they were being uprooted.  
If this case points to a dark site of the notion of habituation in European 
human rights law – the possibility for the Court to apply its own interpretation of 
what being habituated means – we see this more starkly still where habituation is 
grounded in a vision of collective life and articulated by reference to a conception 
of socialisation. Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v Switzerland (2017) is an example of this. 
The applicants in this case were practising Muslims, and they argued that the 
requirement that their daughters take part in mixed swimming lessons at school 
was contrary to their religious convictions. They complained, in particular, about 
the authorities’ refusal to exempt the girls from the classes, alleging a violation of 
their right to freedom of religion under Article 9 ECHR. 
                                                          
113 Ibid., para.1. 
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115 Ibid., para.1. 
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The Government argued that the interference with the applicants’ right to 
manifest their religion here – the refusal of the authorities to exempt the applicants’ 
daughters from compulsory mixed swimming lessons – pursued the legitimate 
aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and protecting public order; 
and the ECtHR accepted this. Specifically, the Court considered that the 
interference pursued the objectives of “the integration of foreign children from 
different cultures and religions” and of “protecting foreign pupils from social 
exclusion”.116 It elaborated these notions in its analysis of the necessity of the 
interference, in which it highlighted the role of the school in the process of ‘social 
integration’: a role which took on an even greater significance when it came to 
“children of foreign origin”.117 Compulsory education, it considered, plays an 
important role in a child’s development; and the children’s interest in receiving this 
full education, thereby enabling their “successful social integration according to 
local mores and customs”, consequently prevailed over “the wish of parents to 
have their daughters exempted from mixed swimming classes”.118 The domestic 
authorities had, consequently, not overstepped their margin of appreciation. 
The Court’s emphasis in this case was on a vision of the development of 
the child as a ‘member’ of ‘the community’ – a ‘community’ into which she was 
being ‘integrated’ and a conception of which was, at the same time, being 
constructed. And so while physical education, including swimming lessons, was 
deemed important for a child’s health and development, the interest in this 
education was not limited to the fact of the children learning to swim and to engage 
in physical exercise. Rather, “it resided especially in the fact of practising this 
activity in common with all the other pupils, with no exceptions being drawn based 
on the children’s origin or their parents’ religious or philosophical convictions”.119 
This notion, of value derived from the fact that an activity is engaged in 
simultaneously (in common), reflects the form of the order of incorporation that 
we considered in Chapter 1, where an ethos of stability and a common identity is 
                                                          
116 29086/12, Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v Switzerland (2017), para.64 (all references to this case are my 
translations). 
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generated through such common being.120 Here, what mattered was that the 
children were swimming simultaneously. They were “learning together and 
practising this activity in common”;121 they were sharing time, and engaging, 
consequently, in what was conceived of as being the construction of a form of 
collective life. Synchronisation is, after all, “fundamental to any collective 
order”.122 
Hence also the emphasis placed by the Court on the longer term social 
lessons that the children would derive from this experience of common being. In 
addressing the argument made by the applicants as to the option of their daughters 
having private swimming lessons instead, the Court therefore not only reiterated 
its statement as to the value of the children swimming in common, but it also 
considered that granting an exemption from the lessons to children whose parents 
could pay for private lessons would generate an inequality in relation to children 
whose parents could not afford lessons. In the same context, the Court recalled 
that the authorities had already offered to accommodate the applicants, whose 
daughters could, for example, cover their bodies in the lessons by wearing burkinis. 
The implicit view was that it was important that children should learn the 
importance of being ‘in common’ now, and that they should ingrain this upon their 
sense of habitual being (a process cast in terms of their ‘social integration’), because 
that would secure the continuity of this way of being in the long run. The children 
were, in this way, written into a conception of collective life at the same time as 
this conception was normatively inscribed upon their own mode of habitual being.  
As a condition of individual continuity in European human rights law, 
habituation accordingly emerges as having two functions. On the one hand, it is 
cast as stabilising the individual and as thereby securing the possibility of the 
processes of self-development and self-realisation. On the other hand, it entails a 
normative vision of what it means to be habituated – of what it means to be 
situated – which renders it a mode of pinning down the individual.  
                                                          
120 See Ch.1, esp. parts. 1.3.1 and 1.3.3. 
121 29086/12, Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v Switzerland (2017), para.100. 
122 B. Adam, Time and Social Theory (1990, Polity Press), p108. 
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3.4 Narrativisation  
The notion of habituation that is articulated in European human rights law – a 
notion that involves a feeling of being habituated and a mode of being situated – 
in many ways implies the notion of narrativisation, which is the second condition 
that substantiates European human rights law’s vision of individual continuity. The 
narrative form itself, as a form for understanding, giving meaning to, and 
constructing an account of our lives,123 is already implicit in European human 
rights law’s notion of ethical potentiality, on account of the teleological quality of 
the latter;124 but it also comes to be explicitly engaged as a means through which 
to organise life and to generate self-understanding (3.4.1). It is cast as working to 
produce a feeling of continuity and to enable the management of experiences 
deemed damaging for self-development and self-realisation, such as trauma and 
anxiety (3.4.2). The resulting account, of narrative ‘truth’, carries only a semblance 
of certainty; and this reflects the choices that are made in creating a narrative and 
that therefore underpin and shape the construction of individual continuity (3.4.3). 
3.4.1 The production of narrative  
At the level of our individual lives, we do not usually experience the present as if 
it is the panning out of some preordained narrative.125 We will likely try to “stabilize 
the sense of self” and maintain a sense of continuity by relating past and present 
experiences,126 but the act of living itself is not an act of narration. The act of 
narration, which is an act – an attribution – of meaning,127 comes only 
                                                          
123 On which, see esp. J. Bruner, Acts of Meaning (1990, Harvard University Press). 
124 See e.g., C. Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (1985, Cambridge 
University Press), Ch.2. The connection is drawn out especially in the literature on narrative 
psychology and humanistic psychology (which is focused on nurturing individual potential). See, 
e.g., R. Josselson and A. Lieblich, ‘Narrative Research and Humanism’, in K. J. Schneider, J. F. 
Pierson, and J. F. T. Bugental (eds.), The Handbook of Humanistic Psychology: Theory, Research, and 
Practice (Second Edition) (2015, Sage Publications), 321-334. 
125 I say ‘we do not usually’ because there are exceptions to this. One such exception is the case 
of unconscious fantasies, highlighted by Lear. He points to the example of the judgment that “life 
shall be disappointing”, where this serves as an expectation as to how life is and will be: J. Lear, 
‘Wisdom won from illness: The psychoanalytic grasp of human being’ (2014) The International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis 95(4), 677-693, p685.   
126 W. M. Meissner, Time, Self, and Psychoanalysis (2007, Jason Aronson), p240. 
127 See, esp. Bruner (1990), above n123; D. E. Polkinghorne, Narrative Knowing and the Human 
Sciences (1988, State University of New York Press); J. Bruner, Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life 
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subsequently, as a means of organising and coming to terms with life and its 
unpredictability: a form of “self-understanding” generated through “narrative 
reflection”.128 Hindsight illustrates this well. ‘New’ or realised information can cast 
what we had settled as a narrative in an entirely different light, calling for a revised 
perspective and a new narrative, and perhaps also awakening previously repressed 
knowledge and unsettling our faith in our capacity to interpret (and therefore 
narrate) in the first place. According to Mark Freeman, hindsight thus “[performs] 
a kind of ‘rescue’ function: by taking up what could not, or would not, be seen in 
the immediacy of the moment, it can rescue us from the oblivion that so often 
characterizes the human condition”.129 It enables us to discover and realise things 
about ourselves; and in so doing, it enables us to form an account of ourselves. 
 European human rights law embraces the narrative form in this sense. If 
habituation is conceived of in European human rights law as being fundamental 
to our sense of stability, the capacity to form an account of ourselves is cast as 
being fundamental to our self-understanding; and this capacity is, in turn, located 
in our understanding of our childhood. This connection between an understanding 
of childhood and self-understanding was first expressed by the ECtHR in Gaskin 
v UK (1989). Mr Gaskin had spent most of his childhood in care, following the 
death of his mother when he was a baby. He alleged that he had been ill-treated in 
care, and upon reaching the age of 18 in 1977, he began trying to obtain access to 
confidential information about his care, on the basis that he felt that learning about 
his past would help him to overcome his present difficulties. The authorities 
refused to grant him access to all his case records, and Mr Gaskin complained that 
this breached his Article 8 right to respect for his private and family life. 
                                                          
(2002, Harvard University Press). Cf. Nussbaum’s critique of accounts linking meaning and 
narrative (and thereby overlooking “what rich reservoirs of meaning lie in daily conversations, in 
nonteleological interactions of many types” [p142]): M. C. Nussbaum, ‘Living the Past Forward: 
The Present and Future Value of Backward-Looking Emotions’, in M. C. Nussbaum and S. 
Levmore, Aging Thoughtfully: Conversations about Retirement, Romance, Wrinkles, and Regret (2017, 
Oxford University Press), 125-143.  
128 M. Freeman, Hindsight: The Promise and Peril of Looking Backward (2010, Oxford University Press), 
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129 Ibid., p20. 
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The ECtHR considered, firstly, that the case records contained in the file 
about Mr Gaskin related sufficiently to his private and family life such that the lack 
of access to the file fell within the ambit of Article 8. It agreed with the then-
Commission (which had already considered the case) that the file “no doubt 
contained information concerning highly personal aspects of the applicant’s 
childhood, development and history and thus could constitute his principal source 
of information about his past and formative years”.130 The question was whether 
the UK had breached a positive obligation in its handling of Mr Gaskin’s requests 
for access to his file.  
The ECtHR held that it had. On the one hand, there was the “vital interest” 
of those in Mr Gaskin’s position “in receiving the information necessary to know 
and to understand their childhood and early development”.131 On the other hand, 
there was the confidentiality of public records, which was important “for receiving 
objective and reliable information”, and for ensuring the protection of third 
parties.132 To be compatible with Article 8, the British system, which required the 
consent of the contributor before granting access to the records supplied by that 
contributor, needed to secure the protection of the individual’s interest in the event 
that the contributor “either is not available or improperly refuses consent”.133 This 
was to be enabled by an independent authority which had the final decision on 
access. The absence of such a procedure here meant that there had been a failure 
to secure respect for Mr Gaskin’s private and family life – a failure to protect his 
interest in understanding and knowing his childhood. 
This need that we are envisaged as having to know about and understand 
our childhood134 arises not least because childhood is conceived of in European 
human rights law as supplying the framework of meaning through which life is 
subsequently structured. Childhood experiences are cast as serving as a sort of 
reference point against which later events are interpreted. These experiences are 
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also, of course, interpreted by the ECtHR against the backdrop of its normative 
account of child development,135 so that the account that emerges is also one of 
what development will look like. In cases of childhood trauma, for example, 
European human rights law constructs an account of the child’s experience 
through the lens of adjustment, with the question being of what a child could, in 
theory, adjust to.136 In some cases, the view is that adjustment is not a likely option. 
In Z and Others v UK (2001), for instance, in which it was found that the local 
authority had failed to protect the applicant children from severe abuse and neglect 
at the hands of their parents, the ECtHR considered, in its assessment of damages, 
that the children would “in all probability, suffer from the effects of their 
experiences for the rest of their lives”, even though “[their] capacity to cope with 
this past trauma” would vary.137 Such a mode of analysis, focused on adjustment, 
entails the construction of a vision of what is likely to be traumatic for a child – a 
vision of “child-specific reactions to trauma”.138 Whilst this account originates in 
the more general vision of child development constructed in European human 
rights law, it also becomes a predictive, normative account of how a life will be 
subsequently lived. The idea underpinning the Court’s point in Z and Others was, 
therefore, that the traumatic experiences of the children would to some degree 
shape their future lives and experiences. The narration of the experience of the 
children here thus enabled the construction of a sense of coherence and continuity, 
not only in the sense that the trauma itself was narrated, but also in the sense that 
so too were its continuing effects. 
3.4.2 The work of narrativisation  
Narrativisation emerges in this way as a means through which to organise life and 
to generate self-understanding. It is cast as producing a feeling of continuity; and 
as part of this, it is presented as a means for the management of experiences 
deemed damaging for self-development and self-realisation. We can see this if we 
consider European human rights law’s approach to trauma more closely. Trauma 
                                                          
135 See part 3.3.1 above. 
136 E.g., 18527/02, Tonchev v Bulgaria (2009), para.39; 40031/98, Gnahoré v France (2000), para.60. 
137 29392/95, Z and Others v UK (2001), para.123. 
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is an interesting case in this context, as it is usually taken to resist meaning and 
interpretation entirely.139 This is not least because it is taken to involve a breach in 
the life of an individual of the sort that defies the usual coping mechanisms140 and 
involves a disruption in, or loss of, sense of self.141 There will only be one who is 
in any conceivable position to recount the experience, for “trauma is often 
experienced as specific to oneself; it is something that ‘I’ and ‘I alone’ – rather than 
‘we’ – have endured and continued to endure”.142 And yet at the same time as 
trauma isolates, it erodes and challenges the possibility of recounting the 
experience at all, by (potentially) affecting and altering or overwhelming the 
memory that the exercise of that possibility relies on.143 Thus in Tyagunova v Russia 
(2012), the ECtHR stated that the authorities face particular difficulties in 
investigating sex crimes, in part because “[the] impact of such a trauma may affect 
a victim’s ability to coherently or fully recount her experience”.144  
 If trauma destabilises an individual’s sense of self in this way, and entails, 
as part of that, a disruption to her sense of continuity, how, then, is an account to 
be given by this individual, when she is thought to get lost in the process of 
recounting? In the case of children, we have already seen that European human 
rights law pulls the experience of trauma into a narrative by reference to its more 
general account of child development; and it does so in a way that is not entirely 
separable from its conceptualisation of childhood as structuring subsequent life 
and experience. In the case of adults, European human rights law takes over certain 
accounts and recognises these alone as accounts of traumatic experiences. We see 
this, for example, in cases concerning deportation measures in which it is argued 
before the ECtHR that the enforcement of an expulsion order would involve 
psychological trauma in breach of the ECHR (because, for example, the expulsion 
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would be to a country where the applicant was previously tortured). The ECtHR 
often considers in these cases, however, that no substantiated basis for the fear of 
trauma has been expressed;145 and/or that there are sufficient conditions, 
instructions, and assurances surrounding any enforcement of an order to 
effectively eliminate the question of trauma;146 and/or that there are possibilities 
for rehabilitation, treatment, and care in the country to which the applicant is to 
be returned;147 and/or that the trauma experienced is attributable to the general 
state of uncertainty in which the applicants have found themselves, such that it is 
not really ‘trauma’ at all.148 
This latter argument is illuminating in what it reveals about the conception 
of ‘trauma’ here. The argument typically runs that the main reason for the “mental 
problems” experienced is that the individuals in question have, for a substantial 
period of time (and due to factors for which they are responsible), lived in 
uncertainty as to whether they will be allowed to remain in a particular country, 
and have “during this period, in various respects integrated into [that society]” and 
are now facing removal from it.149 What is recounted by the applicants as a 
traumatic experience is recast in law as being a ‘consequence’ of a general state of 
uncertainty and something that is not ‘really’ ‘trauma’. This sets in play a tension 
between the objective time of law and the lived time of the individual, because the 
former, which has purported to access and recognise the latter, goes back to it and 
states that its experience was not as recounted. 
European human rights law, accordingly, not only articulates objective 
standards (such as of a substantiated basis for fear of anticipated trauma) but it 
also imposes upon trauma a narrative form. Moreover, in the cases in which it says 
that the recounted trauma (which, it adds, is not ‘really’ ‘trauma’) is caused by 
uncertainty, it effectively states that the threatening moment or condition – that 
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which was anticipated and feared – has already happened.150 The scene is 
reconstructed as reflecting a failure in the process of recounting, and the individual 
is told that it is not the case that trauma lies ahead; rather, she has unwittingly 
already passed through what she thought was a traumatic experience – but which, 
in fact, was a ‘state of uncertainty’. The production of narrative becomes, in this 
way, what Jonathan Lear elsewhere describes as an act of defence, because in 
covering over breaches in the temporal experience of an individual – in “[covering] 
over the countless breaks in which life opens up or breaks apart” – the narrative 
defends the individual against these same disruptions and sustains the notion (even 
if not the reality) of self-continuity.151 
We see a similar phenomenon in cases concerning anxiety, which is also 
cast as being potentially disruptive of self-development and self-realisation and yet 
is held back from this in the case law by being presented as being containable by 
narrative. The case law concerning the disappearance of family relatives, discussed 
in Chapter 2, exemplifies this.152 These cases, it will be recalled, involve the 
allegations of relatives that they themselves have been victims of inhuman and 
degrading treatment on account of the indifference and incompetence displayed 
by the authorities in the face of the disappearance of their family members. The 
concern of European human rights law in its response in these instances pertains 
to the continuing void of anxiety into which the relatives have been plunged as to 
the fate of their loved ones. Once they are out of this void, however – once the 
death of their relatives, for example, has been confirmed as a certainty – it is 
different. This is because the anxiety at the core of these cases is conceived of as 
being a matter of anxiety about fate: a matter of not knowing something that can 
be settled by an account of events.153 Anxiety, on this approach, is presented as 
being something that can be contained by narrative; moreover, it is cast as needing 
to be contained by narrative.  
                                                          
150 This is, interestingly, in keeping with Winnicott’s vision of breakdown: D. W. Winnicott, ‘Fear 
of Breakdown’, in G. Kohon (ed.), The British School of Psychoanalysis: The Independent Tradition (1986, 
Free Association Books), 173-182. 
151 J. Lear, Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life (2000, Harvard University Press), p125. 
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Narrativisation is thus conceived of as a means for the management of 
experiences that are deemed damaging to the processes of self-development and 
self-realisation. These processes are conceived of as depending on a sense of 
continuity and a self-understanding that is itself based on this continuity; and this 
sense of continuity can, according to European human rights law, only be 
generated through the construction of narrative – hence the need to manage 
experiences that are deemed disruptive to the sense of self-continuity by pulling 
such experiences within a narrative. Narrativisation is also cast, then, as enabling 
individuals to come to terms with destabilising experiences. This presupposes a 
need to come to terms with such experiences at all;154 and it is on this basis that 
these experiences are treated as being contained (and thereby organised) within the 
terms of European human rights law, with the individual then being brought to 
these terms.   
3.4.3 Narrative ‘truth’155  
The use of the narrative form to construct an account of self-continuity across 
time and to deal with experiences deemed damaging to self-development and self-
realisation presupposes that there is some certainty about the narrative that is being 
offered up. But this brings us to a problem that European human rights law has 
to address, which is that the narrative form itself is unstable. We know this already 
from our earlier discussion of hindsight – an experience which shows that an 
established narrative may be changed in an instant, and that in constructing a new 
narrative, things that had been latent in the original narrative may come to the fore 
in different ways. The narrative form is also unstable in a sense highlighted by 
Martha Nussbaum, who argues that narrativisation destabilises our engagement 
with the present. This is not only because “the minute one undertakes 
retrospective narration, one is to that extent no longer living forward”, but because 
the stripping out of all that is “‘superfluous’, ‘repetitious’, ‘trivial’, and so forth” in 
                                                          
154 See further Ch.5, esp. parts 5.2.3 and 5.3.   
155 The term comes from D. P. Spence, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation 
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order to create “a clear, and possibly single or at least not too complicated, 
narrative arc” does not do justice to the “actual messiness” of life.156  
 Implicit in these points of instability and fragility is a further way in which 
the narrative form is unstable too. This consists in the instability of the assumption 
that the narrative itself rests on: the assumption of the veracity of the narrative at 
all. In the early 1980s, this was raised by Donald Spence in his critique of the 
Freudian narrative tradition in psychoanalysis, whereby, he claimed, 
psychoanalysts had been led to become “searchers after meaning”, looking for 
“coherence and continuity”.157 He argued that there had been a failure to 
distinguish ‘narrative truth’ (with its presentation of a coherent account) and 
‘historical truth’ (what actually happened). By assuming, Spence suggested, that the 
freely-associating patient had “privileged access to the past”, and that the story 
being heard by the analyst is “the same as the story he is telling”, “then it is 
tempting to conclude that we are a hearing a piece of history, an account of the 
‘way things were’”.158 Spence argued that this confused narrative and historical 
truth, and represented a failure to see that “the past is continuously being 
reconstructed in the analytic process”.159  
If the acts of giving or hearing an account of experience intrinsically involve 
a working on its form in this way, then not only is there a construction of a 
narrative – the conferral of coherence and a semblance of continuity on an account 
– but it is also clear that more than one narrative is possible, and that a choice is 
always made as to from where to begin the narrative. On occasion, European 
human rights law has had to specifically address this question of conflicting 
narratives. An example is to be found in the case law concerning the distinction 
that haunted the jurisprudence on gender identity up until the start of the present 
century, which involved a split between individual constitution in law (which 
adhered to a static biological model) and individual constitution in fact (which did 
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not).160 This was at issue, for example, in X, Y, and Z v UK (1997), in which the 
applicants complained of the lack of legal recognition of the father-child 
relationship between X (who had transitioned from female to male) and Z (the 
child, who had been conceived by donor insemination and carried by Y, X’s 
partner). The applicants alleged that this had breached their right to respect for 
their family life; and they argued, in particular, that it might undermine Z’s “sense 
of security within the family”.161 But in the place of the legal recognition that the 
applicants sought, the ECtHR proposed a number of ways in which they could 
circumvent the obstacles and consequences that flowed from the lack of 
recognition. In respect of the absence of X’s name on Z’s birth certificate, for 
example, the Court noted that unless X and Y chose to publicise this, neither Z 
nor a third party would know that this was because X had been born female. This 
rendered them similar “to any other family where, for whatever reason, the person 
who performs the role of the child’s “father” is not registered as such”.162 X could 
still act as Z’s social father, therefore, notwithstanding his lack of legal recognition 
as such.163 
The overarching concern of the ECtHR in this case was of “maintaining a 
coherent system of family law”, and it was particularly concerned that granting the 
legal recognition demanded might not necessarily be to the advantage of children 
in Z’s position “in general”.164 In the light of this uncertainty, the Court preferred 
to protect the stability of its category of ‘the child’ – a category which, under Article 
8, does not oblige States “formally to recognise as the father of a child a person 
who is not the biological father”165 – over the interests of Z and her family in 
having their relationships legally recognised. Its adherence was therefore to 
(original, historical) representation in law, at the same time as it recognised that 
this was at odds with the lived experience of the child, and that the latter experience 
was not legally recognised as such at all. 
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This case, and the splitting of narratives that it represents, points to the way 
in which the narrative form is conceived of as enabling a sense of continuity but 
that the nature of this continuity is specified in a certain way. This is drawn out in 
further detail in the area of paternity challenges in European human rights law, in 
which, in a context in which a child has a right to know about her genetic origins, 
a man who is not registered as the legal father makes a claim to be the genetic 
father. As we saw in Chapter 2, there are examples in the case law in which the 
ECtHR has focused on securing the stability of the ‘existing’ family unit in the face 
of the ‘threat’ of disruption posed by the man claiming to be the legal father.166 I 
said in that earlier discussion that these examples exemplify the ethos of 
replaceability that structures the notion of presentation in European human rights 
law, in that where the ECtHR takes this approach, it emphasises the role of 
‘fathering’, and since this is being presently performed by the social father, he is 
experienced by the man contesting his legal paternity as having replaced him in 
this role.  
But a further point also emerges in these cases: a problematisation of the 
idea of ‘truth’. Claims brought by men who are seeking to contest or establish legal 
paternity are cast in terms of ‘biological truth’,167 which involves an appeal to 
genetic fact; and it is in these terms also that the right of the child to knowledge of 
her origins is also recognised.168 Whilst a debate as to the claim to ‘truth’ in this 
context is certainly to be had (not least because it implicates time, as ‘origins’, in 
its claim), the more pressing point for our purposes is that the narrative of 
biological truth sits alongside another narrative, which presents an account 
conceived of in terms of the ‘social reality’ of the child. This latter involves an 
account of truth as consisting in that which is stable – in that which is habitual – 
and to which disruption is to be minimised. Where the two narratives are at odds 
with one another, the ECtHR makes a choice to favour one over the other; and in 
cases concerning children, the perceived best interests of the child will structure 
                                                          
166 See Ch.2, part 2.3.3. 
167 E.g., 45071/09, Ahrens v Germany (2012), esp. para.71; 23338/09, Kautzor v Germany (2012), esp. 
para.73. 
168 E.g., 53176/99, Mikulić v Croatia (2002), esp. paras.55, 64; 42326/98, Odièvre v France (2003), 
esp. paras.28-29; 30955/12, Mandet v France (2016). 
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this decision. But in the fact of the choice itself, the ECtHR specifies a narrative 
that the individuals in question will have to live with.169 And so if the condition of 
habituation is revealed as being a way of situating the individual, the condition of 
narrativisation is revealed as being a way of shaping the experience of this 
individual. 
3.5 Conclusion  
The notion of individual continuity that is specified in European human rights law 
as structuring its idea of individual identity and constituting its vision of time 
emerges as being comprised of two parts. On the one hand, it is cast as being about 
a sense of continuity and as being driven by the continuous processes of self-
development and self-realisation that are envisaged in European human rights law. 
On the other hand, the conditions of habituation and narrativisation that are set 
out as substantiating the notion of continuity are revealed as being normative 
notions that problematise the idea that what we are talking about in relation to 
these is a ‘sense of feeling habituated’ and a ‘sense of continuity’ at all. If being in 
European human rights law is about becoming, then – as the discussion of vital 
potentiality and ethical potentiality in the first section of this chapter showed that 
it is – the conditions of habituation and narrativisation that are used to specify 
what this becoming consists in show that what is in question here is a particular way 
of becoming across time. 
 The sense underpinning the account set out in this chapter is that the 
double function that the idea of individual continuity performs in European 
human rights law is enabled by a vision of the human condition in which we are 
assumed to have a need to assume our self-continuity across time. This assumption 
is reflected in the notions of vital potentiality and ethical potentiality (in which we 
are cast as needing to have a point of beginning and as needing to continually 
negotiate the questions of self-development and self-realisation), as also in the 
conditions of habituation and narrativisation that substantiate this notion of 
individual continuity (and in which we are cast as needing to have a feeling of 
                                                          
169 A striking example is 16112/15, Fröhlich v Germany (2018), discussed in Ch.5, part 5.3.3. 
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stability and a sense of continuity and self-understanding). Ostensibly, the idea of 
self-continuity works in this respect as a form of security in the face of the 
uncertainty that pervades the notions of self-development and self-realisation, 
insofar as it is conceived of as enabling the individual to see herself in the future. 
But, as we have seen in this chapter, the step from the construction of a vision of 
the individual with a need to assume her continuity to the construction of a form 
of continuity to which the individual is subject is not a wide one in European 
human rights law. It is a step from conceiving of time as belonging to the individual 
to conceiving of the individual as belonging to time. And this, of course, is 
explicable by the constitution of European human rights law as a lived order of 
individuation: as an order in which the time of the individual is the time of the 
order – in which the continuity of the individual secures the continuity of the order. 
Thus if Chapter 2 showed us how the individual develops an identity in this order, 
this chapter has shown us how this identity is conceived of as having a continuity 
– a continuity that is constructed on the basis of a vision of the human condition 




– CHAPTER 4 – 
Body 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 3, I argued that time is conceived of in European human rights law in 
terms of individual continuity. More specifically, I suggested that an idea of 
individual continuity structures European human rights law’s notion of individual 
identity and that it reflects a vision of the human condition in which we are 
assumed to have a need to assume our self-continuity across time. This chapter 
argues that this assumption is bound up in the way in which European human 
rights law conceives of us as having a need to be recognised by others – a need 
which is concretised in European human rights law’s vision of the body. 
 The vision of the body that is articulated in this respect hinges, I suggest, 
on two ideas: the idea that our fundamental assumptions about the world and 
about our place in the world are bound up in our sense of our body; and the idea 
that the right to respect for bodily integrity (which is the fundamental 
underpinning of relations between living bodies in European human rights law) is 
about recognition, so that respect for the bodily integrity of another is a matter of 
recognition of that other (4.2). The theory of recognition that emerges from this 
is a theory of mutual dependence between self and other – a theory in which we 
are conceived of as being dependent on the other to see and be seen. The need for 
recognition is cast as exposing us to our vulnerabilities and insecurities, which are 
managed and confronted with and through the other (4.3). But the need for 
recognition is also conceived of as being essential to the sustenance of the self, 
such that in the face of the loss of specific others, the focus is on renegotiating 





4.2 The need for recognition  
In Chapter 3, we saw how an assumption is made in European human rights law 
about our need to assume our self-continuity; and in this section I argue that this 
need is conceived of as being bound up in our sense of our body (4.2.1) and, in 
particular, in a need to be recognised by others (4.2.2). The notion of recognition 
that is articulated in this respect entails two demands: a demand that we recognise 
the abstract position and the role of the other and a demand that we recognise the 
other as such (4.2.3). A vision of our need for the other – and of the mutual 
dependence between self and other – is accordingly articulated in European human 
rights law; and the body is revealed to be at the basis of this vision of our 
relationality and our most fundamental assumptions. 
4.2.1 Bodily integrity 
We know, from Chapter 3, that an assumption is made in European human rights 
law that we have a need to assume our self-continuity; but so far, the basis of this 
assumption (the assumption that we are conceived of as making) is unclear. In the 
following pages, I will suggest that the body is conceived of as supplying this basis, 
which is to say that our bodies are envisaged as being the basis from which we 
make assumptions about the world. This is what the term ‘bodily integrity’ appears 
to capture in European human rights law. 
 The right to ‘bodily integrity’ (or ‘physical integrity’) – and, more 
specifically, respect for this right – is the most fundamental underpinning of 
relations between living bodies in European human rights law; and it runs 
throughout a number of ECHR rights. Thus the protection of an individual’s 
physical integrity is “one of the main purposes” of Article 3 (the right to freedom 
from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment);1 it is safeguarded 
by the rights to liberty and security under Article 5;2 and physical integrity itself 
may fall within the realm of the Article 8 right to respect for one’s private life3 
                                                          
1 5856/72, Tyrer v UK (1978), para.33. 
2 E.g., 38822/97, Shishkov v Bulgaria (2003), para.85.  
3 E.g., 20972/92, Raninen v Finland (1997), para.63. 
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(“since a person’s body is the most intimate aspect of private life”4). In the cases 
in which it is invoked in these ways, the right to physical integrity is primarily 
presented as a negative right to freedom from interference; and ‘physical integrity’ 
itself appears to denote a form of freedom. In Tyrer v UK (1978), for example, 
which was one of the earliest cases in which the term was used, and in which the 
ECtHR found that the judicial corporal punishment of a fifteen-year old by way 
of birching at a local police station violated his right to freedom from degrading 
punishment, the Court described the way in which Anthony Tyrer’s punishment – 
which “constituted an assault on...[his] dignity and physical integrity” – consisted 
in his being “treated as an object in the power of the authorities”.5 In being 
birched, and in the presence of two other policemen, his father, and a doctor, 
Anthony Tyrer had been deeply humiliated. He had suffered an interference with 
his sense of self and with his freedom;6 he had been objectified, and his body had 
been used against him by the authorities. 
The right to respect for one’s physical integrity alludes, in this way, to the 
notion of the inviolability of the body. This inviolability means, for example, that 
the protection of an individual’s bodily integrity under Article 3 cannot be limited 
by reason of the requirements of a criminal investigation or in the name of the 
fight against crime;7 and at a more general level it means that “any interference 
with a person’s physical integrity must be prescribed by law and requires the 
consent of that person”.8 The centrality of consent to the idea of bodily integrity 
also underpins the principle of informed consent in the medical sphere. This is a 
principle within which the rights to consent and to information are intertwined; 
and it is conceived of as appealing to notions of freedom and individuality, such 
that the sense emerges that bodily integrity is not only about the right to control 
and to use one’s body but that the concept of ‘integrity’ itself is also alluding to 
something akin to the essence of what it means to be a particular person.9  
                                                          
4 45872/06, Yuriy Volkov v Ukraine (2013), para.84. 
5 5856/72, Tyrer v UK (1978), para.33. 
6 On which see further Ch.2, part 2.2.2(i). 
7 E.g., 28847/08, Gladovic v Croatia (2011), para.47. 
8 24209/94, Y.F. v Turkey (2003), para.43. 
9 See, e.g., 18968/07, V.C. v Slovakia (2011), para.112. 
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‘Bodily integrity’, as it is conceived of in European human rights law, is 
about more than the boundaries of the body, then – supposing that it is even 
possible to delineate these.10 Jonathan Herring and Jesse Wall, writing on the right 
to bodily integrity in English law and on the way in which its development there 
has been influenced by the ECtHR jurisprudence, accordingly propose an 
understanding of this right as “[giving] a person exclusive use of, and control over, 
their body on the basis that the body is the site, location, or focal point of their 
subjectivity”.11  And yet, even then, if this explanation gets us close to a vision of 
the body as being what grounds our sense of place in the world, the 
conceptualisation of bodily integrity that is presented in European human rights 
law appears to carry this vision even further. 
The idea that emerges in the ECHR jurisprudence seems to be more that 
the body is the basis from which we make assumptions about the world; it is cast 
as being the basis from which our “assumptive worlds” – “the assumptions or 
beliefs that ground, secure, or orient people, that give a sense of reality, meaning, 
or purpose to life” – are created.12 It is this sense that appears to be captured in 
the term ‘bodily integrity’. Breaches of our bodily integrity – by way of degradation 
and humiliation at the hands of the authorities,13 for example, or by being denied 
information necessary to make a free and informed decision about medical 
intervention14 – destroy our assumptions about the world and about how we are 
situated in the world. For, as Drucilla Cornell suggests, we imagine our bodily 
selves to be in a particular way;15 and we envisage possibilities that are contingent 
on these bodies. And so when, for example, the ECtHR says that the sterilisation 
of a woman without her informed consent is a profound violation of her physical 
                                                          
10 On which difficulty, see J. Nedelsky, ‘Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self’ (1990) 
Representations 30, 162-189; J. Herring and J. Wall, ‘The Nature and Significance of the Right to 
Bodily Integrity’ (2017) Cambridge Law Journal 76(3), 566-588, p586-587; J. Herring and P.-L. Chau, 
‘My Body, Your Body, Our Bodies’ (2007) Medical Law Review 15(1), 34-61, p45-49. 
11 Herring and Wall (2017), above n10, p580. 
12 J. Kauffman, ‘Introduction’, in J. Kauffman (ed.), Loss of the Assumptive World: A Theory of 
Traumatic Loss (2002, Routledge, New York), 1-9, p1. The use of the term ‘assumptive worlds’ in 
this context originates in C. Murray Parkes, ‘Psycho-social transitions: A field for study’ (1971) 
Social Science and Medicine 5(2), 101-115. See further the Introduction, n54. 
13 E.g., 54810/00, Jalloh v Germany (2006). 
14 E.g., 8759/05, Csoma v Romania (2013). See also 81272/12, Ioniţă v Romania (2017), paras.84-86. 
15 D. Cornell, The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography and Sexual Harassment (1995, Routledge). 
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integrity, and one which strips her of her “reproductive capability”,16 it is also 
recognising that the ‘assumptive world’ of that woman – as to what was possible, 
and as to what is now possible – has been shattered. Hence also the Court’s 
recognition of the important role played by our physical environments in this 
regard,17 and its acknowledgement that risks generated by, for example, 
uncontrolled packs of stray dogs that are left free to roam the streets,18 or 
operations that cause environmental damage and pollution,19 may be destabilising. 
The implication that is reflected in such cases is that it is in a sense of bodily 
integrity that a conception of individual security and stability (and therefore self-
continuity) begins. In other words, our assumptions about the world originate in 
this point. 
4.2.2 Recognition 
The most fundamental assumption that we make, according to European human 
rights law, is that we will be recognised by others. This assumption is conceived of 
as being inseparable from the assumption of self-continuity; and we can see this if 
we go back and think about the contexts in which ‘bodily integrity’ is invoked in 
the case law. It appears primarily in terms of threats to20 and assaults upon21 
integrity; and the breach is cast as being experienced by the individual in question 
as being a lack of recognition: an indifference to her situation, and a failure to 
properly recognise her on these terms. This was what underpinned the complaint 
of the applicant in Konovalova v Russia (2014), for example. In that case, Ms 
Konovalova complained that she had been made to give birth in front of medical 
students, in violation of her Article 8 right to respect for her private life. She 
claimed before the ECtHR that she had only learned of the possible presence of 
the students when she was nearly unconscious and unable to move hospital, and 
that she had not given written consent to their actual presence at the birth of her 
                                                          
16 18968/07, V.C. v Slovakia (2011), para.116. See also 29518/10, N.B. v Slovakia (2012). 
17 See, e.g., 22743/07, Otgon v The Republic of Moldova (2016), paras.15-17. 
18 E.g., 9718/03, Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v Romania (2011). 
19 E.g., 46117/99, Taşkin and Others v Turkey (2004); 48939/99, Öneryildiz v Turkey (2004). 
20 E.g., 57693/10, Kalucza v Hungary (2012), para.59. 
21 E.g., 46423/06, Beganović v Croatia (2009), para.67. 
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child. Her objection was to the unauthorised witnessing of her labour; she felt – 
as she put it in earlier proceedings – that “the demonstration of her labour, which 
had been carried out without her consent, had caused her physical and 
psychological suffering and violated her rights”.22 
The ECtHR considered that there had undoubtedly been an interference 
with Ms Konovalova’s private life right, on account of the fact that the medical 
students had “witnessed” the delivery and “thus had access to the confidential 
medical information concerning [her] condition”.23 It focused on the way in which 
the legal provision which enabled medical students to participate in medical 
treatments did not contain safeguards capable of protecting the private lives of 
patients – something which, it said, had only been exacerbated by the approach of 
the hospital and the domestic courts. The information that had been provided to 
Ms Konovalova prior to the birth had been vague in its reference to the possibility 
of the involvement of students; moreover, Ms Konovalova had only learned that 
students would be present the day before, “between two sessions of drug-induced 
sleep, when she had already been for some time in a state of extreme stress and 
fatigue on account of her prolonged contractions”.24 At the time of this 
notification it was not possible to tell whether Ms Konovalova was given a choice 
about the participation of students or whether “in the circumstances, she was at 
all capable of making an intelligible informed decision”.25 The Court concluded 
that there had been a violation of Ms Konovalova’s Article 8 rights, because the 
presence of the medical students at the birth had not complied with the 
requirement of lawfulness. The sense conveyed in the reasoning of the Court in 
reaching this conclusion was that the hospital had failed to properly recognise Ms 
Konovalova’s position (and, in particular, her vulnerability during labour); and this 
lack of recognition had constituted a form of maltreatment. 
Axel Honneth, who has elsewhere similarly noted that the categories that 
we use to express a sense of “moral maltreatment” are often ones which are 
                                                          
22 37873/04, Konovalova v Russia (2014), para.24. 
23 Ibid., para.41. 
24 Ibid., para.47. 
25 Ibid., para.47. 
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“related to forms of disrespect, to the denial of recognition”, suggests that this in 
itself invokes the sense that “we owe our integrity, in a subliminal way, to the 
receipt of approval or recognition from other persons”.26 The experience of 
disrespect means that “the person is deprived of that form of recognition that is 
expressed in unconditional respect for autonomous control over his own body, a 
form of respect acquired just through experiencing emotional attachment in the 
socialization process”.27 Mistreatment of another in this way is, accordingly, 
mistreatment of that other’s sense of self. 
Within the terms of European human rights law, the denial of recognition 
need not be deliberate in this regard. In Ms Konovalova’s case, for example, the 
lack of recognition derived primarily from the carelessness and thoughtlessness of 
the hospital that handled her labour. This point – that there does not need to be 
any evidence of intention to find a denial of recognition – was illustrated more 
clearly still in Price v UK (2001). Ms Price was four-limb deficient and also suffered 
from kidney problems. She had been committed to prison for contempt of court, 
following her refusal to answer questions about her financial situation during civil 
proceedings. The sentencing judge ordered that she be detained for seven days but 
took no steps to see whether there were facilities available which could 
accommodate the level of her disability. Ms Price was subsequently detained in 
inappropriate conditions, in which she was “dangerously cold, [risked] developing 
sores because her bed [was] too hard or unreachable, and [was] unable to go to the 
toilet or keep clean without the greatest of difficulty”.28 The Court concluded that 
there was no evidence of “any positive intention to humiliate or debase” Ms Price, 
but considered that the fact of her detention in such conditions, and with such 
consequences for her, constituted degrading treatment in violation of Article 3.29 
In a Separate Opinion, Judge Greve developed this reasoning further. She 
argued that the “compensatory measures” that are secured for a person with 
                                                          
26 A. Honneth, ‘Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the 
Theory of Recognition’ (1992) Political Theory 20(2), 187-201, p188-189. 
27 Ibid., p190. 
28 33394/96, Price v UK (2001), para.30. 
29 Ibid., para.30. 
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disabilities in a “civilised country” “come to form part of the disabled person’s 
physical integrity”.30 Consequently, any obstacle set up in the path of a person’s 
access to these measures (as, in this case, the impediment to Ms Price taking with 
her to prison the battery charger required for her wheelchair) constitutes a 
violation of that person’s physical integrity. All that was required in Ms Price’s case 
was, Judge Greve argued, “a minimum of ordinary human empathy”31 – a basic 
understanding and recognition of Ms Price’s position. Instead, there had been a 
failure to see her situation and to treat her accordingly – a failure, in other words, 
of recognition.  
4.2.3 Seeing the other 
Respect for the bodily integrity of another is accordingly cast as being about the 
recognition of that other. But what, according to European human rights law, do 
we see when we recognise the other? Judge Greve’s suggestion in Price v UK was 
that recognition is about empathy, so that we exercise our imagination to try to 
envisage and understand the experience of the other. Martha Nussbaum has 
elsewhere argued that we need a stronger mode of relating to others in these terms 
too, in the context of her broader analysis of the fears and prejudices that she 
identifies as structuring many contemporary European and American responses to 
religion (such as the burqa and niqab bans now common in a number of Council 
of Europe states32). She suggests that whereas fear is a narcissistic emotion, 
involving the focus of an individual “on her own safety, and (perhaps) that of a 
small circle of loved ones”, in empathy, by contrast, “the mind moves outward, 
occupying many different positions outside the self”.33 When we use our 
“participatory imagination” to see the situation of the other, we are transported 
beyond the limits of our selves and are led to think about the lives of others.34 
                                                          
30 Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Greve. 
31 Ibid. 
32 See part 4.3 below. 
33 M. C. Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an Anxious Age 
(2012, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), p146. 
34 Ibid., p143-144. 
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But in European human rights law, the dominant idea of what it means to 
see the other is narrower and more specified than this. The demand is, firstly, that 
we see the abstract position and the role of the other – that we see the implications 
that automatically flow from the position of being a detainee,35 for example, or of 
being a patient in hospital.36 Whereas the empathetic imagination described by 
Nussbaum demands an imagination of the life of a person that extends beyond the 
confines of any category, the recognition of position articulated in European 
human rights law is more limited in quality. We can see this most clearly if we turn 
to consider cases concerning the family and the protection of the position of 
children within the family, whereupon we immediately encounter prohibitions that 
are based largely on the position of these children and are articulated in accordance 
with a particular conception of the family.37 
An example is to be found in the case law concerning incest, which is cast 
as compromising family structure. In Stübing v Germany (2012), for instance, which 
concerned a consensual sexual relationship between adult biological siblings (who 
had been brought up separately) and the consequent conviction of Mr Stübing for 
incest, the focus of the German courts and then the ECtHR was largely on the 
effect of this relationship on the family structure and on the four children born to 
the couple. The German Constitutional Court had concluded that criminal liability 
was justified by a number of objectives, including “the protection of the family, 
self-determination and public health, set against the background of a common 
conviction that incest should be subject to criminal liability”.38 In particular, it 
expressed concerns about the damaging effects that sexual relationships between 
siblings might pose to family structures (and, consequently, to “society as a whole”) 
and to “sexual self-determination”.39 The ECtHR, in acknowledging these “[not] 
unreasonable” aims,40 noted, moreover, the findings of the Leipzig District Court 
as to the vulnerability of Mr Stübing’s sister. She was sixteen when she began the 
                                                          
35 E.g., 77248/12, Dimcho Dimov v Bulgaria (No. 2) (2017), paras.58-62. 
36  E.g., 8759/05, Csoma v Romania (2013), para.44. 
37 On which see more generally Ch.2, part 2.3. 
38 43547/08, Stübing v Germany (2012), para.63. 
39 Ibid., para.63. 
40 Ibid., para.65. 
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sexual relationship with Mr Stübing (who was then aged 23), and the District Court 
had concluded that she was “only partially liable for her actions”, as she “suffered 
from a serious personality disorder which, together with an unsatisfying family 
situation and mild learning difficulties, led to her being considerably dependent on 
the applicant”.41 The ECtHR considered that in the light of these circumstances, 
Mr Stübing’s conviction – which interfered with his sexual life (“he was forbidden 
to have sexual intercourse with the mother of his four children”42) – met a pressing 
social need, and that the German courts had been within their margin of 
appreciation in convicting him of incest. There had, therefore, been no violation 
of Article 8. 
Underlying the reasoning of the German courts and the ECtHR in this case 
was a focus on the protection of family structure and on the undue dependency of 
Mr Stübing’s sister, who was cast as having been “led” to her (over-) dependence 
on her brother by her circumstances, which included, not least, her “unsatisfying 
family situation”.43 The siblings had not, the courts considered, been able to form 
a ‘proper’ lateral sibling relationship; and implicitly, the sense was that this 
structural inequality might be handed down to their children now too (as a 
consequence of their exposure to their parents’ relationship), or that it might 
disrupt family integrity more generally. Similar concerns about family boundaries 
and about the exposure of children to particular relationships – for example, to a 
relationship between a father-in-law and his daughter-in-law44 – have been 
articulated elsewhere too, with the ECtHR being concerned in such cases to secure 
recognition of the differentiation of roles within its conception of ‘the family’.45 
The idea that recognition is about seeing the position of the other in this 
way generates a narrower account, then, than that which is envisaged by 
Nussbaum’s notion of empathy, which demands an imagination that transcends 
categories. But the account of the position of the other – of the roles by reference 
                                                          
41 Ibid., para.64. 
42 Ibid., para.55. 
43 Ibid., para.64. 
44 E.g., 36536/02, B. and L. v UK (2005), paras.36-37. 
45 On which see more generally Ch.2, part 2.3.2(i). 
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to which the individual is presented – is not the only account of recognition that 
is set out in European human rights law. For if we think back to cases like Price v 
UK, we see that there is also a demand that we see the other as such. This is a 
thinner demand than that of the feeling of empathy called for by Judge Greve in 
Price v UK. Whereas empathy entails a capacity to imagine the experience of the 
other (something which requires a capacity to position oneself in the place of the 
other), the demand to see the other as such is simply one of acknowledging that 
the other is different and has her own needs. This latter form of recognition carries 
with it a subtle undertone, too; for if recognition is about seeing the other, then 
the process of recognition is also a process of individuation.46 This is because, as 
Jessica Benjamin puts it, in the moment that we recognise the other, that other 
recognises us too.47 This mutuality of recognition means that we are profoundly 
dependent on each other to see and be seen; and this, according to Benjamin, is 
what underpins the paradox at the heart of recognition: “the self is trying to 
establish himself as an absolute, an independent entity, yet he must recognize the 
other as like himself in order to be recognized by him”.48 We can see, then, that a 
conception of recognition that is based not only on position but also on being 
itself necessarily entails a form of self-reflection. The possibility emerges – and as 
an intrinsic part of European human rights law’s vision of our need for the other 
– that we are seeing something of our own self when we see the other.  
4.3 Living with the other  
The need for the other that is portrayed in European human rights law and 
originates in its conception of bodily integrity gives rise to a dependence on the 
other to see and be seen as a person. In this section, I examine how this 
dependence deepens into an account in which individual insecurities and 
vulnerabilities are managed and confronted with and through the body of the 
other. In particular, I consider the nature of the ethos of ‘living together’ that is 
                                                          
46 See further D. Cornell, At the Heart of Freedom: Feminism, Sex, and Equality (1998, Princeton 
University Press), p62-63. 
47 J. Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination (1988, 
Pantheon Books), esp. Ch.1. 
48 Ibid., p32. 
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considered to bind the self to the other in the public sphere (4.3.1). I suggest that 
the way in which this ethos has been articulated reveals much about the structure 
of the relationship between the self and the other and about what it is of ourselves 
that we see when we see the other (4.3.2); and I argue that the idea that emerges 
from the case law is that we gain exposure to our own vulnerability through the 
other (4.3.3). 
4.3.1 Living together 
The relation of mutual dependence that obtains between the self and the other in 
European human rights law culminates in the articulation of an ethos of ‘living 
together’, which is about the management of this dependence in the public sphere. 
This has been constructed in cases involving the outward appearance of the 
other;49 and it has been primarily established in cases concerning challenges 
brought by Muslim women against the French and Belgian prohibitions on 
covering the face in public – prohibitions which evidently affect the freedom of 
Muslim women to wear a full-face veil in public.50 The leading case in this regard 
is S.A.S. v France (2014), the reasoning of which was subsequently applied in 
Belcacemi and Oussar v Belgium (2017) and Dakir v Belgium (2017).51 In S.A.S. v France, 
the Grand Chamber accepted the argument of the French Government that the 
prohibition on covering the face in public pursued, in the name of the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others, “respect for the minimum requirements of 
life in society”.52 It noted that it was aimed at a conception of “living together” in 
which it was necessary and significant to see the face of the other in social 
                                                          
49 Cf. the more general point in European human rights law that appearance is a matter of personal 
identity and is about the expression of personality: 49304/09, Biržietis v Lithuania (2016), para.58. 
Matters are more complex when it comes to religion, however; see, e.g., 44774/98, Leyla Şahín v 
Turkey (2005), para.114-116, on how the secular nature of an institution can purportedly be 
affected by the religious clothing of an individual (on which see Ch.2, part 2.3.2(ii)). 
50 Such prohibitions have been introduced in several CoE States in recent years (and have been 
debated in many more States). See further E. Brems (ed.), The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in 
Europe and the Law (2014, Cambridge University Press). 
51 37798/13, Belcacemi and Oussar v Belgium (2017); 4619/12, Dakir v Belgium (2017). For further 
discussion of these cases see S. Trotter, ‘“Living Together”, “Learning Together”, and 
“Swimming Together”: Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v Switzerland (2017) and the Construction of 
Collective Life’ (2018) Human Rights Law Review 18(1), 157-169. 
52 43835/11, S.A.S. v France (2014), para.121. 
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interaction;53 and it reasoned on the basis of this assumption about the significance 
of the visibility of the face in socialisation.  
This idea, of the special significance of the face, goes back a long way in 
European thought. The face has been variously theorised as symbolising 
individuality (symbolising the self, or reflecting the soul, for example54) and as 
being at the basis of ethical relationships of responsibility.55 Indeed in Bouyid v 
Belgium (2015), the Grand Chamber drew these strands of thought together, noting, 
in the course of its response to the two applicants (who alleged that they had been 
slapped on their faces by police officers whilst in a police station), the 
“considerable impact” of a slap to the face, insofar as such an act “affects the part 
of the person’s body which expresses his individuality, manifests his social identity, 
and constitutes the centre of his senses...which are used for communication with 
others”.56 What is significant about these lines of thought in the context of S.A.S. 
v France, however, is that neither supplies an argument for compelling the exposure 
of the face. Such compulsion would, in fact, be antithetical to the deeper normative 
orientation of both the argument from individuality and the argument from 
relationality, which leaves as outstanding the question of the use of this form of 
compulsion in the name of social interaction.  
The sense that there is something more complex at issue in these cases is 
found in the Court’s focus in S.A.S. v France (and, subsequently, in Belcacemi and 
Oussar v Belgium and Dakir v Belgium) on the way in which the covered face was 
interpreted by others. The ECtHR considered that it could “understand the view 
that individuals who are present in places open to all may not wish to see practices 
or attitudes developing there which would fundamentally call into question the 
                                                          
53 Ibid., paras 81-85. 
54 E.g., G. Simmel, ‘The Aesthetic Significance of the Face’ (1901) (transl. L. Ferguson), in K. H. 
Wolff (ed.), Georg Simmel, 1858-1918, A Collection of Essays, with Translations and a Bibliography (1959, 
The Ohio State University Press), 276-281, p277-278; G. Simmel, ‘Sociology of the Senses’ (1908), 
in R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess (eds.), Introduction to the Science of Sociology (1921, The University of 
Chicago Press), 356-360, p359-360. 
55 E.g., E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (transl. A. Lingis) (1991 [1961], 
Duquesne University Press), p194-219. 
56 23380/09, Bouyid v Belgium (2015), para.104. See further Ch.2, part 2.2.2(i). 
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possibility of open interpersonal relationships”.57 It could also “accept that the 
barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is perceived by the 
respondent State as breaching the right of others to live in a space of socialisation 
which makes living together easier”.58 Both of these statements concerned the 
interpretation of the veil made by others. It was they who considered that it might 
call into question the possibility of a particular type of relationship; it was they who 
interpreted it as a barrier. And if the very fact of these interpretations at all reveals 
the fragility of a mode of socialisation which, it seemingly transpires, is founded 
entirely upon this form of appearance, it also brings to light something else. This 
is that what is in issue here is the projection of meaning onto bodies – in this 
instance, by individuals onto the covered faces of others. The question is essentially 
one of the willingness of individuals – who feel destabilised by the appearance, in 
public space, of a covered face – to conduct interpersonal relationships which do 
not stem from their own terms of appearance. The construction of the veiled face 
of another as a ‘barrier’ reflects an unwillingness – a hostility, an insecurity – which 
is then projected onto, and subsequently cast as deriving from, that other; and this 
finds a channel of expression in European human rights law in the ECtHR’s 
acceptance of the experiences of the projecting individual in terms of ‘the rights 
and freedoms of others’. The latter occurs because the projecting individual, in 
receiving back the meaning that she projected onto these bodies, makes herself a 
victim whose own rights and freedoms are now at stake. She is, in other words, a 
victim of her own self. Thus projection is not only cast as being a mode of relating 
between living bodies, but its alienating effects are also legitimated.  
4.3.2 Seeing the self 
This same process can be seen in Gough v UK (2014), which also concerned the 
ethical significance of the exposure of the body. Mr Gough held a belief in “the 
inoffensiveness of the human body” and “social nudity”.59 He expressed this by 
being naked in public, and he bore the nickname ‘the naked rambler’ as a result of 
                                                          
57 43835/11, S.A.S. v France (2014), para.122. 
58 Ibid., para.122. 
59 49327/11, Gough v UK (2014), para.6. 
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his decision to walk naked from Land’s End in England to John O’Groats in 
Scotland. He was repeatedly arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned for 
his public nudity, and he complained before the ECtHR that this had violated 
several of his Convention rights, including his Article 10 right to freedom of 
expression. 
The ECtHR accepted that Mr Gough’s public nudity constituted a form of 
‘expression’ within the meaning of Article 10, on the ground that it was a 
manifestation of his conception of life. It also accepted the argument of the UK 
Government that the measures taken against Mr Gough – namely his arrest, 
prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment – were aimed at preventing crime and 
disorder. The Government had not specified the nature of this potential disorder 
and crime, and the Court instead elaborated this itself, setting up a framing of the 
naked body as provocative and threatening that would structure its subsequent 
reasoning. The measures taken against Mr Gough were, it said, “designed to 
prevent the applicant’s committing breach of the peace through causing offence 
to and alarming other members of the public by confronting them with his naked 
state in public”; and the aims pursued were those of “seeking to ensure respect for 
the law in general” by preventing the potential crime and disorder that could have 
resulted had Mr Gough been allowed to “continually and persistently flout the law 
with impunity because of his own personal, albeit sincerely held, opinion on 
nudity”.60  
The Court’s focus was, in this way, on how others would react to Mr 
Gough’s naked body, and on the duty that he was under “to demonstrate tolerance 
of and sensibility to the views of other members of the public”, bearing in mind 
the “behaviour that they might consider offensive”.61 The framing was one of 
potential alarm and distress, potential offence, and potential crime and disorder; 
and it meant that Mr Gough’s manifestation of his conception of life and belief in 
social nudity had to be compliant with this infinite range of uncertainties, 
insecurities, and anxieties. The way in which he expressed himself was interpreted 
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as constituting a repeated ‘imposition’ of “antisocial conduct” upon “unwilling” 
and “unwarned” innocent others;62 and the basis of the regulation of his naked 
body was, therefore, the alarm and insecurity of these others. In other words, the 
issue was with the reaction that his naked body induced in others – with the 
interpretation that was projected onto his body by these others; with what his 
naked body became under the gaze of these others.63 And so just as in the ‘living 
together’ cases, the regulation here was based on unease and anxiety. 
If we draw these cases on the ethical significance of the exposure of the 
body together, we could say that they are about symbolic action upon the body. 
The focus, we could say, is on the appearance of the body, and on a conception of 
‘public order’ that the body is taken to need to signify. This reading would, perhaps, 
be unsurprising; after all, as Mary Douglas puts it, the physical and social bodies 
are always in interaction: “[t]he social body constrains the way the physical body is 
perceived”.64 But there is surely something more at stake here than the regulation 
of the appearance of this body. The reasoning unravelled in the pages above reveals 
a deepening of law’s vision of the basic dependence of the self on the other; what 
appears to emerge is the use of the other to preserve fundamental assumptions 
about the self. This is because in the course of projection, “subject is turned into 
object and object into subject”;65 problems of the self are perceived as being 
problems pertaining to the other. The nature of mutual recognition, as we have 
seen it so far, means that the act of recognising the other involves the 
presupposition that it is possible for the self to be seen by that other. In the 
manipulation of the failure to recognise the other into a perception of failure on 
the part of that other (which is the nature of projection), there is a preservation of 
the basic assumption that it is possible for the self to be seen at all.  
The preservation of this basic assumption in this way is, in fact, a function 
of defence mechanisms like projection according to George Vaillant, who has 
                                                          
62 Ibid., para.176. 
63 On this intersubjective, ‘gaze’-based quality of nakedness, see R. Barcan, Nudity: A Cultural 
Anatomy (2004, Berg), p23. 
64 M. Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (1970, Barrie & Rockliff: The Cresset 
Press), p65. 
65 G. E. Vaillant, The Wisdom of the Ego (1993, Harvard University Press), p46. 
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elsewhere described how the deployment of such mechanisms reflects the 
“remarkable capacity” of the ego for “life-preserving distortion”.66 He suggests 
that they serve an adaptive function, and that in contexts of change and disruption 
they enable our most basic assumptions (which are otherwise under threat) to be 
preserved whilst the more gradual process of adapting these assumptions takes 
place.67 In the cases considered above, the form that this takes is that of the 
projection of insecurity onto the other, such that the interpretation that the self 
makes is of a sense of having been unsettled by the other. This projection serves, 
in such cases, to preserve two fundamental assumptions: an assumption of the 
insecurity of the self (now experienced as having its source in the other) and an 
assumption that the self can be seen at all (just not by this other, who cannot be 
seen, and therefore cannot see). The act of resisting the other is also, then, an act 
of expressing a profound need for that other. The dependence between self and 
other further deepens, therefore. 
4.3.3 Vulnerability  
In the interpretation that is made of the self as having been unsettled by the other, 
the body of the other becomes something onto which insecurities are projected. It 
becomes a reflection of these insecurities. But as Emmanuelle Bribosia and Isabelle 
Rorive point out, in the context of the face veil bans, there is a question to be 
asked here about how to reconcile this sort of regulation, based on public 
insecurity, with the vision of freedom of expression articulated in Vajnai v Hungary 
(2008).68 There, in the context of its examination of whether Mr Vajnai’s 
conviction for wearing the symbol of the international workers’ movement in 
public had violated his right to freedom of expression, the ECtHR emphasised 
that although, in the context of Hungary’s history, the display of the red star “may 
create uneasiness among past victims and their relatives”, “such sentiments, 
                                                          
66 Ibid., p9. 
67 On which in European human rights law see further Ch.5. 
68 E. Bribosia and I. Rorive, ‘Insider Perspectives and the Human Rights Debate on Face Veil 
Bans’, in E. Brems (ed.), The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in Europe and the Law (2014, Cambridge 
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however understandable, cannot alone set the limits of freedom of expression”.69 
In particular, “[g]iven the well-known assurances which the Republic of Hungary 
provided legally, morally and materially to the victims of communism, such 
emotions cannot be regarded as rational fears”.70 And finally: “a legal system which 
applies restrictions on human rights in order to satisfy the dictates of public feeling 
– real or imaginary – cannot be regarded as meeting the pressing social needs in a 
democratic society, since that society must remain reasonable in its judgement”.71 
Although the arguments about public insecurity were not quite as explicit 
in the face veil ban cases and in the public nudity case as they were in Vajnai v 
Hungary, they still supplied a subtle undertone to the submissions of the 
Governments and the reasoning of the Court; and the question remains, therefore, 
of how to reconcile the competing conceptions of freedom of expression that 
emerge from these cases. The distinguishing feature appears to be the notion of 
“rational fears”: the concerns raised in Vajnai v Hungary were explicitly cast by the 
Court as not being rational.72 Supposing, then, that there is, at some level, 
something about the fears and insecurities expressed in the cases concerning the 
ethical significance of the exposure of the body that is being deemed ‘rational’, we 
need to consider what that is. We already know that the capacity of the appearance 
of another to unsettle us is cast as being grounded in our own capacity to project 
meaning. In this regard, bodily appearance, as a form of expression, is in many 
ways more challenging than, for example, speech, because it more clearly leaves as 
open a range of possible interpretations – a range that is only limited by the 
imagination of the one interpreting the expression. If, then, we are unsettled by 
the appearance of a naked body in the street, this may be because that body is 
reflecting the insecurities that we have projected onto it. In this way, the body of 
the other can reveal back to us our own insecurities; and, as we have already seen, 
it is this insecurity that is the part of the self that is seen when we see the other in 
this way according to European human rights law.  
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70 Ibid., para.57. 
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 If this element of the vision of mutual recognition in European human 
rights law is profoundly self-centric in quality, its nature – of a notion of unsettling 
– also indicates something more. For inherent within the feeling of being unsettled 
is also a sense of a loss of control; and here, the unsettled, projecting individual 
has been made into a victim by herself, and of herself. The sense is that in her 
quest to retain control (and therefore a sense of continuity), she has realised her 
essential vulnerability to loss. Here, the vulnerability is to loss of control; but there 
is also a semblance of a loss of sense of self reflected in the process of the 
projection of underlying insecurities onto the other. In this way, the suggestion of 
European human rights law here seems to be that this element of mutual 
recognition – this element which is about seeing something of our own self – is 
about seeing our insecurities and our vulnerabilities. Conceived of like this, the 
underlying idea in the cases considered above comes to be that it is through the 
other that we see and confront our own vulnerability. This, in turn, implies a 
fundamental dependence on the other to gain exposure to this vulnerability. The 
sense implicit in the case law is that there is something rational about a fear of this 
vulnerability. And yet, at the same time, there is a paradox at play here, which 
means that this vulnerability is kept at a distance and observed through the other. 
The paradox is that we need, according to European human rights law, to be able 
to see our vulnerability – our vulnerability that we fear. 
4.4 Loss of the other  
The account that emerges is one in which we are cast as being dependent on the 
other to be recognised at all and to confront and manage our insecurities and 
vulnerabilities. As part of this, we gain exposure to our vulnerability to loss. The 
vulnerability that we have discussed thus far is vulnerability to loss pertaining to 
individual insecurities. But there is also the question of our vulnerability to the loss 
of the other, which is necessarily a significant part of a vision of mutual recognition 
which posits the other as being so fundamental to the constitution of the self. In 
this section, I examine the way in which this vulnerability to loss is envisaged in 
European human rights law, focusing on the loss of specific others to death. In 
cases of specific others – objects of attachment – the form of our recognition by 
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the other is deemed particularly significant to our sense of self. This has its origins 
in European human rights law’s conceptualisation of individual presence, which, 
as we saw in Chapter 2, is partly about the way in which close others are imagined 
to figure in our sense of place.73 Our loss of such an other is, within European 
human rights law’s vision, the ultimate expression of our vulnerability, consisting 
in a physical loss and in a loss of recognition. I suggest that grief in this context is 
consequently expressed in two needs: a need for certainty and control over the 
dead body in question (4.4.1) and a need for a representation of the lost object 
(4.4.2). Once these two needs have been met, then, European human rights law 
suggests, the work of mourning can begin. This consists in the incorporation, by 
the surviving individual, of the representation of the lost object, such that loss is 
conceived of as necessitating a renegotiation of the original form of recognition 
and a reconstitution, therefore, of its effects (4.4.3). 
4.4.1 Lost objects of attachment   
Grief at the loss of a loved one is conceived of in European human rights law as 
being expressed, in the first place, in terms of a sustained need, on the part of 
surviving relatives, for the dead body of their lost object of attachment. In 
particular, this need is for certainty and control over what will happen to the dead 
body – certainty that the organs of a child will not be removed without parental 
consent, for instance,74 or that tissue will not be removed from the body of one’s 
spouse without consent.75 This latter issue arose in Elberte v Latvia (2015), in which 
Ms Elberte complained that the removal of tissue from her late husband without 
her consent or knowledge and the fact that he had been buried with his legs bound 
had violated her Convention rights.  
The ECtHR found that not only had there been a violation of Ms Elberte’s 
Article 8 right (since the interference with her right, as the closest relative, “to 
express consent or refusal in relation to tissue removal” was not in accordance 
                                                          
73 See Ch.2, part 2.2. 
74 E.g., 4605/05, Petrova v Latvia (2014). 
75 E.g., 61243/08, Elberte v Lativa (2015). 
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with the law),76 but that the level of Ms Elberte’s suffering here had amounted to 
degrading treatment in violation of Article 3. She had only learned about the 
removal of tissue from her husband two years after his funeral, and she had 
subsequently endured years of “uncertainty, anguish and distress in not knowing 
what organs or tissue had been removed...and in what manner and for what 
purpose this had been done”.77 On top of the uncertainty that she had experienced 
as to what had happened, she had also then suffered knowing of the “intrusive 
nature of the acts carried out on her deceased husband’s body”.78 A subtle 
connection was therefore articulated between Ms Elberte’s own rights in relation 
to the fate of the body of her deceased husband and the more general notion of 
respect for the human body after death.79 
This connection hinges on the recognition of the dead body as an object of 
attachment in its own right. This also arose in Marić v Croatia (2014), in which the 
ECtHR found that Mr Marić’s right to respect for his private and family life had 
been violated on account of the fact that the hospital in question had disposed of 
the remains of his full-term stillborn child as clinical waste, leaving Mr Marić and 
his wife in great distress and without any knowledge of where their child had been 
buried.80 The basis of the violation here was that the interference with Mr Marić’s 
rights had not been in accordance with the law; but in finding that there had been 
an interference in the first place, the Court also implied that the hospital had 
handled the case with insufficient sensitivity, especially in the light of the fact that 
“[i]n an area as personal and delicate as the management of the death of a close 
relative...a particularly high degree of diligence and prudence must be exercised”.81 
Whereas for the couple, the baby had a social identity as their child, this went 
unrecognised in the hospital’s classification of the baby’s body as ‘waste’. The 
situation of Mr Marić and his wife had been exacerbated by the fact that they had 
been left without any knowledge as to where their baby had been buried; and this 
                                                          
76 Ibid., para.140. 
77 Ibid., para.139. 
78 Ibid., para.142. 
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situation was worsened further still when it came to light that their baby’s body 
had been cremated along with clinical waste. Not only, therefore, had their child’s 
not been recognised as such a body, but they had been left without a material focus 
for their grief. 
That the dead body of a relative – or knowledge of its location and place in 
the world – can constitute such a material focus further underlies cases concerning 
participation in funeral arrangements82 and the return of bodies to families; and in 
relation to the latter line of case law, the ECtHR has, for example, given short 
shrift to delay between a post-mortem and the eventual return of a body to the 
family.83 In Girard v France (2011), the Court stated that the applicants had a right 
to bury their daughter, which was protected by their Article 8 right to respect for 
their private and family life;84 and it considered that the four-month gap between 
the authorities’ decision to return the samples taken from the exhumed body of 
the applicants’ daughter and the actual return of the samples constituted an 
unjustifiable delay and one which violated the Article 8 rights of the applicants, 
who were awaiting the samples in order to conduct a final burial ceremony.  
The issue in relation to the dead body of a close relative is not only, 
therefore, that of having some semblance of control over the body, but also of 
continuing ties to the relative. This was expressed by the ECtHR in Abdulayeva v 
Russia (2014), in which the applicant complained that the refusal of the authorities 
to return her son’s body to her – on the basis of a legal provision which prevented 
the authorities from returning the bodies of terrorists who had died “as a result of 
the interception of a terrorist act”85 – breached a number of her Convention rights, 
including her right to respect for her private and family life. The Court emphasised 
the detrimental effect of the measure on Ms Abdulayeva, who had been “deprived 
of an opportunity, otherwise guaranteed to the close relatives of any deceased 
person in Russia, to organise and take part in the burial of the body of her son and 
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also to ascertain the location of the gravesite and to visit it subsequently”.86 This 
was “particularly severe”, it considered, since not only did it not “result from her 
own action, inaction or fault of any kind”, but it effectively involved “permanently 
cutting the links between the applicant and the location of the remains of the 
deceased”.87 And so although the objectives of public safety, the prevention of 
disorder, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others could justify 
some limitations on Ms Abudlayeva’s rights in respect of the funeral arrangements, 
these objectives were not a “viable justification” for denying her “any participation 
in the relevant funeral ceremonies or at least some kind of opportunity for paying 
her last respects to her son”.88 The Court considered that the authorities had failed 
to consider the possibility of an alternative, and less detrimental approach; rather, 
the measure here had had “a purely punitive and arbitrary effect on the applicant, 
by switching the burden of unfavourable consequences in respect of the deceased 
person’s activities from him onto the applicant”.89 There had, consequently, been 
a violation of Article 8. 
Knowledge of the location of a loved one’s burial site is, in this way, 
deemed important for surviving relatives. It operates as an anchor and a point of 
focus for them, and it thereby comes to represent a form of continuity in the 
relationship in question. This means that the dead body is not only envisaged as 
being an object of attachment in itself but as also being a continuing object of 
attachment. And so in the articulation of the grief that underpins the expression 
of the significance of the dead body and of continuing ties to this body from the 
perspective of relatives, there is also the beginnings of a subtler expression – of 
the continuing social presence of this body – which derives here exclusively from 
the fact that this body is thought of and related to. The body of the loved one 
continues to play, in this way, a vital role in the continuing assumptive frameworks 
of surviving individuals.  
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4.4.2 Representation  
The need of the bereaved for the form of social presence that we are describing 
here has elsewhere been cast by Vamik Volkan in terms of a turn towards 
representation. He suggests that “[t]he physical loss (or even a threat of physical 
loss) [of a person or thing] turns the adult mourner’s attention to the object 
representation of what was lost”.90 In European human rights law, the notion of 
the continuing social presence of the dead body of a relative implies this idea of 
representation, for the body is not only presented as being an object of attachment 
in itself, but as being a representation of the person who was and the whole “form 
of life” that went with her being.91 But European human rights law also goes 
further than this, in that it implies that there is a need to stabilise an account of the 
deceased and to represent this by way of a narrative of the life that was lived. This 
narrative representation of the lost object is conceived of as being in the interests 
of the surviving relatives, in that it is a representation that they can appeal to. 
An example is Elli Poluhas Dödsbo v Sweden (2006), in which Mrs Poluha – 
whose application to the ECtHR was pursued through her five children following 
her death in February 2003 – complained that the refusal of the domestic 
authorities to allow her to transfer the urn containing her husband’s ashes from a 
family grave in Fagersta (where the family had lived) to her family burial plot in 
Stockholm violated her Article 8 rights. Mrs Poluha herself intended to be buried 
in the Stockholm plot (and she was in fact subsequently buried there in 2003), and 
she argued that not only did she no longer have any connection to Fagersta, as she 
had moved to Västerås to be closer to her children, but that her children had agreed 
to the transfer and that she was sure that her husband would not have objected to 
it. The authorities refused the request, however, on the ground of the notion of “a 
peaceful rest” under the domestic Funeral Act.92 Before the ECtHR, the Swedish 
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Government further argued that the interference with Mrs Poluha’s Article 8 rights 
pursued the principle of respect for the deceased (which gave rise to the principle 
of “the sanctity of graves”), and that it therefore had as its objective the legitimate 
aims of the prevention of disorder, the protection of morals, and the protection of 
the rights of others.93  
The Court framed the case as calling for a balance between “the individual’s 
interest in having a burial transfer” and “society’s role in ensuring the sanctity of 
graves”, in the course of which exercise a wide margin of appreciation was to be 
granted to the State.94 It considered that whilst, on the one hand, the transfer of 
the urn would be straightforward and would not entail any public health 
considerations, there were, on the other hand, “no indications that the applicant’s 
husband was not buried in accordance with his wishes”.95 The Court assumed, 
rather, that his wishes must have been taken into account when he was first buried 
– a time when he had no connection to Stockholm. He was buried in Fagersta, “in 
the town where he had lived for twenty-five years, since his arrival in Sweden, and 
where he had worked and raised his family”.96 Moreover, Mrs Poluha was not 
precluded from being buried in the same plot; and the Court noted to this end that 
she had continued to live there for seventeen years following her husband’s death. 
It concluded that the domestic authorities had struck a careful balance between 
the interests at stake, and that Mrs Poluha’s Article 8 rights had not been violated. 
The Court, in this way, accorded significant weight to the presumed 
placebound ties of Mrs Poluha’s deceased husband to Fagersta. It assumed that he 
would have wanted to stay there, even as his widow moved to a different town; it 
assumed that since the couple’s life together had been in Fagersta, that is where he 
would have wanted to stay. The Court’s reasoning thus presupposed that Mrs 
Poluha’s husband had actually expressed a wish to be buried in Fagersta – when, 
in fact, the evidence was that he had not expressed any wishes at all as to his burial97 
                                                          
93 Ibid., para.20. 
94 Ibid., para.25. 
95 Ibid., para.26. 
96 Ibid., para.26. 
97 Ibid., para.13. 
190 
 
– and it also disclosed a lack of attention to the original framing of the case. For 
although it initially presented the matter in terms of Mrs Poluha’s interest in having 
the urn transferred as against society’s interest in protecting the sanctity of graves, 
its subsequent reasoning departed from this. Rather, Mrs Poluha’s desire to 
transfer the urn was pitted against the presumed desire of her late husband; and 
the impression conveyed was that she was not acting in accordance with his wishes 
or interests. The Court, meanwhile, articulated what it took to be the wishes of 
Mrs Poluha’s dead husband.98  
At the same time, however, we can see in this same reasoning the Court 
setting out a representation of the couple’s life as having taken its complete form 
in Fagersta. Fagersta, it suggested, was the representation of the common life of 
the couple; and it was there that the remains of Mrs Poluha’s husband were to stay, 
in that ending. One way of reading this reasoning would be to say that it was 
oriented towards establishing Fagersta – the place, and the narrative of the couple 
associated with it – as being a representation, for Mrs Poluha, of her lost object. 
This reading is consistent with the vision set out in the slightly later case of Jäggi v 
Switzerland (2006), in which Mr Jäggi, who was sixty-seven years old, complained 
that the refusal of the domestic courts to allow him to have a DNA test on the 
remains of A.H., his putative biological father (but who had always denied 
paternity of Mr Jäggi and had refused to undergo paternity tests), violated his right 
to respect for his private life. At issue in this case was, therefore, on the one hand 
Mr Jäggi’s right to “establish his paternity” (as an important element of his “right 
to an identity”, and, therefore, of his private life99) and, on the other hand, “the 
right of third parties to the inviolability of the deceased’s body, the right to respect 
for the dead, and the public interest in preserving legal certainty”.100  
The Court considered that A.H.’s family had not presented “any religious 
or philosophical grounds for opposing the taking of a DNA sample” – a measure 
                                                          
98 For a similar example of this claimed capacity to speak, see also 46470/11, Parrillo v Italy (2015), 
para.196 (discussed in Ch.3, part 3.2.1). 
99 58757/00, Jäggi v Switzerland (2006), para.37. 
100 Ibid., para.39. 
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which, it added, was “relatively unintrusive”.101 The only reason that A.H.’s 
remains had not been moved up until now was that Mr Jäggi had renewed the lease 
on his tomb up until 2016: “[o]therwise, the peace enjoyed by the deceased and 
the inviolability of his mortal remains would already have been disturbed at that 
time”, as it would be in 2016.102 And so, the Court considered, “[t]he right to rest 
in peace therefore enjoys only temporary protection”.103 By contrast, Mr Jäggi’s 
interest was an “overriding one”, and, the Court concluded, his right to respect for 
his private life had been violated by the Swiss authorities.104 Implicit in the Court’s 
reasoning here was the sense that the disruption that a DNA test would impose 
on the deceased would be minimal by comparison with the lifelong disruption that 
Mr Jäggi had experienced to his personal identity.  
Thus whereas in Elli Poluhas Dödsbo v Sweden, the Court considered that the 
account of Mrs Poluha’s late husband’s life had been settled and that the place of 
Fagersta, and the narrative of the life of the couple that was associated with it, was 
itself a representation of the lost object, in Jäggi v Switzerland, the account of A.H.’s 
life had not been settled and continued to affect the “truth” of Mr Jäggi’s personal 
identity.105 In particular, in the face of his insecurity and lack of knowledge about 
whether A.H. was his biological father, Mr Jäggi had been incapable of forming a 
representation of his biological father – for him, the perpetually lost object – or, 
indeed, a proper representation of A.H., who was now also a lost object. 
The importance of settling an account about the deceased in this way – an 
account which supplies a representation of the lost object for surviving relatives – 
also emerges in the line of cases concerning the disappearance of family members 
that we considered in Chapters 2 and 3.106 These cases typically concern the 
anguish caused to relatives by uncertainty as to the fate of their loved ones; and 
the focus of European human rights law here is on the need of the relatives for 
certainty and for an account which explains what has happened. And so alongside 
                                                          
101 Ibid., para.41. 
102 Ibid., para.41. 
103 Ibid., para.41. 
104 Ibid., para.44. 
105 Ibid., para.38. On which notion, see further Ch.3, part 3.4.3. 
106 See Ch.2, part 2.2.2(iii) and Ch.3, part 3.4.2.  
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the procedural obligation under Article 2 to investigate unlawful or suspicious 
deaths there is, in the case of a disappearance, an obligation to account for this 
too.107 This means that “the procedural obligation will, potentially, persist as long 
as the fate of the person is unaccounted for”, and this is even if the point is reached 
where the death of the person in question may be presumed.108 Thus even in the 
absence of knowledge as to the location of the dead body, it must be possible, 
European human rights law says, to account for how the body arrived in that 
position. An account as to this must be settled so that relatives can come to terms 
with what has happened. The focus, in other words, is on settling an account about 
the person and creating a representation of this person by way of a narrative about 
the life that was lived. 
4.4.3 The renegotiation of recognition  
The account of loss depicted in European human rights law involves, therefore, 
the expression of grief in two needs: a need for the material body of the deceased 
and a need for a representation of the lost object. Only then, law suggests, can the 
work of mourning begin. Mourning itself is presented as involving a shift in the 
mode of relating to the representation of the lost object, and one that involves the 
incorporation of this representation.  
This occurs, in the first place, because the nature of a narrative 
representation (as the representation of a lost object in European human rights 
law) is one which is presented as enabling a continuation of a narrative about the 
person after their death. This continuation occurs in the minds of those who seek, 
for example, to account for the death of a relative, or to understand or discover 
things about the life of that relative. It is not just the case, therefore, that the body 
itself continues to exert an influence upon relatives after death – though this 
influence, as we have seen, is a significant one, as expressed both in the possible 
desire for control over the dead body of a relative and for certainty and security as 
to its fate and in the notion that respect for the dead body of a close relative is 
                                                          
107 E.g., 16064/90 et al., Varnava and Others v Turkey (2009), para.145. 
108 Ibid., para.148. 
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closely bound up in one’s own rights. Rather, there is also the continuing social 
presence of the individual, as this is expressed in the narrative representation of 
that individual’s life. This is a presence which goes beyond the materiality of that 
individual’s body and rather invokes the idea that “the dead – particularly those in 
living memory – remain in communion with the living”.109 It secures the 
continuation of the lost object and prevents it from ever being fully “given up”,110 
and it has largely as its object the ontological security – the sense of self and 
stability – of the surviving relative.111 A narrative about the deceased is accordingly 
worked into the narratives of the surviving relatives. It is incorporated into their 
own accounts of their lives. 
This form of incorporation is conceived of in European human rights law 
as serving to overcome the failure in recognition that inevitably occurs when a 
specific other, as an object of attachment, is dead. For if recognition by a specific 
other is fundamental to an individual’s sense of self, then in the face of that other 
being dead, there is a need to derive from somewhere – from within, even, 
European human rights law suggests – the condition that would have been drawn 
from that other, in order to be able to persist at all. The suggestion seems to be 
that by incorporating a representation of the lost object, the individual secures this 
for herself. In the Freudian tradition of psychoanalytical thought,112 this moment 
of incorporation would typically be deemed the moment of the potential 
acceptance of the loss; thus, as Jonathan Lear puts it, Freud’s suggestion is that 
“we come to accept the loss of a person in the external world by re-creating that 
person imaginatively in our internal world”.113 The account put forward by 
European human rights law does not go so far as to specify incorporation in terms 
of acceptance, however. Rather, incorporation is conceived of as securing a form 
of lost recognition, with the underlying assumption being that the way in which 
                                                          
109 56760/00, Akpinar and Altun v Turkey (2007), Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fura-
Sandström, para.7, drawing on 30 BVerfGe 173, Mephisto (1971, German Constitutional Court). 
110 S. Akhtar, Matters of Life and Death: Psychoanalytic Reflections (2011, Karnac Books), p106. 
111 Ibid., esp. p155-159. 
112 See S. Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917) in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: On the History of Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology 
and Other Works – Vol XIV (transl. under J. Strachey) (2001, Vintage), 243-258. 
113 Lear (2017), above n91, p98. 
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the representation of a lost object is related to in death constitutes a continuation 
of the way in which the object was related to in life. The death of a loved one is 
accordingly envisaged as entailing a renegotiation of recognition. 
This incorporation of a representation of the object enables the possibility 
of the reorientation of the individual in the face of her loss. The representation is 
used, in this way; and this is not least because incorporation here involves 
managing the loss of the object itself (the death of the person) and the threat that 
this loss poses to the ontological security of the surviving relative.114 Managing 
these threats by way of incorporating a narrative representation of the object serves 
a vital function in European human rights law. It brings surviving relatives to the 
point and possibility of reorientation. 
The account set out in European human rights law here is also, therefore, 
one in which mourning is conceived of as bringing individuals through to the 
possibility of reorientation in the face of loss. In this, the account of mourning is 
also profoundly revealing of the structure of recognition in European human rights 
law. It reveals the way in which the fragile, yet fundamental, constitution of mutual 
recognition – which is also a source of the self, in European human rights law – is 
reconstituted and sustained in the face of loss.  
4.5 Conclusion  
European human rights law conceives of our fundamental assumptions about the 
world and about our place in the world as being bound up in our sense of our body 
– and, in particular, in our sense of bodily integrity; and the right to bodily integrity 
is conceived of as being about recognition, so that respect for the bodily integrity 
of another is a matter of recognition of that other. The theory of recognition that 
emerges on this basis is, as we have seen, a theory of mutual recognition, in which 
we are conceived of as being dependent on the other to see and be seen. This 
dependence means two things: that we confront and manage our vulnerabilities 
                                                          
114 For a parallel account, albeit one of object-usage as opposed to representation-usage, see D. 
W. Winnicott, ‘The Use of an Object and Relating Through Identifications’ (1968), in Playing and 
Reality (2005 [1971], Routledge), 115-127. 
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and insecurities with and through the other; and that recognition by specific others 
is part of our sense of self, such that in the face of the loss of that recognition, 
there is a need to reconstitute its effects. Thus the theory of recognition articulated 
in European human rights law on the basis of its vision of the body emerges as 
being a theory of the sustenance of the self – a theory in which the need for 
recognition is conceived of as reflecting and implying a need to sustain continuity 
and in which our fundamental assumptions to this effect are conceived of as 
originating in our sense of our bodily self.
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In Chapter 4, we saw how European human rights law conceives of our sense of 
our body as being the basis from which we make fundamental assumptions about 
the world and about our place in the world, and how a need for recognition is cast 
as being bound up in these assumptions. This chapter examines how an interaction 
is envisaged between our fundamental assumptions and our experiences. I argue 
that a normative account of the management of reality is elaborated in European 
human rights law, and that this account forefronts a particular manner of 
integrating experience, understanding, and knowledge that constitutes European 
human rights law’s conception of wisdom.  
At the basis of this account of the management of reality is, I suggest, a 
conception of us as having two needs: a need to preserve our fundamental 
assumptions, the object of which is the preservation of our sense of identity, and 
a need to integrate experiences into our frameworks of assumptions, including 
those experiences that are at odds with our fundamental assumptions (5.2). The 
process of the integration of experience that is articulated on this basis has three 
stages: a stage of understanding the experience in question; a stage of ascribing 
meaning to it; and a stage of tolerating it and thereby living with it (5.3). The 
resulting account is one of a normative standard against which our understanding 
and behaviour is evaluated in European human rights law. But it is also an account 
that presupposes a vision of what it means to be capable of integrating experience 
in the first place. More specifically, it presupposes an individual who is capable of 
accepting responsibility, overcoming emotion, and withstanding influence (5.4). I 
argue that these capacities are conceived of as developing over time into a certain 
outlook on life towards which the individual is oriented. This supplies a moral 
orientation to the notion of individual continuity specified in Chapter 3. But it also 
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implies that this notion of individual continuity has to accommodate a sense of 
detachment, and this is because the mode of addressing reality that is specified 
here envisages an individual who is capable of detaching herself from reality.  
5.2 The question of reality  
We have already seen, and particularly in Chapter 4, that European human rights 
law envisages us as having a tendency to strive to preserve our fundamental 
assumptions about the world and about our place in the world. This section 
examines this tendency and its implications more closely. I suggest that our 
fundamental assumptions are cast as shaping and underpinning our sense of 
identity, such that the tendency to strive to preserve our frameworks of 
assumptions has as its object the preservation of our sense of identity (5.2.1). The 
question that then arises is the question of reality, and, more specifically, of reality 
that is at odds with our fundamental assumptions (5.2.2). I argue that the 
suggestion made in European human rights law is that to manage reality, we need 
to integrate experiences into our assumptive frameworks; and this means that we 
may also need to adapt our assumptions to the reality that we are faced with (5.2.3). 
5.2.1 Assumptions and identity  
Our fundamental assumptions about the world and about our place in the world 
are conceived of in European human rights law as being bound up in our sense of 
identity: they are cast as being bound up in the way in which we think of ourselves 
and articulate ourselves.1 This is not only in the sense that European human rights 
law assumes us to make certain assumptions about our self-continuity and our 
identifiability and recognisability (as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). It is also in the 
sense that our fundamental assumptions are themselves presented as securing 
these same qualities. This is reflected in the idea that we come to learn about 
ourselves and about what really matters to us as we learn about which of our 
fundamental assumptions are non-negotiable and which are more malleable and 
subject to being nuanced over the course of our lives. Our non-negotiable 
                                                          
1 On this notion of identity see further Ch.2, part 2.4.3. 
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assumptions are those without which our lives would not make sense to us. They 
are of the sort that generate, for example, the concern that many people express, 
according to the ECtHR in its case law on assisted dying, “that they should not be 
forced to linger on in old age or in states of advanced physical or mental 
decrepitude which conflict with strongly held ideas of self and personal identity”.2 
Non-negotiable assumptions are fundamental to an individual’s sense of 
ownership of her life. They pertain to her way of conceiving of the meaning of her 
life.  
 Our more malleable or developmental assumptions are those assumptions 
that are deemed essential to our development and to stages of this development, 
but will, over the course of our lives, be adapted and nuanced. These include the 
assumptions that children are cast as needing to make about parental authority, 
such as about the location of their security and safety in a parental figure.3 This 
arose in Popov v France (2012), which concerned the administrative detention of a 
couple and their young children in unsuitable conditions. One of the contributing 
factors to the ECtHR’s finding that there had been a breach of Article 3 of the 
ECHR in relation to the children was that the situation “created anxiety, 
psychological disturbance and degradation of the parental image in the eyes of the 
children”.4 Implicit in the Court’s reasoning in this respect was the idea that the 
children needed to be able to hold on to an image of their parents as protectors. 
The detention of the family in an insecure and stressful environment, which had 
been “ill-adapted to the presence of children” and in which the parents were 
themselves distressed and powerless, was not conducive to this.5 Rather, it would 
have harmed the fundamental assumptions that the children made and relied on 
about the location of their safety and security in their parents: assumptions that 
were predicated on an internal image of their parents and that were bound up in 
their own sense of self. 
                                                          
2 2346/02, Pretty v UK (2002), para.65.  
3 See further Ch.3, part 3.3.  
4 39472/07 and 39474/07, Popov v France (2012), para.101. 
5 Ibid., para.95 et seq. 
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 Ultimately, such developmental assumptions will, by definition, change 
over time. But they will only do so if they are enabled to be held in the first place; 
thus, as we saw in Chapter 3, an understanding of one’s childhood is cast in the 
case law as being necessary for self-understanding;6 and in Chapter 2 we saw how 
although European human rights law conceives of the senses of place and 
orientation as working together, the former is somewhat prior to the latter insofar 
as it is necessary to have some sense of place in order to be able to orient oneself 
at all.7 The point about our fundamental assumptions is that our sense of identity 
is cast as being developed in relation to our developmental assumptions8 and as 
being shaped and underpinned by the non-negotiable assumptions that we come 
to form over time. We know from Chapters 2, 3, and 4 that we are conceived of 
as having, furthermore, a tendency to strive to preserve our assumptions – 
assumptions about who we are and who we are taken to be (Chapter 2), about our 
self-continuity (Chapter 3), and about our capacity to be recognised (Chapter 4). 
What we see when we consider the way in which our assumptions and our identity 
are cast as being bound up in each other is that the notion that we have a tendency 
to strive to preserve our fundamental assumptions is, at the same time, a notion 
that we have a tendency to strive to preserve our sense of identity.9 
5.2.2 Assumptions and reality  
The question that then arises is the question of reality. This is a question, in 
particular, of what happens when a tension arises between our assumptions and 
reality – of what happens when the individual comes up against a reality that is at 
odds with her fundamental assumptions. As we saw in Chapter 4, George Vaillant 
has argued that in contexts in which “we cannot bear conflict or when change in 
our lives happens faster than we can accommodate it”,10 defence mechanisms 
enable coping and adaptation. They do so, he suggests, by temporarily 
                                                          
6 Ch.3, part 3.4.1. 
7 Ch.2, part 2.2.1. 
8 This is made especially clear by European human rights law’s vision of child development and 
of the assumptions that children need to make. See further Ch.3, parts 3.3 and 3.4.1. 
9 On which see further Ch.2, part 2.4.3. 
10 G. E. Vaillant, The Wisdom of the Ego (1993, Harvard University Press), p108. 
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“clouding…reality through thoughts, feelings, and behaviours”;11 and the idea is 
that this then protects the individual and buys her time to adapt to the reality. In 
European human rights law, the sense is that the act of striving to preserve 
fundamental assumptions in the face of a contrary reality can be similarly used to 
defend against reality. This was articulated clearly in Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and 
Others v Russia (2010). The case concerned the dissolution of the religious 
community of Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow by the Russian courts – a 
dissolution which, the ECtHR found, had breached the fundamental rights of the 
community and its members, including their rights to freedom of religion, 
association, and expression. The ECtHR ruled that the domestic courts had not 
adduced “relevant and sufficient” reasons in support of the grounds that they had 
relied on for dissolving the community (these grounds being that “the applicant 
community forced families to break up, that it infringed the rights and freedoms 
of its members or third parties, that it incited its followers to commit suicide or 
refuse medical care, that it impinged on the rights of non-Witness parents or their 
children, or that it encouraged members to refuse to fulfil any duties established 
by law”).12 In particular, when it came to the claims that had been raised by relatives 
of the members of the community about the effect of the community on their 
family members, the ECtHR considered that the domestic courts had not 
sufficiently considered the way in which these claims had been clouded by the 
feelings and frustrations of the relatives themselves.  
As to the charge that the community had forced the break-up of the families 
of its members, and the blame that families had levelled on the community for 
deterioration in their relationships with their relatives, therefore, the ECtHR’s view 
was that much of this blame stemmed from “the frustration that non-Witness 
family members experienced as a consequence of disagreements over the manner 
in which their Witness relatives decided to organise their lives in accordance with 
the religious precepts, and their increasing isolation resulting from having been left 
outside the life of the community to which their Witness relatives adhered”.13 
                                                          
11 Ibid., p11. 
12 302/02, Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and Others v Russia (2010), para 160.  
13 Ibid., para.111. 
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Quite often, it stated, the “source of the conflict” and the estrangement that was 
caused by the unhappiness of family members about the “self-dedication to 
religious matters” of their relatives had its origins in “the resistance and 
unwillingness of non-religious family members to accept and to respect their 
religious relative's freedom to manifest and practise his or her religion that is the 
source of conflict”.14 Similarly, the claim brought by family members that the 
community had damaged the health of its members (in that it had led to “sudden 
and negative changes of personality”) “reflected their subjective assessment of the 
situation, strongly coloured by their frustration and estrangement from relatives”.15  
The ECtHR’s view of this case was, therefore, that the complaints that had 
been raised by relatives of members of the community during the course of the 
domestic proceedings may have had their roots in an attempt on the part of those 
relatives to resist the reality of the way in which their family members had chosen 
to live. Implicit in the Court’s reasoning here – and in the language that it used to 
describe the ‘frustration’, ‘resistance’, and ‘unwillingness’ of the relatives – was the 
sense that the relatives may have been trying to preserve fundamental assumptions 
about themselves and their family members. The instruction issued by the ECtHR 
to the domestic courts in this regard was simply that without close consideration 
of the reasons that the relatives had for their complaints, the domestic courts risked 
becoming complicit in the perpetuation of what was essentially a fantasy that the 
relatives had created.  
5.2.3 The need to integrate experience  
The question of reality – and of reality that is at odds with our fundamental 
assumptions – is, in this way, a question of the management of reality. The 
suggestion made in European human rights law (as was implicit in the ECtHR’s 
reasoning in Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and Others v Russia, considered above) is 
that the act of striving to preserve our fundamental assumptions in the face of a 
contrary reality is not a mode of managing reality as such. Rather, the idea 
                                                          
14 Ibid., para.111. 
15 Ibid., para.145. 
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articulated is that in order to manage reality we need to integrate experiences into 
our assumptive frameworks and thereby into our sense of identity.16 An example 
of this comes from case law in which parents are revealed to be holding on to a 
particular idea of their child in the face of a contrary reality. This was at issue in 
Sbârnea v Romania (2011), which concerned the complaint of Mr Sbârnea that the 
authorities had failed to take action to enforce a judgment concerning contact with 
his daughter, in breach of his Article 8 right to respect for his family life. Mr 
Sbârnea and M.S. had divorced in 1998, when their child, E., was almost four years 
old. For a few years, Mr Sbârnea and E. had a “close and affectionate” 
relationship,17 but then, during the Christmas holiday of 2002, he told her that he 
was remarrying and that he and his new wife were expecting a baby. Thereafter, E. 
refused to meet him on her own. Mr Sbârnea’s explanation for this was that M.S. 
was “trying to punish him by preventing him from having contact with his 
daughter, after she realised that he was starting a new life and that the separation 
from her was therefore final”.18 He blamed M.S. for the deterioration in his 
relationship with E., and he complained that he had been put “in a position” in 
which he was unable “to exert his parental role” and that his “authority as a father” 
had not been recognised.19 He also blamed the public authorities, who, he 
considered, had failed to convict M.S. for what he alleged was her non-compliance 
with the judgment defining his contact rights. 
 In assessing this case, the ECtHR noted that at the time that Mr Sbârnea 
lodged the criminal complaint against M.S. (in which he alleged that she had not 
complied with the contact judgment), it did not appear that “his relationship with 
the child was obstructed to the extent that they had no contact or that the mother 
[had] prevented him from seeing or contacting the girl”.20 Nevertheless, Mr 
Sbârnea had still “gained the firm belief that M.S. was discrediting him in front of 
                                                          
16 See, e.g., 52502/07, Aune v Norway (2010), at para.70 on the problems that A (who was in foster 
care) had been exposed to through his biological parents (e.g., they had been “heavy drug abusers” 
and “he had been exposed to serious ill-treatment”) and how these elements of his background 
would all have to be “integrated into his identity”. 
17 2040/06, Sbârnea v Romania (2011), para.8. 
18 Ibid., para.10. 
19 Ibid., paras.90, 97. 
20 Ibid., para.117. 
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E. and that this led to the girl’s change of attitude”;21 and he had consequently 
lodged the complaint because “he wanted M.S. sanctioned, considering that this 
would force her to act in such a way as to change the girl’s attitude towards him”.22 
The Court concluded, however, that the reason for the lack of contact between 
Mr Sbârnea and E. was not that E.’s mother had prevented this, nor that there had 
been a failure on the part of the authorities to encourage contact. Rather, E. had 
not wanted to have contact with her father – something which had not been helped 
by Mr Sbârnea’s pursuit of the criminal complaint against her mother and the 
extensive investigations and proceedings that she had been consequently involved 
in.23 Whereas Mr Sbârnea had focused his efforts on “obtaining an official 
acknowledgement of his firm belief that M.S. was exerting a negative influence on 
the child”, the reality was that E. did not want contact and had, furthermore, 
expressed that “she did not feel that [Mr Sbârnea] attempted to understand her 
point of view or to respond to the wishes that she had expressed so many times”.24  
Underlying the ECtHR’s judgment – and particularly its emphasis on the 
belief that Mr Sbârnea had formed about M.S.’s purportedly negative influence – 
was the notion that Mr Sbârnea was striving to retain a particular idea of his child 
and of his former partner. This is a common feature of the case law in which the 
ECtHR concludes that the belief of a non-resident parent in the negative influence 
of the other parent on their child is just that – a belief – and one which can serve 
to obscure the reality that, for example, their child does not want to have contact 
with them.25 At the same time as the ECtHR implies that fixation on such a belief 
is harmful insofar as it obscures reality, however, it also seems to imply that this 
kind of belief serves a protective function, in that it enables the individual in 
question to retain a particular idea of their child and former partner and to thereby 
preserve particular assumptions that are fundamental to his or her sense of self. 
The sense is that it might well be easier to adopt the view that the child has been 
                                                          
21 Ibid., para.118. 
22 Ibid., para.118. 
23 Ibid., paras.122, 137. 
24 Ibid., para.137. 
25 See, e.g., 805/09, Pascal v Romania (2012); 13589/07, Cristescu v Romania (2012); 22266/04, 
Rytchenko v Russia (2011). 
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misled by the other parent than to concede that the child is expressly refusing 
contact, and that it might be easier, too, to conceive of the negative influence in 
question as having its source in the other parent rather than contemplating that it 
may lie in oneself. Such thinking enables the preservation of an idea about the child 
(and particularly about the need of the child for oneself), about one’s parental 
authority (that it is continuing), about the other parent (who emerges as a 
continuing object for the projections of the self), and about the self (and 
particularly about the location of blame outside of oneself). What seems to be 
indicated is that a focus on preserving these ideas – which both support and 
express fundamental assumptions about the self – can take the place of an 
accession to a reality that is harder to bear. But critically, this is cast as only serving 
to signal the existence of the need to face up to reality and to integrate experience 
itself. 
5.3 The integration of experience  
On the one hand, therefore, European human rights law envisages us as having a 
need to preserve our fundamental assumptions, the object of which is the 
preservation of our sense of identity. On the other hand, we are cast as having a 
need to integrate experiences into our frameworks of assumptions, and to 
accordingly face up to reality that is at odds with our assumptions. In the course 
of the struggle that takes place between these needs, two conclusions are drawn in 
European human rights law about the nature of the integration of experience. The 
first is that the act of striving to preserve assumptions that run counter to reality 
can sometimes be taken to signal a need to adapt to that reality, which is what we 
saw in the preceding pages. The second is that we are portrayed as taking a while 
to integrate experiences that require an adaptation in our fundamental 
assumptions. A vision of what it means to integrate experience (and therefore to 
adapt our assumptive frameworks) is in this context articulated. This is presented 
as having three stages: a stage of understanding the experience in question by 
reference to the reasons for it and its causes (5.3.1); a stage of ascribing meaning 
to the happening (5.3.2); and a stage of locating the self in relation to the experience 
by tolerating the experience and living with it (5.3.3).  
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5.3.1 Understanding experience 
The first stage of integrating experience in European human rights law is a stage 
of understanding the experience in question by reference to the reasons for it and 
its causes. This is a stage of examining why and how something has happened. 
Information plays an important role here. In child protection cases, for example, 
where State authorities have removed children from their homes in response to 
child abuse allegations, the ECtHR has been clear that “[a] parent may claim an 
interest in being informed of the nature and extent of the allegations of abuse made 
by his or her child”, and that this is “relevant not only to the parent’s ability to put 
forward those matters militating in favour of his or her capability in providing the 
child with proper care and protection but also to enable the parent to understand 
and come to terms with traumatic events affecting the family as a whole”.26 The 
role of information in these cases is twofold: it enables the parent to deal with the 
allegations that have been made (and, therefore, to be involved in the decision-
making process about the future care of the child) and it is necessary in order for 
the parent to process (“to understand and come to terms with”) what has 
happened.27 
 The notion of understanding that is articulated in this way is cast as being 
bound up in the individual’s own self-understanding. An example is Silva and 
Mondim Correia v Portugal (2017), in which Mr Silva and Mr Correia alleged that the 
domestic courts’ dismissal of their paternity proceedings (on the ground that their 
claims were time-barred) breached their Article 8 rights to respect for their private 
lives. The ECtHR, in assessing this case, emphasised that the time-limit on 
instituting proceedings to establish judicial recognition of paternity was, under the 
Portugese Civil Code, ten years from the date of reaching majority, with an 
additional period of three years being applied following certain circumstances 
(such as where an individual became aware later on in life of something that would 
                                                          
26 28945/95, T.P. and K.M. v UK (2001), para.80. 
27 See also, in a different way, the importance ascribed to understanding in the context of the 
Article 6 right to a fair trial. Article 6 requires that “the accused, and indeed the public, must be 
able to understand the verdict that has been given; this is a vital safeguard against arbitrariness” 
(34238/09, Lhermitte v Belgium (2016), para.67). 
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justify bringing proceedings). Mr Silva and Mr Correia had, however, instituted 
proceedings when they were aged sixty-eight and forty-four years old respectively 
(“many years after coming of age”) and moreover, they had always known the 
identities of their biological fathers, meaning that they fell outside the 
supplementary three-year allowance too.28 The Court considered that the 
applicants had “shown an unjustifiable lack of diligence in instituting paternity 
proceedings in that they have waited fifty and twenty-six years, respectively, since 
reaching the age of majority to seek to have their paternity legally established”.29 
The fact that they had a “vital interest in having their biological truth legally 
established” did not itself “exempt them from complying with the requirements 
laid down by domestic law”;30 and, the Court concluded, the application of the 
time-limit in their case did not entail a breach of Article 8.  
The ECtHR’s implication here was that the passivity and lack of diligence 
that Mr Silva and Mr Correia had demonstrated with regards to the issue of the 
legal recognition of their genetic fathers was unreasonable. More than this, the 
sense was that they had been unreasonable in expecting the issue to be resolved at 
this stage at all, particularly given that in contexts of paternity proceedings the 
interests at stake are never only those of the child but also those of the putative 
father (and indeed also his family) – who has an interest “in being protected from 
allegations concerning circumstances that date back many years”.31 The Court’s 
ruling required the applicants to see that the outcome (the dismissal, at the 
domestic level, of the paternity proceedings) had been caused by the fact that they 
had missed the deadline for instituting proceedings by several decades; and they 
were also required to see beyond their own interests and to think about the 
implications that the bringing of these proceedings had carried for the putative 
fathers. They were, in other words, required to see their own responsibility in 
relation to what had happened, and to understand the effects of their actions. 
                                                          
28 72105/14 and 20415/15, Silva and Mondim Correia v Portugal (2017), para.67. 
29 Ibid., para.68. 
30 Ibid., para.68. 
31 Ibid., para.53. 
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5.3.2 The ascription of meaning to experience 
The conceptualisation of understanding as the first stage in the integration of 
experience raises the question of experiences that resist understanding entirely. 
These are experiences that Cora Diamond describes as cases of “the difficulty of 
reality”: “experiences in which we take something in reality to be resistant to our 
thinking it, or possibly to be painful in its inexplicability, difficult in that way, or 
perhaps awesome and astonishing in its inexplicability”.32 The experience of this 
difficulty is “the experience of the mind’s not being able to encompass something 
which it encounters”.33 The problem, therefore, is not only one of a reality that is 
contrary to our fundamental assumptions; it is a problem also, of being unable to 
even say that it is contrary to these assumptions: a problem of “an experience of 
inadequacy in human conceptual life itself”.34 Conceptual adequacy is broader in 
scope than an assumptive framework. An assumptive framework shapes what 
Cheshire Calhoun describes as an “expectation frame” that is a “stance...toward 
the facts”.35 She suggests that the frame that we adopt towards a particular state of 
affairs licences a way of thinking;36 thus a disposition to contentment is “a 
disposition to employ expectation frames that enable us to see our imperfect 
condition as good enough”.37 Such frames of seeing, which pave the way towards 
a way of thinking, are shaped by our fundamental assumptions, and they inform 
how we perceive reality. But they do not exhaust the possibility of our perception 
of reality in the same way that conceptual adequacy does. Experiences that resist 
understanding in Diamond’s sense are not only contrary to our fundamental 
assumptions (and therefore also to our ‘expectation frames’) but they are 
inexplicable in the sense that we lack the concepts to describe them and the 
capacity to think them. 
                                                          
32 C. Diamond, ‘The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy’ (2003) Partial Answers: 
Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas 1(2), 1-26, p2-3. 
33 Ibid., p2. 
34 J. Lear, ‘The difficulty of reality and a revolt against mourning’ (2018) European Journal of 
Philosophy 26, 1197-1208, p1200. 
35 C. Calhoun, ‘On Being Content with Imperfection’ (2017) Ethics 127, 327-352, p336.  
36 Ibid., p337. 
37 Ibid., p340. 
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 When we turn to consider European human rights law, we find no 
experiences which resist understanding in this sense, which is to say that we find 
no experiences which are taken to express “the sense of difficulty that pushes us 
beyond what we can think”.38 This is a reflection of the extent of the conception 
of the integration of experience in European human rights law – something that 
seems to be primarily a consequence of the way in which the narrative form is used 
here. We saw in Chapter 3 how even in cases of traumatic experiences – which 
would otherwise be taken to consist in their resistance to meaning and 
interpretation – the narrative form is used to contain and account for individual 
experience.39 More broadly, the sense is that traumatic events can be understood 
and brought to terms; thus, as the ECtHR put it in T.P. and K.M. v UK (2001) (the 
case concerning child abuse allegations that I quoted from above), information 
about the nature and extent of such allegations is important not least “to enable 
the parent to understand and come to terms with traumatic events affecting the 
family as a whole”.40 
 Narrativisation is, by definition, a way of ascribing meaning to an 
experience or event; and it is this ascription of meaning to a happening that, put 
more broadly, forms the second stage of the integration of experience in European 
human rights law. This stage is one of describing what it is that has happened, and 
of establishing the meaning of this in relation to the individual’s fundamental 
assumptions about her life. An example that draws out what this means in practice 
is Kearns v France (2008).  
Ms Kearns, an Irish national, had travelled to France in February 2002 to 
make of use of the French system of anonymous birth (a system that enables 
women to give birth anonymously and not to be recorded on the baby’s birth 
certificate41). She gave birth to a baby girl who was placed in the care of the 
authorities the following day; and in May, the baby was placed with a couple with 
a view to her full adoption. In July, Ms Kearns sought the return of the baby, 
                                                          
38 Diamond (2003), above n32, p12. 
39 See Ch.3, part 3.4. 
40 28945/95, T.P. and K.M. v UK (2001), para.80. 
41 On which see further Ch.2, part 2.3.1. 
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because she had persuaded her husband (who was not the biological father) to 
legally recognise the baby and, in addition, the baby’s biological father had by now 
learned of the birth. The French authorities refused her request, however, because 
the two-month time-limit for withdrawing consent to adoption had expired. Ms 
Kearns challenged this in proceedings that went on for almost two years; but she 
was unsuccessful, and in June 2004, a full adoption order was made to the couple 
with whom the baby had originally been placed. Ms Kearns then took her case to 
the ECtHR, where she argued that there had been a breach of her right to respect 
for her private and family life. She complained, in particular, that the time-limit for 
withdrawing consent to adoption was too short and that she had not received 
sufficient information and linguistic assistance to understand the implications of 
registering a birth anonymously. 
 The ECtHR disagreed with Ms Kearns, concluding that the two-month 
time-limit specified by the domestic legislation had struck a proportionate balance 
between the interests at stake. It considered that although the time-limit “may seem 
brief”, it appeared “sufficient to allow the biological mother time to reflect and to 
reconsider her decision to give the child up”.42 The Court went on to note that 
although it was “mindful of the psychological distress which the applicant must 
have experienced”, it “[observed] that she was 36 years old at the time, was 
accompanied by her mother and had two lengthy interviews with the social services 
after giving birth”.43 The sense was that Ms Kearns had received sufficient support 
at the time that she had made the decision, that she had had enough time to reflect 
on this decision, and that she now had to accept the decision that she had made. 
As to the information provided to Ms Kearns – and her argument “that the French 
authorities had not taken all the necessary steps to ensure that she understood the 
precise implications of her actions”44 – the Court emphasised her agency here too. 
It noted that she had chosen to travel to France to take advantage of the possibility 
of anonymous birth registration and that she had visited the hospital prior to the 
birth with her mother and a lawyer. Moreover, following the birth, she had had 
                                                          
42 35991/04, Kearns v France (2008), para.81. 
43 Ibid., para.81. 
44 Ibid., para.85. 
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two long interviews with the social services “in the presence of...a nurse and a 
doctor with knowledge of English, who had been made available by the hospital 
to act as interpreters”;45 and the form that she had subsequently signed consenting 
to the adoption clearly stated that there was a two-month time-limit for 
withdrawing consent, such that “no ambiguity could have persisted in the 
applicant’s mind as to the period within which she could seek the return of her 
child”.46 The authorities had provided her with “sufficient and detailed 
information, affording her linguistic assistance not required by law and ensuring 
that she was informed as thoroughly as possible of the implications of her choice 
and of the time-limits and procedures for withdrawing consent”;47 and overall, the 
State had not breached its positive obligations under Article 8.  
 The ECtHR’s reasoning in this case offers a clear account of the first and 
second stages of European human rights law’s vision of the integration of 
experience, insofar as the Court here set out what understanding and ascribing 
meaning would entail in the context of the facts of this case. It emphasised that 
the situation was one that Ms Kearns had brought about herself and that she 
needed to take responsibility for, from which the implication followed that for her 
to understand what had happened, she needed to acknowledge and accept this 
responsibility. The meaning to be ascribed to the experience in this case was to be 
ascribed in these same terms too: the Court’s reasoning required Ms Kearns to 
relate to her actions by claiming ownership of these, which is to say that it required 
her to establish the meaning of her actions as being reflective of her agency.  
5.3.3 Tolerating experience  
The requirements of understanding and ascribing meaning to experience demand 
a degree of reflection and detachment on the part of the individual. She is required 
to look beyond herself and to reflect on what has happened. This was emphasised 
in a point made in a Concurring Opinion in Odièvre v France (2003) – a case 
discussed in Chapter 2 and which, like the case of Kearns v France discussed above, 
                                                          
45 Ibid., para.87. 
46 Ibid., para.89. 
47 Ibid., para.91. 
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concerned the French system of anonymous birth.48 Ms Odièvre had been born 
anonymously under this system, and she complained that the fact that her birth 
had been kept secret, and that she had consequently been unable to find out about 
her genetic origins, had breached her Convention rights. The ECtHR disagreed, 
essentially concluding that the French legislature had balanced the right of 
individuals to learn about their origins with the (weightier) “general interest” (an 
interest which was essentially one of “[t]he right to respect for life”, which 
encompassed the concern to protect the health of women during pregnancy and 
birth, to avoid abortions, and to avoid “children being abandoned other than under 
the proper procedure”49). Critically, in its discussion of the way in which the 
domestic legislature had balanced the interests here, the ECtHR implied that Ms 
Odièvre needed to think about what she was asking, in a context in which her 
birthmother had never expressed any desire to see her – she had, indeed, “greeted 
their separation with total indifference”50 – and bearing in mind that disclosure of 
information could “entail substantial risks, not only for the mother herself, but 
also for the adoptive family...and her natural father and siblings...”.51 But it was 
Judges Ress and Kūris who put the point most bluntly in their Concurring 
Opinion, stating that “[p]ersons who seek disclosure at any price, even against the 
express will of their natural mother, must ask themselves whether they would have 
been born had it not been for the right to give birth anonymously”.52 Ms Odièvre, 
they suggested, needed to reflect on the implications of what she was asking. 
 This requirement of reflection is articulated more strongly still in relation 
to the third stage of the integration of experience set out in European human rights 
law, which is about how the individual locates herself in relation to the experience. 
This is about more than seeing why and how something has happened and more 
than ascribing meaning to the experience, though both of these are prerequisites. 
Rather, it is about tolerating the experience and coming to live with it. Fröhlich v 
Germany (2018) illustrates what this means. The applicant here, Mr Fröhlich, 
                                                          
48 See Ch.2, part 2.3.1. 
49 42326/98, Odièvre v France (2003), para.45. 
50 Ibid., para.44. 
51 Ibid., para.44. 
52 Ibid., Concurring Opinion of Judge Ress joined by Judge Kūris, para.4. 
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claimed to be the biological father of a girl named S., who had been born to a 
married woman named X with whom Mr Fröhlich had had a relationship. This 
relationship had ended shortly after S. was born, and X and her husband (who was 
S.’s legal father) were raising S. together, along with their other children. They 
refused Mr Fröhlich’s attempts to have contact with S. and they disputed that he 
was her biological father. Matters ended up in the domestic courts, where Mr 
Fröhlich unsuccessfully tried to establish his legal paternity of S., to have biological 
paternity testing conducted, and to obtain joint custody of S. Before the ECtHR, 
he complained, in particular, that the decisions of the domestic courts not to allow 
him to have any information about S. breached his Article 8 rights. 
 The ECtHR found that there had been no violation of Mr Fröhlich’s Article 
8 rights here: the domestic courts had been acting in S.’s best interests and had 
adduced “relevant and sufficient reasons” to justify the decision not to grant Mr 
Fröhlich information about the child.53 The domestic Court of Appeal had based 
its refusal of information rights on its finding that addressing the (preliminary) 
paternity question would be contrary to S.’s best interests, not least because there 
was a risk that “if the applicant’s biological paternity were established, it could not 
be ruled out that this might destroy the child’s present family as the mother’s 
husband might lose trust in his wife”.54 It was “more likely”, according to the 
domestic court, that Mr Fröhlich was S.’s biological father; X’s husband, 
meanwhile, who had known about the relationship between Mr Fröhlich and X, 
“may have had doubts about his biological paternity but…he could live with this 
uncertainty and his attitude had no negative consequences for the child”.55 The 
sense was that X and her husband preferred not to know S.’s biological paternity; 
and if Mr Fröhlich’s paternity was established “against [their] will, there was a risk 
that their marriage would break up, thereby endangering the well-being of the child 
who would lose her family unit and her relationships”.56 As to S. herself, she was 
                                                          
53 16112/15, Fröhlich v Germany (2018), para.66. 
54 Ibid., para.62. 
55 Ibid., para.63. 
56 Ibid., para.63. 
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only six years old, and it would not be in her best interests to “[confront her] with 
the paternity issue”.57  
 In the ECtHR’s consideration (and acceptance) of the reasoning of the 
domestic courts as to S.’s best interests here, a significant point emerged about the 
way in which the management of experience is envisaged in European human 
rights law. At the heart of this case lay, in a way, the strategy of X and her husband 
for managing the situation (a strategy of refusing to find out S.’s biological 
paternity). The ECtHR did not comment on this strategy; the domestic courts had 
heavily hinted that the likely reality was that Mr Fröhlich was S.’s biological father, 
and the problem was clearly that the revelation (or confirmation) of this would 
potentially shatter the relationship between X and her husband and, with this, S.’s 
family life. But in many ways the strategy of X and her husband did unavoidably 
shape the case, because it appeared to be primarily on account of this that the 
ECtHR considered that determining S.’s biological paternity would not be in her 
best interests. More than this, the sense underlying the ECtHR’s judgment (and 
inseparable from the strategy of X and her husband) was that if X’s husband was 
said to be able to live with the uncertainty that the situation entailed, Mr Fröhlich 
was required to do so too. This is not in itself surprising or unusual: it is in the 
nature of the principle of the child’s best interests that the wishes or desires of 
adults may be set aside in its name. What is more notable is the extent of the sense 
that Mr Fröhlich had to live with what had happened, in a context in which the 
domestic courts had implied that they considered him to be S.’s biological father. 
He was required to tolerate the uncertainty and to live with it in the name of a 
conception of S.’s best interests – a conception of best interests that had been 
largely shaped by the strategy that S.’s parents had adopted to manage their 
experience of the situation.  
*** 
If we draw these stages of European human rights law’s vision of what it means 
to integrate experience together – these stages of understanding the experience in 
                                                          
57 Ibid., para.64. 
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question, of ascribing meaning to it, and of tolerating it and thereby living with it 
– what emerges is that the account elaborated is not only an account of the way in 
which European human rights law conceives of us as managing reality and as thereby 
reconciling our (ascribed) needs to preserve our assumptions and to integrate 
experience. It is also an account of how European human rights law expects us to 
manage reality and, in so doing, to integrate understanding and knowledge. This is 
reflected in notions such as of a “realistic expectation” and a “realistic hope” that 
arise in the case law and point towards a conception of what a hope or expectation 
that is borne of reality (as this is conceived of in European human rights law) 
would look like.58  
 The account of what it means to integrate experience is also, in this way, an 
evaluative account. It involves the elaboration of a standard against which our 
understanding and behaviour is assessed and the construction of a normative 
vision of a manner of integrating understanding and knowledge that, I would 
suggest, constitutes European human rights law’s conception of wisdom. This 
normative vision is primarily reflected in the way in which the account that we 
have been discussing presupposes a conception of what it means to be capable of 
integrating experience in the first place – which, in turn, widens into an account of 
the development of a particular outlook on life that is valued in European human 
rights law as constituting a form of moral orientation. It is this normative quality 
of the vision of the integration of experience that the final section of this chapter 
addresses. 
5.4 The development of a certain outlook on life   
The account of the integration of experience that is articulated in European human 
rights law necessarily presupposes a conception of what it means to be capable of 
integrating experience in the first place, and it is this conception that I consider in 
this final section. I argue that European human rights law’s vision of the 
integration of experience presupposes a capacity on the part of the individual to 
                                                          
58 E.g., 46113/99 et al., Demopoulos and Others v Turkey (2010), para.136; 39678/03, Voronkov v 
Russia (2015), paras.38-39.  
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accept responsibility (5.4.1), to overcome emotion (5.4.2), and to withstand 
influence (5.4.3). The development of these capacities – and the development, 
therefore, of the ability to integrate experience in the manner depicted in European 
human rights law – is, at the same time, I suggest, the development of an outlook 
on life in which these capacities are forefronted and towards which the individual 
is oriented. This outlook supplies a moral orientation to the notion of individual 
continuity specified in Chapter 3. But it also implies that this notion of individual 
continuity has to accommodate a sense of detachment, and this is because the 
outlook articulated here involves a degree of detachment from reality itself.  
5.4.1 Accepting responsibility  
European human rights law’s account of the integration of experience presupposes 
a capacity on the part of the individual to accept responsibility in a particular way, 
which is to say that a vision of what it means to be responsible is specified in the 
case law. This involves two demands on the  individual: a demand that she behave 
in a manner that is consistent with any role that she has taken on and a demand 
that she bear the consequences of her actions.59 
 The first demand, which is about individual behaviour in relation to specific 
roles, was first discussed in Chapter 2, where I argued that the notion of 
presentation articulated in European human rights law involves a normative 
conception of the roles through which the individual is presented.60 It is this same 
quality that is at issue here in the demand that the individual behave in a manner 
that is reflective of her position in the world and her role-related responsibilities 
and duties. Adults, for example, are conceived of as bearing a specific responsibility 
to children, which consists in a “moral duty to defend a child’s interests”.61 And 
when it comes to more specific roles, the conception of personal responsibility 
articulated in European human rights law quite simply requires behaviour that is 
consistent with the responsibilities and duties carried in relation to these. Thus 
members of the armed forces are not to use their freedom of expression to 
                                                          
59 See further Ch.6, part 6.3.1. 
60 See Ch.2, part 2.3. 
61 18620/03, Juppala v Finland (2008), para.43. 
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“[undermine] military discipline”62 or to disclose secret military information that 
would undermine national security;63 politicians are expected to display “a greater 
degree of tolerance” of criticism that is made of them than “private” individuals 
are, having “inevitably and knowingly [laid themselves open] to close scrutiny 
of...every word and deed”;64 and public figures more generally are to expect that 
actions that they may well deem private, but that are in fact of public nature and 
interest (like matters to do with the legality of income), will likely be taken to reveal 
something about their character and qualities as public figures.65  
If an individual has taken on a particular role, then, she is expected to 
become used to the mode of conduct that this role entails, and to foresee what will 
be expected of her in this light. And so, for example, in assessing whether a ‘law’ 
has met the requirement of ‘foreseeability’,66 the ECtHR has held that not only 
may this requirement be satisfied “even if the person concerned has to take 
appropriate legal advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail”,67 but that this 
need to take legal advice “is particularly true in relation to persons carrying on a 
professional activity, who are used to having to proceed with a high degree of 
caution when pursuing their occupation” and who “on this account [can] be 
expected to take special care in assessing the risks that such activity entails”.68 Such 
individuals are, on account of their roles and their consequent habituation to 
certain ways of conducting themselves, to expect to be held to a different standard 
than those who are not used to conducting themselves in this way. 
The second way in which a conception of personal responsibility is 
specified is in terms of the demand that individuals understand the reasons for 
                                                          
62 5100/71 et al., Engel and Others v The Netherlands (1976), paras.100, 103. 
63 12945/87, Hadjianastassiou v Greece (1992), paras.45-47. 
64 9815/82, Lingens v Austria (1986), para.42. 
65 See, e.g., 34315/96, Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v Austria (2002), paras.36-37.  
66 This occurs in the context of analysing whether an interference with a right was ‘in accordance 
with the law’ or in the context of specific provisions such as Article 7. The assessment here is 
essentially of reasonable foreseeability; see, e.g., 1051/06, Mihai Toma v Romania (2012), paras.26-
31; 32492/96 et al., Coëme and Others v Belgium (2000), para.150. 
67 17862/91, Cantoni v France (1996), para.35. 
68 Ibid., para.35. 
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their actions69 and that they bear the consequences of these.70 This has been set 
out most clearly in cases in which the expectations of individuals are at odds with 
their situation in law – and which mismatch, European human rights law suggests, 
they should have been aware of. In Dalia v France (1998), for example, the ECtHR 
paid short shrift to Mrs Dalia’s argument that the refusal of the French courts to 
lift the permanent exclusion order against her breached her private and family life 
rights, in a context in which the main family tie in question (a child born to her in 
France) had been formed at a time “when she was in France illegally” and “could 
not be unaware of the resulting insecurity”.71 In this case, it was Mrs Dalia’s 
conviction for drugs offences that had led to the the permanent exclusion order 
against her in the first place; and the nature of this conviction weighed heavily in 
the Court’s reasoning, especially given “the devastating effects of drugs on people’s 
lives”, with the Court understanding “why the authorities show great firmness with 
regard to those who actively contribute to the spread of this scourge”.72 The Court 
concluded that the refusal of the domestic courts to lift the exclusion order was 
not disproportionate to the legitimate aim of preventing disorder or crime and that 
there had, therefore, been no violation of Mrs Dalia’s Article 8 rights. The more 
subtle idea underpinning the reasoning here was that individuals who put 
themselves in insecure and uncertain positions through their own conduct cannot 
expect these positions to be secured and stabilised, and that they should firstly 
have foreseen the consequences of their actions and must secondly take 
responsibility for these.73  
                                                          
69 See, e.g., 31753/02, Kaya v Germany (2007), para.63; 69735/01, Chair and J.B. v Germany (2007), 
paras.63, 67, in which the ECtHR implied that the applicants had not fully “come to terms” with 
the reasons for the offences that they had committed. 
70 See, e.g., 42857/05, Van der Heijden v The Netherlands (2012), concerning the applicant’s 
complaint that she was required to give evidence in criminal proceedings against her long-term 
unmarried partner (whereas an exemption applied to couples who had formal recognition of their 
partnership by way of marriage/registered partnership) and in which the Court noted that the 
applicant had to “accept the legal consequence” that followed from the fact that she had “chosen” 
not to formally register her relationship, which was that she “[had] maintained herself outside the 
scope of the ‘protected’ family relationship to which the ‘testimonial privilege’ exception 
attaches…” (para.76). 
71 26102/95, Dalia v France (1998), para.54. 
72 Ibid., para.54. 
73 This is a common theme in the case law. See, e.g., 26940/10, Antwi and Others v Norway (2012), 
para.92 (on the formation of links to a country through “unlawful residence”); 5049/12, Senchishak 
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This notion of foresight was further drawn out in Ruszkowska v Poland 
(2014). This case was brought by Ms Ruszkowska who, until the sudden death of 
her husband G.K. in December 2004, ran a foster home with him in which they 
cared for seven foster children and their two biological children. Following her 
husband’s death, Ms Ruszkowska legally dissolved the foster family. But complex 
proceedings then ensued concerning the survivors’ pension to which G.K.’s 
children (biological and fostered) were entitled in equal shares. Ms Ruszkowska 
claimed that the only children eligible were G.K.’s biological children, and that 
since the children who had formerly been in her foster care were now with other 
families, they should not be entitled to the pension. Before the ECtHR, she further 
argued that the way in which the pension was apportioned meant that her 
biological children were being treated less favourably than the foster children, and 
that this constituted discrimination against her and her biological children. She 
argued that whereas her biological children “had only one parent to provide for 
them”, the foster children “had new foster parents to provide for them, they could 
still inherit from their biological parents and, in addition, continue to receive their 
part of the survivors’ pension”.74 Had she not fostered any children at all, “her 
biological children would have been entitled to half the total amount of the 
pension each”; but she had, and this had led, she claimed, to her family “bearing 
an excessive individual burden”, including a deterioration in their finances and “life 
prospects”.75  
The Court assessed Ms Ruszkowska’s complaint under Article 14 (the 
protection from discrimination in the enjoyment of ECHR rights and freedoms) 
in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol 1 (the right to peaceful enjoyment of 
                                                          
v Finland (2014), para.56 (on there being no ‘family life’ between Mrs Senchishak and her adult 
daughter, and that this hadn’t been established by the fact that the two had lived together for five 
years at the time of the case since Mrs Senchishak “[had] not been lawfully resident in Finland 
during this time and she must have been aware of her insecure situation created by the fact that 
she was not regularised in Finland”); 25358/12, Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy (2017) (concerning 
the termination of a relationship with a child born through an international surrogacy 
arrangement, and the notion that this was a “consequence of the legal uncertainty that [the 
applicants] themselves created in respect of the ties in question, by engaging in conduct that was 
contrary to Italian law and by coming to settle in Italy with the child” [para.156]).  
74 6717/08, Ruszkowska v Poland (2014), para.39. 
75 Ibid., para.40. 
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possessions). It noted that Ms Ruszkowska and her husband “decided to create a 
foster home of their own free will”, with the aim of “providing care to a number 
of non-biological children in difficult situations on a par with care provided to their 
biological children”.76 They were financially supported by the State in this venture. 
Moreover, Ms Ruszkowska “accepted responsibility for the children’s care” – a 
responsibility which affected the inheritance rights of her biological children.77 
Furthermore, it had not been argued or shown that the total amount of the pension 
would “have constituted a significant part of the budget of the applicant’s family”, 
nor had it been shown that the way in which the pension was divided “was such 
as to make a significant difference” to the “financial situation or life prospects” of 
the biological children by comparison with the foster children.78 The Court 
concluded that “the difference in treatment complained of had no appreciable 
impact on the applicant’s and her biological children’s situation”,79 and that there 
had been no violation of Article 14 with Article 1 of Protocol 1. It emphasised that 
Ms Ruszkowska and her husband had chosen to run the foster home, and that at 
the time they did so, the relevant provisions were in force. Thus Ms Ruszkowska 
“was not justified in expecting that the pension would be apportioned to the 
children in the way she suggested”.80 Rather, the Court implied, she should have 
thought about the implications of her actions at the time she set up the foster 
home; and it was these actions that she was now required to bear the consequences 
of. 
5.4.2 Overcoming emotion  
The second capacity that is presupposed by European human rights law’s vision 
of the integration of experience and that forms part of the outlook on life that it 
envisages is the capacity to set aside emotion. This is presented as being a matter 
of mature judgement. In cases concerning parental separation, for instance, and 
where there are complex problems owing to “unresolved issues between the 
                                                          
76 Ibid., para.62. 
77 Ibid., para.62. 
78 Ibid., para.63. 
79 Ibid., para.63. 
80 Ibid., para.64. 
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parents”, the ECtHR has been clear that “a certain amount of time has to pass in 
order for the parents to overcome emotional hurdles and establish a mature 
relationship focusing on the best interests of the child”.81 Emotions are thereby 
cast as clouding judgement and as needing to be set aside or overcome. Moreover, 
the capacity to do this is deemed a sign of maturity – maturity which must be 
attained by the individuals in question by themselves, for “when two persons have 
lost affection for each other...it cannot realistically be expected from the State to 
make one of these persons adopt a positive attitude towards the other”.82 The 
obligation that a “lack of cooperation between separated parents” places on the 
State in contexts of, for example, contact disputes, is, then, rather “an obligation 
to take measures that would reconcile the conflicting interests of the parties, 
keeping in mind the paramount interests of the child”.83  
 The capacity to overcome emotion in this way is essentially conceived of as 
being about self-control, and this was set out clearly in Wdowiak v Poland (2017). 
Mr Wdowiak complained that the domestic authorities had failed to effectively 
secure his rights to contact with his son, J., in breach of his right to respect for his 
family life. Mr Wdowiak and J.’s mother, M.K., had separated not long after J. was 
born, in 2002. From 2005, the courts were involved in arranging contact between 
J. and his father. In January 2007, M.K. took J. to Germany (in breach of the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction), and for a year, 
Mr Wdowiak had no contact at all with J. Following the return of M.K. and J. to 
Poland in January 2008, the conflict between M.K. and Mr Wdowiak “grew 
deeper”, and “each applied to the courts to strengthen their own rights to the 
detriment of the other parent”, following which the domestic courts suggested that 
they go for counselling.84 Although this suggestion failed, the ECtHR noted that 
the authorities had nevertheless been able to ensure contact between Mr Wdowiak 
and J. between 2005 and 2012; thereafter, when further conflict arose, the domestic 
courts modified the contact arrangements, ordered mediation and family 
                                                          
81 28708/06, Trdan and Ć v Slovenia (2010), para.96. See also 13589/07, Cristescu v Romania (2012), 
para.69; 805/09, Pascal v Romania (2012), para.85. 
82 60092/12, Z.J. v Lithuania (2014), para.105. 
83 E.g., 48542/99, Zawadka v Poland (2005), para.67. 
84 28768/12, Wdowiak v Poland (2017), para.68. 
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counselling, and enabled penalties to be applied to M.K. each time a visit between 
J. and Mr Wdowiak did not take place. Despite these efforts, however, there was 
“little impact on the applicant’s right to participate effectively in his son’s life, visit 
him regularly or take important decisions about him”.85 
The ECtHR considered that the national authorities had taken all the steps 
that they could in order to enforce the contact arrangements, and that there had 
accordingly been no violation of Mr Wdowiak’s family life rights. The difficulties 
in enforcing the contact arrangements were rather “largely due to the mother’s 
reluctance to allow contact but also to the child’s open hostility towards his father 
and his refusal to see him”.86 Matters had been especially exacerbated by M.K.’s 
“uncooperative attitude” and her inability to overcome “her manifest hostility” 
towards Mr Wdowiak;87 and, as the domestic courts had recognised, both parents 
had adopted an “egoistic attitude...which prevented them from cooperating in the 
best interests of the child”.88 There was nothing more that the domestic authorities 
could do; each parent – and M.K. in particular – needed to overcome the hostilities 
that they felt towards each other. 
The ECtHR’s interpretation in this case, as in other similar cases in which 
it finds that the hostility and lack of cooperation between separated parents is “to 
the children’s detriment”,89 was, therefore, that there was an inability on the part 
of the parents to focus on what mattered: the child. The parents were cast as being 
unable to overcome their emotions in a way that would have enabled them to make 
arrangements about their child’s future. The sense was not only, therefore, that the 
management of the situation here required the setting aside of emotion, but there 
was also a valuing of the capacity to set aside emotion itself, the idea being that 
clarity as to what matters sometimes requires looking beyond the self.90  
                                                          
85 Ibid., para.71. 
86 Ibid., para.71. 
87 Ibid., para.71. 
88 Ibid., para.69. 
89 17254/11, Krasicki v Poland (2014), para.95. See also, e.g., 2210/12, P.F. v Poland (2014), para.60, 
and, concerning lack of cooperation with the authorities: 13441/87, Olsson v Sweden (No 2) (1992); 
26971/07, V v Slovenia (2011). 
90 It was this same point that we saw in relation to 16112/15, Fröhlich v Germany (2018), discussed 
in part 5.3.3 above. 
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5.4.3 Withstanding influence  
The idea of the individual that begins to emerge is of an individual who thinks with 
herself and for herself, and who is capable of withstanding influence and in a way 
being free of herself. This is reflected in the assumption of the capacity of the 
individual to overcome her emotions, and in the notion of the possibility that she 
might reflect on and ascribe meaning to her experiences in a way that enables her 
to live with these. An assumption is made in this regard about the individual’s 
capacity to withstand influence. In our earlier discussion of Kearns v France, we saw, 
for example, that the ECtHR assumed that Ms Kearns had the capacity to separate 
the decision that she had made immediately following the birth from the influence 
of the circumstances that then presented themselves a few months down the line 
(and in which the baby’s biological father had learned about the birth of the baby 
and her husband had agreed to legally recognise the child). She was required to 
separate the decision that she had made about the baby at the time of (and prior 
to) the birth from her reflections on this decision.91  
 There is a normative underpinning to this assumption about the individual’s 
capacity to withstand influence. We can see this more clearly when we consider 
the way in which the assumption that was made about Ms Kearns’ capacity to 
tolerate her sense of regret here was inseparable from the implication that Ms 
Kearns ought to have known better. This seemed to be the undertone of the 
ECtHR’s reference to the fact that she was thirty-six years old at the time of the 
birth;92 and we saw a similar sort of reference to age being made also in Odièvre v 
France.93 In that case, the Court took the view that Ms Odièvre and her anonymous 
biological mother were in an equivalent position, such that the private interests at 
stake here “[did] not concern an adult and a child, but two adults, each endowed 
with her own free will”.94 By interpreting this case as involving two women with 
equal autonomy, the Court was able to sidestep the hierarchical relationship that 
                                                          
91 See part 5.3.2 above. 
92 35991/04, Kearns v France (2008), para.81. 
93 See part 5.3.3 above. 
94 42326/98, Odièvre v France (2003), para.44. 
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necessarily obtained between them and that was precisely what was at issue here.95 
It was able to flatten the hierarchical structure and to assume a capacity on Ms 
Odièvre’s part – and to demand of her this capacity – to withstand this structure 
and to situate herself as equally positioned to her biological mother. 
 The capacity to withstand influence is conceived of as developing with age, 
such that it is presented as being an effect of (or achievement of) maturation; thus 
in Kearns v France, it was noted that Ms Kearns was thirty-six years of age, and in 
Odièvre v France, it was emphasised that the case here concerned two adults. This 
makes for a normative vision of what it means to be mature; but it also paves the 
way for an account of what it means to be immature (and therefore, in the 
ECtHR’s sense, susceptible to influence). This is articulated particularly in relation 
to children, who are conceived of as not having fully developed this capacity to 
withstand influence; and the effect of the subsequent construction of a notion of 
‘immaturity’ (as susceptibility to influence) is a simultaneous construction of what 
‘influence’ consists in.  
 An example is Dahlab v Switzerland (2001). The applicant in this case, Ms 
Dahlab, was a primary-school teacher, and she complained that a prohibition on 
her wearing her Islamic headscarf while teaching infringed her right to manifest 
her religion. The ECtHR deferred to the reasoning of the Federal Court, which 
had found the measure to be justified on the grounds of the “potential 
interference” with the religious beliefs of others and the breach of the principle of 
neutrality in schools.96 It conceived of the Islamic headscarf as “a powerful 
external symbol”, and noted that it was hard to assess the impact that this might 
have on the freedom of conscience and religion of Ms Dahlab’s pupils, who were 
aged 4-8 (“an age at which children wonder about many things and are also more 
easily influenced than older pupils”).97 The Court’s assumption here – that there 
would necessarily be some (negative) impact on the children – was 
notwithstanding the fact that there was no evidence of any impact whatsoever on 
                                                          
95 On which see further Ch.2, part 2.3.1. 
96 42398/98, Dahlab v Switzerland (2001, admissibility decision), para.1. 
97 Ibid., para.1. 
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the children. Thus the Court considered that it could not “[deny] outright that the 
wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytising effect”, and 
expressed concerns that it was hard to reconcile with the values and principles 
“that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils” (such as 
gender equality, tolerance, respect for others, equality, and non-discrimination).98  
 The effect of the invocation of the age of the children in this case, 
combined with the claim that they were susceptible to influence and that the 
Islamic headscarf could have an influence upon them, was thereby bound up in a 
normative judgement about the signification of the headscarf itself. The same 
approach has since then been taken in cases involving students choosing to wear 
the Islamic headscarf, notwithstanding that this involves a collapse in the basis of 
the argument as it was originally made (which was about teachers being in a unique 
position to transmit a particular vision to their impressionable pupils).99 Thus the 
invocation of a notion of ‘immaturity’ and of susceptibility to influence has enabled 
the construction of an account of what constitutes ‘influence’,100 which is to say 
that the articulation of the importance of the development of the capacity to 
withstand influence has enabled the construction of a normative account of what 
constitutes ‘influence’ itself.  
*** 
The capacities presupposed by European human rights law’s vision of the 
integration of experience – the capacities of accepting responsibility, of 
overcoming emotion, and of withstanding influence – form a conception of what 
it means to be capable of integrating experience in the manner set out in European 
human rights law. They are also cast as being capacities that develop over time, so 
that the account of the integration of experience is an account of the acquisition 
of experience. An association is consequently drawn between being young and 
                                                          
98 Ibid., para.1. 
99 E.g., 27058/05, Dogru v France (2008); 44774/98, Leyla Şahin v Turkey (2005). 
100 Elsewhere in the case law, we see this same argument about susceptibility to influence being 
made where a State has expressed concerns about the access of the ‘general public’ to something 
(see, e.g., 10737/84, Müller and Others v Switzerland (1988) (concerning paintings); 17419/90, 
Wingrove v UK (1996) (concerning a video); 13470/87, Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria (1994) 
(concerning a film)).  
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making errors, with some errors being linked to youth (hence the phrase “acts of 
juvenile delinquency”101) and children and young adults more generally being 
granted a margin of error in the course of learning social norms and rules because 
they are young and maturing.102 The sense is that in youth, errors are to be learned 
from and overcome through the process of maturation – this being a time in which 
the individual’s “personality and attitude” is changing and developing.103  
 The resulting account is not only, therefore, one of the capacities required 
to integrate experience in the manner set out in European human rights law. As a 
developmental account (an account in which these capacities are conceived of as 
developing over time), it is also an account of an outlook on life – an account of a 
manner of approaching life – towards which the individual is oriented and to which 
she is to aspire. As such, it supplies a moral orientation to the notion of individual 
continuity specified in Chapter 3. At the same time, it points to the way in which 
this notion of individual continuity has to accommodate a certain degree of 
detachment, because the outlook on life constructed here is, as we have seen, one 
which demands that the individual is able to detach from reality itself. It envisages 
an individual who is able to set aside her circumstances, her emotions, her history, 
and her vulnerability – an individual who exercises agency to stand at a certain 
distance from life itself. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The vision of the management of reality that emerges in European human rights 
law – a vision predicated on a particular way of integrating experience and 
                                                          
101 1638/03, Maslov v Austria (2008), para.81. See also, e.g., 12313/86, Moustaquim v Belgium (1991), 
para.44. 
102 See, e.g., 5056/10, Emre v Switzerland (No 2) (2011), para.74, on how the criminal activities of 
the applicant were “errors of youth that he seems to have acknowledged”. This is part of the 
more general construction of childhood as an important time for learning social rules (on which 
see Ch.3, part 3.3.3). 
103 Thus in cases involving the sentencing and treatment of young offenders, the Court has 
emphasised the need to take account of “developments in the young offender’s personality and 
attitude as he or she grows older” – “the changes that inevitably occur with maturation” 
(21928/93, Hussain v UK (1996), para.53; 23389/94, Singh v UK (1996), para.61). See also 
60367/08 and 961/11, Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v Russia (2017), para.80: “The Court considers 
that when young offenders are held accountable for their deeds, however serious, this must be 
done with due regard for their presumed immaturity, both mental and emotional, as well as the 
greater malleability of their personality and their capacity for rehabilitation and reformation.” 
226 
 
approaching life – is one in which the individual is required to detach from reality 
and to approach it at a distance. The stages of European human rights law’s 
account of the integration of experience (stages of understanding experience, 
ascribing meaning to it, and tolerating it and thereby living with it) and the 
capacities that underpin these stages (capacities of accepting responsibility, 
overcoming emotion, and withstanding influence) are, in this way, all oriented 
towards this sense of distance.  
 The resulting account is of a mode of integrating experience, 
understanding, and knowledge and of coming to approach life and to exercise 
judgement in a manner that is consistent with the outlook on life that is valued in 
European human rights law. It is against the backdrop of this normative standard 
that European human rights law evaluates understanding and behaviour. But more 
than this, the standard elaborated here is conceived of as being a standard to which 
the individual is oriented in going about her life: a vision of what the wise 
management of reality consists in, and one which locates the notion of wisdom in 
a degree of detachment from reality itself.  
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In Chapter 5, I argued that European human rights law’s account of the integration 
of experience is oriented towards the development of a certain outlook on life, and 
that this outlook demands a degree of detachment from reality itself. This chapter 
examines the vision of the present that is bound up in this – and, more specifically, 
the way in which the individual is conceived of as relating to this present. I argue 
that the individual is envisaged as being attached to the present and as extending 
beyond it, and that this comes to light when we examine how the individual is 
conceived of as relating to material things in European human rights law. 
 To begin, I argue that things are conceived of in European human rights 
law as standing for something in time (such that, for example, the things that go 
to make up an individual’s home are cast as containing the memories of the past, 
the familiarity of the present, and the hopes of the future) and as revealing 
something about that which has already happened (for example, a thing that is 
taken to represent a forthcoming risk already tells us something about the way in 
which the present is conditioned by that risk) (6.2). The duality that emerges 
between the present and what lies beyond the present in this way makes for a 
vision in which the individual is conceived of as relating to material things in a way 
that pushes her beyond the present itself. This is underpinned by an emphasis on 
foresight (on foreseeing that which is to come), a notion of the everyday (which 
the condition of the present is appealed to), and a way of abstracting the individual 
and representing her in the terms of the form of the thing (which is an image of 
the relationship that links the individual to the thing) (6.3). I argue that this makes 
for a vision in which the individual is conceived of as being attached to the present 
and as extending beyond the present; and the final part of the chapter assesses the 
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implications of this for the notion of individual continuity in European human 
rights law (6.4).   
6.2 Things in time  
Implicit in the chapters of my thesis thus far has been a sense of the way in which 
European human rights law conceives of the individual as having an attachment 
to material circumstances and to material things. We have seen this in cases 
concerning matters ranging from the material conditions of detention to questions 
of symbols, clothing, works of art, animals, and prostheses. In none of these cases 
is the ‘thing’ in question ever ‘just’ a thing, of course. Rather, what is at issue is 
what the ‘thing’ signifies, represents, and communicates – of the way in which the 
thing is placed. In this section, I argue that things are placed in European human 
rights law in relation to individual time and that this is how they acquire meaning 
here1 (6.4.1). The way in which things are cast as standing for something in time is 
partly a function of the treatment of things as embedded in narratives (for example, 
the things that go to make up an individual’s home are envisaged as containing the 
memories of the past, the familiarity of the present, and the hopes of the future); 
but it is also about the way in which things are cast as pointing to some conception 
of time that lies beyond the thing and that is materialised in it (as when, for 
example, a thing is taken to represent a forthcoming risk) (6.4.2). I argue that in 
materialising time in this way – in pointing to that which is to come – things also 
materialise that which has already happened (a present that has come to be in a 
particular way), such that the account of things in European human rights law is 
also an account of the condition of the present and of how the individual relates 
to this present (6.4.3). 
6.2.1 Time in things  
Things come into European human rights law in the language of time, and in 
particular in the language of expectations about the thing and expectations as these 
                                                          
1 This notion of the acquisition of meaning should not be taken to imply that things have some 
prior state to meaning in European human rights law: the placement of things in relation to 
individual time means that things have meaning in this sense from the outset (they are things 
because they are in relation to individual time).  
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are read into and thought of as being represented by the thing. The question is of 
what the thing stands for in time – of the time that can be seen in the thing. This 
is most obviously illustrated by things that both stand for and are taken to be a 
part of some phenomenon. For instance, the material interests that are a dimension 
of the Article 8 notion of ‘family life’ (and that pertain, for example, to 
maintenance obligations and inheritance matters)2 are taken to stand for this family 
life (and indeed to affirm the reality of its existence).3 Another example is that of 
the home, which is cast as containing and representing a sense of attachment and 
as also being the target of (and so that which is contained by) that same sense of 
attachment.4 Thus whether somewhere constitutes a ‘home’ within the meaning of 
the Article 8 right to respect for the home depends on “the existence of sufficient 
and continuous links with [the] specific place”,5 which means that the home – 
elsewhere described as that most “central material referent for ordering nature and 
human behaviour”6 – is cast in temporal terms, as the representation of one’s roots 
and expectations about the future. Critically, it is not enough that a place is thought 
of as being one’s home; nor is it enough that the place is intended to become one’s 
home. The meaning of the notion of ‘home’ in the ECHR does not, therefore, 
“comprise property on which it is planned to build a house for residential 
purposes”, and nor does it “cover an area of a State where one has grown up and 
where the family has its roots but where one no longer lives”.7 Rather, the notion 
of the “sufficient and continuing links” that are represented in the ‘home’ demands 
that the imagination of the ‘home’ be grounded in some material reality – that it 
be grounded in some reality of having made the place a home. Markers of having 
                                                          
2 6833/74, Marckx v Belgium (1979), para.52. 
3 The material interests must seemingly flow from the actual existence of this ‘family life’ and 
from an engagement with what ‘family life’ entails, such that the material interest comes to stand 
for this family life. Thus whereas it is not possible to derive from Article 8 “a right to be 
recognised as the heir of a deceased person for inheritance purposes” (36983/97, Haas v The 
Netherlands (2004), para.43) rights pertaining to one’s self-understanding, and to one’s personal 
identity – and, therefore, to knowledge and understanding of one’s childhood and background, 
for this purpose – do form part of Article 8 (58757/00, Jäggi v Switzerland (2006), para.26). 
4 See, e.g., 15711/13, Stolyarova v Russia (2015), para.61. 
5 58255/00, Prokopovich v Russia (2004), para.36. 
6 J. Wilford, ‘Out of rubble: natural disaster and the materiality of the house’ (2008) Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space 26, 647-662, p654. 
7 15318/89, Loizidou v Turkey (1996), para.66. 
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made a place a home (and that are drawn out in case law in which individuals have, 
for whatever reason, left the place they call home) therefore include those that are 
bound up in ‘things’, such as the leaving behind of furniture.8 
 If the cases on the material interests of the family and on the home bring 
to the fore the question of what the thing represents in time (and of how it can 
come to be a particular thing because of how it contains and represents some 
notion of time or inherently temporal sense, such as attachment), the significance 
of the posing of a prior question – of the meaning of seeing time in the thing at all 
– is well-illustrated by Chowdury and Others v Greece (2017). In that case, the ECtHR 
had to determine whether the work of Bangladeshi migrants in appalling 
conditions on a big strawberry farm in Greece constituted forced or compulsory 
labour in breach of Article 4 of the ECHR. In the course of its deliberation on this 
– in which the ECtHR ultimately concluded that the case had indeed “clearly 
[demonstrated] the existence of human trafficking and forced labour”9 – the Court 
relied on a conception of time purportedly rendered visible by the strawberry in 
order to emphasise that the applicants’ situation could not be characterised as one 
of servitude.10 It considered that whereas “the fundamental distinguishing feature 
between servitude and forced or compulsory labour within the meaning of Article 
4…lies in the victim’s feeling that his or her condition is permanent and that the 
situation is unlikely to change”, here “the applicants could not have had such a 
feeling since they were all seasonal workers recruited to pick strawberries”.11 
Despite the harsh living and working conditions that the workers had to endure, 
therefore – they worked in the greenhouses for twelve hours a day, “picking 
strawberries under the supervision of armed guards”;12 they lived in “makeshift 
                                                          
8 See, e.g., 9063/80, Gillow v UK (1986), para.46. See also 72118/01, Khamidov v Russia (2007), in 
which the applicant’s intention to return to the estate that he and his family had moved away from 
for two years was treated as being supported by the fact that he had left the gas and electricity 
running (para.127). 
9 21884/15, Chowdury and Others v Greece (2017), para.100. 
10 The applicants were not claiming that their situation had constituted servitude. The point is 
more to consider the way in which the Court distinguished forced or compulsory labour and 
servitude on the basis of the way of seeing involved in each situation.   
11 Ibid., para.99. 
12 Ibid., para.7. 
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shacks made of cardboard, nylon and bamboo, without toilets or running water”;13 
they had not been paid for months, and were shot at by an armed guard when they 
went across the fields together to ask the employer for their wages – the Court 
emphasised that the applicants could see beyond these conditions. This was 
because their labour (and so their very being on the farm) was tied to the picking 
of the strawberries in season. The ECtHR’s focus in this regard was on the notion 
of time represented in the ripe (or almost ripe) strawberry – the strawberry ‘in 
season’ – and the workers, being seasonal workers, were attached to (and captured 
in the Court’s analysis in relation to) this one period in the life of the strawberry. 
 We can see the real significance of this framing – this reading of the 
moment of time rendered visible in the strawberry ‘in season’ – by considering 
what this perspective depended on. It depended on the setting aside of the reality 
of a longer-term perspective – a perspective which would have entailed an account 
of all the work that had to be done in the run-up to the strawberries being ready 
for picking and all the work that would need to be done for the following year’s 
crop. By focusing on the strawberry in season, and on the individual workers as 
seasonal workers in relation to this one moment, there was an obscuring of the 
more relational reality of the way in which each worker on the farm, however 
seasonal, was locked into a structure that both conditioned and transcended the 
moment of the strawberry ‘in season’ and that was tied to the conditions on the 
farm. This longer perspective was in fact reflected in the Court’s finding that the 
situation in the strawberry fields had been an ongoing one that the authorities had 
known about for a long time, and that Greece had consequently failed to fulfil its 
positive obligations under Article 4 to prevent human trafficking and to protect 
the applicants. But within this finding, it was the shorter-term perspective – of the 
time of the individual worker only – that structured the Court’s analysis of whether 
the situation constituted servitude or forced labour; and in its finding that the 
applicants would not have felt their situation to be permanent and unlikely to 
change (and that it therefore did not constitute servitude, though it did constitute 
forced labour), the sense was that they would have retained their capacity to see 
                                                          
13 Ibid., para.7. 
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out of the situation. In other words, they would have retained their ability to 
imagine a future and to thereby project their own individual continuity through the 
temporary (because seasonal) situation; they would have retained their capacity to 
hope.14 The act of seeing, that depended here on a way of thinking about the 
strawberry in season, was thereby cast as constituting a way of resisting, at the same 
time as it was reiterated as being at the essence of the distinction between forced 
or compulsory labour and servitude in European human rights law.15  
6.2.2 Narratives of things  
The notion of the time that can be seen in the thing, and the act of seeing that is 
bound up in this, points to the way in which things are embedded in narratives in 
European human rights law. Of course if things are read in terms of individual 
time – a form of time that, as we have already seen, is about individual continuity 
through time16 – then a narrative reading is inevitable. Things – and the material 
environment of the individual more generally – will always be embedded in a 
narrative. To take one of the most striking illustrations that we have already 
touched on, the ‘home’ in European human rights law is a narrative notion. It is 
conceived of as being bound up in the construction of a narrative of an individual’s 
life (insofar as it grounds and frames a life17) and as signifying a more normative 
narrative too (insofar as it is conceived of as being a notion that is borne of and 
ought to denote feelings of security, stability, attachment, and familiarity).18 
 In respect of this way of reading things in narrative terms, the reasoning in 
Chowdury and Others v Greece discussed above points not only to the way in which 
the strawberry in that case was treated as being embedded in a narrative about the 
impermanence of the situation of the workers. It also illustrates the way in which 
a narrative about the future (and in that case, about the possibility of a different 
future) can be drawn from the thing, such that the thing is conceived of as 
                                                          
14 On which see further Ch.3, part 3.2.3. 
15 On which see also 67724/09, C.N. and V. v France (2012), para.91. 
16 See Ch.3. 
17 See further also Ch.2, part 2.2.1. 
18 See, e.g., 1870/05, Irina Smirnova v Ukraine (2016), para.93: “A home is usually the place where 
an individual is supposed to feel safe...and sheltered from unwanted attention and intrusions...”. 
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containing a form of time and as simultaneously materialising that time. The way 
in which things can be taken to reveal something about the future emerges more 
starkly still in cases of things that are taken to stand for the forthcoming. An 
example is to be found in the readings of things implicated in cases of ‘natural’ and 
industrial disasters that are deemed to have been foreseeable to the point that the 
occurrence of the disaster represents an inevitable materialisation. In such cases, 
what is at issue in regards ‘things’ is not as much the way in which disasters disrupt 
the relationship between humans and things (“[a]s buildings crumble, streets 
buckle, houses flood, and bridges collapse, it is not just the ‘natural’ world that 
opposes humans, but all material things”19) but rather the way in which disasters 
that are deemed to be foreseeable involve, by definition, the framing of things – 
both material things and the matter involved in the disasters – through the lens of 
a build-up to an event, such that the thing comes to represent the forthcoming 
disaster. For example, in the years running up to the methane explosion that was 
at issue in Öneryildiz v Turkey (2004) (an explosion that occurred at a municipal 
rubbish tip and killed thirty-nine people who lived in slum dwellings below it), the 
risk was deemed to have been so foreseeable, and so containable, that the waste at 
the rubbish tip essentially represented the forthcoming disaster, and the homes 
and belongings of the people who lived below the tip represented susceptibility to 
disaster.20  
 We can see this further still by considering Budayeva and Others v Russia 
(2008), which was a case brought in the aftermath of a series of devastating 
mudslides that hit the town of Tyrnauz in Russia in July 2000, killing many people 
and destroying many homes. In its reasoning in this case, the ECtHR focused on 
how the State authorities had failed to maintain the mudslide defence and warning 
infrastructure, in a context in which they knew of (and had repeatedly been warned 
about) the likelihood of a mudslide hitting that particular town.21 The Article 2 part 
of the case was therefore cast as being one that involved “the foreseeable exposure 
                                                          
19 Wilford (2008), above n6, p648. 
20 48939/99, Öneryildiz v Turkey (2004).  
21 15339/02 et al., Budayeva and Others v Russia (2008). 
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of residents...to mortal risk”;22 and the devastation was cast as flowing from the 
lack of repair to the defence infrastructure, with there being “no justification for 
the authorities’ failure to prepare the defence infrastructure for the forthcoming 
hazardous season”.23  
There was a shift within this analysis when it came to the applicants’ 
complaint that the same failings of the authorities that had led the ECtHR to find 
a violation of Article 2 had also led to a violation of their right to protection of 
their property. The Court therefore considered that in “natural disasters, which are 
as such beyond human control” the positive obligations on the State “as regards 
the protection of property from weather hazards do not necessarily extend as far 
as in the sphere of dangerous activities of a man-made nature”;24 and the 
devastation, which had hitherto been cast as flowing from the failure to maintain 
and repair the mud-defence infrastructure,25 was now cast as flowing from the 
“weather hazards”.26 The mudslides themselves went from being thought of as an 
event that had engaged “the State’s responsibility for positive preventive action”27 
to something resembling more an “assemblage” of processes, matter, and forces,28 
with the applicants’ property being what was in the way of the “weather hazard”. 
On either approach, however, both the property and the mud infrastructure were 
cast as representing susceptibility to risk. Just as in Öneryildiz v Turkey, the risk that 
was represented in this case in the damaged mud-defence infrastructure, and in the 
mud itself, also weighed down on and marked the homes and possessions of the 
residents of Tyrnauz.  
                                                          
22 Ibid., para.158. 
23 Ibid., para.151. 
24 Ibid., para.174. 
25 Ibid., para.149. 
26 Ibid., paras.174-175.  
27 Ibid., para.142. 
28 For such “a congregational understanding of agency”, see J. Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political 
Ecology of Things (2010, Duke University Press), p20, Ch2. Thus when it came to the question of 
compensation, the Court considered that “the damage in its entirety could not be unequivocally 
attributed to State negligence, and the alleged negligence was no more than an aggravating factor 
contributing to the damage caused by natural forces” (15339/02 et al., Budayeva and Others v Russia 
(2008), para.182).  
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The time that was made visible in and that was read from the things in 
Öneryildiz v Turkey and Budayeva and Others v Russia was the time of risk; the focus 
of the ECtHR was on how the disasters had come to be so forthcoming and on 
the materialisation of this forthcoming. As part of this, the thinking about each of 
the things involved in these cases was a thinking about the thing in the future and 
the future represented by the thing. Such a way of thinking not only draws 
attention to how things in the case law are implicated in narratives (for example, 
narratives of belonging, possibility, and inevitability). It also draws attention to 
how this way of thinking is a thinking about a thing that has brought itself closer 
and that has consequently also brought a particular notion of the future closer. The 
question is of what is brought forth in the thing.  
6.2.3 Materialisation  
The materialisation of that which is to come is also, necessarily, a materialisation 
and revelation of that which has already happened (a present that has come to be 
in a particular way). In other words, the representation of the thing in terms of 
individual time – and largely in terms of the future represented in the thing – is a 
means through which the thing discloses that which has already happened: the life 
that has been made conditional on the management of a specific risk, for example. 
The thing, in this way, not only renders visible that which has already happened; it 
relays some effect that it is also, in part, a cause of.29  
 This rendering visible of that which has already happened – of how the 
present has been shaped – is exemplified by the case law concerning polluting 
matter, and in particular by cases in which a certain concentration of pollutants is 
described as being “potentially harmful”.30 Notwithstanding this description, the 
‘potential’ per se cannot ever be the issue in these cases, for it is already too late: 
the term “potentially harmful” collapses past, present, and future insofar as it 
                                                          
29 This formulation comes from Strathern’s analysis of gift exchange. See M. Strathern, The Gender 
of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with Society in Melanesia (1988, University of California 
Press), at p221: “Gift exchange...is...the circulation of objects in relations in order to make 
relations in which objects can circulate... The gift works as the cause of a relation as well as its 
effect.” 
30 E.g., 55723/00, Fadeyeva v Russia (2005), para.87 (and see also 53157/99 et al., Ledyayeva et al. v 
Russia (2006)).  
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points to the notion of the ‘potentially harmed’ (either already, or right now, or in 
the future). It points to the condition of the potential, and this condition is a 
continuing condition of susceptibility and vulnerability (which in itself may 
constitute “actual detriment” to an individual’s “health and well-being”31).  
The question in cases concerning ‘potential harm’ cannot only be one of 
the potential for something, and of whether the potential itself has been actualised, 
therefore; it is also a question of what the potential has done to the current 
condition. In this sense, the term ‘potentially harmful’ renders visible the condition 
of the present. An example of this is Dzemyuk v Ukraine (2014), in which Mr 
Dzemyuk complained that the construction of a cemetery in close proximity to his 
home had contaminated his water supply and had adversely affected his use of his 
home as well as his and his family’s health, in breach of his right to respect for his 
home and private life. The first question for the ECtHR, “in the absence of actual 
damage to the applicant’s health” was of “whether the potential risks to the 
environment caused by the cemetery’s location established a close link with the 
applicant’s private life and home sufficient to affect his ‘quality of life’ and to 
trigger the application of the requirements of Article 8”.32 The Court found that 
the Article 8 threshold was indeed met. The cemetery was situated 38 meters from 
the applicant’s home (in breach of the domestic regulations, which stipulated a 
minimum distance of 300 metres), it was “a continuous source of possible health 
hazards and the potential damage caused by such [was] not easily reversible or 
preventable”, and it exposed the applicant to the risk of “serious water pollution” 
(something which the authorities had acknowledged).33 In these circumstances, the 
Court considered, there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to 
respect for his home and private life; and “the interference, being potentially 
harmful, attained a sufficient degree of seriousness to trigger the application of 
Article 8”.34  
                                                          
31 As in 55723/00, Fadeyeva v Russia (2005), para.88 (which involved the “potentially harmful” 
industrial pollution that came from a steel plant that operated near the applicant’s home). 
32 42488/02, Dzemyuk v Ukraine (2014), para.82. 
33 Ibid., para.83. 
34 Ibid., para.84. 
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The ECtHR ultimately found in this case that there had been a breach of 
Mr Dzemyuk’s Article 8 rights on account of the fact that the actions of the 
authorities in building and using the cemetery had been in breach of the domestic 
regulations and had therefore not been lawful within the meaning of Article 8. But 
what this case also shows, from the perspective of our consideration of 
materialisation, is the way in which the notion of ‘potential harm’ reveals the 
condition of the present. It renders visible how the potential for something has 
already reshaped the present. And this same rendering visible applies to the notion 
of containing time in European human rights law more generally too. The language 
of containing time – of containing risk, for example, as in Öneryildiz v Turkey and 
Budayeva and Others v Russia – pulls the future within the present.35 But in so doing, 
it also reveals the effect that this has already had on the present. The condition of 
the present emerges as being one of containing this future,36 which is to otherwise 
say that the mode of relating to the present that is envisaged here is a mode of 
containing the future.  
6.3 The condition of the present   
The temporal configuration of things depicted in the preceding pages shows how 
things in European human rights law are taken to enable encounters of particular 
kinds: encounters with a narrative of the future that a thing is taken to reflect and 
represent, for example, or encounters with the reality of that which has already 
happened as it is disclosed by a thing. But more than this, the account of the 
placement of material things in European human rights law also gives rise to an 
account of the present: an account of a present which is conceived of as being 
about containing the future.  
 This section examines the way in which the individual is located in this 
vision. The conceptualisation of the present as containing the future makes for an 
                                                          
35 On which see further Ch.3, part 3.4.2, on the language of containing anxiety. 
36 See also Hu’s argument that the language of containing risk, of disaster management and 
contingency planning, renders it impossible to think about how life could be radically different, 
because the focus is entirely on containing the future within the present and on maintaining the 
present as such: C. Hu, ‘“A jungle that is continually encroaching”: The time of disaster 
management’ (2018) Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 36(1), 96-113, p102-110. 
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account in which the individual is located between present and future. On the one 
hand, she is conceived of as being attached to material things. On the other hand, 
these material things are taken to reveal that which is to come as well as that which 
has already happened; and so in being attached to material things, the individual is 
also pushed beyond them. I suggest that this account is underpinned by a way of 
seeing that emphasises foresight (6.3.1), a way of relating to material things that is 
based on a notion of the material extent of the individual (of how far she extends 
in her material environment) (6.3.2), and a way of representing the individual in 
her relations with material things that involves an abstraction from life itself to deal 
in the language of forms (a form being an image of the relationship that links the 
individual to the thing) (6.3.3).  
6.3.1 Foresight   
The positioning of the individual between present and future places certain 
demands on the individual. Foremost among these is a demand of foresight, which, 
as we saw in Chapter 5, is part of European human rights law’s vision of personal 
responsibility.37 Foresight is conceived of as being central to European human 
rights law’s vision of seeing material things; and it is primarily articulated in terms 
of the expectations that apply to the individual in her dealings with things. These 
expectations will, on occasion, be deemed inherent in the role that an individual 
has taken up or the position that she holds; and where this is the case, the material 
thing in question will be treated as pointing to that expectation. For instance, the 
non-reimbursement of expenses incurred in the course of performing a 
professional duty may be a part of (and a signification of) that duty (such that the 
duty cannot in itself constitute an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions stipulated under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1).38 Restrictions on 
individual property may, meanwhile, be justified in the name of social justice – 
something which feeds into the idea, discussed in Chapter 2, of the role of the 
                                                          
37 See Ch.5, part 5.4.1. 
38 See 8919/80, Van der Mussele v Belgium (1983), paras.48-49 (concerning the complaints of Mr 
Van der Mussele that the pro bono work that he was obliged to do as a lawyer breached his 
Convention rights). On this case see Ch.2, part 2.3.2(ii). 
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individual in constructing a conception of the collective.39 And in cases involving 
any kind of “commercial venture”, the ECtHR has been keen to point out that 
such ventures, by their nature, involve “an element of risk” that must necessarily 
inform the conduct of the individuals (and companies) in question.40 Individuals 
acting in these roles and engaging in these activities must in other words foresee 
what might happen and act accordingly.  
An example of this latter approach is Gasus Dosier-und Fördertechnik GmbH v 
The Netherlands (1995). The applicant company here, Gasus, had sold a concrete-
mixer to a company called Atlas on the condition that it retained title of the mixer 
until the full price had been paid. The concrete-mixer was subsequently seized and 
sold by the tax authorities that were pursuing Atlas; and Gasus complained that 
this had breached their property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In 
holding that the interference was proportionate, the Court emphasised that Gasus 
were “sufficiently aware” of the risk involved in this venture “to take steps to limit 
it” (for example, they had allowed Atlas to pay the purchase price of the mixer in 
instalments and had reserved their title to the mixer until the full price had been 
paid).41 There were other steps that they could have taken too (for example, they 
could have declined to extend credit to Atlas); and it was also relevant that they 
had allowed the goods “to serve as “furnishings” of the tax debtor’s premises” 
such that “[t]hey might therefore well be held responsible to some extent for 
enabling the tax debtor to present a semblance of creditworthiness”.42 
What was essentially at issue in this case was, therefore, the expectations 
that had been formed about the concrete-mixer; and the mediation of expectations 
is the essence of the point in the notion of foresight that emerges here. The 
expectations that have been projected by the individual onto a thing or that have 
been formed in relation to that thing are mediated by the expectations that derive 
from the roles that those same individuals are performing or the positions that 
                                                          
39 See, e.g., 8793/79, James and Others v UK (1986); 10522/83, Mellacher and Others v Austria (1989). 
See also 18072/91, Velosa Barreto v Portugal (1995) (on the social protection of tenants). See further 
Ch.2, part 2.3.2(ii). 
40 See, e.g., 12742/87, Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v Ireland (1991), para.59. 
41 15375/89, Gasus Dosier-und Fördertechnik GmbH v The Netherlands (1995), para.70. 
42 Ibid., para.70. 
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they hold. An example which illustrates more closely how this mediation occurs is 
Brosset-Triboulet and Others v France (2010). The family of the applicants in this case 
had, since 1945, occupied a house that stood on maritime public land. Following 
the enactment of the Coastal Areas Act – the aim of which was to protect the 
seashore and the environment – the authorities had refused authorisations to 
occupy such properties. The applicants’ occupancy authorisation had consequently 
not been renewed, and they complained that this (and the order to demolish their 
house) breached their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.  
 The Court structured its reasoning in this case around two narratives. On 
the one hand, it considered that the applicants were aware of the precarious nature 
of the basis of their occupancy of the house (the basis of their occupancy being 
the decisions authorising this); and they were also aware of the obligation on them 
“in the event of revocation of the decision authorising occupation, to restore the 
site to its original state if required to do so by the authorities”.43 On the other hand, 
the authorities had tolerated their occupancy of the house;44 and “the time that 
elapsed had the effect of vesting in the applicants a proprietary interest in peaceful 
enjoyment of the house that was sufficiently established and weighty to amount to 
a ‘possession’ within the meaning of...Article 1 of Protocol No. 1”.45 The question 
was of whether, given the applicants’ interest in continuing to occupy the house, 
“the order to restore the site to its original state” was a means proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued (of “[promoting] unrestricted access to the shore”).46 
The Court held that it was. It emphasised the importance of protecting 
coastal areas and reiterated that the applicants “had always known that the 
decisions authorising occupancy were precarious and revocable”.47 But more than 
this, it treated both the authorities’ refusal to renew the authorisation of occupancy 
and the order to demolish the house as “[corresponding] to a concern to apply the 
law consistently and more strictly, having regard to the increasing need to protect 
                                                          
43 34078/02, Brosset-Triboulet and Others v France (2010), para.70. 
44 Ibid., para.89. 
45 Ibid., para.71. 
46 Ibid., para.84. 
47 Ibid., para.89.  
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coastal areas and their use by the public, but also to ensure compliance with 
planning regulations”.48 Thus the question became one of the viability of 
exempting the applicants from the application of this law: something which 
“would go against the aims of the Coastal Areas Act...and undermine efforts to 
achieve a better organisation of the relations between private use and public use”.49 
The expectations that were held by the individuals in this case (and that were 
formed in the context of their knowledge about the precarious basis of their 
occupancy) were therefore to be mediated with the expectations that were made 
of them in the context of their position as private occupants of public land and as 
subjects of the law. There was a sense, moreover, that all this was already known 
– or ought to have been known – in the first place, given the nature of the 
applicants’ position here as private occupants of public land – as occupants with a 
precarious basis for occupancy and therefore a precarious relationship with the 
house. The broader point to be drawn from this case is that the placement of things 
in terms of time entails a certain expectation that the individual, being located 
between present and future by dint of her relations with material things, will use 
the knowledge gained from this position to demonstrate a degree of foresight in 
her engagement with these things.  
6.3.2 Material extent   
The extent of the foresight that is required in this context is shaped by an account 
of the material extent of the individual, which is about how far the individual 
extends in her material environment. Some things, for example, are cast as being 
things in relation to which the individual has built up her sense of self to the point 
that she is treated as having a material dimension of her self.50 We have already 
seen that the things of the home are especially closely associated with an 
individual’s sense of self;51 and other examples of close associations between things 
                                                          
48 Ibid., para.92. 
49 Ibid., para.92. 
50 See further the psychologist William James’s notion of the ‘material self’: W. James, The Principles 
of Psychology, Volume I (1981 [1890], Harvard University Press), p279-324.  
51 This is arguably seen most clearly in cases involving searches of the home, where the 
interference with the home is often cast as constituting an interference with the sense of self 
(insofar as it closely touches private life) and as disrupting the sense of familiarity in the home. 
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and sense of self in the case law include the relevance ascribed to “sentimental 
attachment” to a thing (including in awards of damages)52 and the treatment of a 
bag search as a body search.53 These things, we might say, are things into which 
individual “psychic energy” is deemed to have been invested54 or that have already 
become “biographical objects”.55 They are things into which the individual has 
already extended her self.56 
 An assumption is quite clearly made in European human rights law, 
however, that there is some limit to the way in which the individual articulates 
herself in this way. The case of Botta v Italy (1998) draws out what this means in 
practice. The applicant, Mr Botta, was physically disabled, and he complained 
about the lack of facilities (in particular, access ramps and lavatories) to enable 
people with disabilities to access the beach and the sea at a private seaside resort. 
He alleged that this was in breach of Italian legislation and that the State had 
violated his Article 8 rights by failing to take appropriate measures to remedy the 
situation. In particular, he complained that the lack of access at the seaside resort 
had left him “unable to enjoy a normal social life which would enable him to 
participate in the life of the community and to exercise essential rights”.57 
The Court held that the right to respect for private life was not applicable 
here, because the “direct and immediate link” that there needed to be between the 
                                                          
Thus the Court has stated that “[t]he exercise of powers to interfere with home and private life 
must be confined within reasonable bounds to minimise the impact of such measures on the 
personal sphere of the individual guaranteed under Article 8 which is pertinent to security and 
well-being...” (28867/03, Keegan v UK (2006), para.34). 
52 E.g., 34044/02, Depalle v France (2010), para.90 (sentimental attachment to the house); 
35014/97, Hutten-Czapska v Poland (2006), para.248 (sentimental value of the family house); 
34078/02, Brosset-Triboulet and Others v France (2010), para.93 (sentimental attachment to the 
house); 24360/04, Giuran v Romania (2011), para.22 (the sentimental value of the items stolen 
from the applicant’s apartment); 55167/11, Waldemar Nowakowski v Poland (2012), para.56 (the 
sentimental value of a collection of old weapons).  
53 As per domestic law: 27153/07, Cacuci and S.C. Virra & Cont Pad S.RL. v Romania (2017), 
para.70. 
54 M. Csikszentmihalyi and E. Rochberg-Halton, The meaning of things: Domestic symbols and the self 
(1981, Cambridge University Press), p8. 
55 See V. Morin, ‘L’objet biographique’ (1969) Communications 13, 131-139; J. Hoskins, Biographical 
Objects: How Things Tell the Stories of People’s Lives (1998, Routledge). 
56 On the idea of which see further L. Malafouris, ‘Between brains, bodies and things: tectonoetic 
awareness and the extended self’, in C. Renfrew, C. Frith, and L. Malafouris (eds.), The Sapient 
Mind: Archaeology Meets Neuroscience (2009, Oxford University Press), 89-104.  
57 21439/93, Botta v Italy (1998), para.27. 
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measures sought by Mr Botta and his private life in order for there to be positive 
obligations on the State in this regard was lacking.58 Mr Botta was considered to 
have asserted a “right to gain access to the beach and the sea at a place distant 
from his normal place of residence during his holidays”: something that concerned 
“interpersonal relations of such broad and indeterminate scope” that there could 
be “no conceivable direct link” between the measures that he was urging and his 
private life.59  
If the framing of this case stemmed from the framing of the concept of 
‘private life’ in terms of the ‘primary’ intention of the Article 8 guarantee “to ensure 
the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each 
individual in his relations with other human beings”,60 the focus on how far, in 
terms of relations, the Article 8 guarantee extended derived from the sense that 
there is a limit to these relations, and also to the extent of the individual in his or 
her material environment. The reference to the idea that Mr Botta was out of his 
usual place and out of his usual time (he was “at a place distant from his normal 
place of residence” and on his holidays61) furthermore pulled the case out of the 
realm of his everyday life and implied that this made a difference to the nature of 
the ‘right’ that Mr Botta was asserting and distanced it still further from his private 
life.  
Since Botta v Italy, the Court has emphasised that in cases of this kind, 
“Article 8 cannot be considered applicable each time an individual’s everyday life 
is disrupted, but only in the exceptional cases where the State’s failure to adopt 
measures interferes with that individual’s right to personal development and his or 
her right to establish and maintain relations with other human beings and the 
outside world...”.62 A particular conception of the ‘everyday’ is adopted, therefore; 
and so in Zehnalová and Zehnal v The Czech Republic (2002), for example, in which 
Mrs Zehnalová and her husband Mr Zehnal complained about the inaccessibility 
                                                          
58 Ibid., para.34. 
59 Ibid., para.35. 
60 Ibid., para.32. 
61 Ibid., para.35. 
62 27677/02, Sentges v The Netherlands (2003, admissibility decision). 
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of a number of public buildings in their home town to people with impaired 
mobility, it was a significant factor for the ECtHR in its ruling as to the 
inadmissibility of the complaint that it was unclear, given “the large number of 
buildings complained of” (initially 220 buildings) “as to whether the first applicant 
needs to use them on a daily basis and whether there is a direct and immediate link 
between the measures the State is being urged to take and the applicants’ private 
life”.63 The everyday has a formative function in constructing an account of the 
material dimension of the self in this way.64 It matters in determining how far the 
individual extends in her material environment.65   
6.3.3 The form of things   
The ways of seeing and relating that are articulated here, with their constructions 
of foresight and material extent, set in train a way of abstracting from the individual 
and the thing, and this is further developed in the convergence of these elements 
in the idea of the form of the thing. The form of the thing is an image of the 
relationship that links the individual to the thing, and it enables the thing or the 
material environment of the individual to be carried through time. The idea of the 
form itself derives its logic from the notion of potentiality discussed in Chapter 
3.66 Potentiality not only underpins individual continuity in European human rights 
law but it also involves the ascription of a form which there is then a becoming 
into. This occurs, in particular, in conjunction with the idea of self-development 
                                                          
63 38621/97, Zehnalova and Zehnal v The Czech Republic (2002, admissibility decision), para.2. 
64 This is the term of the psychologist William James. See above n50. 
65 See further, e.g., 46133/99 and 48183/99, Smirnova v Russia (2003), which concerned, among 
other things, the complaint of one of the applicants that her national identity paper (the ‘internal 
passport’) – “a document essential for everyday living in the country” (para.89) – had been 
unjustifiably withheld by the authorities. The Court emphasised the way in which “in their 
everyday life Russian citizens have to prove their identity unusually often, even when performing 
such mundane tasks as exchanging currency or buying train tickets. The internal passport is also 
required for more crucial needs, for example, finding employment or receiving medical care. The 
deprivation of the passport therefore represented a continuing interference with the applicant's 
private life” (para.97). See also 27812/95, Malige v France (1998), in which it was relevant in 
classifying the sanction of deducting points from a driving licence in terms of Article 6 that “the 
right to drive a motor vehicle is very useful in everyday life and for carrying on an occupation” 
(para.39) – something from which the Court could infer that “although the deduction of points 
has a preventive character, it also has a punitive and deterrent character and is accordingly similar 
to a secondary penalty” (para.39). 
66 See Ch.3, part 3.2. 
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that directs the individual; but its logic also applies much more generally, so that 
things in European human rights law are ascribed with specific forms. For 
example, the things that are put in the place that is called the home (such as 
furniture) both come to carry and are mutually intertwined in the form of the 
familiarity that is represented in the home;67 the treatment of a bag search as a 
body search suggests that the bag comes to acquire the form of the inviolable;68 
the treatment of the crucifix as part of tradition enables it to be carried through by 
reference to that tradition;69 and cases concerning the right to peaceful enjoyment 
of possessions are treated in terms of the form of ownership, the essence of which 
is the ability to use and alienate the possessions in question.70   
The idea of the form in these cases tells us something about the continuing 
representation of the individual in the thing. For example, the form of things 
owned is ownership, and thinking about oneself as owner involves the continuing 
representation of “owner-identity” in the thing.71 But the notion of the form also 
tells us something about how things are carried through in terms of individual time 
and about the relation between the individual and the thing that is established in 
this regard. An example which illustrates this is the way in which questions of 
peaceful enjoyment and market value are intertwined when it comes to the right 
to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. Cases in which the complaint is that 
                                                          
67 See part 6.2.1 above. 
68 As per domestic law: 27153/07, Cacuci and S.C. Virra & Cont Pad S.RL. v Romania (2017), 
para.70. 
69 30814/06, Lautsi and Others v Italy (2011), para.68. 
70 Thus even where a right of property has “become precarious” and has “lost some of its 
substance”, it is still possible to say that it has not fully disappeared providing that the individuals 
can continue to use the possessions (7151/75 and 7152/75, Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1982), 
para.63). (See also, e.g., 14556/89, Papamichalopoulos and Others v Greece (1993), para.45; 27053/95, 
Vasilescu v Romania (1998), para.53.) And even where use is temporarily not possible, the fact of 
retaining the status of owner is what counts (see e.g., 5493/72, Handyside v UK (1976), para.62).  
71 The term comes from J. Lamb, The Things Things Say (2011, Princeton University Press), p42. 
See, e.g., 58254/00, Frizen v Russia (2005), which concerned the seizure of Mrs Frizen’s car in the 
course of criminal proceedings against her husband. Mrs Frizen argued that this seizure violated 
her property rights, as sole legal and registered owner of the car. The Court ultimately held that 
the interference with Mrs Frizen’s property rights had no legal basis; but in considering which of 
the rules regarding property the case was to be examined under, the Court distinguished this case 
from those “where the domestic authorities ordered forfeiture of physical things which had been 
the object of the offence...or by means of which the offence had been committed...even where 
such things belonged to third parties” (para 29). As Mrs Frizen submitted, “the vehicle in question 
was only for her personal use and...it was not used to commit any offence” (para 29). 
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there has been some interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions are 
accordingly tied up with the question of whether there has been some interference 
with the market value of the possessions (this non-interference with market value 
being deemed a part of peaceful enjoyment). In Galev and Others v Bulgaria (2009), 
for example, the applicants, who lived in a four-storey block of flats, complained 
about their neighbour’s reconstruction of her second-floor flat as a dental surgery, 
alleging, inter alia, that the operation of the surgery had prevented them from 
peacefully enjoying their possessions and that it had caused the value of their flats 
to decrease. The Court ruled this complaint to be manifestly ill-founded: as to the 
first limb, it noted that “Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee the right 
to enjoy one’s possessions in a pleasant environment”, and as to the second it 
noted that “while a severe nuisance may affect the value of real estate and thus 
amount to a partial expropriation, there is no evidence showing that the 
construction of the dentist’s surgery caused the value of the applicant’s flat to 
drop”.72 The sense was that it would be the language of market value – the language 
of the abstract representation of the thing – that would enable the thing to be 
carried through time, not the subjective experience of it. 
The effect of the carrying through of the thing or the material environment 
of the individual in reference to the form that is ascribed to the thing is further 
illustrated by Nerva and Others v UK (2002). The applicants in this case were waiting 
staff, and they complained about the decision of the domestic courts to treat the 
tips that were included by customers in cheque and credit card payments as the 
property of their employer, the effect of which was that their employer could treat 
the tips as part of their statutory minimum remuneration. They argued that this 
breached their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. 
The Court disagreed. It considered that the applicants “[could not] maintain 
that they had a separatet right to the tips and a separate right to minimum 
remuneration calculated without reference to those tips” and stated that “[t]he fact 
that the domestic courts ruled in a dispute between private litigants that the tips at 
                                                          
72 18324/04, Galev and Others v Bulgaria (2009, admissibility decision), para.2. 
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issue represented ‘remuneration’ within the meaning of the applicable legislation 
cannot of itself be said to engage the liability of the respondent State under Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1”.73 The Court emphasised that this was a matter of interpreting 
and applying domestic legislation; and the domestic courts had held that the title 
in the tips had passed to the employer who had then paid the tips to the applicants 
“out of its own funds”.74 Furthermore, the applicants “[could not] claim that they 
had a legitimate expectation that the tips at issue would not count towards 
remuneration” as this view “[assumed] that the customer intended that this would 
not be the case” – something that was “too imprecise a basis on which to found a 
legitimate expectation which could give rise to ‘possessions’ within the meaning of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1”.75 The Court concluded that “it was for the applicants 
to come to a contractual arrangement with their employer as to how the tips at 
issue were to be dealt with from the point of view of their wage entitlement” and 
that they could not “rely on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to base a claim to a higher 
level of earnings”.76  
In this case, the disruption of the relationship between the individual waiter 
and the customer with regards to the tips paid by that customer essentially 
occurred in the moment that payment was made by cheque or credit card. These 
modes of payment led to the passing of title to the employer, which in turn meant 
that the tip acquired a different form. It lost its form as a tip and became part of a 
wage, and this was because it became part of a different relationship (that between 
employer and employee). 
The form of the thing – as an image of the relationship that links the 
individual to the thing – constitutes, in this way, a representation of the individual 
in her relations with material things that involves an abstraction from life itself. It 
works alongside the way of seeing that emphasises foresight and the way of relating 
to material things that emphasises the material extent of the individual to make for 
an account in which the individual is conceived of as being attached to material 
                                                          
73 42295/98, Nerva and Others v UK (2002), para.43. 
74 Ibid., para.43. 
75 Ibid., para.43. 
76 Ibid., para.43. 
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things and as also extending beyond them – as being both attached to the present 
and carried beyond it. 
6.4 Beyond the present   
The condition of the present emerges as being one in which the focus is on 
containing the future. This means that the individual, in being attached to the 
present, is simultaneously conceived of as extending beyond it. She is located 
between present and future; and as we saw in the preceding section, this is 
underpinned by a way of seeing that emphasises foresight, a way of relating to 
material things that is based on a notion of the material extent of the individual, 
and a way of representing the individual in her relations with material things that 
involves an abstraction from life itself to deal in the language of forms. 
 This section examines the implications of this vision. It begins by analysing 
the logic of the form in more detail. I argue that the form’s logic of abstraction has 
a reflexive quality, such that the possibility arises for the form itself to become a 
thing, with the relationship between the individual and the thing then being 
rendered material and pursued for its own sake (6.4.1). This entails a shift from the 
practice of the thing (a practice originally represented in the form, in that the form 
is an image of the relationship between the individual and the thing) to the practice 
of the form (a practice of a representation) (6.4.2). I argue that the overall effect 
of this is that stability in European human rights law comes to be located beyond 
the present, with the individual conceived of in terms of that which is to come 
(6.4.3).  
6.4.1 Forms as things 
We have already seen how the logic of the form (as an image of the relationship 
between the individual and the thing) works to represent the relationship between 
the individual and the thing through time – and how it works, therefore, to 
represent and locate the individual between the present and the future. But forms 
can also be treated as things that are pursued as such. This has been partly enabled 
through the concept of ‘possession’ that underpins Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of 
the Convention – a concept that has “an autonomous meaning which is not limited 
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to ownership of physical goods”77 and that has been interpreted to extend into 
forms that are built up through the individual (such as forms of use and livelihood) 
and that would otherwise be inseparable from the individual. 
An example of the reconstruction of a form as a thing is to be found in 
Saghinadze and Others v Georgia (2010). The ECtHR in this case had to assess whether 
a cottage that the applicant had settled in with his family – a cottage that he had 
been offered by his employer, but to which he had no registered title – constituted 
a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In deciding that 
the applicant had “a right to use the cottage as his accommodation and that this 
right had a clear pecuniary dimension” such that it could be regarded as a 
‘possession’,78 the Court emphasised “the authorities' own manifest tolerance of 
the first applicant's exclusive, uninterrupted and open use of the cottage and the 
adjacent premises for more than ten years”.79 During that time “the first applicant 
installed and planted various fixtures, fruit trees and vegetables, and started 
keeping poultry and small livestock; he was also able to accommodate eight of his 
displaced relatives, without applying for additional permission from the State; the 
State never objected to the socio-economic and family environment established by 
the first applicant”.80 The way in which the applicant had been using the cottage, 
and the way in which he came to build up a “socio-economic and family 
environment” thus came to constitute a ‘possession’ within the meaning of the 
Convention. The form of use was thereby reconstructed as a thing. 
                                                          
77 See, e.g., 33202/96, Beyeler v Italy (2000), para.100. For example, the concept of ‘possessions’ 
has been interpreted to include other rights and interests that constitute assets and pecuniary 
assets such as – in certain situations – debts and claims (“even to a particular social benefit...if it 
is sufficiently established to be enforceable...”) (see, e.g., 11931/03, Teteriny v Russia (2005), 
para.47). The notion of ‘possession’ does have a material edge to it; thus “the hope of recognition 
of the survival of an old property right which it has long been impossible to exercise effectively 
cannot be considered as a ‘possession’...nor can a conditional claim which lapses as a result of the 
non-fulfilment of the condition” (see, e.g., 42527/98, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v Germany 
(2001), para.83). 
78 18768/05, Saghinadze and Others v Georgia (2010), para.108. 
79 Ibid., para.106. 
80 Ibid., para.106. See also 13216/05, Chiragov and Others v Armenia (2015), paras.146-147 (the 
treatment of a ‘right of use’ of land conferred on an individual as a possession within the meaning 
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1). 
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A similar reconstruction, albeit this time involving the form of livelihood, 
occurred in Doğan and Others v Turkey (2004), which concerned the forced eviction 
of the applicants from their village by the security forces and the authorities’ refusal 
to allow them to return to their homes and land. In addressing the alleged breach 
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 here, the Court held that the “overall economic 
activities” of the applicants could constitute ‘possessions’ within the meaning of 
this provision.81 It emphasised that the applicants had built up their livelihood in 
the village: “[a]lthough they did not have registered property, they either had their 
own houses constructed on the lands of their ascendants or lived in the houses 
owned by their fathers and cultivated the land belonging to the latter”; 
furthermore, they “had unchallenged rights over the common lands in the village, 
such as the pasture, grazing and the forest land, and...they earned their living from 
stockbreeding and tree-felling”.82 The applicants’ livelihood was reconstructed in 
this way as a ‘possession’ – a thing.  
The treatment of a form (such as a way of use or livelihood) as a possession 
poses a challenge to theories that depict close relationships between self-
possession and the possession of objects and between possession and narrative. 
Such theories depict the owning of something – its treatment as a possession – as 
being what enables an account of it to be given, with the idea being that ownership 
enables the incorporation of a thing into a narrative of self-continuity and, 
simultaneously, a construction of that same narrative self-continuity.83 The 
challenge posed by cases in which forms are treated as things is that these cases 
involve the alienation of that which is already bound up in the individual. The 
treatment of a form as a thing involves the taking of the image of the relationship 
between the individual and the thing – the taking of the image of the practice 
between the individual and the thing, for example (as in the cases of the forms of 
use and livelihood) – and its rendering material. This points to the reflexive quality 
of the form (the way in which it indicates back to the material present from which 
it came and continues to affect it) and to the consequently cyclical quality of its 
                                                          
81 8803/02 et al., Doğan and Others v Turkey (2004), para.139. 
82 Ibid., para.139. 
83 See further Lamb (2011), above n71, p64 et seq. 
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logic of abstraction (the way in which it involves a cycle of abstracting from the 
material present and then the rendering material of this abstraction). 
6.4.2 The practice of forms  
Where a form is rendered a thing in this way, two points of abstraction are 
involved. There is firstly the original abstraction: an abstraction from the 
relationship between the individual and the things in question (and therefore from 
the actual practice of things) to the form itself. This is the nature of the form as an 
image of the relationship between the individual and the thing; thus in the case of 
Doğan and Others v Turkey that we discussed above, the material activities of the 
working of the land and the felling of the trees were cast in the first place in the 
terms of the form of ‘livelihood’. The second point of abstraction occurs from the 
form to the practice of the form itself, which is to say that the focus shifts from 
the actual practice represented in the form (the felling of trees represented in the 
form of ‘livelihood’, for example) to the practice of the representation (the practice 
of a notion of ‘livelihood’ in terms of its treatment as a ‘possession’). 
 The effects of this second form of abstraction are illustrated in the case law 
in which the form of reputation is treated as a thing. The possibility for one’s 
reputation (as something made) to be treated as a thing possessed was left open in 
Niemietz v Germany (1992). The applicant in this case, Mr Niemietz, was a lawyer, 
and he argued that a search of his office (which the Court found to be in breach 
of Article 8) had impaired his reputation and had consequently breached Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1. The Court dismissed this strand of Mr Niemietz’s complaint, 
considering that it had already treated “the potential effects of the search on the 
applicant’s professional reputation” in terms of Article 8 such that no separate 
issue arose under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.84 It did not say, however, that 
reputation does not fall within the realm of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1; and so a 
space was left for the possibility that reputation could be treated as a thing 
possessed.    
                                                          
84 13710/88, Niemietz v Germany (1992), para.40. 
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In the earlier case of Van Marle and Others v The Netherlands (1986), the 
reputation of the applicants had in fact been indirectly treated as a possession in 
this sense. The case concerned a refusal by the domestic authorities to register the 
applicants as certified accountants, and in it the Court treated the clientele that the 
applicants had built up (through their reputation) as an asset “and, hence, a 
possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.85 The Court went 
on to find that there was an interference with the applicants’ right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of their possessions because “[t]he refusal to register the applicants as 
certified accountants radically affected the conditions of their professional 
activities and the scope of those activities was reduced. Their income fell, as did 
the value of their clientèle and, more generally, their business”.86 And so the 
reputation of the applicants in this case was treated, albeit indirectly, as a 
possession; and then in Niemietz v Germany the possibility for a more explicit 
treatment of reputation was left open.  
The question of the form of reputation arose once again in Buzescu v 
Romania (2005), which concerned the annulment of Mr Buzescu’s registration with 
the Constanţa Bar. Before the ECtHR, Mr Buzescu complained, inter alia, that the 
decision interfered with his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, 
arguing that “the economic interests associated with his business represented a 
‘possession’ within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1”.87 The Court noted 
that although the part of Mr Buzescu’s complaint that concerned “loss of future 
income” fell outside the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, “law practices and 
their goodwill” did constitute ‘possessions’ within the meaning of that provision.88 
But the difficulty in sustaining this distinction – arguably, the loss of clientele 
would only ever be relevant in this context because of its leading to a loss of 
income – was then revealed in the Court’s finding that “there was an interference 
with [Mr Buzescu’s] right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions” on the 
basis that “the annulment of [his] registration with the Constanţa Bar led to a loss 
                                                          
85 8543/79 et al., Van Marle and Others v The Netherlands (1986), para.41. 
86 Ibid., para.42. 
87 61302/00, Buzescu v Romania (2005), para.79. 
88 Ibid., para.81. 
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of that part of his clientele which was interested in his ability to provide the full 
range of services of a Romanian lawyer, and hence to a loss of income”.89  
In these cases, the pursuit of a form (reputation) leads to its being indirectly 
treated in terms of a thing. This, in turn, enables some other thing (for example, 
lost income) to be pulled within the notion of possession, in the name of the 
further pursuit of the form of the reputation. The focus shifts from the form itself 
(and from the actual practice represented in the form) to the practice of the form. 
And once the form has been alienated from the individual in this way, the 
individual can no longer remain in full possession of it, even though it is the very 
rendering of the form as a ‘possession’ within the meaning of the Convention that 
brings about this result. This is because the relocation of practice at the level of 
the form entails a shift to the presentation of the individual in the terms of the 
form – a shift from the realm of experience to the realm of representation.  
6.4.3 The location of stability  
The notion of the form emerges as having three expressions that are critical to the 
configuration of things in terms of individual time in European human rights law 
and that underpin the conceptualisation of the individual as being located between 
present and future. The form of the thing (as an image of the relationship that links 
the individual to the thing) enables the thing or the material environment of the 
individual to be carried through time. It presupposes the attachment of the 
individual to material things and to material circumstances (the image of the 
relationship is an image of this attachment) but it also conceives of this attachment 
as extending beyond the present. The form as a thing (involving the rendering 
material of the original image of the relationship that links the individual to the 
thing) points both to the reflexive quality of the form (the way in which it indicates 
back to the material present from which it came and continues to affect it) and to 
its logic of abstraction (the way in which the logic of the form is one of a cycle of 
abstracting and rendering material). The practice of the form (involving a practice of 
                                                          
89 Ibid., para.88. 
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the representation that the form constitutes) ties experience itself to the level of 
the form. 
 The construction of the form in this way implies that the form is a 
stabilising force in the location of the individual beyond the present and in the 
conceptualisation of the condition of the present as a condition of containing the 
future, because it supplies a frame for the carrying through of the individual 
beyond her material attachment to the present. This stabilising quality derives from 
the origins of the form in the notion of potentiality in European human rights law 
(potentiality being about becoming, and the form being a specific expression of a 
becoming into). Potentiality is itself conceived of as being stabilising. There are 
two reasons for this. First, potentiality generates individual continuity through time 
in European human rights law – something that we saw in detail in Chapter 3 and 
that is reflected in the way in which material things are conceived of as pointing 
beyond the present. Second, potentiality itself remains always beyond the present, 
to the point that it can never itself be rendered a material ‘thing’.90 It is conceived 
of as bearing a stable focus: a focus on that which is to come. Thus whereas others, 
and Hannah Arendt in particular, have depicted things themselves as “stabilizing 
human life”,91 the vision in European human rights law seems to be more that 
stability is primarily located at the level of the form (and in the final analysis, in 
potentiality).  
 The location of stability at the level of the form, and the conceptualisation 
of this as being both a consequence of and a part of the notion of individual 
continuity in European human rights law (by virtue of the relationship between 
the notion of the form and potentiality) is not, however, without implication for 
the notion of individual continuity itself. In particular, this way of locating stability 
entails the alienation of the individual, in the sense that an alienating way of relating 
                                                          
90 Thus in 46470/11, Parrillo v Italy (2015), discussed in Ch.3, part 3.2.1, and in a context in which 
the embryos were being treated in terms of vital potentiality (their potential to become human), 
the Court stated that “[having] regard to the economic and pecuniary scope of that Article, human 
embryos cannot be reduced to ‘possessions’ within the meaning of that provision” (para.215). 




is set out here92 – a way of relating that involves a distancing of the individual, the 
relocation of continuity at the level of her representation, and the emergence of a 
mode of being that is constituted on the basis of this distance and is located in the 
form (the representation itself). As we have seen in this chapter, this is what is 
concretised in the placement of things in terms of individual time: a placement 
which entails the location of the individual between present and future and 
therefore her representation in terms of that which is ‘to come’. And the effect of 
this account of the relationship between the individual and material things – an 
account entailing a conceptualisation of the individual as being attached to the 
present and as extending beyond it – is that a notion of alienation emerges as being 
inherent within the vision of individual continuity in European human rights law.  
6.5 Conclusion  
The argument of this chapter has been that the individual is conceived of in 
European human rights law as being attached to the present and as extending 
beyond it. This, I have suggested, is concretised in European human rights law’s 
vision of the relationship between the individual and material things, which 
emerges as follows. Things are cast in European human rights law as materialising 
time: as pointing to that which is to come as well as that which has already 
happened. This gives rise to a conception of the condition of the present as being 
a condition of containing the future, and this, in turn, makes for an account in 
which the individual is located between present and future – attached to material 
things and extending beyond them. This is underpinned by a way of seeing that 
emphasises foresight, a way of relating to material things that is based on a notion 
of the material extent of the individual (of how far she extends in her material 
environment), and a way of representing the individual in her relations with 
material things that involves an abstraction from life itself to deal in the language 
of forms (a form being an image of the relationship between the individual and the 
material thing). The representation of the individual in this way culminates in a 
                                                          
92 See further Jaeggi’s theory of what alienation of this kind (in the sense of a disruption in one’s 
identification with and appropriation of the world) looks like: R. Jaeggi, Alienation (transl. F. 
Neuhouser and A. E. Smith; ed. F. Neuhouser) (2014, Columbia University Press, New York). 
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shift from the realm of the individual’s relations with the thing to the practice of 
what these relations represent – a shift which, I have argued, means that stability 
in European human rights law emerges as being located beyond the present and 
in the terms of potentiality – the terms of that which is to come. The effect of this 
is that the notion of individual continuity in European human rights law has to 
accommodate a notion of alienation, because in the moment that stability is located 
beyond the present, individual continuity is relocated at the level of the 
representation of the individual, and a mode of being emerges that is located 
between present and future and in terms of that which is to come.  
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– CONCLUSION – 
 
This thesis has offered an account of how European human rights law imagines 
the human condition. It has shown how a series of ordering assumptions about 
the human condition structure European human rights law; and it has shown, 
moreover, that these assumptions are a constitutive part of its nature as a lived 
order. What I want to do in these final pages is to draw the arguments of my thesis 
together and to consider the overall vision of the lived order of individuation that 
is articulated in European human rights law. I will begin with a brief summary of 
the arguments made in the six substantive chapters.  
 In Chapter 1, I argued that we can think of the ECHR legal order as an order 
of individuation (as an order that is constituted upon and structured by a vision of 
‘the individual’), and, more specifically, as a lived order of individuation (as an order 
that presupposes and expresses a mode of being such that the order is itself lived). 
I argued that a lived order has three main features: it is governed by an ethos, which 
functions to support and structure the mode of being of the order; it is internalised 
by those within it; and it structures life by setting out a vision of space, time, body, 
wisdom, and things.  
 In Chapter 2, I argued that space is conceptualised in European human 
rights law by reference to two visions: a phenomenological vision of the sense of 
place of the individual, which I described as an idea of presence, and a more 
functional or instrumental vision of the position of the individual – of the 
representation of the individual through the terms of some role or status – which 
I described as an idea of presentation. I argued that the two visions are fundamentally 
at odds with one another, but that their mediation opens up a space for the 
negotiation of individual identity in European human rights law.  
 In Chapter 3, I argued that this idea of individual identity is structured by a 
notion of individual continuity across time: a notion that is borne of European 
human rights law’s conceptualisation of ‘being’ as being about ‘becoming’ 
(potentiality) and that is grounded by reference to two conditions: habituation 
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(which is about what the individual is habituated to) and narrativisation (which is 
about the construction of narrative as a means through which to organise life). I 
argued that whilst these conditions are cast as being about the individual’s sense 
of continuity, they also enable the individual to be pinned down within the terms 
of European human rights law and the continuity of its order to be secured. I 
argued that this double function is enabled by a vision of the human condition in 
which we are assumed to have a need to assume our self-continuity across time. 
 In Chapter 4, I argued that this assumption about our need to assume our 
self-continuity is bound up in the way in which European human rights law 
conceives of us as having a need to be recognised by others – a need which is 
conceived of as originating in our sense of our body. The chapter developed an 
account of the theory of recognition elaborated in European human rights law on 
this basis; and I argued that this is, in essence, a theory of profound mutual 
dependence between self and other – a theory in which we are cast as depending 
on the other in order to gain exposure to our vulnerabilities and in which in the 
face of the loss of a specific other, the focus comes to be on reconstituting the 
effects of the loss of recognition by that other.  
In Chapter 5, I examined the way in which an interaction is envisaged 
between our fundamental assumptions (as originating in our sense of our bodies) 
and our experiences in European human rights law. I argued that a normative 
account of the management of reality is elaborated, and that this account 
forefronts a particular manner of integrating experience, understanding, and 
knowledge that constitutes European human rights law’s conception of wisdom. 
In particular, I argued that as part of this the individual is oriented towards an 
outlook on life that forefronts a series of capacities that essentially require her to 
detach from reality, so that European human rights law’s vision of the wise 
management of reality is conceived of as involving a detachment from reality itself.  
In Chapter 6, I examined the vision of the present that is bound up in this 
conceptualisation of the management of reality. I argued that the individual is 
envisaged as being attached to the present and as extending beyond the present, 
and that this is concretised in European human rights law’s vision of the 
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relationship between the individual and material things. I argued that the 
representation of the individual in this way – as ultimately located between present 
and future – means that stability in European human rights law is located beyond 
the present and in the terms of that which is to come. The effect of this is that the 
notion of individual continuity in European human rights law has to accommodate 
a notion of alienation, because in the moment that stability is located beyond the 
present, individual continuity is relocated at the level of the representation of the 
individual, and a mode of being emerges that is located between present and future 
and in terms of that which is to come.   
*** 
The account that I have developed through the six chapters of my thesis is an 
account of five main categories of ordering assumptions that structure European 
human rights law and are all broadly oriented towards a notion of individual 
continuity – towards the persistence of ‘the individual’ through time. These are 
assumptions about the way in which ‘the individual’ develops an identity in 
European human rights law, about her need for a sense of continuity across time, 
about her need for recognition by others, about her agency in managing reality and 
her capacity to detach from reality, and about the way in which she is located 
between present and future by being both attached to material circumstances and 
able to extend beyond these. My argument has been that these assumptions are a 
constitutive part of the nature of European human rights law as a lived order. To 
see what binds these assumptions together, therefore – to see what vision of the 
human condition underpins and emerges from the notion of individual continuity 
that these assumptions give rise to – we need to turn our attention back to the 
question of the lived order constituted by European human rights law. In 
particular, we need to consider the three features of lived order outlined in Chapter 
1: the structure of its vision of life (in terms of its account of space, time, body, 
wisdom, and things); its internalisation as an order; and the ethos that governs it. 
Drawing the chapters of this thesis together, we can account for the lived order of 
individuation set out by European human rights law as follows.  
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1. The structure of European human rights law’s vision of life (in terms of its account 
of space, time, body, wisdom, and things) is as follows. Space is conceived of 
in terms of the sense of place and the position of the individual (the 
mediation of which generate a space for the negotiation of questions of 
individual identity). Time is conceived of in terms of individual 
continuity (a notion which has its origins in an idea of potentiality). The 
vision of the body that is set out is a vision of the way in which our 
bodies ground us (in the sense that our fundamental assumptions about 
the world and our place in the world are cast as being based on our 
bodies) and relate us to each other (in the sense that our bodies are cast 
as being bound up in each other, as reflected in the theory of mutual 
recognition elaborated in this context). Wisdom is conceived of in terms 
of a mode of managing reality and addressing life that involves the 
development of an ability to detach from reality itself. The vision of 
things set out is a vision of a way of relating to material things that 
forefronts their standing in relation to individual time: a vision that 
involves a conceptualisation of the individual as being attached to 
material things and as extending beyond them.  
    
2. The internalisation of the order that is constituted by European human rights law is 
envisaged in terms of (and is reflected in) the way in which those within 
the jurisdiction of ECHR law rely on, appeal to, and fundamentally 
assume the existence of the rights and freedoms set out in the ECHR. 
More than that, we have seen in this thesis how European human rights 
law is conceived of as engaging with the assumptions of those within its 
jurisdiction, insofar as it makes assumptions about these assumptions 
(about a need for a sense of continuity and a need to be recognised, for 
example). The consequence of the way in which European human 
rights law sets out a vision of the human condition in these terms is that 
when those within the jurisdiction of ECHR law assume their rights in 
the terms of the ECHR, they also assume European human rights law’s 
vision of the human condition. This to say that appeals to European 
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human rights law are also, inevitably and necessarily, appeals to its vison 
of the human condition. The ECHR legal order is accordingly lived and 
internalised through the way in which (and to the extent that) those 
within the jurisdiction of ECHR law rely on and assume their rights and 
freedoms under the ECHR.  
 
3. The ethos that governs the lived order of European human rights law is an ethos 
of individual continuity, involving an appeal to – and a concern with – 
the persistence of the individual through time. Thus the space of 
individual identity that is articulated in European human rights law is 
structured by a notion of individual continuity, the basis of which is an 
assumption that the individual needs to assume her self-continuity; 
European human rights law’s account of the fundamental assumptions 
that the individual makes more generally generates a theory of mutual 
recognition that leads us towards a vision of how the individual 
reorients herself (and therefore sustains herself) in the face of loss and 
disruption; the account of the management of experience that is set out 
on this basis is conceived of as being directed towards the acquisition 
of wisdom and as being, therefore, a developmental account; and finally, 
the individual is conceived of as relating to material things in a manner 
that depicts things as materially representing individual continuity – a 
representation that leads to a vision of the individual as located between 
present and future and in terms of that which is to come.  
 
It may be recalled that I said in Chapter 1 that the ethos of a lived 
order has three dimensions: a local dimension (involving the place of 
the order); a common dimension (involving the body of the order); and 
an individual dimension (involving the subject of the order). The ethos 
of individual continuity that governs the lived order of European 
human rights law has three dimensions in this sense. Local continuity 
pertains to the way in which the ethos of individual continuity is 
envisaged in the context of the jurisdiction of the order of individuation 
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set out in European human rights law (it is a vision that is tied to this 
jurisdiction, since it is tied to European human rights law). Common 
continuity pertains to the way in which the vision of individual continuity 
is also a vision of the continuity of the mode of being articulated 
through European human rights law – and, indeed, a vision of the 
continuity of the order of European human rights law itself – since ‘the 
individual’ is the basis of this order entirely (and so in securing the 
continuity of this individual, the continuity of the order is secured). 
Individual continuity pertains, finally, to the conceptualisation of the 
subject of the order of individuation – ‘the individual’ – in terms of her 
individual continuity and as located between present and future and 
oriented towards her continuity.  
*** 
And so we come, finally, to the question of the mode of being that is presupposed 
and expressed by European human rights law’s mode of order; and what we have 
seen in this thesis is that the ethos of individual continuity that is set out in 
European human rights law functions to support and secure a mode of being that 
is about becoming. The individual is conceived of as being in a continuous state 
of becoming, and this is not only in the sense of the notion of ethical potentiality 
discussed in Chapter 3 (a notion which, as we saw in that chapter, involves a vision 
of the continuous development and realisation of the self) but in the sense that the 
notion of individual continuity that drives European human rights law involves a 
conceptualisation of a continuous process of coming into the terms of European 
human rights law and of coming to terms with all that which must be brought to terms 
according to European human rights law.  
Chapters 2 and 3 were, accordingly, about coming into the terms of 
European human rights law, in that they set out an account of what it means to 
come into the language of presence and presentation that underpins European 
human rights law’s idea of ‘the individual’ and into the language of dignity that 
underpins European human rights law entirely. Chapters 4 and 5 were about 
coming to terms with all that which must be brought to terms according to 
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European human rights law, in that they grappled with European human rights 
law’s vision of the challenge of putting something into terms and living with it 
when the possibility of the former somehow presupposes the latter and the latter 
simultaneously the former. The chapters showed how, in this context, European 
human rights law envisages the management of specific experiences (like loss) and 
sets out a broader account of what it means in European human rights law to 
integrate experiences (including those that are at odds with our fundamental 
assumptions) into our assumptive frameworks and to accordingly acquire 
experience. Chapter 6, finally, was about the effect of this vision of coming to 
terms, in that it set out an account of the logic of this vision – a logic which 
ultimately involves the locating of the individual between present and future, and 
the conceptualisation of the present as being about containing the future – and 
considered the implications of a focus on the ‘coming’ of the coming to terms (a 
focus which eventually means that individual continuity is relocated at the level of 
representation and the individual is conceived of in terms of that which is ‘to 
come’). 
The vision of the human condition that emerges in European human rights 
law is, in this way, a vision in which the fundamental question to be negotiated is 
a question of coming to terms – a question of coming into the terms of European 
human rights law and of coming to terms with all that which must be brought to terms 
according to European human rights law. This mode of becoming – of coming to 
terms – is what binds the ordering assumptions of EHRL together and underpins 
the notion of individual continuity that these assumptions give rise to. It also, 
therefore, underpins the six qualities that European human rights law relies on for 
its significance and that were introduced in the Introduction to this thesis. It 
underpins the interpretive vision of European human rights law, in that, as we have 
seen, an account of what it means to come to terms underlies the interpretation of 
cases before the ECtHR. It structures the modes of reasoning of European human 
rights law, by way of which conflicting interests are brought into terms with each 
other. It underpins the integration of values that we see in European human rights 
law, in that the provisions of the ECHR are integrated in the interpretation of the 
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ECtHR by reference to a vision of what it means to come to terms. It structures 
European human rights law’s expression of a vision of emancipation, insofar as 
emancipation is cast as involving being brought into the terms of European human 
rights law (in the way set out in Chapters 2 and 3) and claiming through the 
language of these terms. It structures the expression of the therapeutic potential of 
European human rights law, insofar as European human rights law is conceived 
of as supplying a language and a means for coming to terms with experiences that 
may well otherwise resist the very possibility of a (potentially beneficial) 
expression. And it structures the expression of the form of accountability that is 
pursued through European human rights law, insofar as the constraint that 
European human rights law places on State power – and its delineation, more 
specifically, of the use of that power – is bound up in an account of how the 
individual comes to terms.  
*** 
That, then, is my thesis: that European human rights law imagines the human 
condition as a condition of coming to terms. And what we have seen in this thesis 
is what this vision entails, which is to say that we have seen an account of how life 
is lived when this vision is lived. To conclude, I want to reflect on two implications 
of this drawing of an order of individuation around a mode of being of becoming 
– a mode of coming to terms.  
The first implication is that the possibility of ‘arriving’ (of being as anything 
other than becoming) is precluded by the very nature of the structure of the order 
that is constituted by European human rights law. This is an order that, as I have 
argued, presupposes and expresses a mode of being of becoming – a mode of 
coming to terms – and is sustained by an ethos of individual continuity that both 
functions to support and structure this mode of being and simultaneously sustains 
the continuity of the order of individuation itself. The effect of this vision – a 
vision of continuity based on a mode of being as becoming – is that there is never 
any need to account for what it looks like to ‘come’ to terms. This is not only an 
effect at the level of the individual, who is always conceived of as becoming. It is 
also, and inevitably (given the nature of European human rights law as an order 
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that is constituted upon and structured by this individual), an effect at the level of 
the order, in the sense that there is never any need to give an account that points 
to anything beyond European human rights law’s order of individuation. This is 
because, in expressing and presupposing a mode of being that is about becoming, 
European human rights law’s order of individuation is conceived of as exhausting 
the possibility of a ‘beyond’ that is not accommodated by it. Thus it is not only 
that there is no need to give an account of what it looks like to ‘come’ to terms, or 
to go ‘beyond’ the order; it is that these possibilities are precluded entirely. 
The second implication of the mode of being of becoming articulated here 
is related to the first; and it is that the possibility of writing a full account of ‘the 
individual’ in European human rights law is precluded by the nature of the form 
of order that ‘the individual’ is an organising principle of. For in European human 
rights law’s order of individuation – an order which has, as its mode of being, a 
mode of becoming – ‘the individual’ is always, necessarily, an individual who is 
‘coming to terms’: an individual who is always ‘to come’. We can draw out the 
assumptions that are made in European human rights law about ‘the individual’, 
therefore; but we can never fully account for ‘the individual’ who is always ‘to 
come’.  
*** 
This thesis has offered an account of the vision of the human condition that 
underpins the interpretation of the ECHR by the ECtHR. It has shown how a 
series of assumptions about the human condition are made in European human 
rights law; and it has shown how these assumptions structure European human 
rights law and are a constitutive part of its nature as a lived order. More specifically, 
my thesis has offered an account of the vision of the human condition that 
underpins and emerges from these assumptions. This vision is one of the human 
condition as a condition in which the fundamental question to be negotiated is a 
question of coming to terms – a question of coming into the terms of European 
human rights law and of coming to terms with all that which must be brought to 
terms according to European human rights law. It is this vision that European 
human rights law relies on for its significance, in the sense that it underpins its 
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interpretive vision, its modes of reasoning, its integration of values, its expression 
of a vision of emancipation, its therapeutic potential, and its form of accountability. 
It is this vision that underpins European human rights law’s nature as a lived order 
of individuation. And it is this vision, finally, that is brought to bear every time an 
appeal to an ECHR right is made. 
267 
 
– BIBLIOGRAPHY – 
 
Case law 
European Court of Human Rights  
1474/62 et al., Case “Relating to Certain Aspects on the Use of Languages in Education in 
Belgium” v Belgium (1968) 
5100/71 et al., Engel and Others v The Netherlands (1976) 
5493/72, Handyside v UK (1976) 
5310/71, Ireland v UK (1978) 
5856/72, Tyrer v UK (1978) 
6833/74, Marckx v Belgium (1979) 
7151/75 and 7152/75, Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 
8919/80, Van der Mussele v Belgium (1983) 
9214/80 et al., Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK (1985) 
9063/80, Gillow v UK (1986) 
8793/79, James and Others v UK (1986) 
9815/82, Lingens v Austria (1986) 
8543/79 et al., Van Marle and Others v The Netherlands (1986) 
9267/81, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium (1987) 
9749/82, W. v UK (1987) 
10737/84, Müller and Others v Switzerland (1988) 
10454/83, Gaskin v UK (1989) 
10522/83, Mellacher and Others v Austria (1989) 
268 
 
14038/88, Soering v UK (1989) 
15576/89, Cruz Varas and Others v Sweden (1991) 
12313/86, Moustaquim v Belgium (1991) 
12742/87, Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v Ireland (1991) 
16213/90, Burghartz and Schnyder Burghartz v Switzerland (1992) 
13590/88, Campbell v UK (1992) 
12945/87, Hadjianastassiou v Greece (1992) 
13710/88, Niemietz v Germany (1992) 
13441/87, Olsson v Sweden (No 2) (1992) 
14556/89, Papamichalopoulos and Others v Greece (1993) 
13580/88, Karlheinz Schmidt v Germany (1994) 
16969/90, Keegan v Ireland (1994) 
13470/87, Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria (1994) 
27776/95, AG and Others v Sweden (1995, admissibility decision) 
15225/89, Friedl v Austria (1995) 
15375/89, Gasus Dosier-und Fördertechnik GmbH v The Netherlands (1995) 
18072/91, Velosa Barreto v Portugal (1995) 
17862/91, Cantoni v France (1996) 
21928/93, Hussain v UK (1996) 
17383/90, Johansen v Norway (1996) 
15318/89, Loizidou v Turkey (1996) 
23389/94, Singh v UK (1996) 
17419/90, Wingrove v UK (1996) 
269 
 
23178/94, Aydin v Turkey (1997) 
23078/93, Bouchelkia v France (1997) 
21627/93 et al., Laskey and Others v UK (1997) 
25017/94, Mehemi v France (1997) 
20972/92, Raninen v Finland (1997) 
29107/95, Stedman v UK (1997, admissibility decision) 
21830/93, X, Y and Z v UK (1997) 
21439/93, Botta v Italy (1998) 
26102/95, Dalia v France (1998) 
27812/95, Malige v France (1998) 
27053/95, Vasilescu v Romania (1998) 
31127/96, E.P. v Italy (1999) 
45924/99, Juric v Sweden (1999) 
24833/94, Matthews v UK (1999) 
25803/94, Selmouni v France (1999) 
33202/96, Beyeler v Italy (2000) 
29192/95, Ciliz v The Netherlands (2000) 
32492/96 et al., Coëme and Others v Belgium (2000) 
32346/96, Glaser v UK (2000) 
40031/98, Gnahoré v France (2000) 
25498/94, Messina v Italy (No. 2) (2000) 
46346/99, Noack and Others v Germany (2000, admissibility decision) 
32842/96, Nuutinen v Finland (2000) 
270 
 
39221/98 and 41963/98, Scozzari and Giunta v Italy (2000) 
44599/98, Bensaid v UK (2001) 
22430/93, Bronda v Italy (2001) 
27238/95, Chapman v UK (2001) 
25781/94, Cyprus v Turkey (2001) 
42393/98, Dahlab v Switzerland (2001, admissibility decision) 
25702/94, K and T v Finland (2001) 
37794/97, Pannullo and Forte v France (2001) 
33394/96, Price v UK (2001) 
42527/98, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v Germany (2001) 
28945/95, T.P. and K.M. v UK (2001) 
29392/95, Z and Others v UK (2001) 
36515/97, Fretté v France (2002) 
28957/95, Goodwin v UK (2002) 
25680/94, I v UK (2002) 
34315/96, Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v Austria (2002) 
46544/99, Kutzner v Germany (2002) 
39393/98, M.G. v UK (2002) 
53176/99, Mikulić v Croatia (2002) 
42295/98, Nerva and Others v UK (2002) 
56547/00, P, C, and S v UK (2002) 
2346/02, Pretty v UK (2002) 
38621/97, Zehnalova and Zehnal v The Czech Republic (2002, admissibility decision) 
271 
 
39665/98 and 40086/98, Ezeh and Connors v UK (2003) 
36022/97, Hatton and Others v UK (2003) 
41666/98, Kyrtatos v Greece (2003) 
52750/99, Lorsé and others v The Netherlands (2003) 
48206/99, Maire v Portugal (2003) 
42326/98, Odièvre v France (2003) 
27677/02, Sentges v The Netherlands (2003, admissibility decision) 
38822/97, Shishkov v Bulgaria (2003) 
46133/99 and 48183/99, Smirnova v Russia (2003) 
50901/99, Van der Ven v The Netherlands (2003) 
35968/97, Van Kück v Germany (2003) 
24209/94, Y.F. v Turkey (2003) 
23656/94, Ayder and Others v Turkey (2004) 
69949/01, Aziz v Cyprus (2004) 
8803/02 et al., Doğan and Others v Turkey (2004) 
74969/01, Görgülü v Germany (2004) 
36983/97, Haas v The Netherlands (2004) 
45582/99, L. v the Netherlands (2004) 
48939/99, Öneryildiz v Turkey (2004) 
58255/00, Prokopovich v Russia (2004) 
46117/99, Taşkin and Others v Turkey (2004) 
53924/00, VO v France (2004) 
36536/02, B. and L. v UK (2005) 
272 
 
61302/00, Buzescu v Romania (2005) 
55723/00, Fadeyeva v Russia (2005) 
58254/00, Frizen v Russia (2005) 
11057/02, Haase v Germany (2005) 
44774/98, Leyla Şahin v Turkey (2005) 
46221/99, Öcalan v Turkey (2005) 
73316/01, Siliadin v France (2005) 
11931/03, Teteriny v Russia (2005) 
48542/99, Zawadka v Poland (2005) 
61564/00, Elli Poluhas Dödsbo v Sweden (2006) 
35014/97, Hutten-Czapska v Poland (2006) 
58757/00, Jäggi v Switzerland (2006) 
54810/00, Jalloh v Germany (2006) 
28867/03, Keegan v UK (2006) 
53157/99 et al., Ledyayeva et al. v Russia (2006) 
77617/01, Mikheyev v Russia (2006) 
13178/03, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium (2006) 
46410/99, Üner v The Netherlands (2006) 
17209/02, Zarb Adami v Malta (2006) 
56760/00, Akpinar and Altun v Turkey (2007) 
69735/01, Chair and J.B. v Germany (2007) 
27473/02, Erdoğan Yağiz v Turkey (2007) 
6339/05, Evans v UK (2007) 
273 
 
70204/01, Frérot v France (2007) 
31753/02, Kaya v Germany (2007) 
72118/01, Khamidov v Russia (2007) 
39388/05, Maumousseau and Washington v France (2007) 
5410/03, Tyisąc v Poland (2007) 
68354/01, Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v Austria (2007) 
15339/02 et al., Budayeva and Others v Russia (2008) 
27058/05, Dogru v France (2008) 
55525/00, Hadri-Vionnet v Switzerland (2008) 
18620/03, Juppala v Finland (2008) 
21906/04, Kafkaris v Cyprus (2008) 
35991/04, Kearns v France (2008) 
3013/04, Khadzhialiyev and Others v Russia (2008) 
1638/03, Maslov v Austria (2008) 
30562/04 and 30566/04, S and Marper v UK (2008) 
33629/06, Vajnai v Hungary (2008) 
46423/06, Beganović v Croatia (2009) 
26713/05, Bigaeva v Greece (2009) 
18324/04, Galev and Others v Bulgaria (2009, admissibility decision) 
49151/07, Muñoz Díaz v Spain (2009) 
1234/05, Reklos and Davourlis v Greece (2009) 
18527/02, Tonchev v Bulgaria (2009) 
16064/90 et al., Varnava and Others v Turkey (2009) 
274 
 
25579/05, A, B and C v Ireland (2010) 
38832/06, Alajos Kiss v Hungary (2010) 
52502/07, Aune v Norway (2010) 
34078/02, Brosset-Triboulet and Others v France (2010) 
46113/99 et al., Demopoulos and Others v Turkey (2010) 
34044/02, Depalle v France (2010) 
302/02, Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and Others v Russia (2010) 
41615/07, Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (2010) 
18768/05, Saghinadze and Others v Georgia (2010) 
30141/04, Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2010) 
60333/00, Slyusarev v Russia (2010) 
29878/07, Steindel v Germany (2010, admissibility decision) 
28708/06, Trdan and Ć v Slovenia (2010) 
23459/03, Bayatyan v Armenia (2011) 
5056/10, Emre v Switzerland (No 2) (2011) 
9718/03, Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v Romania (2011) 
22590/04, Girard v France (2011) 
24360/04, Giuran v Romania (2011) 
28847/08, Gladovic v Croatia (2011) 
31950/06, Graziani-Weiss v Austria (2011) 
5829/04, Khodorkovskiy v Russia (2011) 
31827/02, Laduna v Slovakia (2011) 
30814/06, Lautsi and Others v Italy (2011) 
275 
 
42310/04, Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v Ukraine (2011) 
35348/06, R and H v UK (2011) 
22266/04, Rytchenko v Russia (2011) 
2040/06, Sbârnea v Romania (2011) 
17080/07, Schneider v Germany (2011) 
37452/02, Stummer v Austria (2011) 
26971/07, V v Slovenia (2011) 
18968/07, V.C. v Slovakia (2011) 
45071/09, Ahrens v Germany (2012) 
26940/10, Antwi and Others v Norway (2012) 
39954/08, Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012) 
24027/07 et al., Babar Ahmad and Others v UK (2012) 
67724/09, C.N. and V. v France (2012) 
13589/07, Cristescu v Romania (2012) 
40721/08, Fáber v Hungary (2012) 
57693/10, Kalucza v Hungary (2012) 
23338/09, Kautzor v Germany (2012) 
1051/06, Mihai Toma v Romania (2012) 
29518/10, N.B. v Slovakia (2012) 
805/09, Pascal v Romania (2012) 
39472/07 and 39474/07, Popov v France (2012) 
33376/07, Piruzyan v Armenia (2012) 
126/05, Scoppola v Italy (No. 3) (2012) 
276 
 
42202/07, Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v Greece (2012) 
43547/08, Stübing v Germany (2012) 
19433/07, Tyagunova v Russia (2012) 
42857/05, Van der Heijden v The Netherlands (2012) 
40660/08 and 60641/08, Von Hannover v Germany (No. 2) (2012) 
55167/11, Waldemar Nowakowski v Poland (2012) 
24626/09, X v Turkey (2012) 
8759/05, Csoma v Romania (2013) 
48420/10 et al., Eweida and Others v UK (2013) 
34529/10, Gutsanovi v Bulgaria (2013) 
552/10, I.B. v Greece (2013) 
55508/07 and 29520/09, Janowiec and Others v Russia (2013) 
13423/09, Mehmet Şentürk and Bekír Şentürk v Turkey (2013) 
19840/09, Shindler v UK (2013) 
66069/09 et al., Vinter and Others v UK (2013) 
29617/07, Vojnity v Hungary (2013) 
45872/06, Yuriy Volkov v Ukraine (2013) 
38552/05, Abdulayeva v Russia (2014) 
42488/02, Dzemyuk v Ukraine (2014) 
56030/07, Fernández Martínez v Spain (2014) 
49327/11, Gough v UK (2014) 
37873/04, Konovalova v Russia (2014) 
17254/11, Krasicki v Poland (2014) 
277 
 
50132/12, Marić v Croatia (2014) 
24069/03 et al, Öcalan v Turkey (No. 2) (2014) 
2210/12, P.F. v Poland (2014) 
4605/05, Petrova v Latvia (2014) 
6717/08, Ruszkowska v Poland (2014) 
43835/11, S.A.S. v France (2014) 
5049/12, Senchishak v Finland (2014) 
32541/08 and 43441/08, Svinarenko and Slyadnev v Russia (2014) 
60092/12, Z.J. v Lithuania (2014) 
39350/13, A.S. v Switzerland (2015) 
23380/09, Bouyid v Belgium (2015) 
13216/05, Chiragov and Others v Armenia (2015) 
61243/08, Elberte v Lativa (2015) 
41418/04, Khoroshenko v Russia (2015) 
10161/13, M. and M. v Croatia (2015) 
10383/09, Mamchur v Ukraine (2015) 
46470/11, Parrillo v Italy (2015) 
40167/06, Sargsyan v Azerbaijan (2015) 
15711/13, Stolyarova v Russia (2015) 
14097/12 et al., Varga and Others v Hungary (2015) 
39678/03, Voronkov v Russia (2015) 
49304/09, Biržietis v Lithuania (2016) 
33677/10 and 52340/10, Fürst-Pfeifer v Austria (2016) 
278 
 
23682/13, Guberina v Croatia (2016) 
25960/13, I.A.A. and Others v UK (2016, admissibility decision) 
1870/05, Irina Smirnova v Ukraine (2016) 
46577/15, Ivanova and Cherkezov v Bulgaria (2016) 
34238/09, Lhermitte v Belgium (2016) 
61495/11, M.G.C. v Romania (2016) 
30955/12, Mandet v France (2016) 
7334/13, Muršić v Croatia (2016) 
22743/07, Otgon v The Republic of Moldova (2016) 
37798/13, Belcacemi and Oussar v Belgium (2017) 
27153/07, Cacuci and S.C. Virra & Cont Pad S.RL. v Romania (2017) 
17484/15, Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v Portugal (2017) 
21884/15, Chowdury and Others v Greece (2017) 
4619/12, Dakir v Belgium (2017) 
77248/12, Dimcho Dimov v Bulgaria (No. 2) (2017) 
81272/12, Ioniţă v Romania (2017) 
60367/08 and 961/11, Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v Russia (2017) 
56080/13, Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v Portugal (2017) 
22662/13 et al., Matiošaitis and Others v Lithuania (2017) 
29086/12, Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v Switzerland (2017) 
25358/12, Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy (2017) 
72105/14 and 20415/15, Silva and Mondim Correia v Portugal (2017) 
28768/12, Wdowiak v Poland (2017) 
279 
 
16112/15, Fröhlich v Germany (2018) 
Court of Justice of the European Union 
C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen (1963) ECLI:EU:C:1963:1 
C-497/10 PPU, Barbara Mercredi v Richard Chaffe (2010) ECLI:EU:C:2010:829 
National courts  
30 BVerfGe 173 (1971) (Mephisto) (German Constitutional Court) 
39 BVerfGE 1 (1975) (First Abortion Decision) (German Constitutional Court) 
Judgment 118/1996 (Italian Constitutional Court) 




Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (England and Wales) 
Article 66 of the French Constitution 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU  
Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction 
Books, articles, and chapters 
Abelard, P. Peter Abelard’s Ethics (ed. D. E. Luscombe) (1971 [c.late.1130s], Oxford 
University Press) 
Adam, B. Time and Social Theory (1990, Polity Press) 
Agamben, G. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (transl. D. Heller-Roazen) 
(1998 [1995], Stanford University Press) 
Agamben, G. The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life (transl. A. Kotsko) 
(2013, Stanford University Press) 
Akhtar, S. Matters of Life and Death: Psychoanalytic Reflections (2011, Karnac Books) 
Anderson, B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism 
(2006 [1983], Verso) 
Anderson, E. N. ‘German Romanticism as an Ideology of Cultural Crisis’ (1941) 
Journal of the History of Ideas 2(3), 301-317 
Arendt, H. ‘Prologue (speech delivered upon receiving Denmark’s Sonning Prize 
in 1975)’, in Responsibility and Judgment (ed. J. Kohn) (2003, Schocken Books), 
3-14 
Arendt, H. The Human Condition (Second Edition) (1998 [1958], University of 
Chicago Press) 
Arendt, H. The Origins of Totalitarianism (1976 [1951], Harcourt) 




Azoulai, L., Barbou des Places, S., and Pataut, E. (eds.), Constructing the Person in EU 
Law: Rights, Roles, Identities (2016, Hart Publishing) 
Azoulai, L. ‘The European Individual as Part of Collective Entities (Market, 
Family, Society)’, in L. Azoulai, S. Barbou des Places, and E. Pataut (eds.), 
Constructing the Person in EU Law: Rights, Roles, Identities (2016, Hart 
Publishing), 203-223 
Azoulai, L., Barbou des Places, S., and Pataut, E. ‘Being a Person in the European 
Union’, in L. Azoulai, S. Barbou des Places, and E. Pataut (eds.), Constructing 
the Person in EU Law: Rights, Roles, Identities (2016, Hart Publishing), 3-11 
Baer, S. ‘Dignity, Liberty, Equality: A Fundamental Rights Triangle of 
Constitutionalism’ (2009) University of Toronto Law Journal 59(4), 417-468 
Barbou des Places, S. ‘The Integrated Person in EU Law’, in L. Azoulai, S. Barbou 
des Places, and E. Pataut (eds.), Constructing the Person in EU Law: Rights, 
Roles, Identities (2016, Hart Publishing), 179-202 
Barcan, R. Nudity: A Cultural Anatomy (2004, Berg) 
Bejan, T. M. Mere Civility: Disagreement and the Limits of Toleration (2017, Harvard 
University Press) 
Benedict, St. The Rule of St Benedict (transl. C. White) (2008 [c.540], Penguin Books) 
Benjamin, J. The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination 
(1988, Pantheon Books) 
Bennett, J. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (2010, Duke University Press) 
Birren J. E. and Svensson C. M. ‘Wisdom in History’, in R. J. Sternberg and J. 
Jordan (eds.), A Handbook of Wisdom: Psychological Perspectives (2005, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), 3-31 
Braunels, W. Monasteries of Western Europe: The Architecture of the Orders (transl. A. 
Lang) (1972, Thames and Hudson Ltd.) 
Brems, E. (ed.), The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in Europe and the Law (2014, 
Cambridge University Press) 
Bribosia, E. and Rorive, I. ‘Insider Perspectives and the Human Rights Debate on 
Face Veil Bans’, in E. Brems (ed.), The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in 
Europe and the Law (2014, Cambridge University Press), 163-183 
282 
 
Brugger, W. ‘The Image of the Person in the Human Rights Concept’ (1996) 
Human Rights Quarterly 18, 595-611 
Bruner, J. Acts of Meaning (1990, Harvard University Press) 
Bruner, J. Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life (2002, Harvard University Press) 
Bryson, A. From Courtesy to Civility: Changing Codes of Conduct in Early Modern England 
(1998, Clarendon Press) 
Burckhardt, J. The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy: An Essay (2010 [1860], Dover 
Publications) 
Butler, C. Benedictine Monachism: Studies in Benedictine Life and Rule (1919, Longmans, 
Green and Co.) 
Butler, J. Giving an Account of Oneself (2005, Fordham University Press) 
Butler, J. ‘Response: Performative Reflections on Love and Commitment’ (2011) 
Women’s Studies Quarterly 39(1/2), 236-239 
Buttimer, A. ‘Home, Reach, and the Sense of Place’, in A. Buttimer and D. Seamon 
(eds.), The Human Experience of Space and Place (1980, Croom Helm Ltd.), 
166-187 
Cahoone, L. ‘Civic Meetings, Cultural Meanings’, L. S. Rouner (ed.), Civility (2000, 
University of Notre Dame Press), 40-64 
Calhoun, C. ‘On Being Content with Imperfection’ (2017) Ethics 127, 327-352 
Carlisle, C. On Habit (2014, Routledge) 
Carsten, J. ‘Constitutive Knowledge: Tracing Trajectories of Information in New 
Contexts of Relatedness’ (2007) Anthropological Quarterly 80(2), 403-426 
Cary-Elwes, C. Law, Liberty and Love: A Study in Christian Obedience – Foundation of 
European Civilization (1950, Hodder & Stoughton) 
Cavarero, A. Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood (transl. P. A. Kottman) (2000, 
Routledge) 
Cavarero, A. Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence (transl. W. McCuaig) (2009 
[2007], Columbia University Press) 
283 
 
Chalmers, D. ‘The Persona of EU Law’, in L. Azoulai, S. Barbou des Places, and 
E. Pataut (eds.), Constructing the Person in EU Law: Rights, Roles, Identities 
(2016, Hart Publishing), 89-108 
Chalmers, D. ‘Political Community and EU Law’ (manuscript on file) 
Chalmers, D. and Trotter, S. ‘Fundamental Rights and Legal Wrongs: The Two 
Sides of the Same EU Coin’ (2016) European Law Journal 22(1), 9-39 
Cohen-Eliya, M. and Porat, I. Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (2013, 
Cambridge University Press) 
Cornell, D. At the Heart of Freedom: Feminism, Sex, and Equality (1998, Princeton 
University Press) 
Cornell, D. The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography and Sexual Harassment (1995, 
Routledge) 
Costa, J.-P. ‘Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights’, in C. McCrudden (eds.), Understanding Human Dignity (2013, 
Oxford University Press), 393-402 
Coutts, S. ‘Union Citizenship, Social Integration and Crime: Duties Through 
Crime’, in L. Azoulai, S. Barbou des Places, and E. Pataut (eds.), Constructing 
the Person in EU Law: Rights, Roles, Identities (2016, Hart Publishing), 225-240 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. and Rochberg-Halton, E. The meaning of things: Domestic symbols 
and the self (1981, Cambridge University Press) 
Davetian, B. Civility: A Cultural History (2009, University of Toronto Press) 
De Coulanges, F. The Ancient City: A Study on the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of 
Greece and Rome (1916 [1864], Simkin) 
De Witte, F. ‘Emancipation Through Law?’, in L. Azoulai, S. Barbou des Places, 
and E. Pataut (eds.), Constructing the Person in EU Law: Rights, Roles, Identities 
(2016, Hart Publishing), 15-33 
De Witte, F. ‘Integrating the Subject: Narratives of Emancipation in Regionalism’ 
(2019) The European Journal of International Law 30(1), 257-278 
Desouza, N. ‘Philosophy as Philosophical Anthropology: An Interview with 
Charles Taylor’, in A. Waldow and N. DeSouza (eds.), Herder: Philosophy and 
Anthropology (2017, Oxford University Press), 13-29 
284 
 
Diamond, C. ‘The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy’ (2003) 
Partial Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas 1(2), 1-26 
Douglas, M. Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (1970, Barrie & Rockliff: The 
Cresset Press) 
Douglas, M. Purity and Danger: An analysis of concepts of pollution and taboo (1966, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.) 
Douzinas, C. ‘Human Rights, Humanism, and Desire’ (2001) Angelaki: Journal of the 
Theoretical Humanities 6(3), 183-206 
Dupré, C. The Age of Dignity: Human Rights and Constitutionalism in Europe (2015, Hart 
Publishing) 
Dworkin, R. Law’s Empire (1998, Hart Publishing) 
Editorial Comments, ‘EU law as a way of life’ (2017) Common Market Law Review 
54(2), 357-367 
Eliade, M. The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion (transl. W.R. Trask) (1950, 
Harcourt, Brace & World Inc.) 
European Court of Human Rights, Overview: 1959-2018, ECHR (2019, European 
Court of Human Rights) (available at: 
https://echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592018_ENG.pdf) 
Fabbrini, F., and Larik, J. ‘The Past, Present and Future of the Relation between 
the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2016) Yearbook of European Law 35(1), 145-179 
Freeman, M. Hindsight: The Promise and Peril of Looking Backward (2010, Oxford 
University Press) 
Freud, S. Civilization and its Discontents (transl. D. McLintock) (2004 [1930], Penguin) 
Freud, S. ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917) in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: On the History of Psycho-Analytic Movement, 
Papers on Metapsychology and Other Works – Vol XIV (transl. under J. Strachey) 
(2001, Vintage), 243-258 
Freud, S. The Ego and the Id (1949 [1927], The Hogarth Press) 
Freud, S. The Uncanny (transl. D. McLintock) (2003 [1919], Penguin Books) 
285 
 
Garin, E. Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance (transl. P. Munz) 
(1975 [1947], Greenwood Press) 
Goffman, E. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1990 [1959], Penguin Books) 
Gonzalez-Salzberg, D. A. Sexuality and Transsexuality under the European Convention on 
Human Rights: A Queer Reading of Human Rights Law (2019, Hart Publishing) 
Gosden, C. Social Being and Time (1994, Blackwell Publishers) 
Green, V. H. H. Luther and the Reformation (1964, B. T. Batsford) 
Gross, E. ‘The Body of Signification’, in J. Fletcher and A. Benjamin (eds.), 
Abjection, Melancholia and Love: The Work of Julia Kristeva (1990, Routledge), 
80-103 
Guignon, C. On Being Authentic (2004, Routledge) 
Hay, D. The Italian Renaissance in its Historical Background (Second Edition) (1977, 
Cambridge University Press) 
Hegel, G. W. F. Elements of the Philosophy of Right (ed. A. W. Wood; transl. H. B. 
Nisbet) (1991 [1820], Cambridge University Press) 
Herring, J. and Chau, P.-L. ‘My Body, Your Body, Our Bodies’ (2007) Medical Law 
Review 15(1), 34-61 
Herring, J. and Wall, J. ‘The Nature and Significance of the Right to Bodily 
Integrity’ (2017) Cambridge Law Journal 76(3), 566-588 
Hobsbawm, E. ‘Introduction: Inventing Traditions’ in E. Hobsbawm and T. 
Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (1983, Cambridge University Press) 
Honneth, A. ‘Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality 
Based on the Theory of Recognition’ (1992) Political Theory 20(2), 187-201 
Hoskins, J. Biographical Objects: How Things Tell the Stories of People’s Lives (1998, 
Routledge) 
Hu, C. ‘“A jungle that is continually encroaching”: The time of disaster 
management’ (2018) Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 36(1), 96-
113 
Jaeggi, R. Alienation (transl. F. Neuhouser and A. E. Smith; ed. F. Neuhouser) 
(2014, Columbia University Press) 
286 
 
Jager, B. ‘Theorizing, Journeying, Dwelling’, in A. Giorgi, C. T. Fischer, and E. L. 
Murray (eds.), Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology: Volume II (1975, 
Duquesne University Press), 235-60 
James, W. The Principles of Psychology, Volume I (1981 [1890], Harvard University 
Press) 
Janoff-Bulman, R. Shattered Assumptions: Towards a New Psychology of Trauma (1992, 
The Free Press) 
Johnson, B. Persons and Things (2008, Harvard University Press) 
Johnson, P. Homosexuality and the European Court of Human Rights (2013, Routledge) 
Johnson, P. Going to Strasbourg: An Oral History of Sexual Orientation Discrimination and 
the European Convention on Human Rights (2016, Oxford University Press) 
Josselson, R. and Lieblich, A. ‘Narrative Research and Humanism’, in K. J. 
Schneider, J. F. Pierson, and J. F. T. Bugental (eds.), The Handbook of 
Humanistic Psychology: Theory, Research, and Practice (Second Edition) (2015, 
Sage Publications), 321-334 
Kant, I. ‘What is Enlightenment?’, (1784) in I. Kant, On History (ed. and transl. L. 
W. Beck) (1963, Macmillan), 3-10 
Kauffman, J. (ed.) Loss of the Assumptive World: A Theory of Traumatic Loss (2002, 
Routledge) 
Kauffman, J. ‘Introduction’, in J. Kauffman (ed.), Loss of the Assumptive World: A 
Theory of Traumatic Loss (2002, Routledge), 1-9 
Kellehear, A. The Inner Life of the Dying Person (2014, Columbia University Press) 
Keller, H. and Stone Sweet, A. A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National 
Legal Systems (2008, Oxford University Press) 
Kharkhordin, O. The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (1999, 
University of California Press) 
Knowles, D. From Pachomius to Ignatius: A Study in the Constitutional History of the 
Religious Orders (1966, Clarendon Press) 
Kristeva, J. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (transl. L. S. Roudiez) (1982 
[1980], Columbia University Press) 
287 
 
Labouvie-Vief, G. ‘Wisdom as integrated thought: historical and developmental 
perspectives’, in R. J. Sternberg (ed.), Wisdom: Its Nature, Origins, and 
Development (1990, Cambridge University Press), 52-83 
Lacan, J. ‘The Mirror-phase as formative of the Function of the I’ (1968) New Left 
Review 1(51) (Sept.-Oct.), 71-77 
Lamb, J. The Things Things Say (2011, Princeton University Press) 
Lear, J. Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life (2000, Harvard University Press) 
Lear, J. Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation (2006, Harvard 
University Press) 
Lear, J. ‘The difficulty of reality and a revolt against mourning’ (2018) European 
Journal of Philosophy 26, 1197-1208 
Lear, J. The Idea of a Philosophical Anthropology (Spinoza Lectures) (2017, Koninklijke 
Van Gorcum) 
Lear, J. ‘Waiting for the Barbarians’, in Wisdom Won from Illness: Essays in Philosophy 
and Psychoanalysis (2017, Harvard University Press) 
Lear, J. ‘What Is a Crisis of Intelligibility?’, in Wisdom Won from Illness: Essays in 
Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (2017, Harvard University Press), 50-62 
Lear, J. Wisdom Won from Illness: Essays in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (2017, Harvard 
University Press) 
Lear, J. ‘Wisdom won from illness: The psychoanalytic grasp of human being’ 
(2014) The International Journal of Psychoanalysis 95(4), 677-693 
Leclercq, J. Aspects of Monasticism (transl. M. Dodd) (1978, Cistercian Publications) 
Levinas, E. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (transl. A. Lingis) (1991 
[1961], Duquesne University Press) 
Lindahl, H. Fault Lines of Globalization: Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality (2013, 
Oxford University Press) 
Long, N. J. and Moore, H. L. ‘Introduction: Sociality’s New Directions’, in N. J. 




Luther, M. ‘To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the 
Reform of the Christian Estate’ (1520) (transl. C. M. Jacobs), in M. Luther, 
Luther: Selected Political Writings (ed. J. M. Porter) (1974, Fortress Press), 37-
49 
MacIntyre, A. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Second Edition) (1985, 
Duckworth) 
Malafouris, L. ‘Between brains, bodies and things: tectonoetic awareness and the 
extended self’, in C. Renfrew, C. Frith, and L. Malafouris (eds.), The Sapient 
Mind: Archaeology Meets Neuroscience (2009, Oxford University Press), 89-104 
Marshall, J. Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law? Autonomy, Identity and Integrity 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (2009, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers) 
Marshall, J. Human Rights Law and Personal Identity (2014, Routledge) 
Mauss, M. ‘A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person, the Notion of 
‘Self’” (1938), in Sociology and Psychology: Essays (transl. B. Brewster) (1979 
[1950], Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.), 57-94 
Mauss, M. ‘Techniques of the Body (1935)’ (1973) Economy and Society 2(1), 70-88 
McCann, J. Saint Benedict (1937, Sheed and Ward) 
McCrudden, C. ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ 
(2008) The European Journal of International Law 19(4), 655-724 
Mears, R. Intimacy and Alienation: Memory, trauma and personal being (2000, Routledge) 
Meissner, W. M. Time, Self, and Psychoanalysis (2007, Jason Aronson) 
Melville, G. ‘The Innovational Power of Monastic Life in the Middle Ages’, in L. 
Bisgaard, S. Engsbro, K. V. Jensen, and T. Nyberg (eds.), Monastic Culture: 
The Long Thirteenth Century – Essays in Honor of Brian Patrick McGuire (2014, 
University Press of Southern Denmark), 13-31 
Miller, W. I. The Mystery of Courage (2000, Harvard University Press) 
Mitchell, J. Siblings: Sex and Violence (2003, Polity Press) 
Mitchell, J. ‘The Law of the Mother: Sibling Trauma and the Brotherhood of War’ 
(2013) Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis 21(1), 145-159 
289 
 
Mitchell, J. ‘Trauma, Recognition, and the Place of Language’ (1998) Diacritics 
28(4), 121-133 
Möller, K. The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (2012, Oxford University Press) 
Möller, K. ‘Justifying the culture of justification’ (forthcoming, 2019) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law  
Moorhouse, G. Against All Reason (1969, The Trinity Press) 
Morin, V. ‘L’objet biographique’ (1969) Communications 13, 131-139 
Morris, C. The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200 (1972, SPCK) 
Mureinik, E. ‘A bridge to where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 
South African Journal of Human Rights, 31-48 
Murray Parkes, C. ‘Psycho-social transitions: A field for study’ (1971) Social Science 
and Medicine 5(2), 101-115 
Nagel, T. ‘Concealment and Exposure’ (1998) Philosophy and Public Affairs 27(1), 3-
30 
Nedelsky, J. ‘Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self’ (1990) Representations 30, 162-
189 
Neuvonen, P. Equal Citizenship and its Limits in EU Law: We the Burden? (2016, Hart 
Publishing) 
Nussbaum, M. C. ‘Living the Past Forward: The Present and Future Value of 
Backward-Looking Emotions’, in M. C. Nussbaum and S. Levmore, Aging 
Thoughtfully: Conversations about Retirement, Romance, Wrinkles, and Regret (2017, 
Oxford University Press), 125-143 
Nussbaum, M. C. The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an 
Anxious Age (2012, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press) 
Nussbaum, M. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (2001, Cambridge 
University Press) 
Palmer, R. R. ‘Man and Citizen: Applications of Individualism in the French 
Revolution’, in M. R. Konvitz and A. E. Murphy (eds.), Essays in Political 
Theory presented to George H. Sabine (1972 [1948], Kennikat Press), 130-152 
290 
 
Pico della Mirandola, G. Oration on the Dignity of Man (transl. A. R. Caponigri) (1956 
[1486], Henry Regnery Company) 
Polkinghorne, D. E. Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences (1988, State University 
of New York Press) 
Popelier, C., Van De Heyning, C., and Van Nuffel, P. (eds.), Human rights protection 
in the European legal order: the interaction between the European and the national courts 
(2011, Intersentia) 
Porter, J. M. ‘Introduction: The Political Thought of Martin Luther’, in M. Luther, 
Luther: Selected Political Writings (ed. J. M. Porter) (1974, Fortress Press), 1-21 
Rabb, T. K. ‘Religion and the Rise of Modern Science’ (1965) Past & Present 31, 
111-126 
Raimondi, G. Opening speech at the solemn hearing for the opening of the judicial year of the 
European Court of Human Rights (25 January 2019, Strasbourg) (available at: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20190125_Raimondi_JY_
ENG.pdf) 
Ratcliffe, M., Ruddell, M. and Smith, B. ‘What is a “sense of foreshortened future?” 
A phenomenological study of trauma, trust, and time’ (2004) Frontiers in 
Psychology 5, 1-11 
Rice, E. F. The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom (1958, Harvard University Press) 
Riesenberg, P. Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau (1992, The 
University of North Carolina Press) 
Roth, M. S. Memory, Trauma, and History: Essays on Living with the Past (2012, 
Columbia University Press) 
Sartwell, C. End of Story: Toward and Annihilation of Language and History (2000, State 
University of New York Press) 
Scarry, E. The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (1985, Oxford 
University Press) 
Scheper-Hughes, N. and Lock, M. M. ‘The Mindful Body: A Prolegomenon to 
Future Work in Medical Anthropology’ (1987) Medical Anthropology Quarterly 
1(1), 6-41 
Schmitt, C. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (transl. G. 
Schwab) (1985 [1922, 1934], MIT Press) 
291 
 
Scribner, R. W. The German Reformation (1986, MacMillan Publishers) 
Scott, S. ‘A Sociology of the Nothing: Understanding the Unmarked’ (2018) 
Sociology 52(1), 3-19 
Selznick, P. ‘Sociology and Natural Law’ (1961) Natural Law Forum 61, 84-108 
Sennett, R. Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization (1994, Faber 
and Faber) 
Sennett, R. Together: The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation (2013 [2012], 
Penguin Books) 
Sennis, A. ‘Narrating Places: Memory and Space in Medieval Monasteries’, in W. 
Davies, G. Halsall, and A. Reynolds (eds.), People and Space in the Middle Ages, 
300-1300 (2006, Brepols Publishers), 275-294 
Siedentop, L. Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism (2015, Penguin) 
Simmel, G. ‘Individual and Society in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Views 
of Life’, in G. Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel (transl. and ed. K. H. 
Wolff) (1950, The Free Press), 58-84 
Simmel, G. ‘Sociology of the Senses’ (1908), in R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess (eds.), 
Introduction to the Science of Sociology (1921, The University of Chicago Press), 
356-360 
Simmel, G. ‘The Aesthetic Significance of the Face’ (1901) (transl. L. Ferguson), 
in K. H. Wolff (ed.), Georg Simmel, 1858-1918, A Collection of Essays, with 
Translations and a Bibliography (1959, The Ohio State University Press), 276-
281 
Simmel, G. The Philosophy of Money (ed. D. Frisby; transl. T. Bottomore and D. 
Frisby) (Second Edition) (1990 [1900], Routledge) 
Simpson, A. W. B. Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the 
European Convention (2001, Oxford University Press) 
Slaughter, J. R. Human Rights, Inc.: The World Novel, Narrative Form, and International 
Law (2007, Fordham University Press) 
Smith, P., Phillips, T. L. and King, R. D. Incivility: The Rude Stranger in Everyday Life 
(2010, Cambridge University Press) 
292 
 
Solnit, R. Hope in the Dark: Untold Histories, Wild Possibilities (2016 [2004], Nation 
Books) 
Solnit, R. A Field Guide to Getting Lost (2006, Canongate Books) 
Solovyov, V. ‘The Idea of Humanity in Auguste Comte’ (1898), in J. D. Kornblatt, 
Divine Sophia: The Wisdom Writings of Vladimir Solovyov (2009, Cornell 
University Press), 213-229 
Somek, A. Individualism: An essay on the authority of the European Union (2008, Oxford 
University Press) 
Spence, D. P. Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in 
Psychoanalysis (1982, W. W. Norton & Company) 
Spitz, L. W. The Religious Renaissance of the German Humanists (1963, Harvard 
University Press) 
Spranger, E. Types of Men: The Psychology and Ethics of Personality (transl. P. J .W. 
Pigors) (1928 [1921], Max Niemeyer Verlag) 
Stalford, H. Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (2012, 
Hart Publishing) 
Stone Sweet, A., and Ryan, C. A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Kant, Constitutional Justice, 
and the European Convention on Human Rights (2018, Oxford University Press) 
Strathern, M. Presentation in the 1989 debate of the Group for Debates in 
Anthropological Theory (on the motion: ‘The concept of society is 
theoretically obsolete’), in T. Ingold (ed.), Key Debates in Anthropology (1996, 
Routledge), 50-55 
Strathern, M. The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with Society in 
Melanesia (1988, University of California Press) 
Swart, K. W. ‘“Individualism” in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (1826-1860)’ (1962) 
Journal of the History of Ideas 23(1), 77-90 
Taylor, C. Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (1985, Cambridge 
University Press) 
Taylor, C. ‘Philosophy as Philosophical Anthropology: An Interview with Charles 
Taylor’, in A. Waldow and N. DeSouza (eds.), Herder: Philosophy and 
Anthropology (2017, Oxford University Press), 13-29 
293 
 
Taylor, C. ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in A. Gutman (ed.), Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics of Recognition (1992, Princeton University Press), 25-73 
Tillich, P. ‘The Right to Hope’ (1965) Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und 
Religionsphilosophie 7(3), 371-377 
Thompson, W. D. J. C. The Political Thought of Martin Luther (ed. P. Broadhead) 
(1984, The Harvester Press) 
Troeltsch, E. ‘The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity in World Politics’ (1922), 
in O. Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800 – Volume I 
(transl. E. Barker) (1934, Cambridge University Press), 201-222 
Trotter, S. ‘Birds Behaving Badly: The Regulation of Seagulls and the Construction 
of Public Space’ (2019) Journal of Law and Society 46(1), 1-28  
Trotter, S. ‘“Living Together”, “Learning Together”, and “Swimming Together”: 
Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v Switzerland (2017) and the Construction of Collective 
Life’ (2018) Human Rights Law Review 18(1), 157-169 
Trotter, S. ‘The Child in European Human Rights Law’ (2018) Modern Law Review 
81(3), 452-479 
Trotter, S. ‘The ethos of replaceability in European human rights law’ in J. Owen 
and N. Segal (eds.), On Replacement: Cultural, Social and Psychological 
Representations (2018, Palgrave Macmillan), 137-146 
Tuan, Y.-F. Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (1977, University of 
Minnesota Press) 
Tuan, Y.-F. Landscapes of Fear (1980, Basil Blackwell) 
Turner, V. ‘Acting in Everyday Life and Everyday Life in Acting’, in From Ritual to 
Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play (1982, PAJ Publications), 102-123 
Turner, V. The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (1969, Aldine de Gruyter) 
Tussman, J. Obligation and the Body Politic (1960, Oxford University Press) 
Ullmann, W. The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages (1967 [1966], Methuen & 
Co Ltd.) 
Ullmann, W. Medieval Foundations of Renaissance Humanism (1977, Elek Books) 
Vaillant, G. E. The Wisdom of the Ego (1993, Harvard University Press) 
294 
 
Van Gennep, A. The Rites of Passage (transl. M. B. Vizedom and G. L. Caffee) (1960 
[1908], The University of Chicago Press) 
Volkan, V. D. ‘Individuals and societies as “perennial mourners”: Their linking 
objects and public memorials’, in B. Willock, L. C. Bohm, R. C. Curtis 
(eds.), On Deaths and Endings: Psychoanalysts’ reflections on finality, transformations 
and new beginnings (2007, Routledge), 42-59 
Wilford, J. ‘Out of rubble: natural disaster and the materiality of the house’ (2008) 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 26, 647-662 
Winnicott, D. W. ‘Fear of Breakdown’, in G. Kohon (ed.), The British School of 
Psychoanalysis: The Independent Tradition (1986, Free Association Books), 173-
182 
Winnicott, D. W. The Family and the Individual Development (2006 [1965], Routledge) 
Winnicott, D. W. ‘The Use of an Object and Relating Through Identifications’ 
(1968), in Playing and Reality (2005 [1971], Routledge), 115-127 
Winnicott, D. W. ‘Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena’ (1953), in 
Playing and Reality (2005 [1971], Routledge), 1-34 
Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations (transl. G. E. M. Anscombe) (2001 [1953], 
Blackwell Publishing) 
Workman, H. B. The Evolution of the Monastic Ideal: From the Earliest Times down to the 
Coming of the Friars – A Second Chapter in the History of Christian Renunciation 
(1913, Charles H. Kelly) 
Zerubavel, E. ‘The Benedictine Ethic and the Modern Spirit of Scheduling: on 
Schedules and Social Organization’, (1980) Sociological Inquiry 50(2), 157-169 
 
 
